York. Regardless of the parentage of his financing, Onassis made spectacular profits from these purchases which led him to begin ordering new tankers from American, European, British and Japanese yards.

But being a prosperous foreigner in the United States during the Cold War drew unwanted attention. In the highly charged atmosphere of the McCarthy era, Onassis (and several of his fellow Greek shipowners) made the mistake of not appearing to be American citizens. Most of the shipowners were not, but their companies were. After an investigation by the FBI, Onassis settled for a face-saving fine and moved his operations to Monte Carlo. His ships were now super tankers of ever larger size. His fleet operated as part of a virtually stateless network. The ownership structure of his fleet was now more elaborate than earlier but with the same purpose, that of protecting each ship from the liability of its fleet mates while obscuring the true ownership. Onassis, himself, seemed to have no fixed abode but spent much of his time on his yacht.

Harlaftis has provided an insightful analysis of the development of ship owning from the 1820s through to the end of the post-Second World War boom. The key to success for Greek shipowners was a combination of family management tied to networks of trust. The Vigliano brothers developed trusted networks with a legion of shipowners, agents, bankers, and shipbuilders based in the centre of world commerce, London. Panagi Vigliano created the prototype for the Greek London office which was followed by a host of Greek shipowners in the twentieth century. The problem of succession, however, remained unsolved. Onassis’ contributed to the evolution of shipping management on two fronts. First, he devised an ownership structure that was extremely opaque to protect himself and his investment. Secondly, he helped broaden the financial base for shipping. *Creating Global Shipping* is a significant work that opens the door to further research in the business history of shipping.

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*Consuls and Captives* is part of a series entitled ‘Changing Perspectives on Early Modern Europe’, and in this book Erica Heinsen-Roach analyses the roles of Dutch consuls in Algiers, Tunis, and Salé during the early-modern period to make the argument that the idea that *Maghrib* Corsairs did not respect European law and diplomacy and therefore, European nations could not make treaties with them is far too reductive. This book rotates around three related concepts. First, the roles of consuls as opposed to ambassadors in European-*Maghrib* diplomacy. Second, the differences between the Dutch and *Maghribi* perceptions of these roles. Third, how geopolitical changes over the seventeenth century altered the first two. *Consuls and Captives* looks primarily at the roles of the Dutch consuls in first Algiers and Tunis, and then Salé, and their roles in releasing and ransoming Dutch sailors enslaved by corsairs. Discussions of other English, French and even Danish and Swedish efforts provide context when needed, but the
focus is very much on the Dutch.

The book is divided into four sections. Part One, ‘Encountering Barbary’, focuses on 1596-22 and the origins of the Dutch-North African relationships, as well as the diplomatic relationship with Constantinople. The second chapter provides basic information on corsairs, and the enslavement of individuals by both the corsairs and the Dutch. The second part, “Transformations” covers 1616-30 and the development of the consul’s role as a state representative rather than merely a trade representative, as well as the conflicting systems between the established practices of ransoming, and Dutch efforts to legislate repatriation of captured sailors through treaties. Part Three (“Confrontations”, 1651-83) deals with the conflicts that arose from Dutch frustration with the failures of their treaty approach, and more importantly, how the Dutch State’s constant struggle to avoid financial responsibility for ransoming sailors, affected the success of their consuls, and why rivalries formed between Christian Dutch consuls sent by Amsterdam and the other cities and locally-based Jewish merchants who acted as agents for both the Dutch and the Maghrabi. The final section “Normative Relations” (1679-1726) describes how the Dutch seemed to finally grasp the importance of tributes, and why they had never been able to legislate away the practice of ransoming sailors.

One cannot criticize the research which is at the heart of this book; it was clearly sufficient for the author’s doctorate. Her absolute mastery of the information shines like a beacon. Not only does she use the appropriate/local terms such as Maghrib throughout the text, but I also enjoyed her ability to balance discussions of Algiers, Tunis, and Salé, within the context of Constantinople, but with an important remove. The very beginning of the book, and the final 90 pages or so (which comprise sections III and IV), contain the clearest writing. Most admirably, Heinsen-Roach brings balance and context when she backs off a bit, and paints in the broader strokes about the larger transformations that render the general, whiggish description of Dutch early-modern diplomacy irrelevant. For example, in respect to Salé, she reveals that the original relationship was built on a common enemy—Spain—which didn’t apply after 1648. Likewise, Heinsen-Roach smoothly introduces aspects of Islamic law and theology which made long-term, permanent treaties and frameworks impossible, whatever the Dutch might have hoped for.

There is an excellent section describing the 1670s and discussing Sir John Narbrough’s time in the Mediterranean and England’s efforts at Tangiers. I really wish I had had this book when I was completing my PhD as it would have provided some lovely context for my discussions of those missions and their effect on the Royal Navy’s professionalization ca.1690-1710.

Unfortunately, the writing in the middle section of this book is more muddled. In particular, having put the book down, I found it difficult to get back into the details and the argument due to the complex nature of the Consuls, and the different conceptions of their roles. There is also some confusion around a number of the illustrations/images. For example, the author includes images of sabres (nimcha) “owned” by Cornelis Tromp and Michiel de Ruyter, but does not directly refer to them in the text. In fact, the book would not suffer if some of the images were removed and replaced with tables, charts or graphs to provide visual comparisons of the number of Dutch sailors enslaved by Corsairs over time, or the value and the
amounts of the gifts made to the governors of Algiers, Tunis and Salé, or similar comparisons. The inclusion of maps would help situate readers who are less familiar with the geography. A fuller explanation of the Dutch relationship with the Hanse/Hansa cities would have clarified why the Dutch acted as their agents during the period. Likewise, it would have been helpful if the author had included some discussion around the realities and duration of maritime (and naval) scheduling during this period. For example, the length of voyages between the Netherlands and the Maghrib, the number of crew aboard merchant ships of various sizes (as well as warships), the seasonal nature of maritime warfare as undertaken by Northern European nations such as the Netherlands and England, and similar details.

My ongoing complaint about modern academic books involves the use of endnotes rather than footnotes, thereby reducing the likelihood that readers will bother to access some useful and interesting comments. Second, is the cost. While $125 may not seem out of line with comparative books, it is still awfully expensive for those grad students and early career researchers who might not access to a review or library copy. That would be a shame, because this is a book that should be widely read, by maritime historians and diplomatic historians, IR specialists and anybody whose interests and research intersects with this topic. Erica Heinsen-Roach’s argument that the existing concepts of Maghribi diplomacy must be overhauled is absolutely convincing.

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Great Lakes maritime history, as so much else that passes as popular maritime history, is often told via a collection of shipwreck tales. Indeed, the reader will learn of a number of “dark and stormy nights” … and days, for that matter. But in this “maritime history inspired by shipwrecks,” Jensen approaches the wrecks as “the consequence and the convergence point of larger patterns of historical events, factors, processes, and social networks.” (1) Consequently, this volume is particularly successful in presenting the reader with the general historical patterns which the class of vessel under discussion illuminates, before diving into the evidence presented by the archaeological work.

Jensen is at considerable pains to situate this study with the historiographical paradigm of the Atlantic World, and Atlantic maritime culture. He begins by arguing that “During much of the nineteenth century, the maritime technologies employed on the Great Lakes differed little in essence from those of the other coastal regions of the United States and North Atlantic.” (15) The challenge is then to sustain that claim against his own argument that the early Great Lakes palace steamers were largely homegrown designs through the 1840s, that were superseded by inferior designs or construction practices imported from the Hudson River and Long Island Sound in the 1850s. (89, 91) I suspect there is significantly more evidence of Long Island Sound inspiration in the steamboat designs through to the 1840s than the author has considered,