BOOK REVIEWS


By law, Danish museums are considered to be research institutions, and though in practice some are not, most maritime museums have a strong commitment to research and publish their own yearbook with papers of scholarly nature. One of the best is Sjæklen, published by the Fisheries and Maritime Museum in Esbjerg.

Sjæklen 1993 is the sixth such yearbook and has seven articles in addition to the museum's annual report. Five articles deal with Danish fisheries and/or their vessels. Carsten Krog and Svend Tougaard examine the basic biological aspects of fishing, while Henrik Bredmose Simonsen has gone through seven newspapers to assess opinions on the 1993 fishing conflict. He concludes that the conflict convinced everybody that the Danish fishery is in a deep crisis due largely to an over capacity in the industry. Through particular attention to the west coast fisheries in Denmark between 1975 and 1992, Poul Holm discusses the problem further. He claims that over-fishing is the explanation why the industry has moved from one crisis to another during the last twenty years. In addition there is an article on the fishing vessel Sikar and a short piece on a large archive handed over to the museum by the Sea-Fishing Association in Denmark.

The two remaining articles are of more interest to maritime historians. Henning Thalund gives an interesting glimpse into what is still a living Scandinavian tradition, namely the so-called votive ships, i.e. models of ships hanging in churches. Most were made by seamen and were given to the churches as an appreciation, or to remember comrades lost at sea. Thalund describes twenty-three votive ships hanging in churches on Fanø, each with its own story. The article is an introduction to what will be a much larger work which promises to be an exciting new field of interest, on the crossroad between maritime and church history.

In his article, Morten Hahn-Pedersen follows the career of the three-masted barque Killeena, which was bought by a limited company on Fanø from British owners. Hahn-Pedersen provides details from the ship's life, including its financial results. He uses a method seldom used by economic historians — the method of calculating opportunity costs — and concludes that the share-holders would have been better off putting the money into the bank instead of investing in Killeena. One hopes that others in maritime history will follow Hahn-Pedersen's example.

The museum in Esbjerg has as its mandate not only the history of the fisheries but of many other maritime activities. This wide perspective is reflected in Sjæklen 1993, for the yearbook covers many themes. The Sjæklen series also strives to reach an international readership, to judge by the fact that every chapter includes a short and precise summary in English. Yet too wide a perspective works sometimes to the yearbook's detriment, for the aim of the book is then unclear and its regional focus raises the danger of appealing more to the local community than to maritime historians outside Denmark. If the museum wants to capture a larger, more scholarly, audience, greater attention should perhaps be paid to providing each issue with a particular theme, or with themes of related interest.

Anders Martin Fon
Bergen, Norway


The recently published translation of Alain Corbin’s *Le Territoire du vide* (1988) makes a major work of cultural history available to the anglophone reader. Professor Corbin shows how the centuries-old fear of the sea and repugnance towards its shores was replaced between 1750 and 1840 by the awakening of a collective desire for the seashore in western Europe.

Both the Classical and the Christian traditions had largely viewed the sea in negative terms as the abode of chaos and a place of danger. Where the sea met the land was a zone of particular hazard, of storm, shipwreck, and seaborne invader. However, a new view of the sea and seashore began to emerge in the seventeenth century. The prophets of natural philosophy began to view nature as a witness to the power of God, and this favourable view of natural wonders extended to both sea and shore.

Although this positive intellectual view was one reason for the increasing popularity of the seashore in the eighteenth century, a more practical reason was the growing medical consensus on the health-giving benefits of the sea, with sea-bathing leading to the development of the first coastal resorts. Then, under the influence of the Romantic movement, writers and artists began to stress the beauties of coastal scenery and the sea, providing solace for the soul as well as the body. Even scientific progress brought people to the seashore, to study the geological strata of the cliffs and the biological contents of the tidal pools.

Corbin stresses the vigour and diversity of the coastal communities that the first tourists found. He points out that by concentrating on seafaring, maritime historians have neglected a study of life in the coastal zone, other than in certain major ports. Corbin does not deny that the seashore retained many tragic elements, such as the shipwrecks which obsessed the Romantics, but even these came to be viewed in new ways.

Only in the last section of his magisterial survey, entitled "Inventing the Beach," does Corbin delineate the development of seaside resorts in Britain and Continental Europe. England led the way, and in the Prince Regent's transformation of Brighton from a therapeutic resort to a hedonistic one many of the developments of the seaside resort during the nineteenth century were foreshadowed. Corbin stresses the importance of the example set by royalty and the aristocracy in visiting the seashore and the significance of improvements in transport, especially the railway, in opening the seaside resorts to a much wider leisure class.

If Professor Corbin paints on a wide canvas, John Travis shows how many of the elements noted by Corbin worked themselves out in the seaside resorts of one area, the English county of Devon. The search for health led to the first sea-bathing in Devon around 1750. The great boost to the Devon resorts, especially on the south coast, came during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Members of fashionable society could no longer holiday on the Continent and looked for places at home which had a pleasing climate. Dr. Jebb, physician to George III, announced that he would "aver the pureness and salubrity of the air at Exmouth equal to the south of France," and the Devon resorts found a new popularity. Turnpike roads and improved coach services did something to ease holiday travel to Devon. The fastest-growing resort was Torquay, which had such a mild climate that it was the first English seaside resort to have a winter as well as a summer season.

After 1815 the growth of the south Devon resorts slowed, except for Torquay, as much of fashionable society returned to the Continent for holidays. On the north Devon coast the coming of coastal steamships did much to assist the growth of resorts such as Ilfracombe since land communications with the area remained poor.

When the railway reached the south Devon resorts in the 1840s it gave a considerable boost
to their prosperity. By 1900 railways had reached the main north Devon resorts, but coastal steamer services remained important in that area. At the beginning of the twentieth century mass tourism was already a fact at many English seaside resorts. Devon resorts still fought against this tide, preferring to attract relatively small numbers of wealthier holiday-makers.

Dr. Travis touches on the question of how far the new resorts provided employment for people displaced by the decline of traditional maritime activities in Devon, such as the Newfoundland trade, but the matter is not considered in any detail. Altogether Travis has produced a valuable study relevant to both the history of leisure and maritime history in its widest sense.

Alan C. Jamieson
London, England


Luc Cuyvers reminds me vividly of a gentleman teaching history in whose audience I once had the privilege of being; both reach far beyond the stature of lecturers, for they are in fact entertainers, the complete communicators. Such men possess the rare and unique ability to take a phenomenon, any phenomenon, and lead one back to its early beginnings; from there, they proceed to develop it one's mind with great clarity, never to be forgotten. In Sea Power, Cuyvers follows this approach with great skill. His dialogue is easy-flowing, his material factual and his views convincing. At times his stories have the elegance of a moderate ocean swell, at other times the rigours of a fierce storm. They make for compelling reading and, no doubt, compelling viewing, for the book is a companion to a television series of the same name.

Cuyvers organizes his observations around six expressions of the sea's power, orders them into chapters and intersperses them with constant flashbacks to what is known today of their origins and developments. Thus, "The Great Highway" summarizes global shipping, epitomized by one of today's stupendous (174,000 tons) oil-tankers. "The Riches of the East" captures the origins of cargo-shipping and leads to a lively description of all that takes place on a modern container-ship. In a similar manner, subsequent chapters examine cruise-ships, navies, oil-platforms and ocean-research.

I have no trouble at all — and nobody should — with his eloquent presentations, for Cuyvers is a proven master of display. His chapters on the tanker, cargo-ships and navies may be warmly applauded for their insights and maritime values. This is not to say that every chapter is perfectly in tune with what are commonly considered "matters nautical." Cuyvers himself is uneasy in his observations about cruise ships, (p.89) a form of shipping that, in essence, is far from the seaman's heart. Why, then, include it? Similarly, while his chapter on oil-exploration as practised "aboard" the Norwegian Oseberg Platform is interesting and new to most of us, one is left wondering whether oil-drilling is not more a matter of the land, albeit land beneath the ocean, than the sea? Again, the logic of including it here is not clear. Finally, while the chapter on ocean-research aboard the Japanese high-tech vessel Yokosuka deserves to be part of the book, we seem to miss something here. Cuyvers admits to being in the dark to a great extent about the minute proceedings because he lacked knowledge of the Japanese language (p. 216) and the untranslated briefings of the scientists sailing in the ship. Still, the chapter is concerned with research of the seas and more particularly with the movement of bottom-plates in relation to earthquakes (plate tectonics).

In conclusion, this is an meritorious book. Although its contents may already be familiar to most marine experts, even so it has merit as a refresher. It will find its mark and, presumably, its market mostly among television viewers. I found it an outstanding coffee-table book. The price, given its large format, good photographs and quality of print, is quite reasonable-

Hendrik (Hank) J. Barendregt
Langley, British Columbia

On May 8, 1993, Belgium's National Maritime Museum in Antwerp opened an eight-month exhibition of its collection of models of Chinese junks. *Shaky Ships* was the exhibition catalogue. Following a foreword by the Mayor of Antwerp, the first thirty-eight pages contain an overview of Chinese navigation, including the discovery of the magnetic compass, and voyages of exploration such as those by Zheng He; a discussion on Chinese shipbuilding technology, with similarities in Western Europe; and a history of the collection. The remainder of the catalogue contains a collection profile, followed by a captioned, photographic record of the collection, a useful bibliography and a brief glossary.

The 125 models in the collection represent merchant junks and warships from most of the Chinese provinces, representing Chinese shipbuilding technology around 1900. While the bulk of the collection originated in China as part of the exhibit for the World's Fair in St. Louis in 1904, models from four other collections are included. Scale and craftsmanship vary, ranging through all skill levels from simple folk art to some very accurate models built by skilled craftsmen, following detailed measurement and study.

The catalogue is very well presented and provides an interesting look at shipbuilding totally different to that found in the western world. There's an occasional unusual term, probably due to translation. The collection profile and model collection sections will undoubtedly be of most interest to model builders. The profile contains colour plates of a number of models, plus an excellent overview as to why junks were, and are, built the way they are. The black and white photographs in the collection section each contain the catalogue file information, type, size, crew, and notes on identification sources, plus an additional paragraph relevant to the specific model.

Following the World's Fair in Liege, Belgium in 1905, it appears that negotiations between Belgium and China resulted in the collection remaining in Belgium. Initially the collection was housed in the reserves of the Royal Museums of Art and History in Brussels. In 1925 Emile Beuckeleers-Donche, an Antwerp shipbuilder, found them in a sorry state of repair. In 1927 the collection was handed over to the Municipal Maritime and Trade Museum in Antwerp. Files indicate the collection consisted of "several trucks full of fragments." In 1947 the collection was transferred to The National Maritime Museum, arriving in a total shambles. At this time restoration began, which required extensive study and research, aided in no small part with reference to the works of D.W. Waters, G.R.C. Worcester and others. Restoration was hampered by missing parts and unidentified pieces. Eighty-five of the models were restored at that time. Regrettably some models were beyond identification or restoration. While preparing for this exhibition, several boxes of parts and notes surfaced allowing the restoration of further models.

Since Antwerp and Shanghai now have a treaty of friendship involving two yearly cultural exchanges, the collection will be transferred to China where it will undoubtedly strengthen trade ties between the two countries, at a time when the Chinese markets are opening to the west. Thus the original purpose for the collection has now gone full circle, back to China thankfully, fully restored.

N.R. Cole
Scarborough, Ontario


This is a wonderfully crafted book in which the author tells the story of a small, unremarkable British man-of-war that foundered off the coast of Delaware in 1798. During the 1980s, the *De Braak* became world famous because of the brutal assault on its resting place by a salvage company in a vain search for legendary treasure. As a noted maritime historian and marine archaeologist who participated in the analysis of the
artifacts from the vessel, Donald Shomette has the knowledge and understanding to present all aspects of this fascinating story.

Shomette approaches the book with an historian's keen eye for important details and pertinent facts. This could not have been an easy task considering the myriad of characters who move in and out of the story and the events that surround them. This is a complicated story of greed, law suits, political intrigue and complicity, and intense media attention which Shomette weaves skilfully into a successful whole. Though it often reads like fiction, the scrupulous documentation found in chapter notes, the complete bibliography and the extensive index give evidence that it is indeed history. It will come as no surprise to readers to learn that it was awarded NASOH's 1993 Lyman Award for the best book in US maritime history.

Shomette opens the book with a factual history of the De Braak, including that of the ship's last captain, James Drew, and an account of the vessel's final crossing of the Atlantic and its sinking off Delaware. This is competently done and is placed in the context of wider European and American history. There follows a discussion of the various salvage attempts made on the vessel, starting with an attempt by the Royal Navy shortly after the sinking, followed by a number of private attempts throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This goes hand in hand with a discussion of the growth of the myth of a treasure aboard the De Braak. The myth was reinforced and enlarged with every unsuccessful attempt and took on the aura of fact.

The story moves to the present with the discovery of the De Braak in 1984 by a treasure-hunting group whereupon the pillaging of the site began in earnest. Over the next two years the hoped-for treasure did not materialize. This could easily have been determined beforehand, had the salvors bothered to invest in a little historical research. In a final futile and desperate attempt to recover the fabled treasure, the remaining hull section was savagely ripped from its resting place with cables and a crane, seriously damaging the hull and dumping a great many artifacts back into the water. A large clam-bucket was then used to "excavate" the remainder of the site. The myth of fabulous wealth was finally extinguished but at the cost of destroying a valuable and important archaeological site.

This is also the story of a group of dedicated professionals, including the author, who, under a great deal of adverse peer pressure, undertook to care for and study the thousands of artifacts stripped from the wreck as well as to document the remaining hull structure. Through their efforts, they managed to extract a remarkable wealth of information relating to life on board the vessel, armaments and ship architecture from material devoid of its original archaeological context. They have brought to light the real treasure from the De Braak. The important results of their work are presented at the end of the book. One wonders how much more information could have been gleaned if the site had been excavated in an archaeologically sound manner.

The book also highlights the struggle between preservationists and treasure hunters over control and access to shipwrecks in US waters. Preservationists sought to put an end to the legally sanctioned destruction of a valuable but finite source of maritime history. The battle was waged in Washington through well organized and financed lobbying efforts on both sides. One of the few positive results to come from the archaeological disaster of the De Braak is that it played a pivotal role in the passing of the US Abandoned Shipwreck Act which should insure that a similar episode does not occur again.

This book is extremely well written and a pleasure to read. It is also well illustrated with black and white photographs as well as by line drawings of the more significant finds. Typographical errors are practically non-existent. One glaring exception occurred on page 224, on which were printed the contents of page 234; the contents of page 224 were never located.

Maritime historians and archaeologists will find this a fascinating but sobering book, as will anyone who has more than a passing interest in nautical history. It should absolutely be required reading for anyone involved in the legislation, administration or protection of submerged cultural resources.

R. James Ringer
Ottawa, Ontario

William D. Lawrence was one of the many hundreds of shipbuilders active in the Maritime provinces during the last half of the nineteenth century who not only designed and built vessels but owned and operated them themselves. Shipowning, at the very best of times, could be a very risky business and while many fortunes were made, many others were lost. In Lawrence's case, he was prepared to put all his money into one extremely large vessel rather than several smaller ones. This ship, which he named after himself, was the largest vessel ever built in the Maritime Provinces. In this slim book, David Stephens sets out to tell us the story of this ship and its builder.

However, apart from a section on the voyages of the *Kommander Sven Foyn*, the book, first published in 1975, does little more than take some information which is readily found in the books of Frederick William Wallace and add it to what amounts to a re-write of the article "The Great Ship" by Archibald MacMechan (a copy of which is available at the Lawrence House). Stephens seems to have done little research work of his own: he does not appear to have consulted the Windsor shipping registers for information about vessels built by Lawrence before 1874; he has not used the plans of the Lawrence vessels held at the Public Archives of Nova Scotia; nor has he used the Lawrence papers at the Lawrence House. He does not seem to be aware of the pamphlet published by William D. Lawrence in 1880 in which he discusses his voyage in the ship in great detail. A little additional research would have revealed a great deal about Lawrence and his family which has not hitherto been published.

Stephens writes in a melodramatic style, fraught with ridiculous superlatives, sweeping generalizations, and glaring factual errors. For instance, apart from family tradition, there is no evidence to support the statement that Lawrence attended Dalhousie University although he may have attended the Mechanics Institute that used rooms in the college building at various times from 1833 until 1851. Lawrence was not defeated in politics in the summer of 1868, nor was he a widower at the time. His political career ended when he was defeated in the provincial election of 16 May, 1871, while his wife Mary outlived him by twelve years. The *Pegasus* was sold in August 1874, seven years after she was built, not four. The double stairway on the front porch of the Lawrence house does not resemble a ship's bridge: sailing ships did not have bridges. Rather, this type of stairway was a common architectural feature of the mid- to late 1860s and there are many examples in Nova Scotia. It is ridiculous to suggest that Lawrence was one of the few shipbuilders to master the art of ship design. Many hundreds of Maritime shipbuilders designed their own vessels, vessels which, while not quite as large as the *William D. Lawrence*, were certainly as well designed, well built and made fast passages and money for their owners. The *Masonic*, whose passengers and crew were taken off by the *Pegasus*, was not a British frigate but a small brigantine of Saint John, New Brunswick on a voyage from Dorchester, New Brunswick to New York. While the *William D. Lawrence* was indeed the largest vessel built in the Maritime provinces, it was only slightly larger than the *White Star* and the *Morning Light*, two ships built by William and Richard Wright in Saint John, New Brunswick twenty years before. The two largest vessels built in Canada were the *Columbus* and the *Baron of Renfrew*, both built in Quebec fifty years before. Lawrence's ship was neither the largest vessel afloat in 1874 nor the largest vessel to enter the Mersey. I could go on.

The author does not seem to understand that shipbuilders, even well into the twentieth century, made the half model first when designing their vessels. The lines were then taken off and the familiar halfbreadth, sheer and profiles were produced on paper. The half model of Lawrence's ship has survived and can be seen at the Lawrence House; it is nearly six feet long. Are we really expected to believe that Lawrence carved this model with his jackknife? I also find it hard to believe that Ellis was astonished at the size of the ship under construction when he returned to Maitland in the spring of 1873.
Lawrence's papers reveal that he wrote several letters to Ellis, three years before, telling him of his plans, discussing the model of the ship in detail and giving the ship's dimensions. While the ship was commonly referred to as the W.D. Lawrence, its official name and the one that appears on all official documents and on the paintings is the William D. Lawrence.

This is a terribly disappointing book, filled with inaccuracies and false statements. In no way does it do justice, either to William D. Lawrence, or to the great ship which he built. One can only wonder why it was ever published.

Charles A. Armour
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Women Who Kept the Light brings the experience of twenty-eight female lighthouse keepers vividly to life. It spans the years 1776 to present and covers lighthouses from the Great Lakes and Pacific, Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the United States. Readers are presented the character of each keeper, and the conditions under which she kept the light burning, with great clarity.

The book is liberally illustrated with black and white photographs and drawings. Most are reproduced with astonishing clarity considering their vintage. Photographs of pages from the daily log books and letters in the keeper's handwriting provide historical realism, but some are not legible. As well, a nautical chart of each relevant district is included; however they are difficult to read due to photo-reduction and handwritten captions.

There are fascinating descriptions of the character of these women and the circumstances which shaped them. Emily Fish (keeper in California 1893-1914) changed the tenor of her surroundings by bringing in servants, antiques and thoroughbred horses to pull her carriage. The courage of Ida Lewis (Rhode Island 1879-1903) made her the best-known keeper of her time. She is credited with using her skill with a row boat to save eighteen lives. The dedicated Catherine Murdock (New York 1857-1907) stayed at her post and kept the light going after a dam burst and flood waters carried away houses and barns. Mary Ryan (Indiana 1873-1880) reported the effects of cold weather and isolation in her keepers log "Nothing but gloom without and WITHIN." (p.75)

Each chapter gives enough details about the lighthouse itself to give the reader a feel for it. They range from leaky and dilapidated to solid and comfortable. Some are on rocky outcroppings which are hardly larger than the lighthouses themselves while others are in close proximity to towns and surrounded by neighbouring farms. The keepers were often appointed after the death of their husbands or fathers by the Lighthouse Service because there was no pension system to care for them. The book also describes the keeper's family and whether or not they lived with her. Riveting accounts of shipwrecks, fires and earthquakes are given in their own words. Each chapter concludes with a description of the circumstances such as retirement, dismissal or death by which her sojourn ended.

Sidebars are used as an ingenious method of providing ancillary information about the Lighthouse Board policies, women keepers about whom little is known, new developments in equipment and instructions for keeping the daily log. The sidebars succeed in enhancing the material without distracting the reader.

The book concludes with a chapter describing the effect of changes to the Lighthouse Service on women keepers and the ultimate replacement of resident keepers by automation. An epilogue explains the present uses of the lighthouse buildings which range from bed and breakfasts to marine laboratories. An appendix, organized by state, provides a list of keepers names and dates of service.

The sepia-toned cover photograph of an austere lighthouse and the text book gauge of the paper used by the printer promise a dolorous academic treatise. The casual reader should not be discouraged by this formidable exterior. In fact, the book is very lively and readable. Some
readers may choose to read selected chapters as, naturally, they contain many common elements.

The historian will find this to be a well documented assimilation of information from government records, newspapers, keepers logs, personal interviews and publications. Casual readers will discover a pleasant way to become steeped in the fabric of the daily lives of an unusual group who endeavoured to keep the light.

Suzanne Spohn
Lions Bay, British Columbia


When it comes to seafarers and sexuality, historians invariably point to the dearth of sources relating to the topic. For this reason, the publication of B.R. Burg's *An American Seafarer in the Age of Sail* is a welcome event.

Raised middle-class in the mid-nineteenth century, Philip C. Van Buskirk made for a rather uncommon common seaman. But common to many men of the middle-class, Van Buskirk kept a diary of his activities, thoughts and feelings. He included in his journal a detailed account of his sexual life, including a running tally of his nocturnal emissions and solitary and not-so-solitary vices. Not a straight transcript of the diaries, Burg has woven Van Buskirk's journal entries into a narrative of his own, one organized thematically and chronologically.

Van Buskirk's diaries contain a wealth of information on homosexual relations among seafarers during the nineteenth century. The diaries provide us with access to the subaltern sexual idiom used by sailors. In contrast to the emerging scientific terminology, sailors had an elaborate sexual vocabulary of their own. "Going chaw for chaw," for instance, was an expression used to describe mutual masturbation. The diaries also reveal the way such sexual encounters became the basis for more elaborate relationships. Van Buskirk detailed many of the relationships he witnessed and, as Burg observes, these pairings were most often structured around age and status, reflecting the existing hierarchies of power on board ship. Relationships consisted of an older and younger partner. Again capturing the richness of sailors' sexual language, the junior partner was known as "chicken" and this way of organizing intimate, sexual relationships was referred to by sailors as "chickenship."

While many men and boys actively engaged in the "boom cover trade," Van Buskirk himself pursued a more romantic, often paternal relationship with the boys to whom he was attracted. Though not immune to the sexual, Van Buskirk was filled with guilt and self-loathing when it came to the physical, something he believed he internalized from his constant reading of anti-masturbation tracts. Often commenting on the ease with which the other sailors went after sex, Van Buskirk's journals can be read for the differing ways working-class and middle-class men responded to the dominant sexual ideologies of the time.

I do have some problems with Burg's handling of the issue of sexual identity. On homosexual identity, Burg is quite good. Taking his cue from much of the work done in gay social history, Burg refrains from ascribing a fully formed homosexual identity to sailors who had sexual relations with each other. As Burg explains in the introduction, he does this in part by referring to sailors' sexual relations with other men as "homoerotic" rather than as "homosexual." At the same time, however, Burg does refer to something he calls "heterosexual orientation." (p. 169) He claims that "in the mid-nineteenth century, Americans recognized only an exclusive heterosexual model of behavior. There were no parallel or complementary conceptual alternatives." (p. 88) Burg is only half right. There may not have been any conceptual models for homosexuality in the mid-nineteenth century, but neither were there for heterosexuality. As gay historian Jonathan Ned Katz and others have demonstrated, heterosexuality — like homosexuality — was an historical accomplishment. In fact, the term "heterosexuality" only came into existence after the invention of "homosexuality" during the late-nineteenth century.

I suspect *An American Seafarer in the Age...*
of Sail will be widely cited by those who wish to acknowledge the existence of same-gender sex at sea. We should remember, however, that this is only one diary written by one man. Hopefully the existence of Van Buskirk's rich diary will encourage others to undertake more comprehensive historical investigations of sailors and their sexualities.

Steven Maynard
Kingston, Ontario


Most American children growing up in the 1950s and 1960s spent their Sunday evenings in front of the television watching the "Wonderful World of Disney." At least once a month Uncle Walt would treat us to historically significant events such as the Civil War, the War with Mexico, or tales of the men who tamed the wilderness frontier. Young boys were glued to the sets as stories of action, adventure, heroism and glory unfolded before them. Andrew Jackson, Daniel Boone, Davy Crockett and Mike Fink were the heroes. These were our history lessons, and I will admit, shamefully, that I followed them as far as the last commercial.

Disney gave us the facts skillfully interwoven with myth and folklore. Michael Allen explains that although movies like Davy Crockett and the River Pirates reintroduced Americans to Mike Fink and the western boatmen, the true nature of these men was completely lost in the Myth of the Alligator Horse. Allen argues that previous works on the subject relied almost exclusively on the wealth of literary and folkloric sources dating from the Jacksonian era. He believes that these accounts are an important part of nineteenth century American social history. However, he does not believe that the early folk heroes led those wild, swashbuckling lives.

Thus, the author endeavours to present both sides of the story: the social riverman as well as his mythical, "half-horse half-alligator" counterpart. After the tales were told, and embellished and retold, how did these men actually live from day to day? Allen's research uncovered a number of firsthand accounts written by literate (and therefore, he admits, "atypical") boatmen that give an overview of a way of life never before fully documented. Journals, autobiographies, newspapers and government documents flesh out the story.

Allen focuses primarily on the keelboats and flatboats working on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. The book follows a chronological history divided into two parts: The pre-steamboat era (1763-1823) and the Steamboat Age (1823-1861). He explains how the advent of steam power accelerated the westward advance of civilization. This in turn greatly altered the life of the boatmen. The death of Mike Fink in 1823 symbolically represents the end of the rough and tumble riverboat era. As settlers and entrepreneurs slowly moved west and south towards New Orleans, river landings grew from villages, to towns, to cities. Civilized society became less and less tolerant of the shenanigans of riverboat crews.

Despite the allure of the easy-going life depicted by George Caleb Bingham in The Jolly Flatboater or Twain's Huckleberry Finn, Allen stresses that a riverman's existence was plagued by hardship. Poling, rowing, bushwhacking ("moving a keelboat upstream by pulling on nearby bushes and branches") and cordelling (sending the crew ashore with a line to pull the boat upstream) was backbreaking work. Weeks of dodging river hazards, robbers, foul weather and Indian attacks culminated with an even more arduous return trip upstream or a long walk home. Yet the riverman was essential to the frontier, for an amazing 90 per cent of all non-steam river commerce during this period was carried by flatboats. Flatboating reached its zenith around 1847-1848 and, although it never completely recovered after the Civil War, the last boats plied the Mississippi until the 1890s.

Michael Allen has written an intricately researched volume that examines the reality and the myth surrounding the lives of the eighteenth and nineteenth century western rivermen. In some sections the reader may be left with a
W. Wilson West, Jr.  
Washington, DC


Maine's island-filled Casco Bay is about eighteen miles wide and twelve miles deep. It lies between Cape Elizabeth, on which the city of Portland is situated, and Cape Small. Many of its 'Calendar Islands,' as they are known locally, contain arable land and their settlement dates back to the early inroads of colonists from Massachusetts. Dotted with small communities, the long, sheltered channels between the large islands provided ideal conditions for some early experiments in steam navigation. By the 1870s, the busy summer excursion traffic out of Portland had attracted the attention of a number of steamboat entrepreneurs. In Steamboat Yesterdays Captain Frappier traces the history of most of the companies and vessels involved, dating from Captain Seaward Porter and his Kennebec in 1822.

Steamboating on Casco Bay appears to have reached its peak during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. At this time, it was the practice of the very rich to spend the summer season rusticating in company with their peers and a number of the smaller islands had been developed as exclusive cottage communities. On others, fancy resort hotels vied for the custom of upper class patrons. Portland's masses also sought escape from the heat of the city, turning to the steamers and the fresh island breezes for relief. In response to this summer influx, skating rinks, casinos and other establishments catering to both day and evening cruise patrons became major attractions at favourite ports of call. Dining facilities were in particular demand for the ever-popular shore suppers.

The busy summer excursion runs should have been highly profitable, with steamers like the 261-ton Pilgrim carrying up to 1,100 passengers per trip on the busy Portland to Peak's Island shuttle. However, Frappier's main theme, the rise and fall of the Casco Bay Steamboat Company and the Casco Bay and Harpswell Lines, tells instead a story of unregulated cutthroat competition, the purchase of vessels of ever-increasing capacity and a drastic lowering of fares to beat out the opposition. This inevitably resulted in the companies involved being unable to meet their overheads and, finally, falling victim to lien and sheriffs sale.

Steamboat Yesterdays contains the histories of forty-five companies and over seventy steam passenger vessels. The latter range in size from the 425-ton Machigonne to the little 13-ton Admiral and even smaller steamers. The inclusion of these tiny vessels, some of which appear to have fared quite well while serving the smaller island communities and cottage colonies, adds a special dimension to Frappier's work. So, also, does the quality of the over one hundred and eighty-five illustrations. There are photographs of ships' crews, the grand hotels, island wharves, advertising ephemera and no fewer than fifty-five of the vessels which once operated on Casco Bay. Regretfully, the illustrations are neither indexed nor cross-indexed; nor were brief notes provided on those services still in operation. In addition, someone has neglected to list the sixty-two vessels covered in Appendix A, the "Steamboat Data/Log," in alphabetical order. Appendix C, which traces the past and future histories of twenty Casco Bay boats up and down the coast from New York Harbor to Passamaquoddy Bay, is another random listing.

Notwithstanding these few concerns and the occasional peculiar turn of phrase, the author has compiled a wonderful history of a lost era. In addition to its obvious local interest, Steamboat Yesterdays on Casco Bay should be a welcome addition to the reference libraries of everyone with an interest in steam navigation and the history of the coastal trade east of Boston.

Robin H. Wyllie  
East LaHave, Nova Scotia

This book tells the story of steam navigation on Lake Temiskaming and on its tributary waters in Northern Ontario and Quebec. That story really begins with the start of commercial logging in the 1880s. Steamboating for passengers and package freight developed once the Canadian Pacific Railway opened to Mattawa in 1881 and a branch line was subsequently built from there to Temiskaming, Quebec. Yet passenger service declined following the construction of another railway — what is now the Ontario Northland Railway — from North Bay, Ontario to New Liskeard and Haileybury in the early 1900s, together with the end of the gold mining boom just before 1914. A few steamers survived in summer excursion trades, but fire and obsolescence forced their eventual demise in the 1920s. Steam tugs continued to move rafts of logs until the 1970s, when they, too, became obsolete with the advent of large trucks and the decline of forests near the lake.

Bruce Taylor's study of *The Age of Steam on Lake Temiskaming* is well written. The book is organized into seven chapters: the first provides some historical background; the second and third describe the principal steamboat operations; the subsequent chapters focus on the more minor operations; the last describes docks and dredges. Much appreciated were the several schedules which showed the vessels' sailing time and general deployment. Not so appreciated was the map of Lake Temiskaming, buried between pages 8-9 instead of being conveniently placed inside the front cover.

One feature of the book was the "alphabetical list of steamboats." I only wish that Taylor had consulted some of the standard Canadian marine historical sources in order to avoid some inaccuracies and to acquire fuller data. Thus, the list gives both *Antoine* and *St. Antoine* (p. 138) though the picture on page 107 clearly shows *St. Antoine*. We also read in the list that the side-wheel tug *Argo*, official number 85,356, burned in October 1904, yet we are told on p. 26 that *Argo* was broken up in September 1903. In fact, there were two tugs by that name. The first, number 85,356, was indeed broken up in 1903; the second, a propeller tug with official number 116865, was built in early 1904, only to burn in October of that same year.

Still, on balance, this is a book well worth having for anyone interested in the marine history of the Temiskaming area. It is attractively produced with a suitable dust jacket, there are lots of pictures which capture the spirit of the largely 1880 to 1930 period. Perhaps one of the Canadian marine historical journals could publish a modified version of its listing of steamboats.

Gordon C. Shaw
Thornhill, Ontario


For several reasons, the recent history of Greek shipping is of considerable interest. Not only is the merchant marine sailing under the Greek flag one of the largest in the world but Greek shipowners also command substantial tonnages in various "convenience" registers. Moreover, these fleets have enjoyed growth rates far above the average: measured in gross tons, they increased seventeen-fold between 1950 and 1975.

So far, very few books of high scholarly standards have been available on the history of Greek shipping in languages other than Greek. Dr. Gelina Harlaftis' book — based on her DPhil thesis at Oxford — is therefore more than welcome. As the title of her book indicates, her main objective is to study the linkages between the Greek economy and this impressive shipping industry. This is an extremely relevant and important question: the international character of the industry means that it hardly can be understood as an integral part of the economy but rather as an autonomous element with fairly slender ties with the mother country.

The opening section of the book, "The Shipping Firms," contains an interesting, concise
The Northern Mariner

and well-balanced description of the shipping industry itself. The author stresses some special characteristics of Greek shipping firms, above all the importance of family and island ties. Such groups formed, according to Harlaftis, "an exclusively 'Greek' international maritime network" even when they were residing in London, New York, Egypt or some other distant places, providing its members "the same advantages that membership of an elitist private club would provide," that is, above all, access to confidential private information, (p.9, 19)

Harlaftis also stresses the internationality and cosmopolitanism of the biggest firms and their owners. In the 1950s, they conducted their business increasingly from London and New York (in 1958, less than twenty percent of total tonnage was managed in Greece) and ships were mainly registered in Panama and Liberia. Later, however, even when a wave of "repatriation" brought much tonnage under the Greek flag, the decision centres of many shipping firms remained abroad.

This cosmopolitan nature of shipowners makes a non-Greek reader wonder what really is "Greek" shipping. While it is easy to believe Harlaftis when she lets us understand that Greek shipping tycoons retained an identity with both their family group and mother country, many of them were still absent and even may have had the nationality of some other country than Greece. It is difficult to believe that "Greekness" would be as self-evident as might be concluded from the fact that she never discusses this item.

Another discussion which a non-Greek reader would have appreciated concerns the relevance of making the distinction between "traditional" and "non-traditional" shipowners. By the former Harlaftis denotes people who, in the 1940s, were (at least) second-generation shipowners, who had inherited their wealth and position while the other were newcomers. Since new firms are established all the time in shipping, the importance of being established before a certain date should be explained. The distinction seems to have a connection with the Greek discussion on shipping politics in the 1950s, but it is not clear how useful a tool for the analysis it is in other respects.

The second section of the book, "Shipowners and Economic Development," explores the involvement, above all the investments, of shipowners in other sections of the Greek economy. This must have been the most difficult part of the study, simply because reliable and all-inclusive data on ownership are not normally easy to find. Harlaftis, however, seems to have succeeded well in tracing the various "landward" interests of shipowners and considerable credit must be given to her good overall knowledge of the Greek financial and economic environment, though it could not have been a great surprise to learn that shipping tycoons had particular interest in oil refineries and shipbuilding, and the presentation might have been more enjoyable, for foreign readers at least, had it been written in a more concise and general manner.

The last section of the book, "Shipowners and the Political Establishment," is probably the most interesting for the general reader. It shows clearly that big shipowners are not just anonymous "market forces" but powerful individuals as well as a powerful group which wants and tries to advance its interests by political as well as purely economic means. Harlaftis shows that the ties between Greek shipowners and political establishments were quite tenuous in the 1940s and '50s, yet government did shipping a great service by guaranteeing the purchase of a hundred Liberty ships and lowering the taxes of shipowners. During the dictatorship of 1967-74, the dictators tried to collaborate with shipowners, not simply to benefit the Greek economy but, says Harlaftis, to legitimize themselves nationally and internationally.

This section also analyses the shipowners' own associations and the bifurcation of their influence between London, New York and Piraeus. It is here that Harlaftis finally presents an intelligent and well-founded critique of Greek shipping policy. First, she shows that it was the "anti-convenience" climate (in particular, the actions of the International Transport Federation in the late 1950s) rather than the politics of epanaptrismos (repatriation, including a very generous tax-policy) which caused Greek shipowners to "return" to the Greek register. She also shows that the "repatriation" did not bring direct benefit, such as an increased flow of shipping foreign exchange, to the Greek economy. Indirectly, however, it made Piraeus a great maritime centre and kept the proportion of
Greek sailors on Greek-owned ships very high. Internationally, the most important result of the shipping policy was that Greek ships enjoyed low day costs similar to those in the Liberian register, and much below the Scandinavian or British levels. Although the book, by definition, does not devote much space to shipping markets, it is useful to remember that the Greek-owned merchant navy depends mainly on international gross trading. It may even be questioned whether the "interdependence" mentioned in the subtitle is really "mutual."

Generally speaking, the book is well written, though a few minor blemishes, which can be attributed mainly to copy-editing, are still to be found. In a few cases, there are errors in legends for figures (in Graph 9.4, for example, crew and other costs have been changed) and Table 1.2 is not fully compatible with Graph 1.2. Freight indices, such as the one in graph 7.2, would be more informative if presented as real value series; because the value of the dollar sank after the oil shock, the whole truth is not revealed by nominal freight. Overall, however, these are minor matters and do not weigh heavily compared with the great merits of the book. It certainly deserves to be read by anyone interested in the modern history of shipping.

Yrjö Kaukiainen
Helsinki, Finland


René de la Pedraja, who teaches at Canisius College in Buffalo, New York, was motivated to write on maritime affairs by an interest in the development of steamship companies in Latin America. Indeed, it is possible that he may eventually write the definitive work on the subject; I, for one, would love to read it. But in the interim he has produced a much less satisfying tome. Despite some strengths, the first single-volume synthetic business history to chronicle the rise and decline of the twentieth-century United States merchant marine will not in my view stand the test of time.

The strength of this volume is two-fold. First, its compactness will recommend it to generalists interested in a cursory rather than a detailed examination of the fate of the US merchant marine. Second, de la Pedraja is unburdened by many of the myths that suffuse the study of most national fleets, including the American. This means, for example, that he is able to handle topics like subsidies — both domestic and foreign — with more detachment than most American scholars have displayed. Indeed, he is one of the few modern American scholars to reject subsidies as a primary cause of the decline of the US-flag fleet, persuasively arguing instead that misguided subsidy policies were functions of other factors. Similarly, his treatment of some of the dominant characters in twentieth-century American maritime history, such as J.P. Morgan, is more even-handed than most historians.

Yet somewhat paradoxically the book's strengths are also its weaknesses. Its abbreviated nature means that it is both selective and desultory in many of its judgments. This also makes it even more idiosyncratic than most volumes in the field. And if his fresh perspective is an advantage, this does not mean that the author lacks an agenda. He is more prone than most, for instance, to accept the validity of national fleets as projections of power and prestige, despite an abundance of evidence that such behavior can be counterproductive. And this bias is reflected in some especially shoddy thinking about the future of American merchant carriers. In his concluding chapter he calls for a resurrection of the US merchant marine. His grounds for this recommendation sound remarkably like the "security of supply" arguments advanced for domestic petroleum production during the OPEC oil shocks of the 1970s: as the world fragments into competing trade blocks, he argues, unless it is willing to invest in its own merchant navy "the trading position of the United States must necessarily continue to deteriorate." This is soul food for true believers and determinists but it is not sustained by any evidence beyond wishful thinking. Indeed, the decline of the US merchant marine after World War II, chronicled so carefully in this book, paralleled the very period in which the Ameri-
can economy reached historic heights. This would seem, at the very least, to raise questions about his judgement. But the tendency to assert what needs to be proved is all too characteristic of much of the analysis.

It is a shame that the book is marred by this kind of special pleading and slipshod analysis, for we desperately need a fresh synthesis. Unfortunately, unless he is willing to shed some of his preconceptions, René de la Pedraja seems unlikely to provide it. This, much more than the decline of the US merchant marine, is the real tragedy of the book.

Lewis R. Fischer
St. John's, Newfoundland


Until recently, it might seem that the bread-and-butter cargo carriers that did so much to shape America's growth were largely ignored, except parenthetically in general histories of the world wars. It is to be hoped that this neglect will be addressed in part by a new multi-volume history of American flagged commercial vessels, commissioned by the American Merchant Marine Museum at Kings Point, New York and written by Mark Goldberg. The series is supposed to examine all vessels from World War I to the post-1945 period

The "Hog Islanders" is the first in that series, and focuses on the ships that constituted a significant part of the first American war-time emergency ship building program. To this point, the only noteworthy discussion of the Allied effort during World War I to respond to shortages in shipping has been by British authors, particularly L. A. Sawyer and W. H. Mitchell. As Frank Braynard observes in his Foreword to The "Hog Islanders," interest in American maritime history appears to have concentrated on the famous clipper ships of the mid-1800s. Goldberg's book is therefore a useful departure from this trend as well as a valuable exploration of the response to a particular need.

Goldberg begins with the genesis of the "Hog Island" building program, where national and private capital came together to undertake a massive enterprise which, in some respects, foreshadowed the "can-do" approach that we associated with the construction of the 2,700 EC2 "Liberty" ships during the next war. In 1916 the US Shipping Board, through its ship building arm, the Emergency Fleet Corporation, was responsible for acquiring over 2,000 vessels from a variety of sources. These included four building yards of its own, of which the largest was established at Hog Island, Pennsylvania. The mandate of this yard was to construct two types of vessels: the "Type A," a 7,500-ton dry cargo ship, and the "Type B," a troopship. 122 of both types were completed. Goldberg gives details about the careers of individual ships; most attained very long, if not necessarily eventful, lives. By far the largest section of the book deals with the Type A ships, of which there were 110. A chapter each is devoted to the "Scanships" and the "Delta combiliners," both unique cargo-passenger liners. Goldberg clearly has real affection for the "Hogs" and a love for the "Scanships," whose design and amenities he presents in great detail. The final chapter on the life and times of the Type B "Hog Island" troopships completes his account.

Goldberg has done a laudable job of assembling the facts about a vessel type that became the mainstay of the American merchant marine during the interwar years. The bibliography suggests that he has accessed most of the available records. Goldberg indicates that there is a dearth of photographs of the "Hog Island" ships, a fact that has likely governed the selection of photographs which supports the text of the book. The two plans depicting construction of the "Hog Islanders" are of limited value: one is too simple, the other is too small, and there are no plans of the Type B vessels. There is also a site plan of the building facility at Hog Island. The extensive appendices provide the original and subsequent names of the ships, their launch dates, and their commercial operators. This information is certainly valuable because the book has no index (a master index for the whole
series will be provided in the final volume); to find any details not covered by the appendices, readers will have to skim the book. There are only a few errors in The "Hog Islanders," of which the most glaring is Goldberg's inadvertent attempt to convert the USCGS Paulding into a submarine, (p.191)

Overall, I enjoyed The "Hog Islanders" and I look forward to more volumes in this ambitious series. It will definitely fill a void in American and maritime historical literature, and is sure to find a welcome place on the shelves of nautical enthusiasts.

James Ottley
Creston, British Columbia


Caviar and Cargo is just the second volume of Mark Goldberg's ambitious historical series on the American merchant marine. It follows fast on the heels of his first volume devoted to the "Hog Islanders." As a result it is not totally freestanding in that it contains a short addenda/corrigenda to the first volume, whimsically entitled "Ooops!!"

In Caviar and Cargo, Goldberg sets out to tell the story of the twenty-four passenger-carrying ships built from standard C3 hulls during the Maritime Commission era. Known as the "C3P type," they were to have been the nucleus of a renewed American passenger fleet, and represented a positive result of the restrictive Jones Act of 1920, which closed off trade between American ports to foreign flags. Unfortunately, airline competition and a number of other mitigating factors conspired against the prolongation of this goal past the 1940s. Today, the Jones Act has been such a hindrance to the development of the tourism market in some ports that a new bill called the Unsoeld bill has been designed to lure foreign-flag vessels to American ports as long as their owners are prepared to build, essentially, a new American passenger fleet. History does have a habit of repeating itself.

While "C3P type" may not register with most liner enthusiasts, lines such as Delta, American President, Moore McCormack, American Export and United States will strike a responsive chord. In Caviar and Cargo, Goldberg ably demonstrates his indefatigability to research, his photographic memory and his pleasure in unearthing the most minute of details on each of these twenty-four ships. This is a scholarly history which fills a void that has been unfilled for far too long. It is not, however, a "light read" for the more casual of readers. If anything, the depth and breadth of Goldberg's writings may prove to be a tad too rich for many. However, if you're the kind of person who wants to know everything there is to know about C3 passenger ships but were afraid to ask, then this is the book for you.

There is a proliferation of illustrations, both external and internal, on the ships profiled in Caviar and Cargo. Deck plans are also extensively used, as well as in-depth appendices recounting every measurable statistic you could ask for. The absence of an index in this volume is not an oversight, for the final volume of this series will provide a master index. However, be prepared for a long wait, as it is expected to be a fifteen-volume series.

John Davies
Vancouver, British Columbia


"Going Bananas" is the third in an ongoing series of volumes devoted to the American Merchant Marine History; five are now in print or close to publication and the author indicates that the complete series will have at least four-
The Northern Mariner

The Northern Mariner is an encyclopedia of US-owned or chartered ships engaged in the banana trade with the West Indies and Central America, from the converted tug E.B. Ward in 1878 until the demise of the United Fruit Company in the 1980s. Most attention goes to cargo/passenger ships carrying twenty-eight or more passengers; less detail is given to non-passenger freighters. Due to sheer numbers, vessels of lines trading only to northern West Indian ports such as Havana, San Juan and Nassau have been omitted, as have those of important companies for which bananas were not the chief cargo. All will be covered in subsequent volumes.

Some account is given of the companies which owned or operated the ships, but the accent is on the vessels themselves. These have been described and illustrated in admirable fashion with main specifications, plans of deck and accommodation spaces and excellent black and white photographs, many unique. Each major company has a short introductory section, followed by a detailed listing for each of its ships. These listings were obviously a labour of love, for each shows the date of construction and final disposition, change of ownership and change of name throughout the ship's career. Thus we learn that six World War I destroyers were refitted in 1931 as banana boats. Four of them were subsequently outfitted for blockade-running to Corregidor just before it fell to the Japanese in World War II and one survived until 1955. Almost unbelievably, two even more ancient torpedo-boat-destroyers, commissioned in 1901 and converted in 1922 served throughout World War II. One, exhausted by working for the Piggly-Wiggly Supermarkets during the war, had to be scrapped in 1947. The other lasted until 1956 under Nicaraguan registry. Thus when war broke out in 1914, Common Brothers were managing five vessels. The sinking of Kurdistan (2) on 27 August, 1917 left the company without a ship. The return of peace brought an initial glut of tonnage, but by 1919 a shortage of carrying capacity developed which
stimulated a shipbuilding boom. This in turn produced a situation which saw 2,000,000 gross tons of British ships idle by the end of 1921. Common Brothers were adversely affected by this as a result of ambitious ordering of new ships combined with the escalation in building costs experienced during this period. The company responded in part during the inter-war years with attempts to improve the performance of the ships by improving the efficiency of the steam reciprocating engine. One method claimed to produce turbine efficiency with reciprocating engine flexibility, though we are left wondering if those claims were justified. One of the company ships with the improved type engine was the *Rajahstan*, put in service in 1929 with steam propulsion. This ship also had the distinction of being the largest single-deck steamer in service. Yet the retention of steam propulsion was later regarded as one of the biggest mistakes the managers ever made. Such conservatism was not normally characteristic of Common Brothers. Indeed, in constructing a new ship in 1931 with an enclosed bridge, the company was severely chastised by a peer who considered that "an open bridge with canvas dodger was much to be preferred." (p.56) Old traditions die hard!

The most difficult years of the inter-war period was the early 1930s, when Common Brothers' ships were severely affected by low freight rates and lay-ups. Economic recovery began slowly by 1934, peaked in 1937, then slumped again until the outbreak of the war in 1939. The willingness of Common Brothers to change then came to the fore with the construction in 1940 of *Hindustan* (6) and *Newbrough* (2); both incorporated the "Maierform" hull form and diesel engines.

Despite such innovations, the war proved hard for Common Brothers. When the war began in 1939, the company was managing ten dry cargo vessels, two oil tankers and one coaster. When the war ended, only two of these ships remained. New ventures after the war included participation in an Australia-China service, expansion of their interests in tanker trades, the establishment of their own licensed travel agency and becoming involved in the importing of iron ore. Another example of the trend to change came with the *Hindustan* of 1957 — the seventh company ship to bear that name and the first British owned cargo vessel to be completely fitted with alternating current. Included in the new ventures of the 1960s was the financially unsuccessful entry into the RoRo trade between New York and the Caribbean. It is interesting to note the bewilderment with which ship masters who were accustomed to the conventional cargo ships faced the new generation of RoRo ships with their very unconventional design.

The financial problems brought on by the failure of the John Shaheen oil refinery at Come By Chance, Newfoundland brings an interesting Canadian connection to this book. Common Brothers never recovered from this setback as a result of the loss of guaranteed employment for their ships which the proposed refinery had promised. Then, in March 1979, Common's suffered their first serious marine casualty since 1942 when *Kurdistan* (6) broke in two off the Canadian East Coast. An informative account of the events leading up to the casualty and the results of the formal investigation make this an especially interesting chapter for Canadian readers. The only jarring note is when reference is made to the speed of the *Kurdistan* in "knots an hour" (p. 105) just before the disaster!

The 1980s brought both failures and successes, and it is in this period that the amazing complexities of shipowning, financing, operation and management are brought to the fore. Such widely ranging activities as the cruise trade, livestock carriage and drillship operations have by now become the norm — a far cry from the days of coal and grain as the bread and butter of tramp ship operations.

H.G. Hall
Yarmouth, Nova Scotia


The subtitle gives an accurate, but modest description of this book. It is an intensely detailed and thorough account of twenty companies,
some dating back to the 1840s, which became distilled into the present Tyne & Wear Tugs Ltd. It is also the story of well over two hundred tugs that worked the rivers in the process.

An introductory chapter describes the region's industrial history and its importance to the British economy. The three rivers of the title were the heartland of British coal. With the development of railroads they became major export ports and centres of industry and shipbuilding, and needed many tugs. The author's analysis of coal shipments and shipbuilding in the region explains the decline of the ports. On average there were over one hundred ships built and fifteen to twenty million tons of coal shipped per year on the Tyne alone from the 1860s to the 1920s. That both have declined to virtually zero now is strikingly presented, and readily explains why the present company is able to service the region with only six tugs, when scores were needed as recently as thirty years ago.

Each remaining chapter describes one tug company, its activities, evolution, owners and tugs. The text is interspersed with the authors graphs, charts and maps and hundreds of splendid photographs. There are also reproductions of company letterheads, tariff and rate lists, promotional literature, photos of the company's office premises and some (intentionally?) hilarious photos of company officials and employees. In short, the book is very compelling visually.

The author follows each chapter with that company's illustrated fleet list. Despite resulting duplication, each chapter stands alone and permits easy reference without unnecessary page turning. Excellent indices cross reference all former and subsequent names for each tug. There are colour pages of flag and funnel markings and illustrated fleet lists. The photos are captioned with meaningful text, there are ample cross references, indices and lists and even such interesting minutiae as each company's whistle signal (e.g. Blyth tugs was one short, four long).

This is the author's second book on tugs (the first, *Seahorse's of the Tees*, was to an equally high standard), and he understands tugs and their operations. Although he credits employees past and present, he researched and assembled the book himself without an editor, and made it thoroughly readable and informative, for which he deserves great credit.

There are a few minor points of complaint. With very little additional effort the author's hand drawn maps, charts and graphs could have been reproduced by computer in a more readable and interesting form. For example, to shade the water or land on a map so that one is distinguishable from the other is useful when the subject is not well known to the reader already. The vertical format of nine and one half by twelve and one half inches is awkward. Photos can be reproduced to show great detail, but I would have preferred to sacrifice some detail for better shelvability and handling. One or two definitions of local terminology would have been helpful. Foy boat men are apparently independent waterborne line handlers, and water clerks were apparently tug company mobile dispatchers cum sales agents, who went from pier to pier arranging tugs for the ships in the days before telephones and radios.

Aside from small points such as these, the book is a fine work, it gives excellent balance between steam, paddle and diesel tugs, and covers the territory and period completely. It is a well done work.

Mac Mackay
Halifax, Nova Scotia


In the study of major ports there is an inevitable tendency to focus on the shipping engaged in the most visible and most spectacular feature of a port's business, namely, the conveying of cargoes to or from places far afield. It is easy to view such trade in isolation and to lose sight of the fact that international shipping is merely part of a transport chain. In that chain, the assembly and distribution of goods at and from ports is as vital as the long haul voyage. Local shipping which provides these important services has its own patterns of business; over time, these often give rise to a particular type of vessel specially
tailored to meet the demands of its area of operation. This volume examines the service craft of Liverpool, a body of vessels which had the generic name of "flats" derived from the characteristic of a flat bottom.

Mersey flats were a distinctive type of barge which developed in and around the river Mersey and operated from the 1740s through to the 1950s. Their role was to deliver and collect cargo to and from the port of Liverpool and their working area was that of Liverpool's inland hinterland and the coast of the Irish Sea. This varied environment of canals, rivers, estuary and coastal seas, together with their length of service and the progress of technology, led to the development of a host of variations in design, dimensions and motive power, though all evolved from a common flat hull design.

Mike Stammers has written what must prove to be the definitive history of these versatile vessels. It is hard to be critical of his study at any point other than perhaps the lack of a full index of numbers and tonnage and here, no doubt, lacunae in the statistics explain the omission. The research undertaken is impressive, with sources ranging from the earliest historical references to interviews with surviving flatmen. While comprising of eleven chapters Stammers' book has three main areas of study: flats themselves; the trades and markets served by flats; and the personnel of the flat business, builders, owners and flatmen. On flats themselves Stammers discusses the obvious aspects of design and construction but goes beyond this and examines such aspects of flat operation as rigging and sailing and the techniques of towing. Stammers' mastery of such practical considerations demonstrates the depth of his expertise, for few academics possess a real understanding of the practicalities of operation.

One reason why the operation of flats was a complex activity requiring much skill and local knowledge was that flats worked in a variety of environments and trades. Flat traffic was of three types: lighterage in the immediate docks area, up river and canal work and, of lesser importance, coastal work. Of prime importance in cargoes were coal and salt — the vital commodities in Liverpool's early growth — but grain, general cargo, building materials, fats and oils for the soap industry, manure and indeed any commodity of a bulky nature was carried. Each commodity had its own special features and each route its own intricacies of tide, current and water levels. As one of Stammers' interviewees observed, "there were 101 practical wrinkles to navigate the Mersey."

In his survey of builders, owners and flatmen, Stammers examines such issues as costs, prices, profitability and wages and reveals an extensive knowledge of individuals and companies. In the field of ownership, an interesting feature to emerge is that while in the eighteenth century flats were chiefly owned by small partnerships of merchants, in the nineteenth century, canal proprietors, manufacturers and mine owners were the biggest flatowners. Earlier, in explaining the function of the flat, Stammers compares the flat with that modern vehicle of distribution, the road transport lorry or "juggernaut." It would appear that the comparison is valid not merely in function but in ownership as well for the operation of fleets of flats by many of the large heavy industrial concerns of south Lancashire presaged the experience of the post World War I era when many companies established their own road transport divisions. Such action, along with other factors, was to hasten the demise of the flat, and the last flats finished trading in the 1960s. A final chapter considers the few flats that have survived and measures taken and plans for their preservation.

This book can be wholeheartedly recommended. Scholarly in its research and analysis, it is nevertheless immensely readable and will be enjoyed by all with an interest in maritime and economic history. The book is generously illustrated with plans, sketches and most excellent archive photographs. In its use of such material this volume might well serve as a model, for illustrations are always relevant and invariably supplement rather than distract from the written word. Stammers is to be congratulated on a study which reveals an aspect of shipping generally neglected and contributes to our better understanding of the working of one of the great ports of the world.

David M. Williams
Leicester, United Kingdom

This a New Zealand view of the activities of the Ross Sea Whaling Company (aktie-selskabet Rosshavet, Sandefjord) from 1924-33, particularly as it relates to their repair base in Paterson Inlet, on Stewart Island. Jim Watt, for whom this was clearly a labour of love, compiled this remarkable account of a long forgotten Norwegian industrial venture by delving indefatigably through newspaper and government archives, and by tracking down and interviewing Rosshavet veterans in New Zealand and Norway. The author describes the yard's establishment, what traces of it remain today, and retells the stories of folk associated with it, particularly those 'Norskies' who remained in New Zealand when it finally closed down. A classic study in industrial archaeology, it includes a thorough description of the shipyard at its zenith and what remains of it today. Besides commenting on the whaling activities of some of Rosshavet's competitors, it covers in detail the 1923-1933 expeditions of the factory ships *Sir James Clark Ross*, *Sir James Clark Ross* (2), and the *C.A. Larsen*. This particular vessel was unique because the whales were got on board using a ramp in the bow. All other factory-ships incorporated the slipway in the stern.

Until the early twenties catchers invariably returned their catch to a shore-station for processing. Tønsbergs Hvalfangen had made a limited trial with open sea processing a bit earlier, but the first serious attempts at true pelagic whaling were only made in 1923. Nils Torvald Nielsen-Alonso experimented with a floating factory, *Bas II*, off the African coast, and as Rosshavet sent five catchers and their factory-ship *Sir James Clark Ross* to the Ross Sea. The New Zealand connection arose because at that time the Ross Dependency was administrated by that country.

Many whaling expeditions brought their catchers north for refitting, at the end of the Antarctic summer, but others preferred to overwinter and refit their catchers in the South. Some companies used facilities at Cape Town, and Salvesen and Tønsbergs Hvelfangeri maintained comprehensive repair facilities in South Georgia until the early sixties. It was for this purpose that as Rosshavet established the Paterson Inlet base on Stewart Island, which lies just south of South Island.

*Star VIII* may have been the first catcher fitted with a gangway between hunting bridge and gun-platform, and first with oil-firing, as far as the Rosshavet catchers accompanying the *C.A. Larsen* in 1926-7 went, (p. 126) but there are other claimants for these honours: first catcher fitted with a gangway — Salvesen's *Silva* in 1925; first catcher built to burn oil — *Southern Floe* (1923). Subsequently, of course, oil fuel became universal, and many boats built before 1923 had their furnaces modified for oil firing.

For their 1923 expedition, Rosshavet hired a number of Australians in Hobart, including a young journalist named Alan Villiers. From these experiences he was to write *Whaling in the Frozen South* (1925), the first of many books from the pen of this prolific maritime author.

This attractively laid out book will appeal immensely to everyone interested in "modern" whaling history.

John H. Harland
Kelowna British Columbia


Cet ouvrage est la biographie de John Le Boutillier, personnage qui a marqué l'histoire de la Gaspésie durant la première moitié du dix-neuvième siècle. Tout d'abord, dans ce livre, il s'agissait d'attirer l'attention sur le site du Manoir Le Boutillier de l'Anse-au-Griffon. Plus précisément, l'auteur, Mario Mimeault, estime que ce livre servira à interpréter l'influence
socio-économique de John Le Boutillier.

On connaît déjà l'auteur pour ses recherches sur la pêche gaspésienne aux dix-septième et dix-huitième siècles. Son ouvrage comprend trois chapitres traitant des activités de Le Boutillier, à savoir sa vie familiale, sa carrière politique et son commerce de la morue. Pour tracer le portrait de ce personnage intéressant, Mimeault a eu recours, entre autres, aux archives familiales des Le Boutillier pour montrer surtout la nature des relations entre John Le Boutillier et ses enfants. C'est là où l'on constate que ses fils n'étaient pas aussi travailleurs que leur père l'aurait voulu. À part cela, soulignons cependant la richesse de la bibliographie, qui, j'en suis sûr, encouragera d'autres chercheurs à poursuivre ce projet. C'est ainsi qu'on remarquera des références glanées des archives nationales du Canada et de celles du Québec, privées ou gouvernementales. Ces données sur les activités de l'entreprise de pêche de Le Boutillier sont de grande valeur, puisqu'elles permettent de comparer ses rendements avec ceux d'autres firmes anglo-normandes comme celles des Robin et des Fruing. De plus, l'ouvrage nous fournit des interprétations utiles à l'histoire sociale des pêches canadiennes.

C'est en traitant du portrait de Le Boutillier qu'on s'aperçoit qu'il fut un grand Gaspésien. De fait, sa carrière couvre presque quarante années d'activités variées, sociales, politiques et économiques. L'auteur en arrive à la conclusion que quel que soit le domaine auquel s'intéressait Le Boutillier, il a toujours maintenu une grande discipline de travail et a montré une détermination à toute épreuve. Sur le plan politique, il a vécu les troubles de 1837-38, l'Union des deux Canadas et enfin la Confédération canadienne. Certes, il y a des chercheurs qui diront que Le Boutillier était opportuniste puisqu'il profitait sans doute de son statut politique pour faire fructifier ses affaires. Toutefois, il a grandement contribué au développement économique de la région en donnant du travail à des centaines de Bas-Laurentiens et de Gaspésiens.

En ce qui concerne l'histoire maritime, le troisième chapitre est sans doute le plus important. On y trouve non seulement le réseau régional des activités de pêche de Le Boutillier mais aussi le genre de relations qu'il entretenait avec ses pêcheurs, ses activités de construction navale et ses contacts sur les marchés internationaux. De l'expérience de Le Boutillier comme homme d'affaires, retenons qu'il s'est rendu compte assez rapidement que saisir les biens d'un pêcheur endetté n'était pas nécessairement la meilleure solution pour les deux parties. On préférait, par exemple, que le débiteur travaille comme matelot jusqu'à ce que sa dette soit remboursée.

Si l'étude de Mimeault est un peu courte et quelque peu rapide sur certains points, l'auteur a cependant atteint le but qu'il s'était assigné. De plus, l'ouvrage nous fournit des interprétations utiles à l'histoire maritime des pêches canadiennes.

Nicolas Landry
Shippagan, New Brunswick


This is a useful introduction to the political problems facing decision-makers within and outside the Norwegian fishing industry around 1989-90 when cod stocks in the Barents Sea were at a historical low. The Board of the University of Tromsø commented on the crisis: "Not only the value of the ocean resources but also the values of our culture are in danger." The Norwegian government financed a number of crisis studies, and parts of the present work were written directly for the Coastal Expertise Committee in 1990. With additional material written for readers of this English version (the book was originally published in Norwegian), the book reads as a well-balanced and insightful discussion of the options open to political initiative, both in the short and the long term.

In the end the fisheries crisis did not last as long as many had feared, and quotas were more than doubled in 1993 as compared to the catastrophic year of 1990. Nevertheless, Jentoft's book — apart from some alarmist prophesies which should have been pruned from the book — still is well worth reading. The strategic
problems facing fishermen, the processing industry, biologists, and the government — and basically the future of human settlement in the far north of Norway — make up most of the book, and Jentoft treats them lucidly.

Jentoft's main contribution is an analysis of fisheries management and the role of the fishermen themselves. In a chapter with the suggestive title "Should the fox guard the chicken?" he argues that fisheries politics has usually been more concerned with content legitimacy than with procedural legitimacy. The system developed over the past twenty years is top-heavy and the results have been dictated by tactical compromises, not by strategic consensus. The fishermen have been alienated, and the bureaucrats have used Garret Hardin's well-known theory of "the tragedy of the commons" to argue that the individual pursuit of the fishermen blinds them to the strategic interest of safeguarding the biological resource. Jentoft does not accept this widely held view and argues that "Democracy has its problems, but it is preferable to dictatorship. In the present situation, the fishermen must be made responsible, not lose authority. Giving them greater responsibility...may lead to their becoming more responsible in a moral sense." (p. 116) Without presenting an ideal regulatory system, Jentoft does us all a service in opening a discussion on the democratic problem in a reasoning, rather than passionate way. The book is highly recommended to everyone who wants a fresh look at a wide array of contemporary problems in the fishing industry, and should be of particular interest to Canadians who are experiencing their own fisheries crisis at the moment on their Atlantic coast.

Poul Holm
Esbjerg, Denmark


Dianne Newell's marvellous examination of the role of Native people in the west coast fishery has already received numerous accolades — including this Society's 1993 Keith Matthews Award for Best Book — and rightly so, for this is a fine piece of scholarship. Tangled Webs of History is one of those rare pieces of historical writing — well-researched, accessible, and extremely relevant. The Pacific Coast fishery, while not yet in the desperate shape of the Newfoundland industry, has become a major focus for public debate and increasing racial tensions. The prospect of settling aboriginal land claims and ensuring Native people greater control over the coastal fishery has been met with growing hostility among segments of the non-Native population. As is so often the case when passions run high, truth and understanding are the first casualties.

Newell begins her study with a useful examination of the aboriginal fishery in which she argues that, although "there is no reason to believe that Indians on the Pacific Coast were perfect conservationists," (p. 45) indigenous systems of resource management proved more effective than state-regulation. The book then places Indian participation within the context of the evolution of the west coast fishery. Newell describes how Indian fishers were first drawn into the commercial fishery and then, as corporate and government involvement increased, gradually pushed out of a lucrative and culturally significant enterprise. The final chapters document contemporary legal, political and administrative initiatives relating to the Natives' future role in the industry.

The book has many strengths. It contains a wealth of statistical information on the changing nature of the west coast fishery and aboriginal participation in the industry. The definitive maps, figures and tables stand as a major contribution and will no doubt be cited for years to come. The analysis of the various legal and administrative restrictions introduced by the federal government in an attempt to regulate the fishery is excellent, and provides a particularly useful discussion of how these rules often worked against aboriginal interests. One wishes that Newell had occasionally allowed more "colour" into her account, but any weakness in this area is offset by the author's useful descriptions of the changing technology of harvesting and industry business practices.
Newell's study advances several key themes: that aboriginal people have retained a long-standing relationship with salmon harvesting, that the expansion of commercial fishing initially brought new opportunities that many Native people acted upon, that federal regulations have typically served corporate and non-Native rather than aboriginal interests, that aboriginal leaders and organizations have placed greater Native control over the fishery as a top priority for many decades, and that government efforts to regulate the industry have not been particularly successful. As if to prove her points, within months of the publication of Tangled Webs, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans announced that its estimates for several salmon runs had proven far off the mark and that major changes in allowable harvests were required. Not surprisingly, given Newell's analysis, several observers alleged that Native fishers were overfishing, thus further inflaming the ongoing debate over the future of the Native fishery.

Tangled Webs of History is an extremely valuable addition to British Columbia's historiography, and an antidote to the strong positions that have been taken late in the debate over the future of the coastal fishery. The book also provides compelling evidence for the value of history as an element in public policy discussions, and is a superb example of "engaged" scholarship, which seeks to contribute to contemporary debates without surrendering the principles of scholarship. All participants in the current wrangle over the future of British Columbia's fishing industry would be well-advised to read Tangled Webs. Dr. Newell is to be congratulated for producing a very fine study.

Ken Coates
Prince George, British Columbia


This book, as is stated in the introduction, aims to allow those involved in Nova Scotian deep sea trawl and scallop fisheries to speak for themselves in giving an account of the hardships and hazards which are inescapably associated with their work. The book emanates from a concern for safety at sea, and the research work has had help from both government and private sources; even so, official recognition of the problem has been tardy, and has actually been promoted mainly as a by-product of the development of off-shore oil. The work consists essentially of a series of selected and edited interviews with the personnel in different positions: inevitably the great part of the interviews are with fishermen, but with the significant and pertinent addition of one with the former owner of a fishing company and one with a fisherman's wife. In working on the book the author went on fishing boats operating offshore, and also hired a team of interviewers to broaden the information base. As well as illustrating in direct terms the character of much of the work involved in fishing, it is set in a social context, and the particular problems for fishing families also figure prominently.

The book falls into twelve chapters: one is devoted to an introduction, one to a brief description of the offshore fisheries, and eight given to interviews with individuals; one chapter includes three shorter interviews, and a last chapter summarizes the consequences for family life. With information gathered in a spontaneous interview format, there are inevitable problems of editing the material for publication. Each of the interview chapters becomes a continuous story (or "tale") in its own right, although with considerable jumping from one thing to another: while this is up to a point arbitrary or artificial, it can be justified as the best means of presenting the material for publication. Each of the interview chapters becomes a continuous story (or "tale") in its own right, although with considerable jumping from one thing to another: while this is up to a point arbitrary or artificial, it can be justified as the best means of presenting the work to the reader, and care has been taken to interfere as little as possible with the words and train of thought of the interviewees. Also, with the material from two hundred interviews to select from, it has been possible to demonstrate the reactions of a comprehensive cross-section of people, despite the variations in ability to communicate and reflect encountered with the personnel in the sample. Their age range allows the experience of three generations to be garnered. Furthermore, the worries caused ashore as well as afloat are featured. Thus, in addition to the interview with the fisherman's
wife, the casualty was also interviewed.

There is a commendable awareness of the issue of safety at sea on the part of several people in responsible positions interviewed: this is especially the case with the mariner who had become owner of a small fishing company, and of the captain. Yet at the same time the experience of various others like the deckhand and the casualty do contain indications of the strong pressures there are to keep catching fish, and to the way that safety can be compromised through, for example, fishing in difficult weather, continuing fishing for excessive numbers of hours, and inadequate attention to fishing gear and equipment. Of course there are inescapable problems here with the very character of fishing. The pressures come from companies, skippers and also from the crews themselves: and the fact that the system of dividing up the proceeds means that the returns for all depend very much on the size of the catch fosters an acceptance of risk and danger as well as giving an incentive.

In all, this is a valuable addition to the literature on fishing and the communities for which it is a livelihood; more particularly it focuses on the hazards associated with it. The main contribution is achieved by multiplying cases of the particular rather than the general: systematic analysis is perforce largely confined to the introductory material. Nevertheless the accounts in this volume will strike a chord wherever fishing is pursued as a livelihood: there are important common denominators in the distinctive occupation that is fishing.

James R. Coull
Aberdeen, Scotland


Complementing *Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea*, edited by Donald McRae and Gordon Munro (UBC Press, 1989; reviewed here by me in volume I, No. 1, January 1991), we now have *The Sea Has Many Voices: Oceans Policy for a Complex World*, consisting of sixteen essays on as many aspects of how we Canadians use our three contiguous oceans and treat (or mistreat) our marine environment. The essays are the product of the OCEANS '21 project of the Oceans Institute of Canada. Although written in 1989 or earlier, several essays include in their concluding paragraphs up-dates to March or April 1993. They deal with a broad range of issues, many of them usually thought of as being peripheral to the main stream of ocean-related policies. Since fifteen of the nineteen contributors have some association with Dalhousie University's School for Resource and Environmental Studies, and since the editor, Cynthia Lamson, is an assistant professor of environmental studies at Dalhousie, there is naturally an emphasis on Atlantic Ocean issues. Moreover, the only essay dealing exclusively with the Pacific, that in Part Two concerning the Haida Nation and environmentalists versus loggers and governments on South Moresby Island, has nothing to do with ocean issues. Nevertheless, there is sure to be something for every reader of this journal.

The essays are divided into four parts, each with an introduction by the editor and three or more case studies. The essays in Part One, "Competing Interests," illustrate the political dimensions of Canadian oceans policy-making. Part Two, "Conflicting Values," describes four localized resource-use conflicts. The three case studies in Part Three, "Calculating the Risks," are examples of complex resource problems such as harbour and estuary pollution and shellfish poisoning that have no proven solutions but which call for immediate cooperative action by the stakeholders to mitigate the problems. In Part Four, "Challenging the Status Quo," the contributors invite readers to think critically about how and how much of Canada's financial and human resources should be committed to the protection, administration, research and development of our ocean resources.

Whereas *Canadian Oceans Policy* was written mainly by academics, lawyers and political scientists who discussed what one might call the output side, Cynthia Lamson states that the contributors to *The Sea Has Many Voices*, who are mostly marine scientists and environmentalists, were asked to focus on oceans
policy-making from the input side. She claims, therefore, that this is "the first Canadian book to examine ocean policy in the making." (p.8) Lamson also points out in her general introduction that for more than twenty years the Government of Canada has been "edging towards the formation of an umbrella oceans policy," yet in that time has published only two major oceans policy papers, in 1973 and 1987. This despite the fact that, according to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, there were some fourteen different federal departments and agencies in 1987 overseeing seventy-five oceans-related programs involving more than 13,000 person-years and annual expenditures of $1.3 billion. (p.315) (I recall that when I was the Secretary of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Law of the Sea - ICLOS - from 1971 to 1975, eleven departments and agencies were regularly represented on the committee and at least two others maintained an interest but without actively participating.)

Ms Lamson suggests — correctly, in my opinion — that we Canadians generally are apathetic about ocean issues; but we do react — briefly — to crisis events and other problems of an immediate nature. We also expect our governments) to take all appropriate action.

The editor indicates that ocean policies (like any governmental policies) are political responses to perceived problems; but oceans policy-making in Canada has been highly politicized, sometimes reactive and ad hoc, susceptible to pressure from special interests, inconsistent and lacking continuity. This book emphasizes the roles and activities of the various stakeholders and pressure groups or special interests in the dynamics of oceans policy-making in Canada, and it raises critical questions about the process, the structure and even the function of Canada's oceans policy, while it recognizes that, after some twenty years, the problem, the policy, and the political streams are coming close to reaching a confluence.

There are a few oversights. In one of the essays in Part One and in another in Part Two there are references to "Maps 1 and 2" and "Maps 1, 2 and 3" respectively, yet in fact, the book includes no maps. Similarly, in one study in Part Two, there is a reference to a "Figure 1" which has not been included, though there are two figures in the essay on the funding of marine scientific research. Apart from these lapses, Dalhousie University's School for Resource and Environmental Studies and the McGill-Queen's University Press have delivered a fine and interesting volume, one which I commend to readers of this journal.

Allen D. Taylor
Cantley, Québec


The astonishing story of the lost conquistador, Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca (c.1491-c.1559), who in 1527 set off as treasurer of a Spanish expedition out to claim vast regions of today's Florida, Texas, and Louisiana for Spain, and ended up marginalized by his own people in his own country, is a classic of Spanish exploratory literature. In the words of this edition's editor, the conquistador's chronicle of his New World experiences is "seminal to the Hispanoamerican narrative tradition." Besides numerous editions in Spanish, Cabeza de Vaca's account has been translated into Italian, French, and German, and several times into English. This latest, carefully annotated version, based on Pupo-Walker's acclaimed critical Spanish edition, may well become authoritative in English.

Cabeza de Vaca's story is of a botched initiative that resulted in the deaths of several hundred men — the only survivors were Cabeza de Vaca himself and three companions. On one level it tells of hardships and suffering; on another it is the odyssey of a man who slowly awakens to the complexity of this world's realities, who comes to realize the hollowness of the imperial myth of bringing enlightenment to barbarians sunk in darkness. Tossed willy-nilly among peoples whose customs he never fully understands, completely cut off from his own familiar world, Cabeza de Vaca manages to cope with his circumstances, even at their most difficult. As he loses his initial arrogance,
confrontations turn to helpfulness, and the would-be conquistador and his companions find themselves operating as traders and even as healers. Humour is allowed to colour his reminiscences: Amerindians, he observes, are in a constant state of war, so that they are "as skilful in protecting themselves against their enemies as if they had been reared in Italy." According to Pupo-Walker's footnote, that remark reflects the fact that Cabeza de Vaca had seen military service in Italy. The conquistador gives us our first description of the Amerindian use of fire, both to control vegetation as well as the movements of game; and his is the first European report of buffalo, whose meat he finds better than that of Spanish cattle. He and his companions wander for eight years from tribal nation to tribal nation before finally encountering Spaniards, only to be distressed at their cavalier cruelty to Amerindians. He does not see that such behaviour will bring the New World peoples around to accepting Christianity and becoming loyal Spanish subjects.

Cabeza de Vaca's rejection of the values and practices of imperial Spain, and his painfully acquired appreciation of other forms of human society, do not stand him in good stead upon his return to his own world. In the end he is stripped of his important titles and offices, and is barred from the New World. He died "very poor," contrary to widespread reports that he was honoured at the end of his life. On the other hand he has been honoured by the fact that his chronicle has inspired a host of scholarly studies as well as literary works, including a novel published as recently as two years ago.

Cabeza de Vaca wrote and rewrote his chronicle between 1527 and 1554, never completely finalizing it. When it was published in 1555, there were no other such accounts of the New World against which it could be assessed; information was flooding in, but was only beginning to be systematized. Indications are that the conquistador's chronicle was read by New World historians Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo y Valdés (1478-1557) and Francisco López de Gómara (1510-60?), both of whom produced major works that are valuable sources for scholars today. Pupo-Walker thinks it very likely that the great defender of the Indians, Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484-1566), also read it.

The translation as well as the annotation of this edition respects the integrity of what was, in one sense, a spiritual journey. In particular, Pupo-Walker's introduction and annotations are useful, both in tracing out Cabeza de Vaca's biographical details, and in establishing the geography of the conquistador's odyssey, as well as the identities of the peoples among whom he found himself.

Olive Patricia Dickason
Edmonton, Alberta


The English merchant marine more than doubled in size during the half century from 1580 to 1630. The increasing numbers of ships and the establishment and development of trade routes in the Mediterranean and Atlantic exposed a material portion of the country's seaborne commerce to North African piracy. Scholars have written little of the damage to England's shipping throughout this period and have generally ignored the national effort to eradicate or at least counter the marauders. *Piracy and the English Government* is an attempt to fill in these neglected areas of maritime history by analyzing the economic, diplomatic, political, and social consequences of Barbary depredations from 1616 to 1642. An additional purpose of the book is to examine the policy-making processes of the early Stuarts and evaluate the effects of local, national, and international interests on the conduct of their domestic and foreign affairs.

Hebb's study deals with far more than administrative and institutional matters. It also offers revisionist interpretations of works of sundry historians. His account of Sir Robert Mansell's operations against Algiers in the 1620s diverges dramatically from that provided almost a century ago by Julian Corbett. According to Hebb, Corbett's primary error was to allow his own concern with the pressing strategic problems created by Wilhelm IPs programme of
naval expansion to direct his interpretation of earlier events. Without being fully conscious of what he did, explains Hebb, Corbett refashioned the past in a manner that enabled it to serve the present. Samuel Rawson Gardiner's work also comes under scrutiny, particularly his evaluation of royal schemes to increase revenues. Gardiner's presentation is factually accurate, but Hebb argues that his tendency to ignore various aspects of Caroline political machinations led him into numerous errors.

Perhaps the most insightful segment of *Piracy and the English Government* is the chronological context it provides for examining the evolution of naval administration. The medieval systems of management and logistics used by the Tudors were, in the seventeenth century, systemically inadequate for underwriting construction of large fleets or sustaining blockades of far-away ports. Mansell's failures at Algiers made it clear that substantive changes were necessary, and in due course they were instituted. Later English successes at sea — William Rainsborough's suppression of the Sallee raiders and the brilliant performances of the Commonwealth navy — were not the results of mere chance, increased command effectiveness, or simply examples of tactical genius. They flowed from the establishment and maturation of more sophisticated and efficient methods of directing the navy during the reigns of James I and Charles I.

The book provides abundant evidence of the author's analytic and narrative talents. His estimate of the amount of shipping taken by the Barbary corsairs is convincing, as is the figure of 8,000 he suggests as the approximate number of Christian men, women, and children captured and sold into slavery. The accounts of the prisoners' sojourns through Algerian dungeons, their experiences as items of trade at various slave markets, and their lives in bondage read more like reports of fictional adventures than true stories of captivity.

*Piracy and the English Government* is a meticulously researched investigation of a facet of naval history about which little is known. The author has painstakingly examined the relevant manuscript materials, and is especially well-grounded in the published sources. Unfortunately, the study suffers from the difficulty that afflicts almost all accounts of naval operations off the northern coast of Africa. It provides only the European half of the history. Perhaps in some future age, Arabic sources from the period will be unearthed and made available to complete the picture. Until then, Hebb's work will probably remain the standard version of England's efforts to suppress Mediterranean pirates in the early seventeenth century.

B.R. Burg
Phoenix, Arizona


It is good to have these sixteen essays by Ashin Das Gupta grouped together and so readily available, for some of them were published in quite obscure journals and collections. I had read all of them before, but it was excellent to be able to read them as a whole and see his main themes elaborated and developed.

Ashin Das Gupta was the pioneer of the modern study of the Indian Ocean, but his interest was not really the Indian Ocean as a whole, but rather India and the Indian Ocean. In other words, he implicitly saw India as the fulcrum around which the trade of the ocean was oriented. This is not to say that he ever tried to theorise his perceptions, for he remained a scholar who was reluctant to try and draw wider comparative or theoretical conclusions from his data. We will find in his work no discussion of, for example, the wider concerns of Niels Steensgaard, K.N. Chaudhuri, Philip Curtin or Immanuel Wallerstein. Nor did he presume to discuss the general characteristics of the coastal society about which he wrote, to investigate whether people on the littoral of the Indian Ocean have any social, economic, or cultural traits in common which may set them off as a whole from inland people.

The themes in these essays are several. A prominent one is the uncertain world of the Indian maritime merchant between 1500 and 1800, subject to wildly fluctuating markets and other uncertainties, but not usually, at least in
India, to political pressure. As he so gracefully put it, "Historians normally invoke the Mughal to account for the brittleness of mercantile property. I believe we should do better to study the Indian Ocean market which was more ruthless than any oriental despot." (XIV, p.34) A second recurring motif is the world of Surat and its merchants, where their trade goods came from, where they went, how they were bought, transported and sold. More generally, what he has given us, better than anyone else, is a sense of the profound changes which occurred during his period, changes which were plain to be seen in the world of the merchant, but which spread over into all aspects of Indian life. He constantly stressed that the arrival of the Europeans in the sixteenth century made little difference to Indian sea trade for some centuries. As he put it, "the world of the Indian merchant was not changed in any significant manner by the trading of the Europeans till empires were established." (XIV, p.33)

The fourth major theme is related to this, for he saw a connection between the fate of the Islamic empires in Mughal India and Safavid Iran and the success of his merchants. He was in fact arguing two things here. On the one hand, he rejected categorically older notions of despotic oriental rulers interfering with and plundering merchants. On the other hand he claimed, though not always consistently, that stable Muslim empires in a general way fostered trade, at least indirectly. As the "Islamic Peace" ended around 1700 merchants suffered, with the coup de grâce delivered some time later by resurgent Europeans. This of course raises larger issues to do with the effectiveness of early modern empires and the degree to which their stated intentions, whether benevolent or malevolent, were actually put into operation in real life.

Any reader interested in early modern trade, in the role of the state in this, and in the transition to European dominance, could find no better place to start than in these collected essays. Das Gupta's peers have often envied him his graceful style, as for example in this description of Dutch attitudes to Indian shipping: "But the vexations of sailing with the Gujaratis were intolerable. The Gujaratis had little sense of sailing in formation. Each nakhuda (commander) was a little god on his own ship and displayed the waywardness of immortals." (XI, p.125) While occasionally the style becomes irritatingly mannered, overall these essays are a joy to read. The interested reader will also want to read his two books (Malabar in Asian Trade, 1740-1800, Cambridge, 1967; Merchants and the Decline of Surat, c. 1700-1750, Wiesbaden, 1973), and indeed some of these essays read as preliminary versions of material later incorporated in these books. But there is also much that is new, provocative, interesting, even annoying, in this valuable collection.

M.N. Pearson
Sydney, Australia


Kenneth Morgan has undertaken global research in preparing this focused monograph on Bristol's role in major transatlantic trades during the eighteenth century. English, American, West Indian, Australian, Welsh, and Portuguese archival sources all support this re-examination, as does the extensive bibliography of secondary sources. Statistically supported descriptions of Bristol's slave, tobacco, and sugar trades are the essence of this work, but its purpose is to explain the relative decline of Bristol in these trades in comparison with Liverpool and Glasgow.

Readers of The Northern Mariner will be particularly drawn to the chapters on shipping and its patterns, including thirty-three of the book's forty-nine tables. The strengths and limitations of the port itself are examined, emphasizing unfulfilled potential for port improvement late in the century. Morgan uses Bristol's shipping to Jamaica and Virginia to comment on scholarly debates about the sources of productivity change. Bristol shipping benefitted from the growing dominance of shuttle voyages and the commitment of ships to regular routes. Efficiencies derived from shorter passages were offset by increasing turn-around times. Shuttle voyages were predominant in Bristol's Barbados, Jamaica, and Virginiatraffic,
while voyages to Newfoundland, Boston, Philadelphia, Charleston, and St. Kitts were usually multilateral. Here, as elsewhere, the extensive statistics tend to confirm rather than revise what is already known.

Bristol could not compete with London or Liverpool in price or delivery of a wide variety of exports. This was true even before the south Lancashire cotton mills began producing cheap, washable, and cool clothing for the tropics. By concentrating on the last half of the century, Morgan sees the Irish provisions trade as more peripheral to the West Indies traffic than it was earlier.

Slavers using the Bristol Channel were more vulnerable in war than were vessels going "north about" Ireland to Liverpool. Morgan argues that by switching to successful privateering, rather than maintaining their place in the trades with letter-of-marque ships, Bristol weakened itself. Uncompetitiveness in exports, increased competition in West Africa, demographic failure of the leading African trading families, and growing anti-slavery convictions among Bristol's Quaker merchants, all contributed to the decline of Bristol's slave trade.

Bristol's tobacco trade gradually concentrated in fewer hands, and emphasized the rather extensive regional market rather than re-export. Morgan proves that some Bristol tobacco houses switched from consignment to direct purchases of tobacco, establishing stores in Virginia's York River district.

With England's per capita sugar consumption rising from one to twenty-five pounds per year during the century after 1670, sugar remained Bristol's most lucrative transatlantic trade. This industry became concentrated and specialized comparatively early, and served an extensive home market which included Ireland. More might be done with Morgan's observation that the sugar trade changed completely by 1750, as the tobacco trade was moving away from it.

Morgan's statistical comparison of Bristol with Liverpool and Glasgow is interesting, though the assumption that Bristol could have been Liverpool by 1800 is not self-evident. This is not the sequel to David H. Sacks' magisterial The Widening Gate: Bristol and the Atlantic Economy, 1450-1700 (Berkeley, 1991), nor a complete study of Bristol's seaborne trade in the eighteenth century. However, Morgan has confirmed much and corrected a little of our understanding of Bristol's major colonial trades and, in the process, has provided statistics for which specialists will be particularly grateful.

Ian K. Steele
London, Ontario


Histories of pre-colonial African regions that lay within trading range of the Atlantic continue to be dominated by the transatlantic slave trade. In this, as in other respects, vestiges of the colonial era continue to be in evidence today. The trend in the 1970s represented by Philip Curtin and Werner Peukert and more recently by John Thornton to pay more attention to the domestic economy and society of Africans separate from the Atlantic is a minor strain in the historiography to which James Searing's book on Senegal clearly does not belong. Searing does actually devote a large part of his book to the domestic trade in grain (hitherto largely ignored by historians), to the internal affairs of Wolof and Sereer states, and above all to the trade along the Senegal River. But the key developments in these areas — except for major droughts in the 1750s — are triggered and shaped for Searing by Atlantic commerce. The latter was first dominated by slaves and then, from the later eighteenth century, by commodities produced (or collected) by slaves — first gum, used in textiles, and then peanuts. The main effect of Atlantic commerce was to commercialize traditional agriculture in the Senegal River valley. Surplus grain fed the slaves travelling through this area destined for the Americas. When severe drought struck after 1750, slave volumes fell dramatically. Thereafter the region reoriented itself to gum and peanuts.

The book is based on extensive and original sources from both French and English archives. It is clearly written, and the argument has
considerable internal consistency. Thus, for Searing, in sharp contrast to John Thornton in his *Africa and Africans*, Europeans were considerably wealthier and more technologically advanced by the late seventeenth century when the English and French became dominant in Senegambia's Atlantic commerce. If Europeans could not yet occupy and colonize, they could indirectly restructure economies and societies. The best part of the book is on the societies of St. Louis and Goree, where Searing depicts a "middle ground" between European and indigenous peoples that has intriguing parallels with recent work on eighteenth century mid-western North America. In both locations the middle ground was overwhelmed by European conquest in the nineteenth century. This section concludes with an analysis of the ending of slavery in St. Louis and Goree, a subject not previously dealt with.

Yet the overall argument has a major problem. The level of exports relative to the population just could not have been very great. While the book keeps reasonable track of physical volumes of trade, the author makes no effort to put a value on exports and relate these to estimates of the population of region. If this had been done, it would be immediately apparent that a slave trade of 3,000 to 6,000 a year (one quarter the levels reached in other African regions), and the gum exports that followed (of lesser value than slaves before 1800) could not have the impact that Searing sees. Per capita exports cannot have been more than a few pennies a year. Even allowing for a large multiplier effect, that economist's concept most beloved by historians, the seventeenth-century Senegalese would have had to have been in the Stone Age for any possible values from this level of trade to have had the effect posited here. This belies the sophisticated indigenous trade, social structures, and cultures known to have existed in the region before 1700.

Nevertheless the book occupies a major niche in African and Atlantic history, as well as the more specialised field of Senegambian history, and will have a long scholarly life.

David Eltis
Kingston, Ontario


Arthur Power Dudden certainly has distilled an enormous volume of printed sources in his research to produce *The American Pacific: From the Old China Trade to the Present.* In the course of this narrative he provides an overview of America's involvement with the entire Pacific Ocean and its rim powers since the inception of the United States. The scope is as vast as the largest ocean on earth and spans time from the pre-historic migrations of 35,000 years ago through the struggles of the twentieth century. The book is intended to be a survey capable of instructing the student or providing a helpful review for the historian. Sometimes volumes with such a wide goal achieve nothing, but this is not the case with this work which is enriched and saved by Dudden's scholarship, by his sense of fair play in dealing with rival powers, and by his sense of humour. Numerous chapters dealing with familiar topics suddenly provide a new perspective, or a new anecdote which serves to clarify or enlighten a historical point.

The opening chapter, "Unfurling the Flag," lays the groundwork and reiterates the fact that while general trade and furs were important in opening the Pacific to Americans, whaling provided the greatest stimulation to the development of American geographical knowledge of the Pacific. Dudden notes Alexander Starbuck's listing of forty-six whaling voyages between 1791 and 1800. At first confined largely to the southern reaches of the Pacific and the East Coast of South America, these commercial adventures would reach the Hawaiian Islands in 1820 and British Columbia and Alaska by 1835. The Yankee whalers were often the first Americans on the scene and, in spite of their canny secretiveness, ultimately carried the knowledge of new lands back to their home ports.

Many historical figures are mentioned and Dudden pulls no punches in evaluating them. Lieutenant Charles Wilkes, commander of the Great United States Exploring Expedition (1838-1842), is given credit for being the arrogant, egotistical misanthrope that he was. However,
Dudden’s observation, that "Wilkes would become renowned mainly for his blunder in forcibly removing two rebel emissaries en route to England aboard RMS Trent and almost singlehandedly bringing Great Britain into the war against the Union as the ally of the Confederacy..." (p.17) could leave the impression that Britain entered the Civil War on the side of the Confederacy, when in fact saner heads in London and Washington narrowly avoided such a disaster.

The material on the Hawaiian Islands is particularly well organized and presented. The role of Americans in developing ties with the islands is shown with balanced credit to heroes and villains, and incompetents on all sides. During the 1890s Dudden superbly shows that if Queen Liliuokalani left something to be desired where moderation and diplomacy were concerned, her American opponents were no candidates for sainthood in seeking to destroy Hawaiian independence as a necessary step toward American annexation (1898).

In many ways Dudden's handling of "Destiny in the Philippines" is his finest piece of work. The Spanish-American War accomplished little in terms of American control of the Philippine Islands. After the "victory" came the 'conquest' of the islands in a long and bloody war against native insurgents, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, who considered their hard won independence stripped from them by the Americans. Three years of bloody warfare produced a death toll that may have exceeded 200,000 amongst the insurgents and innocent civilians, while more American soldiers died in the fighting than in the whole of the Spanish-American War both in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The story of the Philippines concludes on July 4, 1946, with the independence of the islands. Some greater detail in the treatment of the period since 1946 would have been appreciated even if there are other later references.

Dudden provides a survey of World War II in the Pacific with credit and condemnation alike. The critical failure of American leadership to understand different concepts of international relations is shown to have worked against the United States with regard to Japan in 1941, China in the late 1940s, Korea in 1950, and Vietnam in the entire post-1945 period. The failure of American foreign policy strategists to understand the mindset of other cultures frequently led to unforeseen crises. The failure of Americans to understand the Japanese system of doing business and the failure of the Japanese to comprehend the depths of American bitterness over their trade practices remains one of the dominant factors of the present day. Dudden points this out and leaves one wanting more.

In a final assessment, periodically it is helpful for historians to set back, digest and survey the research on an area or period. Arthur Power Dudden's *The American Pacific: From the Old China Trade to the Present* is such a work which commands our respect because of the breadth of its vision and the perceptiveness of the author. Dudden's work should be part of everyone's library purchase list.

William Henry Flayhart III

Dover, Delaware


Jimmy M. Skaggs, a Professor of Economics at Wichita State University in Kansas, has told a little known story of US government aid to private enterprises that led to the earliest examples of American overseas expansion. From a variety of historical, economic, geographical, diplomatic and journalistic sources he has fashioned an intriguing and sometimes amusing account. It began prior to the Civil War when declining agricultural productivity in the United States led to a demand for fertilizers to enrich the soil. Guano, or bird droppings from islands off the coast of Peru, proved to be a highly effective fertilizer, but the costs put it beyond the reach of many farmers. These disgruntled farmers put pressure on their elected officials to find a cheaper source of supply. This eventually led to the passage of the Guano Islands Act of 1856. Under this law Americans who discovered uninhabited islands, rocks or keys, and who filed the appropriate papers with the State Department, received exclusive rights to occupy such sites for the purpose of mining guano which was
to be sold in the United States. Such claims were not regarded as permanent acquisitions, but were said "to appertain" to the US during the time that guano was being extracted. Between 1856 and 1903 Americans laid claim to ninety-four islands, rocks and keys mainly in the Pacific and the Caribbean. Sixty-six of these places were temporarily recognized by the State Department, but fewer than two dozen of these were ever mined. At the present time the US still owns nine guano islands.

Meanwhile domestic rock phosphate production grew after 1868 as the imports of guano declined. Beginning in 1869 Secretary of State Hamilton Fish annulled to some extent the force of the Guano Act by failing to vouch for the legality of the mortgages and assignments and simply filing the papers submitted to his department. The State Department abandoned as many islands as possible. But the Treasury Department printed lists of various appurtenances until 1902 because they were exempt from import taxes. Long after the economic value of many of the appurtenances had passed, they were retained for strategic reasons. In 1933 State Department lawyers said that the US had no valid claim under the Guano Act to Kingman Reef, but the following year President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed an Executive Order placing it and Johnson Atoll and Wake Island under the jurisdiction of the US Navy. In 1935 the State Department announced that the US had reclaimed Baker, Howland and Jarvis Islands.

Maritime historians will be most interested in the guano trade, including how the ships were loaded and the effect of the cargo on the hulls and the environment of the ships. There is much useful information on the domestic guano market, on the firms involved, on the terrible labour conditions under which the guano was extracted, on the use of a few of the appurtenances during the Cold War, and their present status. The appendices provide the text of the original Guano Act and later revisions, as well as a listing of all places claimed or acquired under the statute and their ultimate dispositions. All in all, this is the definitive book on an obscure but important subject.

Harold D. Langley
Washington, DC


Joseph Arthur de Gobineau was a French diplomat posted to North America in 1859 as part of an Anglo-French commission whose task it was to investigate problems arising out of French fishing rights in Newfoundland. He sailed from Brest to the French island of St. Pierre adjacent to Newfoundland, then to Sydney and Halifax before spending several weeks on Newfoundland's west coast. He subsequently visited St. John's before retracing some of his earlier steps on his way back to France. *Voyage à Terre-Neuve* records his impressions and experiences. It was written in hopes of making some money out of his travels. The work has been reprinted since, but always in French; this is the first English translation. Michael Wilkshire, the editor, also includes some of the diplomatic correspondence associated with Gobineau's mission as well as a short work of fiction set largely in western Newfoundland — mediocre by literary standards but revealing because it was based on Gobineau's experiences. These writings all provide impressionistic glimpses of the fishing societies and economies of St. Pierre and Newfoundland. The cashless nature of an economy based on truck, the methods employed in the banks and shore fisheries of that era, the importance of the French and English naval patrols in providing isolated inhabitants with medical, legal, and spiritual assistance, all are described. Gobineau's observations do little to change our perceptions of nineteenth-century Newfoundland; most simply reinforce the impressions of better-known witnesses like Edward Wix and Joseph Jukes. Gobineau's value rests largely in the French perspective which he brings to nineteenth-century Newfoundland and in the particular attention he gave to western Newfoundland, where the so-called "French Shore" extended from Cape Ray north to Cape St. John.

What is surprising is Gobineau's poor knowledge of the French experience in North America generally and of French fishing rights in the North Atlantic in particular. Time and
again, he gets things wrong: how and when France established itself on Cape Breton Island, the conquest of Canada, the details and sequence of changes in the treaties defining France's fishing rights in Newfoundland. At the very least, we are forced to consider Anglo-French negotiations in a new light.

Wilkshire uses many official British and French records, but he is not an historian (by profession, he is a professor of French). Thus, in placing Gobineau into an historical context, he makes no use of research by Orville Murphy or the more recent analyses by Jean-François Brière and J.K. Hiller into the diplomacy of French fishing rights in Newfoundland. Wilkshire's light hand in annotating Gobineau's text can also be frustrating — there is no commentary about the several warships Gobineau encounters or about the practices and customs Gobineau records. Notwithstanding these irritations, Wilkshire has given us another window into Newfoundland's nineteenth-century past.

Olaf Uwe Janzen
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


Dean Beeby is a journalist with the Atlantic Bureau of Canadian Press and also the co-author, with William Kaplan, of Moscow Dispatches: Inside Cold War Russia. In a Crystal Land arises, however, not from professional preoccupations but from what Beeby calls his "Antarctic obsession." (p.xii)

To a subject close to his heart Beeby brings his skills as a professional journalist. The book has been well researched in primary and published sources and the prose is clear and workmanlike. Beeby hopes that some of his readers will be coming to the story of Antarctic exploration for the first time and he is particularly good at providing the necessary background information — historical, biographical and technical — for the Antarctic neophyte.

Why a book about Canadians in the Ant-arctic? One of Beeby's reasons for writing In a Crystal Land is his belief in the importance of Antarctic scientific research to Canadian understanding of the Arctic. Although he does not bang the drum loudly on this issue, one gathers that he is in favour of full Canadian membership in the Antarctic Treaty. Canadians should know, therefore, that history has given us a stake in Antarctica.

Beeby also believes that the Canadian experience in the Antarctic has something to tell us about the national character and that the adventures of these men at the bottom of the world have as important a place in Canadian history as the stories of Arctic explorers and fur traders. Even readers with so catholic an interest in Antarctic history that they already knew about all the men whose tales are told here will be interested by the focus on them as Canadians. And if there are readers who knew about all these men, I take my hat off to them. Many will not, and so, with no apologies, I offer Canada's Antarctic roll of honour.

The first name on the list is that of Hugh Evans, assistant zoologist on Carsten Borchgrevink's Southern Cross expedition, 1899-1900. Then come three Canadians associated with the greatest British names in Antarctic exploration: William Mitchell, surgeon on Shackleton's Nimrod, 1908-1909; Charles Wright, scientist on Scott's Terra Nova expedition, 1910-1912; George Douglas, geologist on Shackleton's Quest expedition, 1921-1922. Al Cheesman served as pilot on Wilkins' 1929 Graham Land expedition. Seven Canadians played roles, in some cases crucial ones, in American expeditions. Frank Davies was a geophysicist on Byrd's 1928-1930 expedition, while Jack Bursey and Alan Innes-Taylor were dog-drivers. Bursey was back in Antarctica in 1939-1941 and 1955-1957. Herbert Hollick-Kenyon and J.H. "Red" Lymburner were pilots and Pat Howard an aircraft mechanic on Ellsworth's 1935-1936 expedition. Lymburner and J.B. Trereve were also pilots on Ellsworth's 1938 expedition. Winnipeg's own Andrew Taylor, today perhaps the best known of all Canadians in the Antarctic as one of the fathers of the British Antarctic Survey, joined "Operation Tabarin" as a surveyor and ended up as its commander, 1943-1946. (Sadly, Dr Taylor died a few months
before In a Crystal Land was published.) The harbour master of St. John's, Captain Robert Sheppard, also took part in "Operation Tabarin" as master of SS Eagle, a steam-powered wooden sealer. Last, but decidedly not the least, was Fred Roots, geologist on the Norwegian-Swedish-British Maudheim expedition, 1949-1951, while his brother Walter was tramping across South Georgia on a survey expedition.

The final chapter brings Canada’s story in the Antarctic up to date with references to Gareth Woods, a member of the 1985 "In the Footsteps of Scott" expedition, to the work of Canadian scientists in the Antarctic and to the use of Canadian technology (aircraft, tracked vehicles, prefabricated buildings).

Beeby suggests that there are special reasons why Canadians should have acquitted themselves well in Antarctica’s heroic age. It was not just a question of special skills — as scientists, bush pilots, dog-drivers — or of familiarity with severe cold and long stretches of time without the sight of a blade of grass. It was also their ability to get on with others even under the most trying circumstances, their avoidance of unnecessary risks, their quiet competence. In other words, these men embodied a cultural stereotype which Canadians value and like to think of as characteristic — the "can do" type who gets on with the job and does not call attention to his achievements. In a nation which values modesty, heroes can be hard to find. Thanks to Dean Beeby, we can now raise a quiet cheer for the Canadians whose names now dot the map of Antarctica.

Anne Morton
Winnipeg, Manitoba


This book is about mutiny, murder and plunder on the high seas. It recounts in summary fashion — sometimes very summary fashion — sixty-six stories about shipboard insurrections, of which twenty relate to incidents on naval vessels and the rest on merchant vessels. Included are descriptions of the alleged treason on Drake’s GoldenHind in 1578, Hudson's mutiny-inspired death in 1611, the saga of Bligh and the Bounty, the uprising in the Royal Navy in 1797 and the bloody mutiny on HMS Hermione that same year, including the delivery of the ship to the Spanish, its subsequent recapture by Captain Sir Hyde Parker of HMS Surprise, and the Royal Navy's relentless pursuit of the mutineers, the Plattsburgh mutiny and murders in 1814, the mutiny on the slaver Creole in 1841, and the infamous insurrection and hangings on USS Somers in 1844. The tragic outbreaks of insubordination on board HMS Wagner, the Globe, the Batavia, the Buckman, the Jefferson Borden, the Lennie, and the Pedro Varelo are all included. Haine also considers the celebrated revolutionary insurrection on the Russian battleship Potemkin in 1905 and the mutinies within the Imperial German Navy during 1917 and 1918 that speeded the fall of the Second Reich. The Invergordon Mutiny of 1931 and the Java­nese revolt and seizure of the Dutch battleship De Zeven Provinden in 1933 are two of the best-known naval rebellions of modern times, and their histories are also briefly retold here. In addition to the accounts of individual mutinies, the book has an introduction that sketches the nature of mutiny, its causes, its mechanics, and its penalties. The two appendices outline the history of punishments for mutiny in the British land and sea services, which provided a model for the regulations adopted by other nations, and reproduce philosophical comments and anecdotes about mutiny by two (unidentified) "old salts of the sea."

Haine’s narration is lively and often colourful. Apart from a few jarring errors (such as "Shurness" for Sheerness, the misdating of the Batavia mutiny and murders by two centuries, and the rather partial and heavy-handed characterization of the officers of the Imperial German Navy as sea-going Junkers), the book is a "good read." At the same time, I was disappointed that Haine did not make more effort to link the various mutinies more explicitly and in greater detail to the analytical material that appears in the Introduction. Also disappointing was the number of instances that Haine must confess that he was unable to determine whether or not legal
action was taken or the final disposition of cases involving mutineers. Still, the maps and illustrations are generally well reproduced, and the bibliography will be useful for any readers wishing to pursue this fascinating topic further.

G. Edward Reed
Ottawa, Ontario


How many conceive of navies as "permanent, centrally managed, and bureaucratized [sic] organizations for violence and protection"? Although the language of sea sociology may be jarring, it would be a serious mistake to turn away from this important book on that account. Jan Glete appears to have succeeded brilliantly in achieving his extremely challenging three-fold aim, to explain the role of navies in the efficient monopolization of violence by states, their position as growing organizations within states, and the interplay of dynamics and inertia within established institutions over the long term. His work will become the standard reference for comparative studies of naval power during the age of sail for many years to come.

Glete is primarily concerned with the growth of state-owned navies, the development and production of warships, and the balance of power at sea. His method is quantitative and comparative. He has subjected a multitude of figures on naval strengths and warship construction that are commonly cited in historical literature to intense critical study, and has considered all European and American navies during the three and a half centuries after 1500. The result is sometimes surprising and frequently controversial. It is certainly the most important study of the interplay between technology, naval power, and state formation yet written. Above all it is the work to which others will turn to check their own data and to obtain information when they can not get it for themselves. "Check Glete" will become a byword among naval historians. Yet, it remains an open question whether comparative studies of materiel is the best way to assess relative naval strengths.

Glete presents his material in three very unequal parts. Part 1, which takes the reader on a rapid, 100-page tour through naval technology and social theory concerning administrative development and state formation, serves as an extended introduction to the main body of the text. It may not be to every reader's taste, but study of its contents, especially the sections concerning the social construction of technology and naval administration, will repay the effort to master its expository tone. The book centres about Part 2 which comprises a 375-page study of the dynamics of naval armament arranged in four chronological chapters. Part 3, entitled "Navies and State Building," is a mere thirteen pages in length and serves as a too slim conclusion to the complete study. Interspersed throughout are 140 tables and twelve diagrams. Five appendices containing the author's analysis of the quantitative data on the world's navies during three and a half centuries follow: a 58-page bibliography completes the work.

This is not a comprehensive survey of the rise of sea power. Glete's chief concern is with the technical, material side of naval developments. He believes that a detailed comparative study of the quantifiable aspects of warships and navies will raise new questions about the relations between navies and nations. He also strives to show connections between organizing the use of navies and the interest groups behind them and between naval doctrine and technology. According to Glete four great developments affected the relations between states and navies during the period 1500-1860. First was the emergence of early modern navies marked by the combination of two late medieval innovations, the heavy cast gun and the three-masted sailing ship that evolved during the next century and a half. The second development, a qualitative change followed by a quantitative one, occurred from about the middle of the seventeenth century. Navies suddenly grew in size and administrative sophistication and became permanent fixtures of states. After 1720, navies reached the apogee of their influence in the
European struggle for world hegemony but paradoxically maritime and continental conflicts gradually became separated from one another for more than sixty years, only fusing together once more during the wars of the French Revolution and Empire. Finally, during the middle years of the nineteenth century, new technologies of iron plate, steam power, and steel guns utterly transformed navies as instruments that efficiently monopolized state violence.

However, it is Glete's painstaking computations of naval strengths that are particularly valuable. Any who have tried to do this for themselves or encountered the frequent misuse and abuse of data concerning early modern navies in history books will appreciate the author's efforts and ingenuity. Glete also rejects simple explanations. He appears especially anxious to avoid technological determinism in his study, rejecting both "demand pull" and "technological push" because they underestimate the importance of culture, mentality, history and institutions in the formation of demand and supply. Though he challenges the conclusions of many respected historians he tends to view developments in terms more sensitive to technology and tactics than to society and politics; questions of human resources, manpower, and skill scarcely enter his calculations of the relative strengths of navies and nations. Still, readers should enjoy working through the many arguments.

Some criticisms are unavoidable. The heavily didactic tone of Part 1 is annoying because the subject matter deserves more extended treatment. The main narrative is so inclusive that its foundations may be considered too slim and the result too compressed. Some students of this or that navy may find fault with the comparative nature of the study. In view of the author's central concern with warships and navies, it is unavoidable that his discussion of state formation is not as strong as the technical, material side of naval formation. Most readers will probably not be too concerned. It is to be hoped that they will focus their attention where the author intended, on the rich comparative and quantitative data about warships and navies and the question of their relation to nations.

James Pritchard
Kingston, Ontario


As Adrian Caruana, the noted authority on smoothbore ordnance, explains in his excellent and honest introduction, The Sea Gunner was the first English-language book written solely for the naval gunner. This should be enough to interest students of naval ordnance. Unfortunately, this early manual displays all the problems of the gunnery texts of its period, for it is not really an original work but a compilation from a variety of sources of all the knowledge that Seller (who, it turns out, had only a very rudimentary background in ordnance matters) thought the would-be gunner should know. Even worse, it appears that Seller was an instrument-maker trying to promote the sale of his "Sea Gunner's Rule," a maritime version of the standard land gunner's rule or measuring device which, of course, receives prominent mention in the text.

Thus, the book is largely a "Compendium of Vulgar Arithmetick" containing theorems that may or may not be useful, descriptions and drawings of ordnance that may or may not be accurate, and formulae for powder charges that may or may not be safe. For the ordnance researcher the best thing about this book is Caruana's introductory essay which not only places Seller in the context of his times but also provides an interesting and complete discussion of the science (or rather art) of gunnery in the latter decades of the seventeenth century.

Caruana's conclusion on p. xiii of his introduction sums up the problem of The Sea Gunner, he maintains that its "principal interest lies in the clues it seems to contain to the general state of knowledge of gunnery" as "it seems clear that many of Britain's proud merchant fleet went to sea with a woefully inadequate hotch-potch of armament, entrusted in the charge of some very imperfectly trained and informed 'gunners'." Having perused this early manual I can only say "Amen."

For this reason The Sea Gunner, with its stiff cover price will be of interest only to a few specialists. Nonetheless, Jean Boudriot Publica-
tions are on the right track in reprinting such manuals, particularly if they are as well introduced as was this one. I would, however, like to see more important and reliable texts brought out such as Sir Howard Douglas' *Treatise in Naval Gunnery* or R.W. Adye's *Pocket Gunner and Bombardier*. Their re-issue would not only render a great service to the students of ordnance but also result in publications with a broader market appeal.

I can only recommend this title to the most highly committed devotee of ordnance history.

Donald E. Graves
Ottawa, Ontario


Students of eighteenth-century navies have been fortunate of late to enjoy the scholarly works of Boudriot, Lavery and Coad. Lyon's book, which will be the standard reference for the Royal Navy's age of sail, joins the "must read" list. The venerable lists of Colledge will remain a useful alphabetical listing, covering more centuries and including Commonwealth ships, but for the Royal Navy from 1688-1855 Lyon's volume offers much more value.

The scope of this list is large: each of the hundreds of ships has entries on the designer, precise dates of ordering, laying the keel and launching, dockyard, dimensions of all decks, tonnage, complement, gun allocations and sizes by deck, eventual fate, and the existence of plans extant at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, where most of the research was conducted. Reproductions of original plans are on virtually every page, from the mightiest three-decker right down to humble gunboats. In what obviously took many years' labour the voluminous Progress Books at the NMM were researched cover to cover, as well as the Dimension Books and the unparalleled collection of ship plans at the Museum.

Following a General Introduction which offers a list of definitions and an overview of developments in design, Lyon has organized the listing in four main sections. The first presents all ships in service in 1688, distinguishing those built for the navy from those captured or purchased. The second deals with ships ordered for the navy, subdivided into classes, generally corresponding to the tenure of the Surveyor of the Navy who was responsible for the designs. This provides a very clear explanation of how and why designs were altered or discarded. The third section describes captured or purchased ships, divided into eight periods of wars, and the post 1815 peace. Even seasoned researchers will be impressed by the sheer number of captures described, and the analysis of the influence some had on subsequent British designs. The final section covers auxiliary vessels, such as those on the Canadian Lakes, customs vessels and hulks.

Lyon is the first to admit that complete accuracy is impossible. The often incomplete and contradictory records will not permit it. Changes in a ship's armament could be frequent and unrecorded, changes in function (from frigate to troopship, to receiving ship to hulk) are often hard to date, as are not infrequent name changes. In his Introduction Lyon explains that he decided a list of 95 per cent accuracy now was more important than one of 98.5 per cent accuracy many years later. This is surely correct, and fortunately it is doubtful if we are deprived of any significant information which would alter radically our interpretations of the Royal Navy in this period. Lyon cheerfully invites correspondence with anyone who has more accurate data.

Criticisms, even *pro forma*, are hard to come by. One may be mentioned if only to dispose of it, and that is the non-alphabetical organization. In the Colledge lists one just seeks the ship name, and all vessels which ever enjoyed it are listed in sequence. In Lyon, ships appear strictly in their chronological and class designations. An index sorts it all out, thus adding a step or two, but in this reviewer's opinion the extra effort is well rewarded. The price tag will discourage many a wistful buyer, but those who make the plunge will possess a monumental reference work of very high quality of which Conway Maritime Press can be proud.

Paul Webb
London, Ontario

This is a work of reference giving the date and circumstances of every British warship loss over a period of more than three hundred years. It derives its information chiefly from primary sources, in particular the records of the courts martial which were usually held on the surviving officers to establish the cause of loss. In addition, the compiler, David Hepper, has used Admiralty correspondence, ships’ logs, musters and pay books, together with a range of printed works.

The result consists of a chronological list, starting with the *Increase* sixth rate, wrecked near Cardiff in March 1650, and ending with the three gunboats lost in Admiral Hope’s disastrous attempt to storm the Pei-Ho forts on 28 June, 1859. For each ship it gives date, name, type, tonnage, number of guns, date and place built (purchased, taken, and so on), and the commanding officer’s name, together with a brief summary of the circumstances of the loss. This is followed by alphabetical lists of the ships and commanding officers, the latter of which allows one to identify those unlucky or incompetent officers who managed to lose two or more ships. (The record seems to be held by Captain Andrew Ball, who lost four ships between 1652 and 1670, though the first three of these were fireships expended in action.) Finally, Hepper has analysed the losses in each war from the First Dutch War to the Napoleonic War, breaking down the numbers by rate and cause of loss. This is an instructive exercise; one might have expected to find that a less proportion (27.4 per cent) were lost to enemy action in the French Revolutionary War than in any other, but the contrast between the First Dutch War (77.3 per cent lost to enemy action) and the much less successful Third Dutch War (28.3 per cent, admittedly of a larger number) is striking. So is the discovery that more than half of all the losses in the War of the Spanish Succession were taken by the enemy; since these were almost all cruisers and convoy escorts, the fact provides a good illustration of the effectiveness of the French guerre de course in its heyday.

At one level this book is a fascinating read; it is the sort of reference book which it is pleasant to dip into, and easy to be distracted by. It is also very useful as a ready source of information, and in the few weeks it has been on your reviewer’s desk it has already allowed him to provide instant answers to several obscure questions. By comparison with W.P. Gossett’s *The Lost Ships of the Royal Navy, 1793-1900* (1986), this is in every way superior; more comprehensive, more accurate, and much better produced. A single comparison may serve to make the point: Gossett lists under May 1795 the *Musquito* gunboat, Lieutenant W. McCarthy, “wrecked near Jersey (On the French coast?).” Hepper provides the date (20th June), corrects the detail (she was a floating battery; he was Lieutenant William McCarthy), and gives a much more accurate account of her loss: “Stationed at the Isle St. Marcou, Channel Islands, she was blown out of the anchorage and wrecked on the northern coast of France. Five men drowned.” Hepper has a few slips: the *Conflagration* fireship, lost in the evacuation of Toulon in December 1793, appears in his indices but has unaccountably sunk from the text. Overall, however, this is a valuable work of reference, full of information useful if not essential to any naval historian, and to all those interested in shipwrecks in particular.

N.A.M. Rodger
London, England


Uhlig begins this impressive and detailed study of the United States Navy and its allies at war with several questions: What is the role of the navy? How can it achieve its purpose? How has technology changed the role of navies and the way they fight? Are there constants in naval warfare? Uhlig then sets out to answer these questions by examining a dozen major conflicts,
from the American Revolution to the Gulf War, in which the US Navy and the fleets of allied powers were involved.

Over the course of the more than 200 years this entails, Uhlig explores the range of possibilities of naval war, showing how changing technology has affected the conduct of war at sea and influenced the development of the multifunctional modern fleet. Despite the lengthy time frame and the variety of warfare, Uhlig sees a constancy in how navies conduct their business. He defines five ways of naval warfare: the strategic movement of troops; the acquisition of advances bases; amphibious landings; blockade; and, the struggle for mastery of the local sea. The purposes of naval warfare consist of two absolutes and one conditional: that friendly shipping can flow and hostile shipping cannot; that once the former has been achieved, the navy can be used to land and support an army landed on a hostile shore.

Each chapter provides a detailed account of how naval power was employed during a particular conflict — for good reasons not all conflicts were included. Every chapter also ends with a helpful summary of the main observations which he then consolidates in a concluding chapter. Footnotes are used sparingly; to document his analysis Uhlig prefers short bibliographic essays. Some might find this annoying but there is no question about his knowledge of the literature. The maps are helpful although not always detailed enough. One on the Normandy offensive would have been useful. At the end of the text Uhlig provides a helpful diagrammatic layout entitled "How Navies Fight, 1775-1991," in which he examines forty-three different operational characteristics of naval warfare over the two centuries that he examines. Errors are few, though Newfoundlanders will be surprised to learn that "Saint John's [sic] was provided by Canada to help in the war to which that country had given itself."

Uhlig makes a good case for his conclusions and affirms that sea power has played an important role in the more than one dozen conflicts in which the US Navy and allied fleets have been involved since 1775. Yet his study is not without some contradiction. Navies can also mean submarine fleets, as in the case of Germany in two world wars, when the Allies nearly lost mastery of the sea and risked losing the war. In the Pacific war against Japan it was carrier-borne aircraft that gave real meaning to sea power. The same applied to the Falklands War, except that Exocet missiles made surface ships even more vulnerable. Clearly, the surface fleet has lost its ability to master the local sea. In the most recent conflicts of this century, from Vietnam onwards — the exception being the unusual circumstances of the Falklands — the surface fleet was superfluous. Even Uhlig acknowledges this fact but, a Mahanian at heart, he minimizes its significance.

Those interested in the history of the US Navy or the role of seapower over the past 200 years will find this well-written work a valuable study and the product of much careful and thoughtful analysis.

David Facey-Crowther
St. John's, Newfoundland


John Murray, Lord Dunmore, Governor of Virginia, attempted to restore his authority in the colony in the summer of 1776 after being forced to flee the capital at Williamsburg. First establishing and then abandoning his "floating town" off Norfolk when militia resistance and disease proved too much for his soldiers, adherents to the Crown and the crews of his 100-plus Royal Navy and Loyalist fleet, he sailed north thirty miles to Gwynn's Island off Chesapeake Bay.

From this tiny island he planned to reassert his authority over the colony with the help of British regular and Loyalist forces including the black Royal Ethiopian Regiment, made up of ex-slaves freed by Dunnmore. His aggressive campaign to do so came to naught; under patriot militia attack, he fled from his would-be insular fortress and sailed away to New York, effectively abandoning royal claims to authority in
Virginia. With him went Governor Robert Eden of Maryland, also in exile and, like Dunmore, unable to reestablish royal authority in his colony.

Peter Wrike has now brought together all the pieces of this interesting story and has woven them into a well-paced narrative of martial events that in many ways encapsulate the Revolutionary War, especially in highlighting the importance of sea power on the outcome of that conflict with the Crown. The result is a valuable book of interest to persons far beyond Tidewater Virginia and the Chesapeake. With more judicious editing it might even have become an exemplary naval and military history volume.

Wrike has researched diligently among primary and secondary sources and clearly knows his subject inside out. His descriptions of Dunmore's difficulties before burning and abandoning Norfolk; his history of Gwynn's Island before the war; his clear explication of Dunmore's difficulties in assembling and maintaining his fleet; his details of the strengths and weaknesses of the British defences on the island; his folding the events on and about Gwynn's Island into the larger picture of the war and British attempts to subdue the colonists in their quest for home rule, then independence; his description of Dunmore's retreat first up the rivers off the Bay and then through the Virginia Capes; and his epilogue detailing the subsequent careers of Dunmore and the other major players in this Virginia mini-drama are all noteworthy.

The book, however, is marred by irritating errors that should have been corrected by careful proofreading. A lack of smooth chronological flow (especially in the first two chapters), errors in capitalization, persistent split infinitives, incorrect use of parentheses instead of brackets, and failure to identify initially and clearly major characters in the story serve only to distract the reader and detract from an otherwise well-presented account of one colonial governor's attempt to preserve this colony's place within the Empire in the face of determined Patriot resistance.

Still and all, Wrike has performed a notable service to military, naval and colonial history by his exacting research into a story interesting in itself and a significant chapter in the struggle for American independence in the southern colonies. This volume should be added to every nautical and military history collection.

James M. Morris
Newport News, Virginia


Ship histories are wonderful windows on the maritime world of the past, and it is all the more engaging when a double history appears, in this case that of a whaler and a privateer. The Nantucket whaler was the Hero, sailing under the flag of France. The privateer was the English letter of marque Swallow. The seizure, effected 9 December 1803, occurred off the Brazilian island Santa Catarina. As with such cases, consular files bulged remarkably, and the alleged cavalier, illegal seizure was protested by French, Spanish and Portuguese authorities. Even London's High Court of Admiralty stated its displeasure at the Swallow's unauthorized doings. The authors have used the journal of the first mate of the Hero and that of the carpenter of the Swallow. The former was in their family holdings; the latter was located among the treasures of the American Antiquarian Society. The authors weave a fascinating tale of subterfuge, impressment, forgery, and mutiny. Not to be overlooked are accounts of slaving, false flags, and the capture itself. The eyewitness accounts, one on either ship, add immediacy to the larger events. As Thierry du Pasquier, the French authority on whaling, remarks in a commentary which accompanies The Whaler and the Privateer, "This book provides insight into life on board an American whaleship under French colors early in the nineteenth century.... The book helps us to understand the human aspects of life at sea in a dangerous occupation, in addition to the constant threat of capture by hostile vessels." The interrelationships of officers and men, and the unexpected entertainment of the captives by their captors, add vivid descrip-
tion. Reference is made to some ninety vessels, American, British and French. The work is illustrated and indexed, and is a credit to the authors as a project well worth doing.

Barry Gough
Waterloo, Ontario


This book, the latest fruit of the prolific Greenhill-Giffard couple, is the product of the interplay of many diverse forces, including their own recent book on the Baltic aspects of the Crimean War, Andrew Lambert's revisionist studies on the Royal Navy, a fascination with both the survival of sail and the development of early steamship and marine engineering technology, Giffard's descent from a family with extensive naval service, and in particular the career and dramatic death in Russian captivity in 1854 of Captain Henry Wells Giffard, commander of the paddle steamer HMS Tiger. The structure and contents of the book reflect these influences as well as some strongly held beliefs on the part of the authors.

The bulk of the book is divided almost equally between the career of Captain H. W. Giffard and the exploits of his ships and crew, on the one hand, and the development of steam shipping in the Royal Navy, on the other. With its lengthy quotations it demonstrates that the 'Life and Letters' tradition of naval biography is far from dead. A panoply of characters and ships appear who tend to clog the story which, otherwise, is presented in a most readable style. Occasionally, there are diversions into peripheral or irrelevant issues. Because of the twin purpose of the book it is, inevitably, difficult to have sufficient space available for a comprehensive discussion of the transformation of the RN and the details and full context of Giffard's career. Much is made, for example, of the genesis of the Crimean War and its various stages but the explanation of its political setting and dynamics is fragmentary and unsatisfactory. From a

thematic viewpoint, there is simply too little on Britain's use of gunboat diplomacy. The context is mostly provided from a limited range of secondary sources, in which seminal authors like M.S. Anderson and C.J. Bartlett are curiously absent.

It is now generally accepted that the Royal Navy was keenly interested in the development of steam power and its application to its fleet. Greenhill and Giffard enthusiastically underwrite this new orthodoxy with a wealth of material on experiments, voyages, naval officers, and steamers in action, culminating in the Crimean War. The role of several of the new enthusiasts, like Captain George Evans, is properly highlighted, and the prosaic but absolutely vital importance of lubrication recognized, (p. 136) On the other hand, the expertise of the first Comptroller of Steam Machinery, Captain Sir Edward Parry, (strangely missing from the index) is not acknowledged; as Ann Grant in her biography of Samuel Cunard has shown, Parry had learned much about steam shipping during his long stay in Canada. (This does not mean that he did not benefit from patronage, but it should also be stressed that Parry, in turn, was remarkably useful to Cunard!) There are also some idiosyncrasies (especially the insistence on "sail assist") and selectivity. After a few passing references in the second chapter, there is virtually nothing about the development of steam shipping in overseas as opposed to coastal trade routes. Freda Harcourt's and other studies on the mail subsidy system should have been considered.

The book falls between the various stools of the many themes it aims to discuss. There are many valuable passages, e.g. on the experiments with screw propulsion, the cooperation between the Royal Navy and private engine builders, and the vital role of the early steamers in colonial warfare. Although the general thrust of the argument is not original, certainly much of the evidence is. But this very wealth of material does sometimes become excessive and anecdotal. There are also considerable superficialities in the account, e.g. in the sections on the developments of the engines themselves and their vital parts, such as condensers and boilers, Britain's international politics and strategy, and the connections between the navy and the
growth of merchant steam shipping. There is no mention of the Napier brothers. Silver, not gold, financed the tea trade (p. 112) and Corbinda should be Cabinda. (pp. 173-4) It is debatable whether such overwhelming importance should be attached to the animosity of Tories and Whigs. The emphasis on "sail assist" in analysing the development of steamships is debatable (after all, it existed until well into the 1880s), as is also the authors' insistence that the Crimean War should be renamed the "War with Russia." And although France rather than Russia was Britain's main naval opponent, it would be rash to suggest that France was Britain's "real" rival, (p. 216)

Steam, Politics & Patronage contains an interesting naval biography set during the steam revolution in the Royal Navy and some perceptive insights but, ultimately, it falls between a number of stools. It is simply trying to pursue too many themes and stories. Its ambitious title and subtitle which, ironically, do not even refer to Captain H. W. Giffard, promise more than can be delivered. Even so, many readers will find its contents stimulating.

Frank Broeze
Nedlands, Western Australia


As part of its "Classics in Maritime History" series, the University of South Carolina Press has wisely decided to republish William M. Robinson's The Confederate Privateers. When this work first appeared in 1928, it was heralded as a valuable and unique contribution to the history of the American Civil War. It still is. Robinson's work remains the only comprehensive treatment of privateering (of both the official and the unofficial variety) by citizens of the Confederate States of America during the Civil War.

The book opens with a discussion of how privateering got its start in the Confederacy. Robinson then looks at the high seas cruises of those vessels which were actually employed under letters of marque in 1861 and 1862. Some, like the Jefferson Davis, were quite successful, though that privateer was lost while attempting to enter over the bar at St. Augustine, Florida. But most privateering ventures were disappointing to the owners, in large measure because the vessels were unsuited for that service. As for the effect of Confederate privateering on the shipping industry of the northern states, it was more psychologically disturbing than fiscally harmful. As Robinson points out, the prizes taken on the high seas were — with one single exception — all sailing vessels. As such, they were virtually useless as either naval vessels or as blockade runners. By mid-1862, those privateers which were trim and fast enough had switched over to become blockade runners, a role which proved to be far more lucrative than privateering.

Next, Robinson covers a diversity of topics. Perhaps the most interesting is his description of the trial of the crew of the Savannah, a one-time pilot boat turned Confederate privateer. She left Charleston in late May, 1861 and after taking a merchantman loaded with sugar was herself captured by the USS Perry. The Federal government initially intended trying the Savannah's crew as pirates, but the charges were later dropped for fear of retaliation against northern prisoners of war in Confederate hands.

One chapter is devoted to the story of the last of the Confederate high seas privateers, the Retribution, formerly a tugboat on Lake Erie but re-rigged by the Confederacy as a schooner. Retribution's 1862 cruise became a series of misadventures, such as when a prize crew from Retribution mutinied. The mutineers took over the prize, and with the prize master in irons, delivered both him and the vessel to Federal naval authorities at St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands. Meanwhile, the Retribution had become dangerously unseaworthy. She was taken to Nassau and sold. Her captain, a British citizen named Vernon G. Locke, now was without a command and no longer in possession of a letter of marque (his authority as a privateer master had rested with Retribution and not with him). He therefore decided to turn pirate. Locke was only one of the many odd characters about
whom Robinson writes who became involved in various wild schemes under the mantle of privateering between 1862 and 1865. Only a few of these schemes matured into any constructive reality, but they do make entertaining reading and they provide an illustration of a type of off-the-wall entrepreneurship which existed during the short life of the Confederacy.

Robinson's work would have been much improved had he included a table or two reviewing the voyages of the letters of marque, including their captures or, if not tables, then a summarization would have been welcome. His research was weak on his coverage of privateer-like activity on the western rivers where, but to give an instance, he misidentifies two Army-owned vessels, claiming them as commissioned naval vessels, i.e., the Ellet ram Monarch and the Ellet tug Dick Fulton.

I found the argument in the chapter entitled "United States Dabbles in Privateering" to be particularly flawed. There he argues that the United States government itself skirted legalities in allowing the employment of merchant vessels as combatants. This misconception undoubtedly arose from Robinson's reliance primarily on naval records without any research in other sources. For instance, he wrongly contends that the Vanderbilt (actually the C. Vanderbilt) was under private operation during an 1862 stint as a guard ram in Hampton Roads to counter the CSS Virginia. The facts, as The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies and other official sources could have revealed to him, are that C. Vanderbilt was under charter to the Union War Department during that period. The charter gave the vessel, to borrow from an admiralty term, very much a "sovereign's ship" status, so that it clearly was a legal combatant. Nor seemingly was Robinson aware that a standing Federal statute, first inaugurated in 1819 and still in effect in the 1860s, allowed US merchant vessels to take armed action against vessels which intend armed interference with peaceful passage. This statute also allowed a US merchant vessel to assist in taking back another merchant vessel that had previously been a victim of an illegal capture. Since the Confederacy was in rebellion against the United States, the 1819 act was the authority by which any US flag vessel had the right to act against any vessel flying the flag of the Confederacy and which showed an aggressive intent.

Despite occasional faults, The Confederate Privateers is a must acquisition for those with an interest in the American Civil War at sea.

Charles Dana Gibson
Camden, Maine


A handsome, dashing man, John Newland Maffitt was almost as famous for his wit, charm and winsome personality as for his seamanship and courage. In short, he was a highly cultivated gentleman of courtly manners as well as an accomplished ship's captain and navigator. He was also intelligent and endowed with a lively curiosity that constantly launched him into the search for and the acquisition of knowledge. Trained in the US Navy, as were most Confederate naval officers, Maffitt was among those who, like Raphael Semmes, chose to go South rather than to risk firing on family and friends. He took with him not only his personal qualities but the invaluable scientific knowledge gained while engaged in the coastal survey of the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts of the United States; he also took with him the superb seamanship and intimate knowledge of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea acquired in command of the USS Macedonian while participating in the suppression of the slave trade which, at that time and in that area, was primarily Cuban.

In this thoroughly documented, abundantly annotated study, Royce Shingleton has brilliantly resuscitated the life and times of his hero and both are interesting, indeed captivating. Maffitt as a man was a subject worthy of a carefully documented study such as this, if only as an example of one of the many and diverse components of mid-nineteenth century American society. But he was also a Confederate naval
officer during the epic conflict between North and South, and that is the aspect of his life and times that we shall comment on here.

Maffitt's career under the Stars and Bars illustrates the desperate struggle of a belligerent whose survival depends upon access to world markets but who possesses virtually none of the necessary elements that together constitute sea power. The South had some very competent naval officers but few seamen. It had timber but no heavy industry, no metallurgy, no ship yards equipped to build men of war. The Confederacy therefore looked abroad, especially to Great Britain, for ships and naval artillery to equip a budding navy whose mission on the high seas was destined to be commerce raiding and, closer to home, blockade running. The CSS Florida was one of the British-built raiders, and Maffitt was to demonstrate his extraordinary courage and seamanship as its commanding officer during its first and most successful cruise.

Singleton has added to previously known sources the detailed study of the Maffitt papers now available to scholars in the Southern Historical Collection of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The result is a highly significant study not only of Maffitt's career, but of the acquisition of warships in Great Britain, how they were manned and supplied, their operations and the results they obtained, the numerous international diplomatic and legal difficulties they encountered.

This book will be useful to practically all specialists of the period, including historians of naval and maritime medicine. Maffitt's own bout with yellow fever at the time he ran the Union blockade to reach Mobile with his still unarmed Florida is a case in point.

The aftermath of the war for Maffitt is no less interesting than his service afloat — which was not limited to the Florida. The South and Southerners as a whole paid a terrible price for their secession and Maffitt was no exception. Singleton tells the story as it was, or must have been, and leaves a lasting impression of great tragedy, of no less great heroism, mingled with admiration for the people caught in the throes of history in the making.

Ulane Bonnel
Paris, France

Robley D. Evans (1846-1912) lived in "interesting times." His career in the US Navy began when he journeyed west in a covered wagon as a teenager and ended when he served as the commander of the Great White Fleet. In 1901, D. Appleton and Company published A Sailor's Log, the first of what turned out to be two autobiographies. It is well-written, insightful, and certainly informative, for Evans described his life at the US Naval Academy, the last months of the Civil War, the growth of the new steel navy, Uncle Sam's efforts to assert himself overseas, and Evans' participation in the Spanish-American War. Given these events and their significance, the Naval Institute Press was certainly justified in reprinting the work.

Born in antebellum Virginia, Evans obtained an appointment to the Naval Academy through the connections of his family to a Utah congressman, William H. Hooper. However, this meant that Evans had to trek from Washington, DC across the country in order to establish his residency in the western territory. In the course of this adventure, Evans' party clashed with the Blackfeet Indians, and the young traveller suffered the first of many wounds and injuries.

Evans met his residency obligation. He remained loyal to the Union after the outbreak of the Civil War, and graduated in time to lead a section of Marines and sailors in the second attack on Fort Fisher, near Wilmington, North Carolina. Wounded four times in the battle, he endured severe pain and poor medical attention, but through great determination, managed to save both his legs and his career. After recovery, sea duty assignments took him around the world, first with the USS Piscataqua in the Pacific, later in USS Shenandoah of the Mediterranean fleet. In between, he instructed midshipmen at Annapolis and enlisted recruits on the training ship USS Saratoga. While captain of the cruiser...
USS *Yorktown*, Evans was dispatched to Valparaiso, Chile after the murder and mauling there of sailors belonging to USS *Baltimore*. Evans defined his role as that of incensed but restrained warrior in Chilean waters, and described the sensitive task of coordinating efforts with American and foreign officials. Back home, the populace praised his efforts and the press dubbed him "Fighting Bob."

From South America, Evans directed a makeshift squadron of vessels in regulating the seal skin traffic off the coast of Alaska. At various times he interacted with Britshers, Canadians, and Russians. Evans eventually also acted as something of a diplomat when he took USS *New York* to the North Sea to participate in the opening ceremonies for the Kiel Canal. Evans closed his autobiography by describing his captaincy of USS *Iowa* and that battleship's role in the sinking of the Spanish fleet off Santiago, Cuba.

This edition of *A Sailor's Log* is enhanced by Benjamin Franklin Cooling's expert introduction. By providing an objective view of Evans' life and times, Cooling places the book in a historical context and increases its value as a research source. For the most part, the footnotes provide complete biographical sketch of the participants, dimensions of warships, and geographical locations of colonies, islands, and the like. Nonetheless, this edition does have its weaknesses. The absence of maps of the Asian ports, the coast of Chile, and Baltic, Caribbean, and Mediterranean Seas is sorely felt. On the other hand, obvious details on well-known places like Hong Kong and Cincinnati, the promotion dates of those officers mentioned, or lengthy discussion of the life of Thomas Jefferson and Henry Clay are unnecessary. Readers would be better served by a broader discussion in the footnotes of issues like the problems posed by coal as a fuel, the prevalence of superstitious sailors, racism at the Academy, corruption in the federal government in the late nineteenth century, and the role of warships in diplomatic settings.

Researchers would benefit from having the footnotes include sources of information. Also, the inclusion of a completely new index, or at least the index that appeared in the original printing, would have been equally useful. Instead, we must rely on the table of contents to locate specific details or events in the book. Such irritations notwithstanding, this book should have very broad appeal with armchair sailors and scholars alike.

Benjamin H. Trask  
Newport News, Virginia


Admiral Sir David Beatty, the dashing though questionably effective commander of the British battle cruiser squadron at Jutland in May 1916, became the First Sea Lord in November 1919 and remained in office until July 1927. It was a critical era for the Royal Navy. Long-held traditions of command of the sea were challenged as never before; the future of battleships was debated; imperial resolve waned in the face of pacifism, political indifference, and swinging economies; naval arms races were forestalled at the cost of the forfeiture of numerical and qualitative supremacy; bitter and inconclusive battles were waged between the RN and the Royal Air Force over the future of naval air-power; and the governments of the day vacillated fatally over the importance of the imperial cornerstone in the Far East — Singapore.

Bryan Ranft is to be commended for his crisp, clear and reasoned production of Sir David's correspondence as First Sea Lord. Indeed the Navy Records Society's publication of this second volume of the Beatty papers is timely to say the least, coming as it does at a time when naval administrations around the world are wrestling with the realities of postwar cutbacks. There is, accordingly, a strong sense of *déjà vu* about this volume. Beatty saw his primary responsibilities as Sea Lord as educating and persuading governments regarding the correctness of strategic principles and the need to provide funds to realize them. But it was a thankless task. The politicians of the day were,
for the most part, thunderingly ignorant of or indifferent to those principles. The same, it seems, has been the case in the post-Cold War era when that ignorance is compounded by a propensity for ahistoricism.

Beatty’s overwhelming concern was with maintaining Britain’s world-wide naval superiority. Was Britain, he queried, to contemplate forfeiting that supremacy after three hundred years? To do so, to accept what in 1919 he termed "manifest inferiority," (p.52) would, he argued, have a disastrous effect not only on the empire but on the world. And yet, there seemed nothing for it. Britain’s postwar indebtedness to the United States, a country dedicated to building a navy second to none, left Beatty and his colleagues in a position of acute weakness were the Royal Navy to contemplate matching the US Navy ship for ship. A naval race with the Americans, Beatty concluded, would be the utmost folly — Churchill characterized such a development as "fit for a madhouse." (p.36) The only solution, painful and embarrassing as it was (to use Churchill’s words again), was to embrace naval arms limitation and to hope to disguise the transition to a One Power Standard (in which the RN would be the equal of any other major navy) "under the guise of a replacement policy." (p.92) Yet that, too, had its dangers. British naval yards were falling silent and Beatty began to express genuine alarm that only two years after the war it was becoming harder and harder to find specialized yards and skilled labour. And a new menace was lurking at sea in the Pacific. The naval arms limitations talks in Washington in late 1921 had been at the expense of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which dated back to 1902. "While we are wrangling," wrote Beatty to the First Lord late in 1920, "the Japanese are acting." (p.107) This meant that the fabric of empire in the Far East was under threat at a time when the financial situation was "bad, very bad." (p.208)

In June 1921 the government agreed to create a great defensive position at Singapore, the crossroads of empire in southeast Asia. The acceptance of the One Power Standard (and, indeed, far less in practice) had made Singapore increasingly necessary as Ranft points out. (p.389) Imperial defence policy consisted, in many instances, of the most amazing exercises in wishful thinking. Churchill was determined as Chancellor of the Exchequer to turn his back on the lessons of naval history and to cut and slash the budget in whatever way he could. While he and Churchill remained good friends, Beatty could not refrain from writing to his wife Ethel in 1925 that "that extraordinary fellow Winston has gone mad, economically mad and no sacrifice is too great [for him] to achieve." (p.278) Under the circumstances, the Singapore project, which was to have papered over the cracks in imperial defence and deceived no one, least of all the Japanese, languished in the face of cheeseparing and procrastination.

Another critical aspect of the Singapore affair (and the Beatty papers are an excellent source on this matter) was the endless wrangling over the relative merits of airpower: would aircraft do a better job than big guns? This debate in turn was part of the larger struggle between the RN and the RAF over the ownership of naval aviation. While fully persuaded of the primacy of battleships (and the papers contain some intriguing assessments of the alleged invulnerability of battleships to mines, submarines and aircraft), Beatty was not unaware of the value of maritime airpower as the "Eyes of the Fleet." "Now is the time," he wrote in April 1919, "when the Royal Airforce is melting away to take the matter [of naval airpower] in our own hands." (p.21) It was not, of course, to be the case. Despite his prescience and his great powers of persuasion, Beatty did not succeed in winning control of the Fleet Air Arm for the RN. Hankey wrote to Prime Minster Lloyd George in August 1922 that the two services were "hopelessly divided" on the matter of naval airpower. Eighteen months later there was still a "complete deadlock" (p.266) on the air problem and Trenchard, the head of the RAF, remained graniteically opposed to any challenge to the unity of airpower.

While the Beatty papers are an enormously rich source of information on the issues and personalities of the day, they are also valuable for the light they shed on Beatty, the man. His marriage appears to have been an extraordinarily unhappy one and for most, if not all, of the period he was in office his wife was away in various spas and resorts in France suffering from perennial ill-health. It is hard to know with
whom to sympathize. Somewhat like Captain Cook's wife, Beatty's wife remained virtually invisible; a helpless and hapless neurasthenic victim of her husband's ego and the exigencies of the service. For his part, Beatty found the double burden of his official responsibilities and Ethel's illness almost unbearable. Early in 1922, he wrote to her urging her to "throw off all the imaginary bogies which upset you and which are like [sic] to ruin our lives and destroy the work of my life." (p.198) While he wrote to her constantly, he found solace in similar correspondence with his mistress, Eugenie, to whom he confided in 1925 that he suffered from "frightful waves of depression." (p.289) By 1926 the strain was beginning to tell. Writing to his close friend Keyes, Beatty observed that he was getting "fed up with the constant struggling, intriguing and underhand methods which are employed against me." (p.336) He retired as First Sea Lord eleven months later, marking the occasion with a letter to Eugenie in which he noted that "The great days of the past were and are unforgettable. The latter days since 1919 at times appear like a nightmare. However the everlasting struggle is over and my task is done." (p.352)

To Beatty goes much of the credit for protecting the Royal Navy from pacifists, penny pinchers and politicians ignorant of the realities of empire. He was, however, haunted throughout the balance of his career by the incompleteness of the "great passive victory" (p.7) of Jutland. Though he could not change history, he tried nonetheless, and the concluding portions of this splendidly readable, human, and informative work are dedicated to a largely self-contained essay on the writing of the official account of the battle. For all his dedication to the navy, Beatty does not emerge from this episode with an enhanced reputation. The debate over Jutland was bitter, prolonged and divisive, (p.147) And all the evidence suggests that Beatty exploited his position as First Sea Lord to suppress or distort the historical record in order to have himself portrayed — as he would always have wished to be — as the victor of the day, defender of the navy and upholder of the empire.

James A. Boutilier
Victoria, British Columbia


Despite a large time-frame, this book does what so many academic joint ventures fail to do, viz. illuminate a general problem through close attention to particulars. The reasons for this rests not only on the quality of the contributors but also on the good editing by Brian McKercher who, it should be added, also makes the key assertion underlying the importance of the whole corpus when he states in his own article that "maritime powers had fundamentally different strategic and weapons requirements than did terrene states."

This is worth highlighting because Sidoro-wicz, on the Peace Conference of 1907, writes as if the British Empire were somehow contracted into a nation with needs and policies much like the others who were engaged there. After all, the fact that the British were different was what forced the Liberals in England to develop two wings of approach to the problem: one Liberal and the other Liberal Imperialist.

Keith Neilson understands this difference; he uses the erudite appreciations of Lord Selborne, whose illuminating correspondence has recently been made public, to show how this was at the core of Admiralty thinking. That thinking was based on more than mere comparison elicited from the work of the number-crunching experts. Neilson's writing has power because he by no means succumbs to the argument that a deadly Anglo-German naval rivalry dominated all strategic thought in England. Russia and, until 1905, France were on the planning table in England as well. That the Admiralty dealt with the naval rivalry from such a wide point of view showed an appreciation that British naval and maritime policy was not a subject that could be dealt with by simple numerical comparisons. This came to be appreciated by British statesmen. Politics, naval policy, and naval theory were, as Neilson shows, one.

Lorna Jaffe's careful documentation of the peace negotiations in 1919 shows the clash between idealism and naval requirement. The British and the Americans had different agendas
and different responsibilities which provided the background to the first Washington Conference. Faced with uncomprehending allies, the British opted for quality control, and so they shunned their old Japanese allies. Like the French, the British got no collective security guarantees for their needs, as Malcolm Murfett shows.

Richard Fanning’s paper is a plea for closer examination of the Geneva Conference in the light of the evidence of the documents, as opposed to the propaganda of the time. He suggests that Japanese concerns were more legitimate than they have since been depicted. He suggests that future research may widen this changing viewpoint.

The 1930 London Naval Conference was agreed at the time to be a great if partial success. Greg Kennedy is one of the few historians writing today with insight from both British and American sources. This wide vision allows him to see that Britain was a special case because of her maritime needs. He shows that there are different kinds of maritime defence and how navies, Empire, and Imperial structures interpenetrated; even the Americans glimpsed this at the time. Although a shortage of destroyers would make life difficult for British maritime security in 1939, nevertheless Britain moved through the thirties as the most powerful maritime nation and Empire — a fact that Meredith Berg seems to understand in the last chapter, on the last naval conference in 1935. His particular reference is to the impact of world events on the Japanese. This amounts, really, to a demonstration of the harm done by the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Naval Treaty in 1921, which constrained the British and isolated the Japanese.

McKercher shows in his article that political control must be front and centre to realistic arms talks and results. What is extraordinary about these protracted negotiations between 1926 and 1934 is that, Japan, France, and Italy aside, the contending powers subdued the mere comparison addicts, so that more level-headed navalists, in the political sense of the word, could actually negotiate. On the whole, these are a revealing clutch of papers quite removed from professional nit-picking.

Donald M. Schurman
Victoria, British Columbia


The author of this detailed monograph had attained the rank of Vice-Admiral prior to his death, at the age of eighty-three, in 1992. Six decades earlier he had begun his career on board a French destroyer patrolling the Spanish coast. His squadron’s assignment, simply put, was to do what it could to protect French commercial shipping in those troubled waters, while observing a strict neutrality between the two belligerents in the civil war.

The latter requirement was easier to satisfy than the former. The French government had opted for a policy of non-intervention as of July 1936. It would not support the Spanish rebels under the command of Francisco Franco, but neither would it provide material assistance to the besieged government in Madrid. Ostensibly, the rationale was to avoid any escalation of the conflict, particularly of the sort that could carry the war beyond the Iberian peninsula to the rest of the continent. The French navy did as it was told, and with some enthusiasm.

Although de Lachadenede has little to say on the subject, the fact is that the French officer corps had no affection for the Spanish government, whose political configuration looked clearly left-wing from the deck of a cruiser. Yet that government had nothing to gain by attacking French ships in its coastal waters — ships which could be carrying goods to Republican-held ports. Moreover, it had ended up with only the rump of the Spanish navy. Most of the latter had gone over to the rebels, who were now intent on choking off sea-borne supplies to the Madrid regime. Thus, it was Franco’s forces — with whom the politically conservative French navy had some affinity — which presented the greatest threat to France’s merchant marine and navy. Franco’s forces, and their Italian ally. Therein lay an even greater dilemma for the French naval command. 1935-1936 had seen a substantial Franco-Italian rapprochement, upon which many hopes had been set of constraining, amicably or otherwise, the ambitions of Hitler’s Germany. But suddenly, the Spanish imbroglio
threatened a rash of confrontations between French and Italian naval forces.

Such, very cryptically, is part of the context in which this book is set, a book which wishes to highlight the political, diplomatic and strategic aspects of the French navy's experience during the Spanish Civil War. We can welcome its publication, for what it offers is greater than the misgivings it raises. With respect to the latter, it should be said that this is not the work of a professional historian, whatever the author's commitment and energy. Despite the breadth of the stated objectives, the focus is very finite, as is the range of ideas. After over 350 pages of intervening text, the book ends with a very few pages on the "lessons" of Spain, and a single page Conclusion. There is a lot of repetition in the volume, as is often the case when chronological method is combined with the thematic. The historiographical element is weak, as secondary sources — even those published in French — are all but displaced by the archival materials. The latter, in turn, sometimes appear in rather undigested form, an appearance strengthened by a plethora of information on tonnage, cargo, crew complements, ports of destination, and ships' names. Finally, the sometimes inventory-like character of the text is only underscored by the over-use of very short paragraphs. Altogether, therefore, one has the impression of a text which needed compression and refinement, and in which ideas needed to be rescued from the tyranny of data.

For all that, scholars will remain indebted to the late Vice-Admiral. For as is often the case, the strengths of his work are inverted versions of its limitations. If, for example, the secondary literature is less prominent than it should be, the book does draw very heavily upon the naval archives at Vincennes. Indeed, no other work has culled these particular files as diligently as they have been here. Something similar could be said of the voluminous data which is provided. If one can wish that more of it had come in a more readily digestible form, one is grateful that at least now it is available in a single volume. The 150 supplementary pages of annexes on subjects like the composition of the French naval command, or the Nyon accords, or maritime incidents involving French ships, or the financial costs of the French naval patrols, will be of great assistance to other scholars.

Finally, if professional scholars detect some methodological roughspots, they will also be impressed by the distance which this eye-witness has managed to achieve in his perspective. He is a man of his generation, an officer and patriot, but his work has none of the polemic's edge. If he makes little of the naval corps' ideological affiliations, he does the same for its antipathies. While he concludes that non-intervention and its attendant naval policy were failures — in that they did not prevent the escalation of international tension — he does not stoop to a diatribe against the Popular Front governments in France and Spain. In that sense, the most important of them all, this is a work in which the navy's historical section can take legitimate pride.

Robert J. Young
Winnipeg, Manitoba


When Macpherson and Burgess' magnum opus first appeared in 1981, it filled a gaping void in Canadian naval historiography. Finally, reliably collected in one sturdy volume was a treasure of primary material: a concise 150-250 word biography, with an accompanying photo, of virtually every one of the nearly 500 ships that have served in the Dominion's naval forces since inception early in the century. Raising the magnificent compendium beyond mere coffee table status were a series of supporting appendices giving ships' specifications, listing commanding officers, describing the working of the convoy system, and providing World War II Operational Status charts. Divided logically into three chronological sections (1910-1939, 1939-1945, 1945 to the present), with a brief but well-crafted narrative introduction to each, it faithfully charted the rising and falling tides of the Canadian Navy, Royal and otherwise. Here was the perfect companion to the imminent outpouring of secondary material from Douglas,
That includes this present volume. This reviewer — admittedly taken in by the spiffy picture of the new Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) HMCS Halifax on the cover - was disappointed to crack it open and discover nothing substantially new inside. The accompanying publisher's promotion release, purporting an original publication, and the absence of those magic words, "second edition," should have served as warning: this is neither. Rather, it is barely more than a jazzed-up reprint.

A few ship biography entries have been "cut-and-paste" re-arranged to make way for snippets on the CPF and TRUMP (TRibal Update and Modernization Programme). Likewise, the appendices have been shuffled, largely to make space to bring the list of ships' commanding officers up to date. The moves do nothing to capture the latest resurgence in the fortunes of the Canadian Navy. In fact, in some minor ways, the reorganization of material has interrupted the smooth flow of the original volume. Bras d'Or's loss of status from being listed amongst the major surface combatants is bound to annoy those devoted adherents to its eclipsed potential. And the chopping of the important key to builders in Appendix 7 ("Ships by Classes: Principal Dates and Particulars") from the eminently sensible beginning of the section to a position on the bottom of page 238 — after a whole other appendix and the bibliography — makes no sense, and is advertised only by an easily-missed footnote.

There is a useful addition (p. 159) tabulating the service of RCN ships in Korean waters. But given its presentation, this would have been better suited as an appendix. More puzzling, missing from Appendix 7 are the particulars of the TRUMP modernization and the new-construction CPF programmes.

Lest this seem a review of the book the authors did not write, let there be no doubt of my admiration for — and frequent reference to — The Ships of Canada's Naval Forces. The factual content of the original has stood the test of time remarkably well, with minor errors too few to mention. But the maritime historical community still awaits a true second edition of this ground-breaking work. There are a wealth of possibilities suitable to this format. Suggestions include depicting the ship's crest, official where available, unofficial where not. Graphical presentations, such as a bar-chart of the in-commission years of major vessels, could drive home the impression gained through the book of the increasing value (an "alliance dividend") the Navy has wrung from its hulls in recent years. Finally, wait for the turn of the millennium, by which time the fleet will have been completely replaced, then add a new Part Four on the post-1995 period.

All that aside, this second coming is indeed a blessing. The original run, even at the then-exorbitant price of $60, quickly disappeared from bookstores and has only been available to new researchers from the library shelf. Now, at a competitively priced $35, the reprint is available to a whole new generation of researchers, to sustain the renaissance in Canadian naval historiography.

Richard H. Gimblett
Blackburn Hamlet, Ontario


Among the more unpleasant occurrences in naval warfare is combat with one's own or allied vessels. The valiant attempt by the Fleet Air Arm, fortunately unsuccessful, to sink HMS Sheffield instead of the Bismarck is but one example of the potential disaster caused by insufficient or inaccurate warship recognition.

Upon its entry into World War II, the US Navy prepared and issued an excellent series of recognition books for use in their fleet, of which German Naval Vessels of World War II is an outstanding example. Here are recognition photographs and illustrations of virtually all of the Kriegsmarine units afloat in December 1941. The list of such units is exhaustive to the point of including ships captured (or possibly captured) from European navies. Also included is a page on the never-completed German carrier
Graf Zeppelin.

In detail, the major units are shown by photograph, illustrations including excellent airbrush renderings and model photographs showing eight "aerial angles" seen at 15° and 45° elevation. For "target angles" this book provides twenty-seven views ranging from 0° to 355°. All of this should be a boon to ship modellers. Yet there is so much more. The book also provides information on German camouflage, tables for estimating range from the amount of the ship showing above the horizon, adjusted for the viewer's height above sea level, and illustrations of possible mistaken identity.

Captain Roskill, in describing the misleading enemy reports from HMS Rawalpindi in the winter of 1939, points out the difficulties inherent in ship recognition towards dusk in far northern waters. To add to the difficulties, the Chief Constructor of the German Navy had deliberately adhered to certain design characteristics for his newer ships. Consequently, it was not easy to distinguish between Tirpitz-class battleships, Scharnhorst-class battle cruisers and Hipper-class heavy cruisers. Even the pocket battleships could be mistaken under unfavourable conditions. Consequently, mariners were forced back to doggerel for assistance in matters of memory. Unfortunately, no credit is given to the author (and illustrator) of Jerry Jingles, an addition to this book which takes ship recognition to another literary plane. In the first place, the poet informs us that the single stack and the tower mast are important characteristics of German ships. Here, for example, is your aide-mémoire for the Hipper-class cruisers:

1st dot nicht ein battleship?
Nein, dot ain't no battleship.
Stack near foremost, easy seen,
Dots der HIPPER or EUGEN.

Well, great poetry it's not, but I am prepared to think that any sailor who had memorized Jerry Jingles would never mistake Hipper for the Tirpitz.

David Fry
Pointe au Baril, Ontario


Old sailors' memories fade, too. In this book edited by Thomas G. Lynch — himself since removed to his greater reward — we are told that the conference of which this represents the printed proceedings was unique, because the stories are "not told be (sic? — not the only typographical error, unfortunately) officers as in the past, but by ratings and non-commissioned officers of the day, giving the whole function a more earthy atmosphere." It is, we are told, stories from the "lower deck' perspective." (p.5) Fortunately this is not entirely true. Part of the endearing nature of this book, certainly to this ex-Naval officer reviewer, is the fact that indeed, some of the stories are from serving officers of the time. Officers and others were also used to open the various sections.

There are four sections in all: the Coastal War; the Mid-Ocean War; They Also Served; and Shore Support. Naturally, the memories are not all of the same calibre, and it is not just the seafaring ones that have bite and relevance (though none of them emanate from Naval Headquarters, so we cannot confirm whether or not the "lower deck" harboured the same antipathy about service in the nation's capital as did their officers!). Just as shore activities were critical to the war effort, so too were some of those who served ashore worth hearing from. The sections not only cover the full range of activities in which RCN seamen served but also include reminiscences from merchant seamen and the WRCNS. Most types of ships are covered, although surprisingly there is no account of serving in the trawler-type which is an integral part of the cover design. Also surprisingly, the Halifax Riots are mentioned in only one of the quotations, by one of the Wrens.

The book follows on from Lynch's three-volume Salty Dips, published by the Ottawa Branch of the Naval Officers Association of Canada and preserved similar memories. These
are not necessarily any less "earthy" than *Fading Memories*, and also contained a few lower-deck memories. Thus, the four books taken together are complementary. There is a very definite urge to compare the content of the two sets, if only to determine which is the more relevant; this exercise I have resolutely shunned. All, including *Fading Memories*, have much to tell us. They are to a large degree "insiders' books," but that should not dissuade anyone from picking them up for an evening's enjoyment, particularly in view of some of the distressing works being produced on the darker side of World War II.

These are, indeed, fading memories, and to his credit Lynch claims nothing more nor nothing less for them. He has done nothing to confirm or correct the stories he has captured — except for one, the tragic sinking of HMCS *Esquimalt*, (pp.43-5) where a personal version is also included. As such, and without pretences, it is a welcome, even necessary, addition to our sources for the understanding of Canadian maritime history.

Kenneth S. Mackenzie
Salt Spring Island, British Columbia


Among the allied nations involved in World War II Canada stands tall in its post-war treatment of its armed forces. On the other hand, successive Canadian governments dealt shabbily with its Merchant Navy veterans. This disgraceful omission has only been addressed recently, chiefly through the efforts of The Canadian Merchant Navy Association. Adding insult to injury, an official spokesman for the Royal Canadian Navy recently described wartime merchant seamen as "mercenaries." The ensuing publicity gave journalist Mike Parker the perfect occasion to collect the personal stories of men who served in our war-time merchant marine.

The book consists of forty-nine interviews with merchant seamen and one with a ship's agent, all augmented by an introduction, four short bridging chapters and an epilogue by the author. As might be expected, the interviews embrace all the horrors of the war at sea — the ship sinkings, the ordeal of trying to survive on a raft or in a lifeboat in a North Atlantic winter and, for some, days on end spent as a prisoner of war. These are all graphically described and should not fail to move even the most cynical reader. Parker's own contributions provide the necessary back-drop and the statistics are useful, illustrating as they do the vital role played by the Merchant Navy in the war and the high price that was paid. It should be noted, however, that the statistics reflect totals for all British shipping, not just the Canadian effort. The selection of sixty photographs, many from private collections and therefore not published before, is excellent and compliment the text.

As the subtitle suggests, Parker's purpose is to develop an oral history of the Canadian merchant seaman experience during the war. This goal poses difficulties, for history — always a slippery concept — becomes even more so when qualified by the word "oral," for it is then more dependent than ever on memories. And memories, as we all know, are rarely complete, often inaccurate, and certainly prone to exaggeration. If history is supposed to reflect what really happened, then treat this book with caution. Well-intentioned as its contributors may be, one must be charitable and say that their memories have played tricks on them. Allowance can be made for the inaccuracies that come from youthful inexperience. Few seamen held positions which allowed them to know what was taking place at the command level. Unfortunately, most of those that did know, have since died.

As a result, there are an inordinate number of errors which weaken the book's value as a history. The CPR liner sunk off the west coast of Africa in March 1943 was not the *Empress of Halifax* (p.172) but the *Empress of Canada*. Far too many ships' names are incorrectly spelled to be overlooked: *Bic Island* becomes *Bick Island* (p.106), *Batory* becomes *Petori* (p.167), *Volendarn* becomes *Volendurn* (p.314). Geography, too, is victimized by inaccuracy; on a passage from Java to New York via Cape Horn, one is hardly likely to pass Capetown (p.193). And what does one make of the position "eighty-three miles east southwest from Lockeport"? (p.130) The well-known Cunard White Star Line
is transformed into the "Cunard West Star Line," (p.200) the venerable Lunenburg company Zwicker and Company becomes "Swicker and Company," (p.125) and the notorious British tramping firm Ropner Shipping Co. is identified as "Ropeners." (p. 185) People and place names also fall victim to this indifference to accuracy; Thorold, Ontario as "Thoreau" (p. 198) is one glaring example.

While one can try to overlook spelling mistakes, inaccurate historical facts are another matter; Parker would have been well advised to have had his manuscript read by a proof-reader with a nautical background, especially as it appears that the interviews were transcribed verbatim from tape recordings. This noted, the book still provides interesting reading for a generation largely ignorant of the tremendous contribution made by the Canadian Merchant Navy in World War II. As one who served on British merchant ships for the entire period of the war, I am pleased that Parker attempted to tell the Canadian story before it became too late.

Gregory P. Pritchard
Blue Rocks, Nova Scotia


The frontispiece of the old Royal Navy Fighting Instructions was a photograph of a ship's lookout in dripping oilskins, wet, cold and tired. The caption was: "The Most Important Single Factor." Our corvette sailors, our most important single factor, stood up to every challenge. Corvettes Canada gathers together the recollections of such men in their own words on every aspect of life aboard these small warships during the Battle of the Atlantic from 1939 to 1945. The experiences and feelings described with modesty and humour will provide invaluable reference material for future maritime studies.

Mac Johnston is the editor and general manager of The Legion magazine. Believing that the experiences of men of the lower deck have been overlooked, he contacted Jack Muir of Toronto, a veteran whose hobby is collecting and maintaining mailing lists of World War II ships' companies; with his help he began sending out personalized letters to corvette veterans. Three and a half years, and nearly 2,000 letters later, he was ready to fulfil his aim of recording fairly for posterity the nature and essential elements of the corvette experience. This book is testimony to his success, for here he preserves the seagoing recollections, good and not so good, of over 250 men who served in one or more of fifty corvettes. Both the lower deck and the wardroom are represented. Many excellent photographs, most of which are from private collections, enhance the narrative.

The book opens with a map of the North Atlantic and western Mediterranean, setting the scene for a short but succinct summary of Canada's naval effort during the six year battle. Then follow personal accounts of the very first Canadian-built corvettes and their passages to the United Kingdom. This establishes the general pattern of the book, a sequence of relevant observations on maritime developments of every sort as the battle progressed, illustrated, so to speak, with relevant personal accounts. The historical notes, the description of technical and tactical developments, indeed all the matters associated with the Battle of the Atlantic, are described with accuracy and clarity. Actions with submarines and aircraft are recorded in a gripping manner, interspersed with the comments of the participants. There are two points of view, gently expressed, which perhaps are debatable even though they are held by many naval veterans. The first has to do with Canadian ships having to suffer with inferior equipment while the RN got new equipment. Anyone who had served with the RN and then came back to the RCN knew that many RN ships waited just as long as ours for new gear. The second point concerns our Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Nelles, and his failure to push hard enough to close the equipment gap. When one considers the magnitude of the fifty-fold increase in men and ships over which he presided, we could have suffered worse leadership.

So many old shipmates and friends appear in this book, so many ships that one sailed with; it is hard to believe that only one of these ships is still afloat, HMCS Sackville. When she was
paid off and then restored to her 1944 self as a Naval Memorial, it was in the nature of a miracle. Like Vimy Ridge in World War I, the Battle of the Atlantic brought together tens of thousands of young Canadians from every part of our wonderful country and through hardship and toil united them as one, old shipmates and friends unto death.

This is a splendid book.

L.B. Jenson
Queensland, Nova Scotia


The Allied convoys to Russia during World War II are the basis for these two new books. The main focus of both books is the Allied perspective, but a significant effort is also made to capture the German effort against the convoys. While these books share the same subject, they differ markedly in approach.

Ruegg and Hague intend solely to catalog and illustrate these convoys, providing a minimum of narrative to supplement the plethora of facts and selected photographs that they offer up. The best example is their brief and workmanlike description of the most controversial of all convoys, PQ 17, which takes up less than a page. Clearly, their book should be seen more as a reference than a description.

Viewed in this light, *Convoys to Russia* is a worthwhile volume, making a wide variety of facts and figures easily accessible. Thus, all convoys are listed chronologically, and a brief description of each convoy is provided along with the composition of the convoy indicating each merchantman's assigned position. Allied and German losses during the convoy battles are then listed, followed by a complete listing of merchant ship losses. This last list is provided in both alphabetical and chronological order. Finally, all participating warships and merchant ships are then indicated alphabetically, along with the various convoys with which they had association. The fifty well-chosen photographs and a six page extract from a report compiled by the Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia in June 1944, add welcome context. The brief introductory remarks and general overview, as well as a short description of the peregrinations of the SS *Hopewell* along the north coast of Russia and Siberia in the summer of 1942 round out this short book.

The authors have been at some pains to include all details of the ships and battles of this campaign in their brief account, and their lists appear accurate in most respects. The Ninth Escort Group is not listed as sailing with the last convoy to Russia, JW 67, which sailed from the UK 12 May 1945. These ships were detached en route but nevertheless did sail as part of the convoy. There may be other errors but if so, this reviewer did not see them. The other oversight involves the maps included in this volume. Given their attention to detail in other areas, the failure to include several place names is surprising. The key for the map accompanying the story of the *Hopewell* suggests that Hansen Island and Yugorski Shar suggests that these places are found at numbers '5' and '10' respectively. Unfortunately, these numbers are missing on the map. It is a curious oversight. Aside from these minor points this book provides an excellent short reference book.

Woodman's is a far more substantial work. While virtually all of the information contained in Ruegg and Hague's book also appears in Woodman's, the facts are not simply laid out in tables but are woven into a compelling narrative. Woodman is a novelist, and his experience in prose shows to good effect here. He also possesses sea experience, which gives his description of particular situations the ring of truth. It surely informs his empathetic accounts of the challenges sailors encountered — in terms of natural hazards, naval dangers and cultural complications — while forcing these convoys through. His portrait of the merchant marine sailors and their situation is one of the best this reviewer has read. This does not imply parti-
sanship. Woodman provides very balanced and insightful descriptions of the naval elements of these convoys. He further adds to his masterful narrative by providing a judicious description of the problems and challenges faced by those in shore headquarters away from the scene of the convoy battles. Thus, in discussing the fatal order to PQ 17 to scatter, he manages to portray the Admiralty perspective so convincingly that the reason for the error is understood, and even arouses sympathy, though it is clear that Woodman considers the decision a mistake.

The book draws on many first-hand accounts and some archival work, while being heavily supported by secondary sources. The author deliberately avoids footnotes and provides only a few general notes on each chapter. Six maps and thirty-eight photographs provide good visual references for the book, although Woodman does not include track charts to portray the more important convoy actions and surface engagements he describes. There are few errors, although Woodman claims that schnorkel-fitted U-boats were operating against arctic convoys as early as February 1944, when in fact such equipment did not arrive in northern waters until quite late in that year.

Overall Woodman's book can be recommended to anyone with even a passing interest in the subject. Not only is it good history, but it is a superb tale of the sea, with finely sketched portraits of the men and conditions of the period. Ruegg and Hague's book will suit a more limited audience, but serves well as a reference for those interested in these convoys.

D.M. McLean
Victoria, British Columbia


This book is a history of the British merchant marine during World War II. It covers in great detail every theatre of the war and every aspect of the war-time operations of British merchant ships — the evacuation of Europe in 1940, the Battle of the Atlantic, the Arctic and Mediterranean convoys, the operations in the Far East, and the invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Northwest Europe. There are also sections on the wartime construction of merchant ships and on the men who manned them. Between May 1940 and May 1944 the British lost 2,284 merchant ships to all causes, while throughout the war 31,908 British merchant seamen were killed. This book is therefore also a story of the heroism, fortitude, and sacrifices of the officers and men of the British merchant service who, in large part, made Allied victory possible.

The book is clearly more a labour of love than an exercise in academic history, for it is focused totally on heroic deeds. The author, John Slader, served as a British merchant marine officer during the war and is now a retired businessman. He seems incapable of leaving out any detail, so that The Fourth Service is sometimes more a list or compilation of British merchant ships which were attacked, damaged or sunk than a narrative or interpretive history. Thus, and in contrast to studies such as C.B.A. Behrens, *Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War*, readers will find that Slader gives little attention to such important questions as the allocation by Allied authorities of merchant ship tonnage to particular tasks or theatres. The Fourth Service is that also marred by errors of historical judgement and mistakes of fact. Roger Winn was not the "director" of the Government Code and Cipher School (p. 138) but rather the head of the Submarine Tracking Room in the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre; the Pedestal operation is certainly not "probably the best known of any action at sea." (p.215) Furthermore, without footnotes, it is difficult to judge from where or how the author obtained his information. While the author consulted some materials in the Public Record Office and the National Maritime Museum, The Fourth Service appears to be based for the most part on printed secondary sources.

Nevertheless, while it is not an academic history and in some respects it is a flawed work, *The Fourth Service* is full of interesting details about the British merchant marine in World War II and is good reading for the non-specialist who is interested in the war at sea.

David Syrett
New York, New York

This book lists 5,015 allied naval and civilian ships and craft which took part in Operation Neptune in June 1944. Seven pages of script, some sketch maps and a chronology outline the concept and its execution and then, as befits a work of reference, it gets straight to business.

Listing is done in three parts: ships which carried troops and their gear; main naval escort; and support forces and "other vessels." Each part is sub-divided by category (e.g. landing ships infantry, bombardment battleships and cruisers, the anti-submarine screen, block ships, salvage vessels and tugs). Vessel data varies from section to section. Thus, troopships have tonnage, year of building, nationality, owner, and troops and landing craft carried, while bombarding heavies specify main armament. Generally, all entries include significant movements and actions. The entries concerning Canadian ships are consistent with Canadian sources. Jack Pickford's corvette Rimouski, for example, "left Forth 23 May with Corncobs." (p.112) Corncobs were convoys of block ships to be sunk as breakwaters for al fresco harbours on the landing beaches.

Obviously the utility of a reference depends on the quest. This reviewer, perhaps obsessed with form, would prefer had proper titles for each ship's name (e.g. HMCS, RFA, SS, USS, USNS, etc.) not been omitted. It is not always clear whether a ship was naval or civilian: our Prince David is shown as a Canadian passenger vessel used as a landing ship in the same section as Llangibby Castle, a British passenger liner used as a landing ship, and Samuel Chase, a US APA. Ships' nationalities are nearly always stated, exceptions being the RCN Bangors attached to the (RN) 16th Minesweeping Flotilla and the RN danlayers with the (RCN) 31st M/S.F. CNRS members should have little difficulty with these but numbered craft may present a challenge, with the thirty RCN LCI(L)s simply included in numerical sequence among some 184 of the RN, and our MTBs treated similarly.

The merits far outweigh such flaws. As with every good reference book, one continually stumbles upon fascinating tit-bits while seeking something else; thus we learn that there were 66 A/S trawlers, 307 minesweepers, twenty different landing craft adaptations for purposes as diverse as fighter direction and field kitchens, and seven vessels that laid cross-channel phone cable. The many photographs give life to the text and, unusually these days, are positioned near relevant narrative. Among the most interesting are those of coasters stranded for unloading at low tide, an aerial view of some one hundred ships off a beachhead, and small passenger ferries (with six or eight LCAs at davit heads) looking like bantam weight-lifters.

This is a compact but remarkably comprehensive reference which many will find useful and most enjoy.

Richard L. Donaldson
Victoria, British Columbia


This is a first class job for a privately published book, the profits from which go to the Welfare Section of the Algerines Association, of which Jack Williams was a founder member and newsletter editor for many years. The quality of the writing, editing, proofreading and publishing is well above the usual standard for this type of association history.

No one volunteers to serve in minesweepers. It is usually dangerous, complicated, often uncomfortable, and for long periods, intensely
boring. One rarely sees "the enemy." Perhaps as a result, minesweeping has received little attention from historians. Yet, as Williams' title says, they led the way (at Normandy), ahead of all the landing craft, destroyers and bombardment ships, and, in the motto of the US Navy minesweeping service, "Where you go, we've been." In addition to the Royal Navy's ten minesweeping flotillas of various classes of ships (two augmented by eight RCN Bangor Class minesweepers), there was one completely Canadian Flotilla, CDR Tony Storr's 31st MSF, and one US Navy Squadron, their 7th, off Normandy on 5-6 June, 1944. Their success is affirmed by the fact that the only ships lost to the large fields of mines in the days of the landings were those that strayed outside the marked lanes and areas. Not only does this emphasize that the lanes were indeed clear, but also that the little dan-layers that accompanied the 'sweepers were successful in marking the cleared paths and areas; these small vessels, usually ex-fishing trawlers, are almost never mentioned in histories. Here they get honourable mention.

Williams' approach is straight-forward, telling the story of the preparations, the composition of the various flotillas — the Hunt-Class (built in 1918-19) or "Smokey Joes," for instance, which were "pillars of fire by night, columns of smoke by day," (p.3) the lead-up sweeping along the English coast; out to the "Picadilly Circus" departure point in mid-Channel, and the assault sweeps to within 1,000 yards of the beaches. The problem of the one day's delay, requiring the 'sweepers to reverse course, sweeps and all, for twelve hours and then carry on was an interesting exercise in consummate seamanship, as was the later task of sweeping the bombardment areas under the guns of the British, French and American battleships, monitors and cruisers, as the latter steamed back and forth firing to the Army's requirements. Interspersed with this factual narrative are many direct quotations from the participants themselves: C.O.s and watchkeepers, sweep deck seamen, visual signalmen and Flotilla Senior Officers. This lends an immediacy to the story — it was not just ships, mines, wet wires and otter boards, it was also living, worrying, involved crews, as well as those at home who knew where they would be working their trade.

Williams takes the story from a week or so before D-Day to the end of September and the 'sweepers' job off Normandy. The appendices describe the various classes of ships involved, mine sweeping methods, number of mines swept (a surprisingly inaccurate record, he complains!), and honours and awards (justifiably) given for their part in Operation Neptune — 155 in all, of which 108 were "Mentions in Despatches." It is a book of great worth as a handy and evidently accurate reference. Although Williams includes no specific source references, a bibliography is provided. He also notes, incidentally, that the 'sweepers' log books were discarded after the war — an appalling loss!

Perhaps just as importantly, he tells the story of the minesweepers in an interesting, even entertaining, fashion. There is a large and useful selection of photos as well as sixteen evocative pen-and-ink drawings by N.G. Tacey, describing events as they happened in those few intense weeks. For a change in such publications, I found no spelling errors or mistaken references, even on the Canadian side. All this makes it a book that is well worth shelf space.

F.M. McKee
Markdale, Ontario


French naval forces played a significant role in the liberation of their homeland from German occupation. French warships and naval infantry units participated in the Neptune landings, the invasion and liberation of Corsica and Operation Anvil-Dragoon. Under the direction of the well-known naval historian, M. Masson, the historical section of the French Naval Staff has produced an excellent study of French naval participation in the Normandy, Corsican, and Southern France campaigns. An older work, published in 1969, the volume is still useful today and deserves more attention than it has hitherto received.

The authors provide a wealth of detail on each operation. Equally useful they describe the post landing activities of French naval forces.
After the Normandy landings, for example, French warships continued to escort convoys in the English Channel, helped keep German naval units in check and performed numerous shore bombardment missions in support of allied ground forces in the beachhead. After the allied breakout French ships participated in operations designed to capture ports along the channel coast and in Brittany. French naval infantry took part in attacks to clear the Germans from positions near the mouth of the Scheldt and thus free the port of Antwerp for allied use. Much of the information on the activities of individual ships and squadrons is highly detailed and is therefore of greater interest to the specialist. Yet the voluminous details do add up to an excellent overall picture of the role played by the French navy in several important campaigns.

In presenting the achievements of the French navy the authors avoid a parochial approach; instead, they present the activities of the French navy within the broader strategic and operational context of allied efforts. The descriptions of the planning and preparations for Operation Neptune are a model of clarity and are easily as good as many later studies.

The book could well have used a number of maps, charts and illustrations to enhance what is a first-rate piece of work. The Naval Historical Section's study is house history in the best sense of the term and clearly demonstrates how useful such a genre can be.

Steven T. Ross
Newport, Rhode Island


Long after the end of World War II, a huge 1945 map of the Atlantic dominated the Control Room of Royal Air Force Coastal Command Headquarters at Northwood, Middlesex. The map was left still showing wartime operations of aircraft designated for maritime duties in protecting convoys, hunting U-boats, and attacking enemy coastal targets. The great splash of ocean blue between continents emphasized the magnitude of the task.

*Crucible OfWar* provides a similarly broad perspective to the crucial role of the Royal Canadian Air Force during World War II. This is an epic volume — 1,096 pages — suitably so, considering the vastness of its subject. The Royal Canadian Air Force grew phenomenally during the war, from a mere 4,061 in September 1939 to a strength of 263,000 men and women in 1945, of whom 93,844 served abroad. During those terrible, gallant years, the RCAF became such a large element of Britain's air offensive against Nazi Germany, that RCAF personnel eventually composed over twenty-five percent of RAF Bomber Command, and formed our own Number Six Group. (At hideous cost; 9,919 Canadians died in the skies over Occupied Europe.) As well, there were seven Canadian squadrons in Coastal Command. One unit was sent to the Far East, where its alertness contributed to the destruction of a Japanese naval fleet. Our airmen served in every corner of the world, a national field of honour that *Crucible Of War* covers more comprehensively than you would think from all the strident debate when it was published.

Being an official history, it is a joint writing effort, one could almost say a committee. The four-man team of DND historians has compiled and presented an impressive amount of information, so it is unfortunate that so much media attention was focused at a mere two pages; the echo of a sensationalized television programme aired last year. That scurrilous show, which vilified RCAF bomber crews as "terrorists", was succinctly dismissed as "crap" by J.L. Granatstein, one of our most respected military historians. The issue is explored briefly in *Crucible*, if maybe with more presentism than one might expect from professionals. However, any claim that this official history "supports and vindicates" the television producers' revisionism is proven to be self-seeking nonsense when one actually reads it. It is an unfortunate interlude, which quite detracts from the book's genuine
achievements. Instead, useful media attention could have been paid to more significant revelations of the struggle for eventual "Canadianization" of RCAF squadrons for virtual autonomy within the Royal Air Force.

The wartime RCAF's story is presented here in five massive parts: Air Policy; Fighter War; Maritime Air War; Bomber War (rightly forming the bulk); and Air Transport. The Maritime section offers 175 pages, a topic which could easily form a separate book. Having spent many a weary hour crouched in the turrets of Catalina and Sunderland flying-boats myself just after war's end, this reviewer can appreciate what a demanding job it must have been for aircrew of Coastal Command to protect Atlantic convoys during the war.

That wall-map displayed a large black-outlined area dominating the centre of the North Atlantic, usually called simply "the Gap." It marked the dread region beyond the range of Allied aircraft from either side of the ocean for much of the war's duration. There, U-boats could roam and kill virtually at will, safe from aerial observation or attack. Finally though, the availability of longer-range escort aircraft closed the Gap and reduced the heavy toll of merchant marine casualties.

Maritime air-war had its purely aggressive side, too, involving continual efforts to destroy enemy vessels at sea and in harbour. The Bay of Biscay proved a happy hunting-ground for Coastal Command 'planes, particularly after being equipped with Leigh searchlights whose glare could illuminate U-boats on the surface during darkest night. There's also an unflinching look here at the early failures of RCAF squadrons in their efforts to attack coastal installations. Obsolescent or unsuitable aircraft, and lack of crew experience in dealing with vile weather, made for ineffective raids and caused many casualties. Better aircraft and improved combat skills gradually turned the tide, and Canadian squadrons became the scourge of German naval forces, particularly along the coasts of Holland and Norway.

The text is well supported by excellent colour maps, and evocative black and white photographs. True, there are some obvious omissions; for instance, scant mention is made of the Women's Air Force or the contribution of ground service crews. But considering the sheer volume of information to be covered, Crucible Of War provides a thorough record of the RCAF's achievements — including those who served literally "over seas."

Sidney Allinson
Victoria, British Columbia


Blood, once the price of Admiralty, according to Kipling, is no longer the true price of naval power. From Pax Britannica to Pax Americana the true measures in the age of industrial war are iron and a long purse. Weir's Forged in War makes clear this new truism in a model account of the relationship between industry, science and the American navy during more than twenty years of submarine construction.

Weir provides a straightforward account of submarine design, development, construction management, and the changing operational parameters that concerned American submarine development from 1940 to 1961. The relationship between considerations of cost, technology and strategy are particularly well examined. Weir, a historian with the US Navy's Contemporary History Branch, takes us from mobilization of the navy and industry during World War II through demobilization, the initial Cold War rearmament effort and finally the development of nuclear-powered and missile-firing submarines. There is much new and fascinating information on the origins and problems of these programmes. We learn of the influence of German naval efforts to launch V-2 rockets from submersible cargo containers towed behind U-boats, and how a scientific panel meeting to discuss defence against submarines instead developed the proposal to build offensive missile-firing boats. The legacy of Hyman Rickover also comes in for reassessment. Weir does not question his brilliance but shows that Rickover's over-riding concern with
safety and immediate requirements may have changed the trajectory of scientific and engineering enquiry away from more revolutionary achievements in undersea technology. Weir’s account is doubly commendable, because leavening the story is a critical analytical device revealing the workings of what he terms the "naval-industrial complex." Anyone familiar with Weir’s earlier monographs, Building American Submarines 1914-1940 (Naval Historical Center, 1991), and Building the Kaiser’s Navy: The Imperial Naval Office and German Industry in the Tirpitz Era, 1890-1919 (Naval Institute Press, 1992), will be familiar with the complex series of relationships between science, industry and naval professionals that he attempts to trace. This elevates the account into a first-class contribution to an evolving international literature on the history of technology. Weir takes the trouble to explain the genealogy of the ideas borrowed from W.H. McNeill, I.B. Holley, and other contributors to the history of military technology. The "naval-industrial complex" he explores is not the stuff of grand conspiracies between industrialists and admirals. Rather, he addresses the extraordinary and everyday relationships between scientists, designers, engineers, corporations, politicians, captains and admirals, which in some form have been essential since the early age of sail, but which have taken on greater complexity, as has life, in the twentieth century. It is unfortunate that there is so little Canadian work addressing similar developments for the Royal Canadian Navy and its successor, MARCOM. The unexamined anti-militarism of Canadian academia has sewn the field with salt. To our loss, this field is likely to remain fallow because those who walk it carry the mark of Cain. All naval historians of this period, amateur and professional, will find Weir’s account even-handed and very well documented. As an official historian he has access to a wide range of materials that will remain denied to others for years to come. As with any book aimed at the lay audience, many complex technical items are simplified. Readers of a technical bent may find his descriptions infuriatingly simple but, given his audience, I did not. This book belongs next to Hackmann’s Seek and Strike and Grove’s Vanguard to Trident as a chief reference for technical and related policy decisions through this era. It is likely to remain the definitive account of post-World War II American submarine developments for many years to come.

Michael A. Hennessy
Kingston, Ontario


There are few military occupations that elicit a more visceral response than that of submariner. It is doubtful that many people could remain dispassionate about the prospect of fighting a war from within a small, overcrowded, dank, and claustrophobic vessel beneath the sea, constantly facing the danger of being despatched to a watery and unmarked grave. Yet thousands of sailors did serve on submarines in both world wars and many of them did not survive. Harry Holmes’ monograph gives an account of those American subs that failed to return from their last patrol in World War II.

The American submarine campaign against Japan from 1941 until 1945 was the most successful in history. Ranging throughout the Pacific, and sometimes right into Japanese harbours, US Navy submarines inflicted serious losses upon the Imperial Japanese Navy and crippled their enemy’s vital but poorly protected merchant fleet. Those achievements, however, were not without cost. Fifty-two subs were lost, and Holmes, allotting on average three to four pages per craft, outlines the service record of them all, focusing on their successes and their last patrols. Reflecting the solitary nature of the war they fought, the exact manner in which many of these vessels and their crews met their end remains a mystery. With skilful use of photographs of the subs, often their captains, and even sometimes their victims, Holmes manages to put across in a most readable fashion the often tragic consequences faced by those who fought and died beneath the waves.

The book is not an academic work. The bibliography includes some primary sources but
is not extensive and tends to focus rather narrowly on submarines rather than on the wider naval picture. There are no footnotes, which is a shame, as Holmes apparently used (cited in his bibliography) the personal records of many USN veterans. It would be useful to know who these men are, not only for interest's sake, but because those papers could be used by others interested in the topic. A number of useful appendices are attached, including the technical specifications of the various classes of submarines used by the USN, a chronological listing of vessels lost, as well as a registry of "kills." Emphasizing that his purpose is to honour the memories of the dead and the living, Holmes also identifies the major American memorials dedicated to submariners and their ships.

Well laid out and attractively designed, *The Last Patrol* is a reference guide which could be employed usefully in tandem with more substantive histories, popular and academic, dealing with the undersea campaign in the Pacific during World War II. For those interested in looking at how it felt to be at the other end of an American submarine's torpedo, one need only consult Mark P. Parillo's excellent *The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II* (published in 1993 and reviewed in *The Northern Mariner*, April 1994). A Japanese merchant seaman's lot, given the increasing deadliness of the US Navy's and the Imperial Japanese Navy's ignorance concerning submarine warfare, was not a happy one.

Galen Perras
Gloucester, Ontario


In this second and final volume of his masterful account of the US Navy's fighter planes in combat for the first twelve months of the Pacific war, John Lundstrom has written the proverbial last word on the subject. Like *The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway* (Naval Institute Press, 1984), this work is rooted in meticulous research, notably oral interviews and diaries, carrying the story from the American landings at Guadalcanal on 7 August through the naval Battle of Guadalcanal in mid-November 1942. The outcome of these pivotal struggles was an Allied victory, for Japan thereafter shifted to the strategic defensive.

The focus is on the pilots of five Navy fighter squadrons, at sea and eventually ashore to the "Canal's" Henderson Field after their carriers were sunk or had to retire to repair battle damage — *Saratoga, Enterprise, Wasp,* and *Hornet.* Jimmy Flatley's Fighting 10 (the Grim Reapers) has been justly heralded in other books, but Lundstrom gives Roy Simpler's Fighting 5 its long overdue recognition as the workhorse squadron for the critical first nine weeks of the campaign. Averaging about fifty Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters at any given time, these Navy flyers evenly matched their Japanese counterparts in the more maneuverable Mitsubishi Zero with superior tactics and early warnings by radar and Allied coastwatchers. The mutual pilot attrition suffered in these dogfights and anti-aircraft fire favoured the Americans, however, because of their replacement policy of rotating home veteran pilots before pilot fatigue compromised their skills, in contrast to the Japanese who spent their "top guns" in deference to the code of Bushido, fighting and dying for the Emperor.

*The First Team* is tactical history at its finest. The exciting descriptions of aerial combat follow a day-by-day format and give almost equal attention to bombing and torpedo planes as well, especially in the carrier battles of the Eastern Solomons and the Santa Cruz Islands. The major role of the several Marine Corps fighter squadrons is given its due, as other works have, including the newest, Marion Carl's autobiographical *Pushing the Envelope* (Naval Institute Press, 1994). Lundstrom documents in astounding detail each individual airplane flown, down to its Bureau of Aeronautics catalogue number; each pilot; and each mission, Japanese as well as American. A typical example is J.J. Southerland's dogfight on 7 August with the celebrated Saburo Sakai, until the former ran out of ammunition and had to bail out. (pp.53-55)

Lundstrom is to be especially congratulated...
for his sagacious handling of statistics, namely the realistic number of kills against the greatly inflated claims by pilots — 102 instead of the 193 reported by the five fighter squadrons. Still, throughout 1942, "the U.S. Navy's fighter pilots faced the best aviators the Imperial Navy would ever wield," (p.529) meaning that the much higher Allied scores of 1943-45 were over pilots who were downright inferior, even deficient. Much of this success was due to adapting to the shortcomings of the Zero, knowledge enhanced by the capture of a Zero in the Aleutians during the Midway operations, the results to which the author devotes an entire appendix.

Understandably, Lundstrom identifies himself with the men on the scene and consequently defends the US carrier admirals relieved of their commands and criticized by historians, including this reviewer, ever since — Frank Jack Fletcher, Leigh Noyes, and Thomas C. Kincaid. His views are supported by Stephen D. Regan's biography of Fletcher, In Bitter Tempest (Iowa State University Press, 1994) and Gerald E. Wheeler's Kincaid of the Seventh Fleet (Naval Historical Center, 1994). These arguments are soundly researched, but solid documentation for the reasoning behind these personnel decisions by the high command remains elusive.

The First Team is also notable for its excellent photographs, charts, and diagrams of Japanese air attack formations. Author and publisher alike deserve the highest praise for having produced, in both volumes, the definitive work on the subject.

Clark G. Reynolds
Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina


Admiral Ugaki was killed while leading the final kamikaze attack of the Pacific War. In fact, he left on his last raid after Japan had surrendered. He was so imbued with the will to die and to join the thousands of Japanese navy fliers, whom he had sent before him, that he removed his badges of rank and disobeyed his Emperor by choosing to turn a "blind eye" to the surrender order.

The book was developed almost entirely from the translation of Admiral Ugaki's diary, published in part in 1952 and subsequently translated, annotated with American records, and published in 1991 under the title Fading Victory (reviewed in TNM/LMN). It is the only known diary to be kept by a senior officer. The story starts prior to Japan's entry into World War II, including the events both military and political which culminated in the Pearl Harbor attack of December 1941. The reader is afforded an insight into the form of government which then ruled Japan, together with the dominating influence of the Japanese Army, and to a slightly lesser extent that of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

The author describes the ease with which Japan conquered all before it, certainly in the initial phase of its assault. The Japanese military leaders were so confident that their strategy would deliver southeast Asia, that they discounted the ability of the west to recover and to fight back. As nearly all of the then senior officers had grown up within the then-prevailing religious/cultural environment, they had no idea of the potential war-making capability of the west. They soon discovered that their absence of natural resources left them open to being literally starved and bombed out. They planned on a very short, violent, war to gain control of oil fields, minerals and the like. The results of this adventure is now history.

The diary provides a detailed chronological sequence of the war as seen and recorded by Admiral Ugaki. His comments on the two philosophical camps within the Japanese navy are interesting, as are his comments on the rather surprising lack of co-ordination at middle and senior rank Army and Navy operations commands. There are no maps in this book to assist the reader in following the routes of fleets and task forces and to provide a sense of the vast distances involved.

The Last Kamikaze is an engaging and readable extract/summary of Admiral Matome Ugaki's diary. Readers are spared being overwhelmed by statistics (there aren't any) or technical description of equipment and ships. The focus is on a dedicated, professional Imperial Japanese Navy Officer whose devotion
to his Emperor and to his country was his driving force. He regarded his own self-inflicted demise as the inevitable culmination of his career. Nevertheless, *The Last Kamikaze* is somewhat superficial, so that the serious student of the life of Admiral Ugaki would probably do better to read *Fading Victory*.

Douglas Meredith
Westbank, British Columbia

Brian J. Whetstine. *The Roger B.: The History of the USCGC TANEY (WHEC-37)*. Dallas, TX: Taylor Publishing, 1993. 104 pp., photographs, maps, illustrations. $29.95, cloth; no ISBN.

The *Roger B. Taney* is perhaps the US Coast Guard's best-known cutter, and certainly one of its longest-lived. It was commissioned in October 1936 and decommissioned fifty years later, in December 1986. She was at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese struck in 1941 and was the last survivor of that attack on active duty with any fleet. (For symbolic reasons, the battleship USS *Arizona*, sunk in the attack, remains on the US Navy roster.) Brian Whetstine, a Coast Guard officer, has written an engaging history of the *Roger B. Taney*. The book is reminiscent in style of Allan Snowie's *The Bonnie* or Betty Warrilow's "Nabob."

Whetstine starts with *Taney's* commissioning and includes a good account of her prewar service. He deals with *Taney* during the Pearl Harbor attack, and has a thorough narrative of her World War II activities. He then covers *Taney's* postwar career: on weather stations during the Korean War, interdiction duty during the Vietnam conflict, and ending her career fully involved in drug interdiction in the Caribbean. In 1985, near the end of her career, *Taney* conducted a drug bust which seized over 160 tons of marijuana — that time, a record for drug intercepts. Few ships of any military force have had so long and successful a career. It is not too much to say that *Taney* is to the US Coast Guard what HMCS *Haida* or HMCS *Sackville* are to the Royal Canadian Navy.

This is more than simply a recitation of *Taney's* service career; much is written on life aboard her. Whetstine draws material from interviews and narratives from those who served on *Taney*. The full span of attitudes in the USCG is presented, from the strict prewar division between officers and men in the USCG to the discipline of the postwar years to drug problems in the post-Vietnam era, and then the "tight ship" of the '80s. The narratives add colour and provide insights to US Coast Guard life.

Good detail appears within: there is a short section about "Soogie," the ship's dog from 1937-1948; an explanation of the role of the US Public Health Service vis-a-vis the US Coast Guard; and a list and photos of all *Taney's* skippers from 1936-1986 (one of whom eventually became Commandant of the Coast Guard). The importance of *Taney* to the USCG is made clear; at times, *Taney* was an élite assignment, at other times, much less so.

The book is well-illustrated with many photographs; *Taney* underwent numerous changes in detail and armament in her long-life, and these are shown. The photographs are of value to the modeller and the marine artist.

Symbolically, *Taney* was decommissioned on the forty-fifth anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack. Fortunately, she was not scrapped, but was preserved and is now part of the Maritime Museum in Baltimore, Maryland, where she can be toured by the public. America's taxpayers got their money's worth from USCGC *Roger B. Taney*. So too will purchasers of Whetstine's book. The book is a well-written, worthy tribute to a ship that served America and the USCG well.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


Jonathan Weisgall's book on the Able and Baker atomic bomb tests of 1946 is based on a commendable amount of research that certainly precludes the work from being dismissed as "non-academic," even though it is not written by
a professional historian. The archival sources, the interviews and the secondary literature found in the bibliography leave little doubt that the adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University Law Centre has done his homework.

Weisgall uses a moralizing, preaching, backward-looking approach in his telling of the tale that I found disturbing. Much of the book's material was used in Weisgall's capacity as lawyer for the Bikini islanders in their various legal actions against the US government. And Weisgall is still trying to make his case, only now with a bigger audience.

There is far too much of the "should have known this" or "could have done that" tone to the book. The description of the technology available for measuring radiation, for accurately counting doses, or the level of understanding of the fallout effects of a nuclear blast turns the time arrow into a rearward looking position. Certainly there were risks in these tests, certainly at various levels of government and within the scientific community there was a question of usefulness, but are the decisions to go ahead with these tests criminal actions? The tone of the book is that Weisgall wants the reader to say yes. But is that fair? It appears to be more an attempt to project present day values and judgments on nuclear war, pollution through nuclear testing, and the rights of the Bikini islanders into a time where the context and perspective were entirely at odds with such judgments.

This book would have been well served by some judicious editing. It is unfair to use that old clichéd review line that "In this book is a great article just waiting to come out," but it is a near-run thing. Far too much of the early part of the book is caught up in unnecessary, and incomplete, discussions of pre-war naval building programmes, war-time naval strategy and early cold war politics, material that is covered more fully in other works. Weisgall should have footnoted these areas and moved on to the meat of his book, which is the actual events surrounding the two detonations, the personalities involved in running the Bikini operations, and the case of the islanders being moved to accommodate the blast. In these areas as well better editing would have eliminated a number of repetitious images.

The almost "golly-gee" attitude that the author displays over relatively minor events also tends to detract from the story, as well as from the credibility of the work. One example of this was the description of the logistics and support necessary for the operation, (pp.117-118) Weisgall seems amazed that the US Navy could muster the wherewithal to move and sustain 42,000 people for a few months under peaceful conditions, never realizing that this was a navy that had moved and supplied, in wartime, millions of men overseas in a number of theatres.

As an addition to the knowledge of maritime issues, and in particular as a study of the battle between the Navy and the Air Force to control atomic weapons in the post-war period, this book has little value. As an exploration of America's guilt over the use of atomic weapons, or as a general chronological survey of the day-to-day events seen through the eyes of the people who were at those tests, this is a good, easy read. Perhaps most importantly, the book is a fine guide to a large number of better sources on the topic of early nuclear weapons development, at both the primary and secondary levels.

Greg Kennedy
Kingston, Ontario


Cordon of Steel is the first offering in a new series of publications looking at US naval operations since 1945 that is intended for the general reader rather than the specialist. Presented much in the style of Proceedings, it is easy to read and very well illustrated. Its message is also very clear: navies are still valuable instruments of foreign policy.

In explaining the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis the author makes the assumption that his readers have little or no knowledge of those complex events. This is wise, particularly as most other accounts of the crisis are academic and intended to draw out specific lessons. With the entire resources of the US Naval Historical Center at
his disposal it would have been easy to fall into the trap of writing the definitive history of naval operations during October and November 1962. Instead, Curtis Utz takes the reader carefully by the hand through the political background first from the Soviet point of view and then the Kennedy administration's handling of Khrushchev's calculated gamble before getting into the naval role in the crisis.

As one would expect, the story is told from the American perspective and does not reflect some of the revisionist theories that attempt to justify the Russian rationale for trying to turn Cuba into a strategic bridgehead. Yet the narrative is not insular, and it is reassuring to find several references, including a photograph, to the Canadian role at sea in the anti-submarine operations that were part of the overall response. The involvement of several Latin American warships at the end of the crisis is also mentioned. A few select anecdotes prevent the account from becoming dry. Nevertheless, the author makes it quite clear that his book is, first and foremost, the story of US naval operations during the Cuban crisis. Despite the references to Canadian and Latin American forces, one cannot avoid being left with the view that the crisis was an event directed and largely performed by Americans. And when seen in its entirety, that is the reality. On the other hand, perhaps Canadians tend to overestimate the value of their contribution to international ventures. With a military heritage not widely understood or even respected, especially in our own country, we tend to place more store in our successes than sometimes warranted as a means of counteracting the lack of public recognition.

In explaining how naval forces were used to enforce the quarantine and prosecute the many Soviet submarines that entered Canadian and American waters during the crisis, the author makes wide use of maps, photographs, and dialogue boxes to amplify his narrative. The result is that his wide and necessary use of military terms is not overbearing and *Cordon of Steel* becomes a fascinating insight into the workings of a naval force of the early Cold War era. My only criticism is that more could have been said about the Soviet submarines, particularly about why they were deployed into North American waters. To be on patrol off our shores at the height of the crisis, those submarines left their home bases some two to three weeks earlier, thereby reinforcing the view that moving the missiles and other military equipment and people to Cuba was a carefully orchestrated military operation and not just the whim of Nikita Khrushchev.

As the author concludes, situations such as the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrate the importance of naval forces in "the modern international security environment." Some people may want to see *Cordon of Steel* as just a sales pitch for American seapower. They are wrong. Although not written in classic historical form, the book is good modern history. It tells the story of a very important incident in a clear and concise way. When one understands the extent of the American response to the Soviet attempt to move strategic weapons into Cuba the lack of attention in Canada to the role played by the Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force is worrying. One cannot help but wonder if Canadians really understand just how close to the brink we actually stood in October 1962. For all these reasons, *Cordon of Steel* is important in helping Canadians understand recent history.

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In the history of human malady, seasickness occupies a unique position. It has inspired apprehension and fear, even terror, in the millions; it has provided the best approximation to near-death experience to hundreds of thousands; and yet, mercifully, it has rarely been fatal. The majority of sufferers, having seen across the void, have returned chastened, yet often heartened by the experience: they become, especially if they can retain their sense of humour, as Charles Mazel indelibly demonstrates, better (and usually slimmer) people.

This book is a curious combination. It is a serious book in that it treats a serious subject. But it is also, and perhaps primarily, a humorous
book. There is nothing amiss in this. The author takes the position that seasickness is a natural human condition and that laughter is one of the essential ingredients in coping with it. The question is whether he convinces the reader that he has the right mix of gravity — in his aetiological analysis — and levity — in the reactive giggles which inform commonplace commentary on this sickness.

The book’s ten brief chapters are liberally interspersed with quotations, diagrams, cartoons and tables. The first four chapters (and the last chapter) are the most satisfying, for they address various fundamental issues: the nature of seasickness; the kinds of people affected and the conditions in which the malady flourishes; remedies and alleviation; the role of psychology. These and associated questions are deftly and intelligently discussed, with numerous quotations to illustrate the evolution of ideas about seasickness. We learn, for example, that the ever green Hippocrates, over 2300 years ago, recognised that "sailing on the seas proves that motion disorders the body."

But just why this should be was not definitively elaborated until recently — and we still do not know the exact physiology of the problem. Mazel leads us through a maze of explanations, moving from the sixteenth century "ayre and vapours of the sea" to nineteenth and early twentieth century "blood and guts" theories: cerebral anaemia; muscular tension; the visceral vacuum; the bouncing brain; vestibular over-stimulation. All these theories, in the nature of things, were incomplete: many were frankly wrong; others were accurate in some aspects but confused cause and effect. Only gradually did the accumulation of observation and experience coalesce in the late twentieth century in the more satisfactory theory of sensory conflict which incorporates considerations of unstable motion and the crucial functioning of the inner ear.

Even more engaging, and graphic, are accounts of the various remedies postulated for seasickness, the most impressive of which are the attempted physical cures: creosote pills which worked well, but which smelled so awful they made the taker sick, though not necessarily seasick; the "bagge of saffron" hidden next to the stomach by a seventeenth-century smuggler who, going about his illicit business, found to his surprise that, unusually, he did not get seasick; ammonia with opium, taken internally, or taken externally in the form of an opium plaster on the pit of the stomach; the "cocaine solution" as a solution! How popular some of these nostrums could be with our counterculture.

Equally delightful are the remedies based on food and drink. Ginger and egg whites were thought to be good specifics. Pliny recommended absinthe; later pundits favoured brandy. Others solemnly decreed that no alcohol but champagne could be effective: this was the school of thought that supposed that liberated gases from the champagne (or from pickled onions?) would squeeze and thus stabilise the intestines and gastric organs, providing a defence against an upset stomach! This led, in turn, to attempts to develop mechanical devices to prevent sickness: padded belts with steel plates to hold the stomach together; spinal ice-bags; masks for oxygen, atropine and carbon dioxide. And beyond these individual paraphernalia, there were elaborately designed purpose-built furniture, cabins, and even ships, none of which provided a complete remedy. But the aims embraced by these items have passed via the gyroscope, moveable ballast, and stabilisers into the more comfortable shipping of today.

All of the above account is accomplished with economy and grace. The historical and scientific narrative is clearly drawn, and spiced with an impressive array of literary quotation; in addition to those already cited, Mazel makes frequent recourse to Plato, Sophocles, Byron, Johnson, Disraeli, Twain, Homer, Masefield, Horace, Seneca, Caesar, Bacon, Dickens, Bierce, Jerome and a host of less well known, but authoritative medical, scientific and nautical sources. It is learning lightly worn and faithfully expressed. It incorporates both humour and wisdom and is a creditable addition to the literature.

Unfortunately, from this point on, the book takes a dive in both substance and tone. Chapter 5, entitled "Sex and the Seasick Sailor — the shortest story ever told" consisting of two entirely blank pages, is not so much objectionable as it is simply weak. It does not even make it as undergraduate humour and is best forgotten. Chapters 6 through 9 purport to deal more practically with matters of seasickness on board,
particular attention being paid to menus, food preparation, eating, and the subsequent loss of food. Sadly, this section is played principally for cheap laughs: while there is a place for all genres of humour, any type used to excess palls and loses its force. This is just what happens in the latter half of Mazel's work — four chapters of proto-scatological lee-rail humour, built around barfing, puking, upchucking, retching and spewing, all amusing enough in small compass, but here carried to tedious excess. Happily, in the final chapter, Mazel returns to a lucid response to what he terms "Serious answers to your seasickness questions" and redeems himself with five pages which are worth publishing, and well worth reading.

Michael Staveley
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This is a relative short book packed with enough information to get the computer neophyte sailing down the information superseaway. Randall Brink takes us through the complete process of outfitting a pleasure/office boat, beginning with the selection of a computer. Brink discusses several alternatives, from large desk-top models through notebooks to those especially adapted to harsh environments. The focus is on the operating characteristics of the software and the connections required for additional hardware mentioned later in the book. In the installation section the main concerns are the space available for the computer and safety, both for the sailor and the machine. Brink identifies some of the problems associated with an on-board computer, particularly the provision of adequate reliable power and the challenge of trouble shooting when service personnel are not readily available.

Once a computer is selected and installed, Brink turns to the role it is to play. He describes many shipboard tasks. Some, like keeping the log, recording the stores, and keeping track of maintenance jobs, both done and to be done, are relatively simple. Yet he also shows that the computer can serve as an additional crew member when linked to the appropriate peripherals. The computer can relieve you of the drudgery of steering on long passages; when connected to radar, Loran or GPS receivers, the autohelm and with appropriate chart software, the yacht will stay on course even if you fall overboard.

There is a good section on the peripherals for sending and receiving information from your boat. Not only can you now navigate with more accuracy and have better weather information, you can also stay in constant touch with onshore locations. In fact your yacht can become your office where you can write, send and receive reports, manage your investment portfolio, do almost anything that does not require face-to-face communication. This is a real advantage for those wishing to live and work on their yacht but can be a problem if you see boating as a way to relieve the stress of the workplace.

This little volume is a good source of practical information for those just starting out on the information superseaway. Over twenty of its pages are devoted to navigation tasks. Several navigation and charting software products are described. Each includes what the program can do and the hardware necessary to run each. The programs span the range from courses on celestial navigation at about $44 to surveying/scientific systems costing over $2500. Programs for both IBM type and Macintosh computers are shown. An additional twenty-four pages are devoted to manufactures and suppliers of the materials mentioned in the book. The categories include Inmarsat-C equipment, hand-held navigation calculators, electronic charting equipment and GPS computer interface equipment, to mention just a few. Also included is information on nine on-line services useful for the full time mariner complete with phone numbers, modem settings and current cost of each.

If you plan to computerize your yacht, pick up this book. It is packed with a lot of practical information about almost everything you need to know, whether it is for short stays on board or if you want to live and work at sea for the foreseeable future.

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