BOOK REVIEWS


Some museums have unsolved mysteries in their collections, especially older institutions where items were just collected and their origins were unrecorded. The Danish Maritime Museum at Helsingør had such a mystery. It consisted of three old manuscripts, a French-Danish maritime dictionary, a Danish-French maritime dictionary containing twenty-four illustrations, and a Danish maritime dictionary with descriptions of each term with translations into English and French. The three documents may have entered the collections over sixty years ago. All three were written in the same hand, but no one knew who the author was, what his purpose was or when he wrote the manuscripts, or who sent the documents to the museum?

This last mystery has yet to be solved, but answers have been worked out to the other questions. The royal monogram on some of the plates suggests the manuscripts were written between 1766 and 1808. Plate No. 1 shows the royal monogram of King Christian VII on the stem of a ship of the line launched in 1780. Moreover, a scrap of paper found in the maritime dictionary is dated 24 March, 1792. It therefore seemed probable that the manuscript's author was one of the many Danish and Swedish naval officers who volunteered for service in the British and French navies during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to gain "war experience." Danish officers serving in the two foreign navies sent regular reports to Copenhagen of their experiences. Comparison of the handwriting of the three documents with those in reports of the officers in foreign service, determined that the author was George A. Koefoed.

Born in 1753, Koefoed entered the Danish navy at the age of 12, then was promoted to sub-lieutenant in 1758 before serving in the Danish Mediterranean squadron from 1770-1772. He served in the British navy in 1775-1776 and in the French navy from 1778 to 1783. He commanded Denmark's Mediterranean squadron from 1800 to 1803, then became governor of Bornholm in 1807. According to the fascinating introduction by A. N. Moller, Koefoed modelled his dictionary on M. Lescallier's bilingual French-English dictionary published in 1777. He found that 90 per cent of Koefoed's dictionary's plates were borrowed from Lescallier. Nonetheless, Koefoed adapted these to meet Danish needs. Thus, most of the ships illustrated wear the Danish ensign, and some included are types known only in the Baltic.

Ah of the introductory chapters in both Danish and English are invaluable. One section of this edition of the dictionary deals with Danish eighteenth-century handwriting language (Denmark used the gothic script until 1878). Pages 250-51 show the letter forms typical of eighteenth and early nineteenth century Danish. This is useful for examination of holographic documents from that period. Another section covers the preservation, editing, printing, scope and usage of the dictionary. Thus, the Danish word hundsvot is translated into French as ringo ou ringot and into English as "a strop in the neck of a tackle block for the standing part of a runner." An English index is included that refers "to the Danish head words" of the dictionary, for example, "steering wheel" in Danish is rattet,
shown in French as *Roue de gouvernail*. Moreover, the translation of Danish, Norwegian and Swedish nautical terms into English or French is aided by the publication of the Koefoed dictionary, owing to the similarities in these languages.

The twenty-four plates include illustrations of vessel types, ship construction, rigging, sails and dockyard equipment such as a mast, crane and a rope walk. All major items and their components shown on the plates are numbered, and listed. Component parts are designated by letter. For example, Plate No. 20 shows the cut water; item 259 DC is the rabbet cut in the stem post.

Thanks to the Iver Weilbach Charitable Foundation, Mr. and Mrs. J. Marcussen who voluntarily edited and prepared the manuscript for printing, and the Danish Maritime Museum at Helsingør, all who are interested in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Nordic maritime history now have an invaluable and an exceptionally fine aid for their research.

Dan Harris
Nepean, Ontario


This guidebook provides vital statistics and a brief history for 144 preserved warships from twenty-five countries. The chapters are organized by country, and ships are described alphabetically within each chapter. Each country's naval history is given a short introduction, and most of the ships are illustrated by a photograph. The information provided for each ship is concise and useful; obvious facts such as principle dimensions, rig, tonnage and armament are given as well as less-common but equally useful information such as name changes, the ship's type and class, and dates for her laying down, launching, commissioning and paying-off.

In his introduction, J. Michael Jones lists some of the reasons that warships have been preserved and what kind of historical information and experience they can provide. He is less clear, however, on how vessels were selected for inclusion in this book. The publisher refers to it as a "comprehensive reference work," but we are left wondering just what that means. By what criteria were ships and countries included? Did Jones visit the sites personally? What, in his terms, is a warship? A brief summary of these considerations would have aided in understanding the book's coverage.

This lack of clarity about its purpose reduces the book's usefulness to some extent. Though it includes mailing addresses and telephone numbers, it does not provide information regarding open hours and seasons, admission prices and directions for finding the site. Nor does it have the clear focus of other similar works, like Delgado and Clifford's *Great American Ships* (reviewed here in January 1993), which covers only vessels in the United States preserved and open to the public, or Harry Butkowski's *Warships Associated with World War II in the Pacific*, which covers surviving American vessels from that theatre. A brief index listing the vessels included and their construction dates would also be of interest.

In his introduction, Jones suggests that much of the fascination that preserved vessels hold for their visitors comes from the insight they can offer into the society of their time. What shows up equally clearly in this book, however, is how the surviving ships are also a history of our historical preoccupations. One cannot help be struck, reading through these listings, with the preponderance of certain classes of vessel, such as World War II-era submarines and American battleships, and the relative lack of others. Some useful information could be drawn from the examples in this and other similar books to look at trends and patterns in ship preservation, and their relationship to wider historical concerns.

One questionable inclusion is that of US Brig *Niagara*, listed as having been completed in May 1813. While that fact is in itself true, the vessel bears only the most tenuous relationship to the present replica, and it is pushing the point too far to claim *Niagara* as a preserved vessel in the same class as, for instance, the *Foudroyant*, launched in 1817. This book unfortunately also persists in the sterile and irksome habit of referring to ships as "it," instead of "she."
Overall, the volume is an interesting addition to the literature on preserved historic vessels, though it will not replace any of the standard works. Greater clarity about the criteria employed in choosing the vessels for inclusion would have made it more useful. Its relatively high price may also work against it.

John Summers
Toronto, Ontario


Years ago, in the unenlightened, post-World War II dark ages, sport scuba divers descended upon shipwreck remains, often identifying only the choicest artifacts that they stole from the site to sell for cash or to display in their homes as macho "tokens of accomplishment." Aside from its destruction, this Neanderthal activity ignored the importance of recognizing and appreciating hundreds of other ship’s parts that were necessary for a more complete picture of in situ maritime history. Today, the pre-1980s attitude of "finders keepers" and the removal of any shipwreck parts as souvenirs invite outrage among shipwreck divers today. These illegal activities are deeply discouraged by the vast majority of the sport diving community.

Maritime archaeology programmes first developed in the late 1970s, like those offered by the Marine Conservation branch of the Ontario Underwater Council and, more recently, by Save Ontario Shipwrecks and other local and regional organizations. However, what those programmes lacked was a back-up textbook geared to a general (i.e., non-academic) audience. Until now. *The Wreck Diver’s Guide to Sailing Ship Artifacts of the 19th Century* is a long-awaited accomplishment in an often-overlooked aspect of maritime appreciation. This magically delicious collection of fifty-two drawings, twenty black-and-white underwater photographs, and six black-and-white land photographs is designed for mass consumption by avid sport divers, whether they are exploring shipwrecks on the west coast, east coast, in the Great Lakes, or, for that matter, anywhere in the world where shipwrecks abound.

The simple, clean line drawings of shipwreck artifacts as they were when new are easily interpreted, while the written descriptions are equally succinct. The opening chapter outlines the weakening and eventual collapse of a sunken vessel, with easily understood descriptions of sedimentation and disturbance. Subsequent chapters describe specific parts of the vessel, from ballast, keel, frames, and planking to anchors, masts, spars, rigging, blocks, navigation and steering gear, capstan, windlass, and pumps — in short, all the structures and fittings that comprised a wooden sailing ship are delineated. While simplistic to the professional archaeologist, since it avoids lofty postulations on subjects like the primary data over interpretation, or the field stabilization of artifacts, this guide will leave its intended audience, namely sport divers, craving opportunities to apply its lessons. The book also describes some past failures by sport divers to safeguard history, such as the *Lord Western’s* wooden capstan, which disintegrated after being raised in 1959-60 after a century in the preserving underwater mud of the west coast, (p.44)

The bibliography is not extensive, but is up-to-date and enhances the book’s value for any wreck diver who wants to read more about this topic. If there is a complaint, it is that the book is too short; though it sticks admirably to its title, the addition of a few more chapters on such topics as engines, boilers, and propellers would have broadened the practical application of the book to cover all, or most, wrecks, not just those of sailing ships.

The book is particularly strong in two critical areas: in emphasizing that greater enjoyment for wreck divers results from being able to identify the mysterious bits and pieces at a site, and in stressing that it is the responsibility of wreck divers to protect our non-renewable heritage resources. This small book should be required preliminary reading for all budding marine archaeologists, as well as for divers with pretensions to that status. However, its greatest value lies in the way it seeks to inform the large
sport-diving community which explores shipwrecks as part of its regular activities. It shows that the real heroes are those divers who educate their aquatic peers in the appreciation and conservation of our maritime history. This book, written by and for those heroes, provides an unmuddied introduction to enjoyable and responsible shipwreck appreciation.

Cris Kohl
Chatham, Ontario

Arthur Amos. *Rudders: A Comparison Study.* Rev. ed.; Tobermory, ON: Ontario Marine Heritage Committee, 1993 [order from Ontario Marine Heritage Committee, P.O. Box 145, Tobermory, ON NOH 2R0]. vii + 100 pp., figures, photographs, select bibliography, index. $10 (US $8) + $2 shipping and handling; paper.

The Great Lakes contain an immense collection of shipwrecks, numbering in the thousands. On a warm summer weekend, hundreds of these are observed by divers. They serve as a vast open museum collection — but a museum with few alarms and few interpretive guides. While most of these vessels date from an age with remarkably good records, and in some cases may even have been lost in living memory, in many cases we know very little about them. Much of the process of identification depends on the location of the wreck, reports of vessels in trouble in that area, and the matching of vessel type and overall size. But few vessels on the lakes are as distinctive as, say the *Hamilton* and *Scourge*, or as well documented as the *Edmund Fitzgerald*. Ship "graveyards" like that south of Amherst Island near Kingston may have a dozen or more quite similar craft. Nineteenth-century sailing vessels, built and rebuilt by hundreds of different shipwrights, hailing from several different shipbuilding traditions, provide one of the great challenges of identification.

In *Rudders: A Comparison Study*, Arthur Amos attempts to bring another set of tools to bear on the issue. Might it be possible to narrow the identification of a vessel if it was discovered that different shipbuilders used relatively distinct styles of rudder? Amos' conclusion is: "not yet". The fourteen sites given the greatest study yielded fourteen uniquely styled rudders! Amos concludes from this that "the shipbuilder may have styled each rudder according to his own specifications, perhaps reflecting both practical considerations and personal tastes." (p. 48) This suggests that a larger data set may confirm patterns of style and taste which may yet prove useful. Nevertheless, of the vessels in Amos' data set, three could not be positively identified.

The balance of the volume pursues a related theme, that of steering apparatus. Here, the methodology shifts from underwater measuring and photographing to archival sources (particularly patent records). On two of the vessels in the survey, brass sleeves encasing the steering shafts were stamped with patent, manufacturer, serial number and date. The only piece of information one might want added to this would be the sales books of the Boston Machine Company! And yet, without the date stamp, one is left with a technology which was used for a generation of new builds and who knows how many additional years of active service. Were steerers ever shifted into new hulls as was done with steam engines?

In the end Amos is the first to admit he does not have answers to the issues he raises. Yet he has raised the right questions. Moreover, although the rudder study received an archaeological licence, the methodology was a very non-intrusive one: measuring and photographing. I, for one, hope that the appearance in print of a report that was originally written in 1985 indicates that Amos and the Ontario Marine Heritage Committee are dedicated to expanding the data set. And I'm getting the itch to dig out the wet suit and check out some other sites where the rudder is still in place....

Walter Lewis
Acton, Ontario


_Sail's Last Century_ marks the halfway point in Conway's ambitious twelve volume series on the
history of the ship. Intended as a first-stop reference book for those with some knowledge of and interest in ships and the sea, the series upon completion will form "a coherent history, chronicling the progress of ship design from its earliest recorded forms to the present day." The series is chronological in approach but each volume has a dominant theme.

Central to this volume is the contention that although steam was rapidly taking over routes requiring speed and reliability, the sailing ship was continually being modified to work more economically those routes left to it. Technical, economic and social factors greatly influenced the sailing vessel during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Changes in hull construction and form were a response to industrial and commercial opportunities offered by such factors as improved tonnage regulations, the increased economy of iron and steel production and the liberalization of trade. This adaptation explained the continued use of sail over steam in some trades and the lingering preference of American builders for wood over iron or steel as a building material. Nostalgia played no part in the cold reality of merchant shipping.

The nine chapters in this volume are written by seven contributors who look at "The Wooden Sailing Ship under 300 Tons," "The Wooden Sailing Ship Over 300 Tons," "The Iron and Steel Sailing Ship," "The Schooner in America" and "Schooner Development in Britain" and "The Sailing Ship in The Baltic." To stress the principal technological advances of the period, three chapters deal with "The Transition to Iron and Steel Construction," "The Merchant Sailing Vessel in the Nineteenth Century" and "The Changing Problems of Shiphandling in the Nineteenth Century". Authors with considerable expertise address each subject. Three of them, Basil Greenhill, David MacGregor, and Captain W. J. Lewis Parker, are immediately recognizable to anyone with only a passing interest in marine history. Their chapters reflect the scholarship that has made their earlier, more detailed works standard sources for marine historians. Among the others, Simon Ville's "The Transition to Iron and Steel Construction" is a lucid overview of the development of iron and steel hulls.

The volume heavily emphasizes the impact of technological change on the fleets of Britain, its possessions and the eastern United States. In part this is justified by the dominant role they played in merchant shipping at the time and in the evolution of technology that affected it. Regrettably this preoccupation meant that the fleets of other European countries, notably those of Scandinavia, France and Germany were not as fully explored in proportion to their relative importance. A similar yet less compelling case can be made for eastern Canada and the northwestern United States. Had other fleets been included, a better balance would have been created.

The volume also focuses sharply on the ship, particularly changes to hull design, construction materials and methods, rigging and sailing qualities and general outfit. In my view this would have been enhanced by a more in-depth discussion of the motivations for technological change and the individuals whose ingenuity brought it about. Striking is the absence of any reference to Henry Cunningham and his roller reefing system or Captain J.C.B. Jarvis and his labour saving brace-winches, which was instrumental in the development of the near-perfect square-rigger. There are also a few editorial errors, which is not surprising in so detailed a publication. One of particular note is the reference to a Nova Scotia "round-stemmed tern schooner" which undoubtedly should read "rounded-stemmed tern schooner," known locally as a "spoon" bow.

Despite these reservations the book presents a wealth of information in a very attractive package. Of particular merit are the number and quality of photographs, illustrations, vessel plans, tables and graphs. Suitably placed, they successfully fill their critical role in making this book useful to readers of all levels. The glossary at the back will be useful to those with a limited knowledge of marine terminology. For those wishing to pursue the subject further the annotated bibliography is a very solid beginning. This volume and indeed the series is a worthwhile addition to the marine library of anyone interested in the last century of the sailing ship.

Marven Moore
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia
As a youth, I read everything I could find, borrow or buy about those wonderful creatures of the sea, clipper ships. I knew that their existence on the seas lasted only for a decade — until the Civil War. I knew their great names and their record runs and the immortal designers and builders. I knew how most of them ended their careers — some nobly by fire, by shipwreck, etc., and some ignobly, as coal barges and such. So as a youth I was a thorough-going devotee of these special ships of sail. I was moreover convinced that they were American — all the available literature had convinced me that they were an American invention — they were even identified as "Yankee Clippers." I have mellowed now and have been for years, and so I am fully prepared to read and learn from this wonderful new book, British and American Clippers, that there were, as I later discovered myself, some very notable British ships.

As I leaf through this handsome volume, the old feeling of awe for these complete sailing machines comes rolling back. David MacGregor is precisely the author to write, indeed envision, the comparison between the greatest sailing ships of America and Britain. His book has nine chapters. In Chapters 1 through 3, MacGregor discusses the ocean trade that demanded extremely long ocean passages and the early vessel types like the "Aberdeen Clipper" and "Baltimore Clipper" types that pointed the way to the great extreme clippers of the 1850s. It was the performance of the Baltimore topsail schooner type enlarged to a full ship size in 1834 in the Ann McKim from Baltimore that led New York shipowners to expand their China trade. Unfortunately, MacGregor does not pursue this line of successive vessels to include the subsequent Rainbow and the great extreme clippers out of New England. He does, in Chapters 4 through 6, expand fully into the American clippers of the 1850s. And finally, in the last three chapters, there is the thorough-going literature of those larger British ships in the

Australian trade (1851-55) and the China clippers. Chapter 7, "Clippers of 1853," is the most extensive of the book. Here MacGregor discusses those ships which were the largest of American extreme clippers, culminating with the Great Republic. This marked the apogee of the clipper story, for in this year the tide began to turn for the American extreme clippers. The first iron ships appear and thereafter, new orders were for the modified, or, as they were later called, the medium clippers. The hull lines were not as sharp but their holds were fuller.

MacGregor is an exceptionally skilled marine draughtsman and the entire book is generously illustrated by his fine work. It is especially helpful to have such excellent draughtsmanship to provide continuity and consistency in comparison to the diversity in ships of different sizes, hull configurations and rigs. There are also illustrations by great marine artists of the nineteenth century, most of which have never before appeared so helpfully in technical literature. That century's newest illustrative resource, photography, is also used most appropriately, so that the author shows his subject ships in the real and accurate light of a camera in the earliest marine photography. This use of illustrative material provides a unique and valuable source for an historic analysis and it is well balanced in the several media.

MacGregor's book is a handsome reference meant for study. It is not easily read; it is so thoroughly illustrated that the drawings and paintings divert one's attention from the text. Thus, the author shows two sail plans of the American Clipper Challenge, one by the designer builder and one by himself after her lines were taken off in England with the comparisons in the captions. The reproductions of the contemporary paintings as well as the drawings are well displayed on the pages of this large book.

MacGregor's presentation is direct, factual, and as far as this reader could notice, unbiased. As for the book's subtitle, readers are, for the most part, allowed a fair chance to make their own conclusions. Much of the evidence is graphic and tabular, though any comparison of this kind is most difficult, primarily because of the obvious physical differences between American and British ships. Also, as MacGregor points out, differences between ship captains could
significantly change a ship's performance.

The "Conclusions" offered in the final couple of pages struck me as unnecessary. MacGregor seems to be attempting to explain why the American Clippers preceded the British. His claim that the records of the American ships from New York to San Francisco are of no appreciable interest because the British Trade did not use that route is also open to question. He does not mention those British owners who purchased newly built American clippers, whose records of speed under sail in the British trade have never been matched at that time or since. Nevertheless, I am well content that there is now a book available that deals with the subject of fast sailing ships, clipper ships, that addresses the subject fairly completely.

Thomas C. Gillmer
Annapolis, Maryland


This book sets out to present the history, building methods and information necessary to build, sail and maintain a vessel that occupied a unique position in the history of work boats in America. Since the sharpie was frequently built by those who would use her, the history provides a record of American ingenuity as applied to work boats. Until now, information on the type was scattered in many sources. Reuel Parker brings much of that material together. Yet he also goes well beyond that, achieving his objectives in a concise, well-presented manner.

Had the book been only a simple compilation of what had been previously written, it would have served no great purpose. Where it stands out is in the fact that it was written by an individual who has a practical background gained through designing, building, sailing and maintaining sharpies for much of his life, along with an ability to impart his knowledge in a clear and easy manner. He knows the history of the type, including a thorough knowledge of the vessel in its various migratory forms. He knows first-hand how to get the maximum performance from a very fast sail-driven craft and how easy it is to capsize one. While obviously a dedicated sharpie fan, Parker discusses the vessel's strengths and weaknesses equally, and includes common-sense safety suggestions to be heeded by anyone building and sailing the craft.

The book is well laid out. Chapter One takes us through the history and evolution of the type. Chapter Two discusses traditional construction methods. Chapter Three discusses tools, materials, adhesives, fasteners and safety considerations needed to build a sharpie. Chapter Four describes modern construction methods utilizing readily available materials. Chapter Five discusses details and accoutrements such as rudders, spars, fittings etc. Chapter Six contains a portfolio of designs, and information on lofting and scantlings. Chapter Seven covers sailing, handling and maintenance. Three appendices contain tables of offsets for adapted sharpie designs, three modern sharpie designs by other designers, and a list of material suppliers. A bibliography and index are included.

The book is well supported with clear, well-executed diagrams and numerous photos, many of older vessels. Photos also illustrate building methods of items such as spars, using the time-honoured approach of squaring, marking out, eight-siding, sixteen-siding and finally rounding the mast. The book provides a concise record of the history and building of the sharpie and is recommended to those with an interest in the traditional work boats of North America, along with simply built, though very fast recreational sailboats, including vessels large enough for extended cruising.

N. R. Cole
Scarborough, Ontario


Since the 1930s the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich has had the resources and talented
manpower necessary to establish a reputation of indisputable pre-eminence among international maritime museums. Well before the formal foundation of the NMM in 1934, collections pertaining to nautical themes had begun. Given Britain's role as a premier seafaring nation for over four centuries and her peoples' natural sense of history, it is natural and appropriate that we find there the greatest assemblage of maritime artifacts gathered under one roof. It is from the museum's photograph collection, some 250,000 in number, that John Falconer, a Curator of Historic Photographs, has culled over two hundred images for his book, *Sail and Steam: A Century of Seafaring Enterprise, 1840-1935*.

It is hard to imagine having such a wealth of information at one's disposal and even more difficult to contemplate choosing such a limited number for a book and then organizing them in a coherent manner. This Falconer has done admirably by packaging his selection of photos around seven chapters: "Great Days of Sail," "Britain and the Sea," "The Harvest of the Sea," "Trade and Empire," "Pax Britannica," "To the Ends of the Earth," and "Valediction (Alan Villiers and the last Days of Sail)." Each chapter is preceded by a short introductory essay that outlines the background of the photographs that follow and places them in historical context. Naturally, the photographs are all in wonderful monotone — no pretensions to colour here — and with the earliest dating back to the beginning of the camera's development, one can almost taste the rich earth of the sepia tones of some of the images. All are well captioned with dates, settings and a short background to the image as well as the photographer's name when known. The majority of the photographs were taken in the British Isles, though there are also pictures taken in most of the Commonwealth countries, and CNRS members will be pleased to know that Canada is well represented.

Looking at the book with a pragmatic eye, some of the photos will benefit those concerned with ships' details, particularly those interested in the early vessels that are presented here. Indeed, I have already found the photos of schooners of 1840 helpful for deck fittings, and here I might suggest that an index in the book would have been welcome so that it could be used more effectively as a research tool. Yet not all of the photos are merely static portraits of ships. Most concern the human activities necessary for a ship's existence and purpose, including shore activities such as shipbuilding and fish processing. We therefore get a glimpse of people and their lives of up to a century ago. Some of these last photos are obviously staged and, by today's standards, would be thought to be blatantly contrived. Nevertheless, given their age, they are rather quaint.

Looking at this book with an artist's eye, one must praise it for the sheer visual appeal of the photographs. All are interesting, some are very evocative and even exhibit pathos; none are out of place. Lately there has been an unfair and summary dismissal of "coffee table" books and while some may argue this book to be one of that genre, it is altogether more than that. Further, while it is natural for it to be reviewed in a nautical journal, I would suggest that a review in an art or photography publication would not be inappropriate.

Given this general appeal of *Sail and Steam*, CNRS members might like to keep this book in mind, considering that yet another Christmas is just around the corner.

John McKay
Langley, British Columbia


This intelligent and comprehensive collection of essays grew out of a workshop hosted in 1987 by the Centre for the History of European Expansion at the University of Leiden. Previous studies of European organizations trading with the East Indies are widely dispersed in the literature. This volume brings together seven original essays — one each for the principal Austrian, Danish, Dutch, English, French, Portuguese and Swedish commerce. The time periods vary depending upon sources and scholarly interests: the most restricted coverage is for the Austrian Ostend company and its precursors, 1715-32; the
longest is for the Portuguese Carreira da India, 1497-1810. All the contributions devote considerable attention to eighteenth-century evidence, and this greatly facilitates comparative study. The nine authors bring considerable knowledge to their individual accounts, and on the whole provide articulate and succinct renditions of complex maritime themes. Perhaps wisely, the editors have not attempted to impose their own beliefs or synthesis upon the reader by way of a lengthy introduction or a concluding essay. Knowledge of the age of expansion and Asian geography is assumed, although the essays are sufficiently accessible to be of value to all readers with nautical or economic interests. Casual use, however, will be curtailed due to the absence of an index.

The essays focus upon the voyages conducted by the European companies. Most begin with a brief institutional history and a discussion of sources. Shipping figures prominently in all the accounts, along with trade routes, seasonal timing and durations of voyages, commodities and prices. These topics are explained clearly and comprehensively. One striking feature is the attention devoted to tables and graphs, which permit in most cases systematic study of construction costs, ship movements, shipping costs, cargo capacities and related topics. For this reader, the most interesting theme is the human dimension of the East Indian voyages: crews, diet, health and mortality. All the authors attend to these topics, but all acknowledge as well the difficulties faced by scholars seeking firm evidence on the human features of European commercial expansion. For health and mortality in many instances — at least for the present — we must fall back upon anecdotal and piecemeal evidence, but one highlight here is the ground-breaking work on the Danish experience of mortality by E. Gobel. The overall evidence points to a relatively low European mortality rate by the eighteenth century, established through shorter voyages and improved disease control. With the exception of the English East India Company, we acquire a good understanding of the size of the labour requirements for all the companies and much valuable information on crew composition and origins. The intensive labour involved in researching the human dimension is demonstrated by the statistical evidence provided, although the modest proportion of tables and graphs — fourteen out of the forty-five — demonstrates both source deficiencies and, in some instances, scholarly preferences. The over-riding economic orientation of the collection does produce an implicit economic context for all the subjects examined, from navigation to health. Although there is certainly room for other approaches, it is rare, and refreshing, to find this range of topics covered in a single collection and by virtually all the contributors.

The editors are to be congratulated on bringing this informative — and well laid out — volume through the press. Ships, Sailors and Spices will become essential reading for all who are interested in the European experience of world trade during the centuries of expansion.

J.D. Alsop
Hamilton, Ontario


This is a collection of papers presented at a seminar held four years ago and sponsored by the Urban History Association of India. Thus the emphasis on the layout, planning and development of the major ports ranging from Calcutta to Cuddalore on the east coast and from Karachi to Karwar on the west was inevitable. There seems to be no political unity in the period chosen for the work which spans Mughal, Maratha and British rule in India. Nevertheless, a common thread that links the structure and functioning of all the major ports discussed is their connection to the commercial and political interests of the Europeans, especially the British in India.

One issue that emerges in papers by Gita Bajpai, Narayani Gupta and Indu Banga concerns colonial intervention in the development of port towns such as Broach, Pondicherry and Karachi; all served primarily to supply commodities for the long-distance luxury trade dominated by the Europeans. Ports are then categor-
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ized as an economic concept, as suggested by Atiya Habib-Kidwai, a place of contact where goods and people were transferred between land and maritime space. Studies on Chaul, Cuddalore and Masulipatnam for example, based largely on European accounts show the increasing reorientation of the agricultural economy and textile manufacture of the region to cater to the export needs of the Company's trade. In the case of medieval Chaul, A.R. Kulkami argues that the poverty of the region was a restrictive factor inhibiting any expensive commodities being consumed locally.

A second concern is with the reaction of local merchant groups against the intrusion of alien values and practices of the Europeans. This was particularly true of eighteenth-century Surat and the tensions between the Parsi merchants who adopted British ways and the conservative Bohras as discussed by Dilbagh Singh and Ashok Rajashirke.

Another area of social tension was between the colonial state and the multi-ethnic society of the port cities, particularly Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. A series of surveys were carried out in these territories by the British to gain accurate knowledge for military and revenue purposes, and this frequently resulted in a clash of interests with the local land-owners. But Mariam Dossal asserts that the surveys also helped to demarcate a distinct base, separated from the Indians, for British operations in the country. This base in Bombay gradually emerged as the 'Fort' which was not only the business centre of the town, but also the military headquarters. Nevertheless Bombay could not totally sever its relationship from its indigenous hinterland as shown by Jim Masselos, and the role of the local population in decision-making was significant.

Papers by A. Das Gupta and S. Arasaratnam stand out for the methodological problems raised. Arasaratnam cautions against reliance on European sources for histories of port-towns, asserting that more use should be made of local language records. This source bias is also evident in the choice of ports discussed, since a majority of these were important for European maritime activity; almost excluded from the collection are the smaller port settlements involved in the indigenous network. Das Gupta draws attention to the biographies of individual merchants which need to be documented if we are to understand the dynamics of the maritime city in the eighteenth century.

The collection thus includes an interesting array of topics and themes and is a useful compendium of authoritative studies on ports in the Indian subcontinent and their symbiotic relationship with their hinterlands. An aspect that is lacking and seems to have been overlooked is the 'exterior' situation essential to the location of a port, viz. the long-distance maritime routes that make land-and-sea exchanges in a region possible. An analysis of these sea-routes would have added vibrancy to a discussion which at times seems somewhat stilted by the bias of the European sources used by a majority of the authors and the overwhelmingly land-based concerns. What was the position of these ports in the international maritime networks and to what extent were these routes altered by the Europeans on account of their distinct ship-building technology? This would also provide insights into the earlier beginnings of many of the ports discussed, an issue that needs to be taken cognizance of in any study outlining the impact of colonial intervention.

Another dimension that has been omitted in this primarily text-based collection of papers is the archaeological approach. It would have been interesting to know something about the surviving structures at many of these port-sites and the extent to which these required new engineering skills brought in by the Europeans.

Himanshu Prabha Ray
New Delhi, India


Over the past two decades Frank Broeze has been one of the most influential figures in maritime history. A founder of the Australian
Association for Maritime History and the first editor of its journal, *The Great Circle*, he is currently President of the International Commission for Maritime History. But as important as his contribution has been to these organizations, it is as a scholar that he has made his greatest impact. There is hardly an important international journal that has not published at least one of Frank's meticulously researched, finely reasoned articles, and his work has also graced a variety of edited collections. Those of us who have been stimulated by his always provocative essays have long awaited his first full-length monograph. For the most part this important book does not disappoint.

*Mr Brooks* is nothing if not ambitious: Broeze uses Robert Brooks' life to make a variety of contributions to our understanding of the history of shipping, business and trade. Several of these are of special importance. In the shipping sector, he has produced one of the first studies of the role of sail (as opposed to steam) in providing the infrastructure that made possible the creation of the modern international economy. Moreover, by examining Brooks' links both to the City of London and interests overseas, he has been able to chart in more detail than we have had before the process by which the autonomous shipowner emerged. His contributions to business history include a splendid examination of the sources of finance available to men like Brooks. In the area of trade, he not only adds to our understanding of the development of Anglo-Australian trade before the 1870s but also provides what to my knowledge is the first satisfactory study of the evolution of the Australian wool trade prior to about 1860. For all these reasons and more, this book should appeal to a wide range of historians.

The organizing principle of the book is Robert Brooks' life. While I accept the author's view that in many ways his career was "a paradigm of the rise" of the London-Australia trade, there is a risk in carrying the metaphor too far. While Broeze shows that there were indeed parallels between Brooks' experiences and the development of the Australian trade, he does not convincingly show that the two were identical. Without comparable studies in which to ground his judgements, this would of course be impossible. Yet while a careful reading of the volume provides reassurance that the author recognizes this dilemma, I fear that this is not always clear to the reader. Moreover, even if the problem is recognized, it is hard to know precisely when Brooks' activities can be considered typical and when they may have been unique.

There is one further general difficulty with the book. One of the most common — and generally valid — criticisms of maritime history is that its practitioners fail to place their studies within the context of issues that concern the larger discipline. Frank Broeze accepts this criticism and in *Mr Brooks* sets out to demonstrate the relevance of a maritime perspective to broader historical questions. Yet in so doing he creates new problems. Put simply, Broeze tries to do too much between the covers of a single volume. The interweaving of the various themes is in general skilful, but at times even a master like Broeze runs into trouble. In trying to milk all possible significance out of Brooks' exploits, clarity sometimes suffers.

None of these quibbles, however, should detract from an overall favourable judgement of the book. Even if it is overambitious — surely not a devastating criticism — it provides many sensible judgements and illuminates a number of previously dark corners within its ambit. *Mr Brooks and the Australian Trade* belongs on the shelves of most historians interested in nineteenth-century shipping, business and economic development. Most important, it is an absolute must for all serious maritime historians.

Lewis R. Fischer
St. John's, Newfoundland


One of the endearing features of this short book is the picture of "Charles Kindleberger as a deckboy in the SS Bird City" which adorns the back of the dustjacket. This, and the wry allusions in the text to the pre-academic career of the Ford International Professor of Economics Emeritus at M.I.T. help account for Professor Kindleberger's scepticism towards the underly-
ing assumption of efficiency in the labour market which he located in the work of (among others) D.W. Galenson on labour markets in colonial America and of Lance Davis, R.E. Gallman and T. Hutchinson on labour in nineteenth-century American shipping. And behind these practitioners, Professor Kindleberger takes aim at the loonier assumptions of the present, exemplified by Milton Friedman's cheerful suggestions that "the market, not the government should regulate who should be allowed to drive" and that the certification of physicians and surgeons should be left to the benevolence of the Invisible Hand (p.69). As a survivor of the maritime labour market, Kindleberger registers a loud nay to these propositions, and backs it up with a survey of the evidence on maritime labour in the last five hundred years, demonstrating to his satisfaction that labour supply was erratic and sometimes unfree, the motivations of seafarers often irrational, and attempts to manage the supply of seamen short-sighted or blind. In short, it was a mess.

It is as well that these purposes are stated clearly in advance. Otherwise general readers and even specialists might find it strange that Kindleberger should devote ninety-odd pages of text to reproducing rather disjointed summaries of his encyclopedic but erratic reading of historical works and literary production on the condition of seamen in Europe and America over the last five hundred years. They might be puzzled by the often imprecise and out-of-date information on sailors' geographic and social recruitment and pay in Chapter 1, and the not astonishing impression gained from Chapter 2 (which concerns "The sailors' life at sea and in port") that it was all pretty much as Hobbes described the State of Nature. They might wonder at disarming annotations of the type "Original reference mislaid, but see Dana." (p.43) Or at the use of out-of-date general books like Michael Lewis' *A Social History of the Navy* (London, 1960) when more recent and thorough monographs like N.A.M. Rodger's *The Wooden World* (London, 1986) or Jean-François Brière's *La pêche française en Amérique du Nord au XVIIIe siècle* (Montréal, 1990) are ready to hand. They may find the accounts of naval conscription, impressment and other meddling by government in the labour market difficult to follow if not (when he deals with the French case, pp.19-20), downright misleading. If they have read some of the secondary literature, they might scratch their heads sometimes, too, at what the author has made of it. Thus Kindleberger takes Philippe Ariès' rather racist and categorical description of feckless men from the interior of Brittany as applicable to the people of Breton coastline, when Ariès makes it abundantly clear that in his mind the two are worlds apart, (p.59) Again, Kindleberger takes the present reviewer's findings on the rise in French sailors' peacetime wages in the eighteenth century to mean that they occurred as the result of changes such as the declining need for cannon and the rise in the size of ships, (p.31), when the article in question argues, logically, that these were factors which actually mitigated the demand for labour.

Of course, any attempt to embrace so vast a subject in a few pages is bound to contain a few slips. A more telling objection is that the assumptions of Kindleberger's argument are just as faulty as those of his opponents. The author's scrapbook of cases, taken from over five hundred years and a large number of countries on both sides of the Atlantic, no more makes a general case for market irrationality than the contorted and limited studies of some of his targets prove the contrary. In fact, looked at closely, for limited but reasonable periods of time, and within reasonable territorial limits, it makes a great deal of sense to use the traditional economic and econometric tools in approaching this subject. True, they need to be employed with care and precision. Thus one must take into account not just the stock of available seamen as an indicator of labour supply but also less evident factors such as the varying age structures of the labour force (the result, in great part, of the impact of war and state naval recruitment policy). And one should be very careful about using particular studies as proof of a general case for market rationality.

This reviewer's criticism comes down in the end to the usual cavilling of the specialist, who has some inkling of how things really worked in a limited span of years and in a limited space, against the generalist, who wants to see the overall pattern, but who has only disconnected and often inadequate secondary studies or
literary evidence at his disposal. The former deckboy on the SS Bird City deserves credit for sounding a warning against the mindless and ahistorical use of economic models in analysing economies in the past. His main fault lies in giving the impression that after struggling through this enumeration of greed, folly and misery no historian should want to ask the standard questions of classical economics about the maritime labour market. Kindleberger knows a lot more about the early modern economy than some economic historians in the current generation. But then, so did Adam Smith.

T.J.A. LeGoff
Toronto, Ontario


In this book, the author, who is 79 years old at present, looks back on his remarkable and long career as a seaman. It began in 1931, when as a sixteen-year-old he joined the crew of SS Seattle Spirit of Boston's Eastern Steamship Line, and continued until 1985 when, as Master of that company's SS Samuel Johnston he decided to "swallow the anchor." Throughout those fifty-four years, Frank Farrar's life was one of continuous sea duty in all facets of shipping.

Farrar is — and one can taste this — now drawn to make us part of his world, by relating his many, many experiences through a seemingly endless array of separate stories (sixty-two in all), clearly written long ago and now lifted out of storage for publication. His writing is detailed, factual, witty and entertaining. Life aboard a cargo-ship is painted in all its facets, nothing copied, all gained from personal experience. Numerous photographs of the ships and the people about whom he writes add richly to the text. It is enchanting material. From his tough early years as an AB, he collects his "characters" as he proceeds on his way to the pinnacle of his ambition: master of the SS Augustus P. Loring, a Liberty ship converted to peace-time duty just after World War II.

Farrar makes it very clear that the greatest appeal in making the sea his career was the strong hierarchy invested in running a tight ship. What drew him to ESL in particular was that company's reputation for tight discipline and a long history of responsibility, professionalism, conservatism and inflexibility. He describes in detail the commands of Captains Paul Mahoney and Louis Breckenridge, the latter a man small in stature but huge in skills. He has kind words for those masters originating from Maine and Nova Scotia — to him, there were none better. Farrar has the gift of assessing a condition or situation, extracting from each those points of greatest interest and importance, and then highlighting them in a concise and informative, yet story-like, fashion. He explains the various positions on a ship, the ways of becoming a Deck Officer or an Engineering Officer — and the controversies between the two departments — the ship's bosun and quartermasters, the cook, the stewards, seamen, and oilers; all are observed with a critical eye. His essays on Mr. Bang (Chief Mate), "the best sailor I ever knew," and on AB Moody Harrison, the perfect seaman, who met such a horrible death during World War II, are two of the most priceless stories. However, I enjoyed most his compendia on the gyro-compass, radar, the Plimsoll mark, the protocol of the noon-time position reckoning, the use of paravanes and torpedo-nets during World War II, the difference between Liberty ships and Victory ships, ship's jargon, and the boundaries of ship-side behaviour.

Farrar deems himself very fortunate in having been spared any serious ship's tragedy during his career. Having been exposed to the rigours of Atlantic weather over many years, having been part of the war-time effort, from convoy duty to Normandy landings and Mediterranean (Malta) supply duties, he observes "I never had a ship shot from under me, never had a direct hit by a bomb." (p.368) It is remarkable indeed.

On a critical note, I felt that the book suffers from the typical pitfalls of a self-published book. Thus, it is poorly proof-read and its list of contents is largely out of order. I also felt that Farrar repeats himself here and there, clearly the result of unedited bundling of his separate essays. And yet, there is no doubt in my mind that those who purchase his book will
be richly rewarded. Proficiat to an old salt.

Hendrik "Hank" J. Barendregt
Langley, British Columbia


This delightful book describes the experiences of a young Canadian woman who, after graduating from wireless college in 1944 and having been awarded her federal government certificate of proficiency in radio communications, signed on the 8,500-ton, Norwegian-registered, Westfal-Larsen passenger/cargo liner M/S *Siranger* in San Francisco. It was a time when regulations forbade women from serving as radio officers in Canadian-registered merchant ships, though they held the same certificates as their male counterparts. But Norway had no such reservations, and so women were accepted, indeed welcomed, on their vessels as radio officers. It was this small group of Canadian women who pioneered their radio profession at sea with a high degree of efficiency and success and, in some cases, with distinction, during and after World War II.

The author gives an absorbing account of her introduction to shipboard life. Her first voyage took her around South America via Tierra del Fuego and the Panama Canal. Over the next four years she travelled thousands of sea-miles over the world's oceans. It is an intensely interesting narrative that covers an era when merchant ships were generally fitted with telegraph equipment only — few ships carried the voice-mode — and the radio officer maintained a ship's only link with long-distance land-based stations via CW, or Morse code. Aids to navigation, weather information and radio direction finding, as well as visual signalling with the Aldis lamp were also the radio officer's responsibility, as was, in most cases, the ship's clerical and purser function, where the preparation of crew and customs manifests, port entry and clearance papers, cash advance and wage account documents were the norm, as well as acting as the captain's secretary. With the advancement of electronic technology and satellite communication, the mysterious crackle of Morse code is being heard from the aerials of fewer merchant ships and by the turn of the century it will have all but disappeared. For a written historical review of this eventful era, the maritime community is indebted to the author for a splendid effort.

In *Deep Sea "Sparks"* the author gives not only a first-hand account of the radio profession at sea but, with excellent prose, flair and humour, of shipboard life as well. We read about life at sea, the customs of far-away lands, the climatic extremes from the ice-flows of Magellan Strait to the searing heat of Bombay, from the remote fastness of the Falkland Islands northward to ports just below the Arctic Circle, eastward from the American Pacific coast to far-away South Africa and India via the great cape and the Indian Ocean and the Middle East via the Suez Canal. Indeed, it is a travel-log which is unique for an individual merchant ship, for it includes almost one hundred and sixty ports of call over a four-year period, three circum-navigations of South America and almost a total coverage of the globe with the exception of Australasia and the Orient.

The author dispels the myth that shipboard radio is a man's domain and makes a generous contribution to the historical aspect of a subject that has basically lacked adequate exposure in the annals of sea lore — that silent band of merchant-ship radio officers of which she was a valued member, their role at sea, the trials they endured, their long hours of mentally arduous duty in adverse conditions. This Canadian lass who performed that function very well while adding a new chapter to maritime history, has written an informative and entertaining book for future generations to enjoy.

Today Olive Carroll lives in British Columbia where, if one tunes the radio "ham" bands, she can be heard transmitting her flawless morse with her professional speed-key. We owe her a hearty and sincere "thank you" for sharing her knowledge and experiences. Her book is highly recommended to maritime historians, museums and libraries, lovers of the sea, high-school students, and anyone interested in the last period of wireless in the (CW) Morse code mode.

R.F. Latimer
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia

Among the few maritime occupations which have enabled women to go to sea, that of nursery governess (Kindergärtnерin) is surely one of the rarest. Yet in the 1960s, this was Irene Buss’ job on board those German luxury freighters that combined a freight service with passenger cruises to East Asia and the Far East.

Rather like the Kombischiffe she describes, Irene Buss combines two elements in an original way. Her book describes the journey of the Holstein from Hamburg to Yokohama, and everything on this journey actually did happen. Yet Holstein is a fictional ship, and its passengers and crew are an amalgamation of several people and voyages. This unusual blend of fact and fiction seems a rather elaborate and perhaps unnecessary device, as the photos in the book clearly show us real and recognizable people. But one has to respect the author’s obvious wish to protect the anonymity of her characters, some of whom are admittedly rather colourful. Thus, for instance, we encounter an elegant Countess whose daughter Dolly was a daughter in name only, an obnoxious purser and the curiously taciturn medical nurse whose big secret was only revealed in Yokohama.

The medical nurse and Irene Buss were the sole female occupations in the ninety-nine person crew. Buss’ job was in fact one of the linchpins of the luxury system provided by the German HAPAG to those with both the money and time to spare. For many married couples, the long sea voyage was an opportunity to have a second honeymoon, and thus the children had to be kept well out of the way. A well-run day nursery provided the solution. Buss enjoyed her work and spare time alike. Getting invited by the captain and other officers to exciting shore visits was one perk of being a female crew member, and the book brims with colourful descriptions of the sights of East Asia. But there were, of course, other sides to the coin. As a woman in a male world, Buss had to contend with dubious jokes as well as with the possessiveness of the crew which surfaced, for instance, on a shore leave when she was invited to dance by an English sailor. Mainly, however, Buss seems to have occupied a motherly or sisterly role on board, providing a sympathetic ear to the worries of crew members or helping to choose gifts for their families. At the same time, she sees no reason to keep quiet about the crew’s visits to girlie houses, or the going prices for a “shorttime” in the poor islands of the Philippines — a bar of soap or a packet of matches. All this is recounted with a down-to-earth frankness which greatly enhances the book’s value as a contribution to the maritime social history of the 1960s.

Occasionally, too, the book provides a glimpse of the wider terms of shipping, such as the tight security checks in Djibouti so as to prevent Foreign Legionnaires from illegal embarkation. These glimpses are brief, however, and if one were to find cavils in the book, which opens the Deutsches Schiffahrtsmuseum’s new series “Menschen & Schiffe” (People and Ships), the introduction to the maritime context of Irene Buss’ story might well have been more comprehensive.

Yet this is a charming book, written with a sense of humour and good-natured charm. For Irene Buss, the years at sea were the best ones of her life. In these memoirs, her original happiness shines through, making the book a pleasure to read.

Merja-Liisa Hinkkanen
Turku, Finland


The dust-cover grossly exaggerates in claiming this book “charts the decline of British shipbuilding from 1930 to the present day.” According to Ian Roberts, the book is “a study of the changing nature of the division of labour” in the Wear shipyards. This central issue — seen as the control of the labour process — is examined
largely through interviews with a number of workers. A brief historical review leaps from the era of wood to the 1930s, the author attempting to link the two periods with the statement, "the rise of monopoly capitalism from 1880 onwards came as the last wooden ships were being built. (p.22) This is regrettable since it excludes many major changes affecting the labour force: the transition from wood to iron, the use of steel, and other significant technical changes. The inter-war period is considered with special attention to apprenticeship and the national attempt to lay down conditions for welding. This is followed by a review of the post-war years, including the effect of the rehousing policy in disrupting long established communities. After reviewing the work of many scholars, mainly sociologists such as Lorenz, McGoldrick, Sabel, Zeitlin and others, Roberts challenges the interpretation that Braverman's "iron law of de-skilling" was apparently overcome by shipbuilding workers in the inter-war period, then lost in the 1980s. The changeover to public ownership is described, with Roberts pointing out that some workers were less than enthusiastic about nationalisation. A brief "afterword" covers the ending of Wear shipbuilding.

Roberts regarded a strategy of using "several key respondents" as superior to a more comprehensive coverage, (p.7) Such an approach should have made it essential for Roberts to check the workers’ statements for internal consistency and to inform readers of less-than-accurate information; for instance, inconsistencies appear to exist in D. Richardson's recollections. These statements may reveal an individual's perception, not what actually happened, as in the assertion "Our yards were always able to compete favourably with their rivals." (p. 166) Twelve different workers can be identified from the references, with about seventy quotations in all. Of these twelve, five were plumbers (forty-three extracts), four were from iron trades, one was a shipwright, one a painter — hardly a representative sample for a shipyard. Nor do we know immediately who is making a particular comment. Accounts such as these from individual workers are valuable, but the extent to which this provides a basis for generalisation is debatable. If night shifts were as devoid of work as stated here, then the management was incredibly bad. It is also difficult to understand the almost complete lack of attention to the non-craftsman; a comment related to the "symbolic importance of the hierarchy between skilled and non-skilled" when the plumbers' foreman sent for "fish lots for the craftsmen, partie lots for the labourers" (p.139) is hardly adequate. In addition, Roberts' decision to avoid looking at the issue in trade union terms because that was "well dealt with elsewhere" (p.147) is a surprising claim.

There are also too many errors. Thus, Lorimer was not the General Secretary of the Boilermakers' Society but of the Blacksmiths. Later, when Roberts denied that the clergyman Hopkins, one of his sources, saw the Maure tania (wrongly spelt) being built on the Mersey, he was apparently unaware this ship was a successor to the earlier Tyne vessel. A recollection that Solly French was the first welder on the Wear is given twice in the same chapter. How can a university press publish a work such as this without a bibliography? Roberts might then have listed Tom Pickard's We Make Ships (1989), which is almost all direct quotations from the workers at the Wear yard of Austin & Pickersgill, recorded in 1986. Very properly, Roberts stressed the need to recognise and study the varying circumstances in different shipbuilding centres and in particular on the Wear, where attitudes and practices of both workers and employers were major factors in their behaviour. Roberts' book provides insights into how a sociologist approaches some problems of labour in shipbuilding.

Joe Clarke
Whitley Bay, England


This book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the contemporary fishery. The first systematic attempt to apply insights from the debate over "commons property" to this context, it examines the effect of regulation
and technological change on work and community in the inshore and nearshore Newfoundland fisheries.

After a brief pre-1945 history, the author documents a federal fisheries policy shift from "conservation" toward social and economic concerns. Matthews ties this to the ascendance of a perspective ascribing poverty, excess capacity and resource depletion to the "common property" nature of the fishery. Acceptance of the "tragedy of the commons" thesis led in 1981 to a licensing policy designed to produce a smaller, more professional group of fishers by limiting access to the resource. Although the NFFAWU was supportive of licensing, the provincial government was not, Matthews argues, because of a different value orientation, the rise of "nationalist" sentiment and fear of the impact on a society with few employment alternatives. Licensing policy strengthened the NFFAWU and marginalized the provincial government.

The theoretical framework for Matthews' analysis of the development of licensing and its impacts is derived from debates within the general theory of property. He argues that the "tragedy of the commons" thesis is rooted in a Hobbesian view of human nature as opposed to the view that posits cooperation as the natural condition of humanity. He shares with others the view that the very notion of "common property" is misleading because it implies that property is a thing rather than a set of social relationships. If there are no enforceable rights, there is no property. In most cases, "common property is a form of usufruct property in which access and use are linked to group inclusion, as in community property. Property relations are part of a shared universe of meanings that provides the basis for communal commitment and is different from that in federal fisheries.

The second half of the book demonstrates that inshore fishing grounds in Newfoundland were not "common property" as assumed in the "tragedy of the commons" ideology but consisted of different types of community common property. As a result, licensing policies often conflicted with local mechanisms for managing grounds and regulating fishing activity resulting in considerable dissatisfaction within fishing communities.

In the conclusion, Matthews links his findings to the current crisis, arguing that the moratorium provides an opportunity to mediate between demands for community and government management. The allocation of property rights to groups of fishers while continuing to regulate the offshore, and the creation of new decision-making bodies that give fishers real power, are means to this end.

The research is based on interviews with a stratified random sample of fishers in five communities, beginning with a combination of full and part-time licensees but shifting eventually almost exclusively to full-timers. The data provide an important snapshot of licensing patterns, gear, labour relations, competition, and life satisfaction in these communities at the time of the study. Communities studied differed not only in size but also in dependence on fishing, the gender of fishers, local mechanisms to regulate access to the resource, relations with other communities, local license combinations, and the diversity of species fished. Displeasure with the federal distinction between full and part-timers was widespread, as was conflict over the allocation of lucrative protected-species licenses.

Despite its strengths, Controlling Common Property has several weaknesses. Though he briefly notes the presence of women in the fishery, Matthews treats male control over fishing as "natural" rather than as a product of patrilineal inheritance, women's responsibility for child-rearing, government policies and male-related knowledge transmission patterns. If we do not accept his premise, then we must query his assertion that control of community grounds should be allocated to fishermen. The possibility that this will reinforce male dominance needs to be examined.

Matthews acknowledges that common property theory was not the central concern in data collection. While it certainly makes sense to analyze the data through this theoretical lens, it should not substitute for a careful presentation of important contextual information. Although it is not clearly stated, the research was conducted during the early 1980s, shortly after the introduction of the distinction between full and part-timers. Many protected-species licenses were likely already allocated, which might account for the apparent inconsistency between a commit-
The Northern Mariner

ment to professionalization and the allocation of some protected-species licenses to part-timers. There is no analysis of the underlying institutional processes that shaped the allocation of full and part-time licenses. Moreover, the failure to exclude "moonlighters" from the part-time category, a central goal of NFFAWU which was widely supported by fishermen, and an initiative that would have fit the "tragedy of the commons" metaphor that apparently dominated the thinking of policy makers, needs to be explained. There are also problems with data collection and analysis. The distinction between "moonlighters" and other part-timers is not clear enough. Are so-called "full-time" fishers primarily opposed to those with part-time licenses or to "moonlighters"?

While Matthews' treatment of the licensing dispute is absorbing, he does not explain that the federal government controls harvesting and the provincial government processing. This leads to an error in the chapter on Bonavista, in which he mistakenly suggests that the province established boundaries for crab fishing, clearly a federal responsibility. Finally, while the main thrust of the conclusion is interesting, Matthews might have strengthened it by referring to the continued use of "tragedy of the commons" rhetoric in the 1990s within and without DFO. Reference to such new property forms as "individual transferable quotas" and "enterprise allocation" forms after 1982 could have highlighted the continued relevance of the "common property" debates in the current context.

Barbara Neis
St. John's, Newfoundland


The objective of this monograph is to examine the history of Indonesian fishing in the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ). This is a topic of considerable interest to policy-makers, which perhaps explains why the authors were allowed access to recent government files — a privilege all too rarely extended to researchers.

Indonesian fishers have fished the waters that are now part of the AFZ for at least 300 years. The species targeted by these fishers have changed over time but have included trepang, pearl shell, trochus shell, turtles and sharks. In the 1970s there was a large increase in sightings and detentions of Indonesian fishing craft off the north west coast of Western Australia, creating the appearance of a surge in fishing activity. But this is a remote and isolated part of the continent and the increase in sightings may have been partly due to improved surveillance.

In common with other nations, Australia has rejected Grotius' notion that the sea is the property of all and gradually increased its claims on the ocean until by 1979 it claimed a zone of 200 nautical miles. These actions were legitimated by what Campbell and Wilson call the doctrine of *mare nullius*, a maritime counterpart to *terra nullius*, which asserted that in 1788 the Australia continent was relatively uninhabited and the Aboriginal people were without any property rights over the land. That doctrine has, however, been repudiated by the High Court and in 1993 the federal government passed controversial legislation granting land rights to Aboriginal people. Consequently, one of the major arguments used of late to justify the exclusion of Indonesian fishers from the AFZ is that the Indonesians have changed from subsistence to commercial fishers and thus forfeited any usufructory rights of entry to the AFZ. Indonesians have also been accused of overfishing and threatening Australia with exotic diseases.

One problem is that terms like "subsistence fishery," "artisanal fishery" and "industrial fishery" are used in different and overlapping senses. The authors define the artisanal fishing sector or small-scale fishing sector as one that "embraces the people, technology, skills and knowledge of the indigenous Indonesian fishing industry" (p.2): "A traditional fishery has a demonstrable history of operations that precede the appropriation of its fishing grounds by Australia [authors emphasis]. A traditional fishery is unrelated to type; it may be a subsistence, artisanal or industrial fishery." (p.89) Campbell and Wilson conclude that, contrary to popular belief, the Indonesian artisanal fishery
operating in what is now the AFZ was never a subsistence fishery but was always a commercial one. Thus government policy has been based on a faulty premise.

Chapter 8 provides a detailed and clear analysis of the economics of Indonesian voyaging into the AFZ. It is argued that one reason for the pattern of repeated incursions into the AFZ is that vessel owners usually require crew members to indemnify them against the loss of the vessel, so that if the vessel is apprehended and the vessel confiscated the fishers are plunged into debt from which the only escape is another risky voyage. If caught their prison earnings, which often represent the equivalent of a year's earnings in Indonesia, can be used to reduce their debt. This has led to claims that the fishers are in a "no-lose situation." (p. 158) To combat this, the government changed the law in 1992 to allow prison wages to be confiscated to help cover the costs of repatriating the fishers. Unfortunately, the discussion of the financing and organisation of the trade is limited by the fact that the authors use only Australian sources and lack information on key aspects.

In the final chapter the authors suggest guidelines for policy-makers. These include first, that policy should be based on a more sophisticated understanding of the social, economic and cultural organisation of the fisheries. Such information would undoubtedly help avoid simplistic and ineffective policy. Second, an official buffer zone for shark fishers should be introduced to allow for the fact that the Indonesians are usually equipped only with basic maps and a compass and can inadvertently drift into the AFZ. Third, the government should license boats to operate in the AFZ, giving fishers a form of property right that would provide them with a greater incentive to manage the resource in a sustainable manner. This procedure is followed with Japan and other countries allowed access to the AFZ, albeit with the major difference that they pay substantial fees for the privilege.

In summary, the authors use a careful blend of anthropological, historical, economic and political analysis to provide a scholarly and insightful critique of government policy towards the fishers. The monograph is well written and illustrated with maps and useful drawings of vessels. The major defect with the analysis, which the authors acknowledge, is the lack of research from the Indonesian end and it is to be hoped that they will rectify this deficiency in the future. Meanwhile, The Politics of Exclusion offers an excellent guide for policy-makers and others interested in the activities of Indonesian fishers.

Malcolm Tull
Murdoch, Western Australia


To celebrate the 75th year of the Commander Chr. Christensen's Whaling Museum in Sandefjord, Norway, a symposium held in June 1992 brought together participants from eleven different countries to discuss whaling history. Fifteen speakers presented papers covering a wide chronology: from medieval Norse whaling to nineteenth-century American, British and Norwegian whaling to twentieth-century whaling. An additional four focused on such particulars as conditions of work and health aboard floating factories, scrimshaw, whaling-related exploration and discovery in the Antarctic, and the value of photography in whaling research. This volume, which brings together the proceedings of the symposium, accordingly offers a mixed bag of material for researchers and maritime history buffs.

While the book carries its topic well beyond J.N. Tonnesen and Arne Odd Johnsen's four volumes of modern whaling history, *Den Moderne Hvalfangsts Historie. Opprinnelse og Utvikling* (Sandefjord, 1959-1970), its audience is not defined. Nor is the quality of the papers even. One in particular by Lance Davis and Robert Gallman offers an oversimplified introductory review of American whaling history which relegates Thomas Welcome Roys, whose rocket harpoons were studied by Svend Foyn, to a footnote. Following an economics-oriented discussion of the dominance and decline of
American whaling, the paper then waxes inexplicably technical in its appendix analysis of productivity of New Bedford whaling voyages. Regression analysis, and such terms as heteroscedasticity and collinearity, will not be appreciated by non-technical readers.

Those who may relish Stuart Frank's beautifully illustrated overview of the history of scrimshaw, Susan Barr's "Norwegian Arctic Whaling Seen Through the Eye of a Camera," or Einar Wexelsen's discussion of work-related injuries and illnesses on Norwegian floating factories, will possibly bog down in Ole Lindquist's scholarly examination, supported by 275 footnotes, of medieval Norse whaling references in legal texts printed in Old Norse. Yet Lindquist's conclusions are interesting: that medieval peasant fishermen in Norway, Iceland and Greenland speared large whales in the hope that they would drift ashore. Lindquist concludes that the technique worked in fjords and among skerries, though many were lost, but that it did not work on open coasts or around archipelagos or small islands with limited shores. Early whale hunters therefore developed drives in the Orkney, Faroe and Shetland Islands, utilizing small cetaceans like the long-finned pilot whale that were susceptible to herding. Uwe Schnall's "Medieval Scandinavian Laws as Sources for the History of Whaling" provides a short and readable introduction for Lindquist's analysis.

Appropriately, a number of papers have a Norwegian emphasis. Thor Arlov examines the economic and political factors in Norway's gaining sovereignty in 1920 over Svalbard (Spitzbergen), a common land shared by whalers of several nations since the seventeenth century but heavily used by Norwegians in the early part of this century. Norwegian involvement in the development of modern shore whaling in Newfoundland is reported by Anthony Dickinson and Chesley Sanger and on the west coast of North America by Robert Webb. Robert Headland traces the contribution of whalers to geographical discoveries in the Antarctic, a contribution that was largely Norwegian. Einar Niemi presents a new look at Svend Foy, the Norwegian pioneer of modern shore whaling, outlining his rocky relations with the townspeople of Vadso where he built his first modern shore whaling station. Expectations of increased employment, philanthropic largesse, and the economic benefits stemming from Foy's huge contribution in taxes to municipal coffers were dashed when Foy maned the station mostly with imported labour and successfully challenged a new tax formula. The local fishing population, antagonistic from the start, challenged the new industry from its inception and ultimately in 1904 fostered a moratorium on whaling in Norwegian waters. Niemi sees in this challenge evidence that, to the people of Vadso, chiefly fishermen still caught up in the old household or peasant subsistence economy, the accumulation of profit for reinvestment was alien.

Bjørn Basberg offers the recipe for economic survival used by South Georgia shore whaling stations in the period 1925-1960 when Antarctic pelagic whaling flourished. The principal ingredient, he suggests, was guano production which was not feasible on the floating factory ships of that era. Gordon Jackson considers why the British did not catch rorquals in the nineteenth century and revises his theory published in 1978 (The British Whaling Trade). Anthony Dickinson discusses some aspects of Japanese whaling and sealing in South Georgia. Klaus Barthelmess reviews German whaling 1860-1960.

Despite its unevenness, Whaling and History is a generously illustrated volume with much fresh material, and is well worth having on any whaling history researcher's bookshelf.

Joan Goddard
Victoria, British Columbia


This is a timely publication. Modern technology and an inability to manage international pelagic whaling effectively placed severe pressure on global whale stocks during the early part of this century. The International Commission for the
Regulation of Whaling was thus signed in 1946, and the IWC was established two years later. However, while conservation was an important objective, the principal mandate of the Commission initially was to protect whale oil prices. The IWC, in essence, functioned as little more than a "whalers' club." Early quota policy, for example, led to what became known as the "whale Olympics," thus contributing to even more serious stock reductions.

Despite intensive efforts to implement proper management practices based on sound principles of conservation and sustainable yield throughout the '60s and '70s, virtually all stocks had been reduced by then to such low levels that the IWC declared a total ban on commercial whaling beginning with the 1985-86 season. The Japanese were the single most important participants and therefore the most reluctant to accept this moratorium, agreeing only under the threat of an international boycott. Even then, Japan was one of a small number of nations to use special scientific licenses to continue whaling. "Lethal research," however, has become increasingly unacceptable to IWC members.

In arguing for the resumption of commercial whaling, Iceland, Norway and Japan, in particular, have proposed the re-opening of small-type coastal whaling which, they contend, had much in common with aboriginal subsistence whaling, still permitted under existing regulations. It is their view that in villages where there has been a strong tradition of coastal whaling there is a demonstrated cultural and subsistence need. They argue further that the IWC is controlled by first-world countries which, under the influence of anti-whaling groups such as Greenpeace, have come to believe that whales should not even be used for food. This "cultural bias" is unacceptable to countries such as Iceland which are heavily dependent upon marine resources. In withdrawing from the IWC in 1992, for example, Icelandic delegates expressed the opinion that "the Commission was fundamentally flawed." Iceland, they argued, "has a general concern for the environment, it is overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of the living resources of the ocean, and was encouraged by the Rio [United Nations Conference on the Environment, 1992] endorsement of the principle of sustainable utilization of marine living resources" ( Forty-Third Report of the IWC. Cambridge 1993, p.36). With the international community expressing its support for this principle, the IWC as an international resource management organization finds itself at a critical crossroad. This volume, therefore, is but one of what will undoubtedly become an increasing number of publications on the pros and cons of resuming commercial whaling.

Arne Kalland and Brian Moeran, along with ten other anthropologists from six different countries, visited Japan in April 1988 as participants in a workshop on the recent proposal to reintroduce small type coastal whaling. Their brief was to provide factual information that might help decision-makers. Kalland and Moeran, however, "wished to extend the discussion to Japanese whaling in general, in order to develop further the key concept of 'whaling culture'." They therefore undertook additional field work in Japan and it is the results of this research that are published in this book.

Despite any pretext to the contrary, both authors are unabashedly pro-whaling. This, in part, is due to the fact that they recognize the difficulty of their position. Whales, as they correctly point out, "provide almost as effective a fund-raising image as seals have done." In view of the recent experience of the Eastern Canadian seal fishery, therefore, they set out to make as strong a case as possible for the industry in general, and Japanese whaling in particular.

This is both the strength and weakness of the book. There is little pretext at objectivity. Every possible pro-whaling fact and point is exaggerated and slanted shamelessly. Thus, while much of the evidence is good, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the book is really not unlike the voluminous anti-whaling literature which has so effectively influenced Western opinion since the early 1970s. This makes it difficult to determine whether a more reasoned and balanced assessment of Japan's traditional involvement in whaling would have a stronger impact on public opinion and decision-makers.

Much of the introductory chapter attempts to explain, from a Japanese perspective, why the issue of whales and whaling has become so
provocative. Specific whaling communities are then described in detail in order to establish appropriate settings for the "portraits" of seven men and woman who were intimately involved in various aspects of the industry. Chapter 4, "The History of Japanese Whaling," provides an excellent overview of the evolution of local whaling in a global context. Had it been placed at the beginning, however, this chapter would have enhanced considerably the utility and effectiveness of the community and personnel sections. Pelagic and large type (LTCW) and small type (STCW) Japanese coastal whaling are analyzed in Chapter 5. Work organization, recruitment, career patterns, and company structures are then considered in terms of justifying the evolution of a distinctive Japanese whaling culture which, Kalland and Moeran claim, exists to varying degrees at both regional and national levels. The concluding chapter assesses the impact of the moratorium on individual "whaling" communities and Japanese society as a whole.

While thoroughly researched, the objectivity of this work is also diminished by too great a reliance on obviously partisan Japanese sources, with large portions often poorly integrated into the main text. Rigorous adherence to a more carefully crafted organizational structure would have enhanced the overall quality significantly. Additionally, the lack of a consistent format, clear focus, and unbalanced treatment of detail and general argument, are sometimes amplified by repetition and awkward style. There is, nevertheless, much to recommend this volume. It provides a comprehensive overview of the evolution of the industry. Japanese involvement in whaling also receives fair and detailed treatment. Perhaps Kalland and Moeran's most important contribution, however, lies in their exhaustive marshalling of evidence in support of the resumption of commercial whaling. They are fully as inventive with fact and argument as their more numerous and more vocal anti-whaling counterparts. Fair-minded readers will thus have a better opportunity to distinguish fact from fiction in this complex debate.

Chesley W. Sanger
St. John's, Newfoundland


In 1933 there were seven ship towage companies on the River Thames with seventy-five tugs. One of the companies, Wm. Watkins & Sons, celebrated its centenary that year by publishing *One Hundred Years of Towing* by Frank C. Bowen. In the sixty years since that book, there have been many changes, and it is the aim of *Thames Ship Towage 1933-1992* to cover them. J.E. Reynolds grew up in a "tugging family" and has spent his entire working life on the river rising to the rank of tug master. His record keeping is impressive, and his collection of facts and odd bits of information accounts for the more successful portions of the book.

The book is organized chronologically, with each one- or two-page chapter representing a year and giving a straight-forward account of accidents, new buildings, scrappings and salvage operations. The major events on the Thames since 1933 are also covered: World War II, the run-down of the London closed dock system, the 1975 merger that gave Alexandra Towing control of all ship towing with twenty-four tugs, to 1993 when Alexandra was taken over by the Australian Howard Smith Group. Illustrated fleet lists of 166 tugs follow the text. These appear accurate but are not extensive in detail. It was good to see the official numbers and the radio call signs included. The book concludes with a report of the tug *Sun XV* assisting in the evacuation of Dunkirk. As the only personal narrative in the book, it seems oddly out of place.

The publisher, rather than the author, must take responsibility for the less successful aspects of the book. Pentland Press advertises for authors, and offers them editing, layout and other publishing services, for a fee. That there was very little editing or proofreading is immediately obvious. Countless spelling errors, most related to non-British geography, and a good many typographical errors mar what would have been an acceptable, but bland, text. Some experienced editing could have enlivened the writing, and introduced some variety into the diary-like chronology. There are no references, no index, and no table of contents. There are also no
acknowledgements of photo sources or credits, and the photo captions are rarely descriptive.

The photos are above average and the reproduction is good, but they are scattered randomly in the chapters. Those in the fleet list are far too small. A more rational organisation of the fleet lists could have saved space (and cost), and would have allowed for larger reproduction and better legibility of the photos.

As with most labours of love published at the author's expense certain sacrifices were made. This is a modestly priced work for its size and is reasonably priced compared to some others of similar subject matter presently on the market. Nevertheless it must be said that the missed opportunities make it a lesser book than those others. For instance, maps of the London docks and the lower Thames would have been helpful, and more information on how tugs work there would have been of interest. The other species of Thames tugs are mentioned in passing, but craft tugs are not defined in the book, (tugs that handle barges, lighters and non-propelled craft). It would have been appropriate to make the distinction clearly in the introduction and to explain why they are not covered.

Certainly *Thames Ship Towing* will make its way to the tug enthusiast's book shelf despite its editing, layout and thin fleet list. The minutiae collected by the author through a lifetime on the Thames make it a worthwhile book.

M.B. Mackay
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Though it is the second in the series, this is in fact the third volume in a scheduled work of five books on the history of the Norwegian merchant fleet during the World War II to make its appearance. Bjørn Basberg covers the period from 1943 onwards. In 1940 the Norwegian government confiscated all Norwegian vessels outside German-occupied territory, and operated them in a state-owned shipping-company, Nortraship. *Alliert og konkurrent* is a direct continuation of Atle Thowsen's *Profitt og patriottisme (Profit and patriotism)* which analyzed the first years up to the so-called Hogmanay Treaty by the end of 1942 (see review in *TNM/LMN* III, No. 4, October 1993).

Basberg organizes his volume into two parts. First he discusses Nortraship's role through the last years of hostilities. Like Thowsen, Basberg documents the conflicts within the Nortraship organization, and reinforces the point that not all the members of the Nortraship staff were interested solely in winning the war which, by 1943, was no longer in doubt. Instead, and quite naturally, an effort was made to position the interests of the shipowners and the government advantageously for the end of hostilities. This process may explain much of the apparent conflicts. Norwegian shipowners were anxious to ensure that they could get new tonnage after the war, and Basberg shows how Sweden won the race with Britain to get most of the new building contracts that were signed. This part of the book also indicates how important freight-incomes were for the London-based Norwegian government in exile and its representatives in other countries. Through these means they were able to act freely and independently. Basberg also presents interesting details about the operation of the whaling fleet within Nortraship. Though not as detailed and analytical as Thowsen's, this is nevertheless a good book. It gives a good impression of how Nortraship shifted its focus from a mere fight for survival to an organization looking at the future and planning for peace.

The six chapters in the second part of the book, based mainly on secondary sources, are devoted to the rebuilding of the Norwegian fleet and the final settlement between the shipowners and the Norwegian government, which was not finally reached before 1964. In assessing the settlement, Basberg concludes (pp.344-5) that Norwegian shipowners were well off compared to their counterparts in other allied countries. While this can be seen as an argument favouring the Norwegian state in the long dispute over the settlement, Basberg regretfully refuses to be very explicit in stating his opinion, whether the Norwegian shipowner received a reasonable
treatment or not. My general impression is that Basberg has a good overview and deals with Nortraship on a fair basis. Nevertheless, Basberg often seems to lack focus. Covering more than twenty years of volatile maritime history, one might have expected the author to have been more concentrated along a "red thread." In its present form, many of the chapters seem unmotivated and to a certain extent irrelevant (for example, Chapters 2 and 6).

There are a few disappointments in the layout of the book. For instance, the publisher failed to catch a printing error in the header of Chapter 14. In addition, the picture of shipping director Lorentzen is very foggy and unclear (p.267). Despite these shortcomings, Allien og konkurrent will fill a big gap in Norwegian maritime history. It is also well-illustrated (in particular the first part) and reader-friendly, and should therefore find a large readership.

Anders Martin Fon
Bergen, Norway


To service and maintain Grenfell Mission vessels and the scores of regional fishing schooners from Newfoundland and the mainland, Dr. Wilfred Grenfell had a marine railway built at St. Anthony in 1928. It was one of many enterprises he established in the years following the founding of the International Grenfell Association. Before the railway closed in 1974 (because the cradle de-railed and was never repaired), almost 1900 haulouts were made. The number of different vessels serviced is not noted. Many, however, especially the Grenfell boats, were repeat clients.

The dock masters of the 500-ton Crandall-built railway kept a log throughout, and this book is virtually a copy of these log entries. There is a disclaimer by the author regarding the accuracy of some entries because of the age of the documents or the handwriting of some compilers. It would have been useful to follow the uncertain items with a question mark or other notation.

The short introduction is followed by a dedication, remarks about the log and handwriting, acknowledgements and the author's recollections. Except for these ten pages, the remainder of the book is dedicated to the log entries and photographs of vessels and some of their skippers, the quality of which varies widely. The information about the dock itself is all too sparse. Who were the nameless dock masters, riggers, caulkers and shipwrights who made this facility real and viable? The docked schooners were after all only the customers and only part of the story.

The researcher using this book will find a worthwhile hoard of material, of an area and era not always well documented. For example, the 57-ton Grenfell vessel Maraval, master Will Simms, was docked nine times between July 4, 1934 and September 1, 1935, in the first instance to have a new stuffing box installed and the shaft put in line. The next five dockings were to pack the stuffing box! The shaft was changed on the seventh docking and the last two haulouts were for more packing. The trouble was finally resolved however as she was not docked again till October 1936, and there was no mention of either shaft or stuffing box.

A few interesting points deserve comment: Grenfell vessels are all listed as yachts; the dock was loaded with vessels for the winter usually in late November and the winter work continued till May; there was no discernable increase in business during World War II; and the tonnages are listed as weights (is that common practice in drydocks?).

The author has written a typical example of a locally written, locally published, local history book. It has been lovingly compiled and should become an excellent reference work for anyone seeking information in the period and the area covered. Its major flaw is the absence of an index; it is a pity that the compiler of all this useful data did not include the means to locate specific vessels.

David Walker
Halifax, Nova Scotia
At first glance *Archeology of the Frobisher Voyages* is an impressive publication: detailed, well illustrated and attractive. As one reads it, however, one becomes annoyed with the many repetitions and lack of integration of the evidence presented. There is also a serious conflict between the archaeological evidence offered and the conclusions drawn.

The archaeology of the sites on Kodlunarn Island in Frobisher Bay, long identified as those of the 1576-78 Martin Frobisher expedition, has a lengthy history. The first work in 1860-62 was by the American explorer Charles Francis Hall while searching for survivors of the ill-fated Franklin expedition. There were excavations in the 1920s by members of the Donald MacMillan expeditions, in 1974 by Walter Kenyon, and in 1981 and 1990 to 1993 by staff of the Smithsonian Institution. Hall divided the material he brought back from Kodlunarn Island between the Smithsonian Institution and the Royal Geographic Society in London. The Smithsonian disposed of everything but an iron bloom during a clean-up operation in 1953. In 1980 Wilcomb E. Washburn, Curator of the Division of Political History at the Smithsonian, came upon this iron bloom and had its metal analysed and radiocarbon-dated. Two dates were obtained — AD 1180 ±107 and AD 1271 ±133 (1160-1280 and 1240-1400). Because the dates were considered too early for the bloom to be from the Frobisher expedition, a Norse provenience was suspected, and the 1981 Smithsonian expedition was mounted to check Kodlunarn Island for other indications of a Norse presence. The expedition surveyed several previously unknown Frobisher mines, structures and artifacts from the Frobisher camps as well as a wealth of Inuit sites of various periods but found no evidence of the Norse. However, three more blooms were uncovered which yielded radiocarbon dates in line with those of the Hall bloom, and so the search for the Norse was resumed in 1990, continuing in 1991, 1992, and 1993. Even more blooms were uncovered but no Norse material.

The book consists of fourteen articles by nearly as many authors. The introduction gives the history of the Frobisher expeditions and summarizes the contents of the book. The several articles then describe the Kodlunarn sites from the perspective of each author's academic discipline. Wilcomb Washburn delineates the history of the Hall collection, W.F. Fitzhugh his own archaeological work on the site as well as the expeditions that preceded the Smithsonian venture. Susan Rowley discusses legends of the Frobisher voyages surviving among the Inuit, archaeologist Reginald Auger discusses the artifacts, and Dosia Laeyendecker the radiocarbon dates. Conservator Jacqueline Olin and metallurgists Donald Hogarth, Henry Unglik, Garman Harbottle, Michael Wayman and others analyse the metallurgy of the blooms, the lab methods used by the various researchers, and the mining and metallurgical experiments conducted by Frobisher's men. Almost every writer feels compelled to give a thumbnail sketch of the history of the Frobisher voyages, a needless repetition which becomes irritating and distracting. Virtually every writer also discusses the blooms and their radiocarbon dates, invariably with a different set of dates. Since nowhere are all the blooms or dates listed, this only confuses the reader.

Almost all the writers conclude that the context of the blooms is clearly that of the Frobisher expeditions, yet, because of the early radiocarbon dates, everyone speculates that the blooms must be Norse. The arguments for this contradictory conclusion are strained while the archaeological evidence shows clearly that the blooms are associated with the Frobisher structures. The considerable space devoted to the conclusion that they must be Norse therefore seems rather pointless. Indeed, the futility of the elaborate arguments for a Norse provenience of the blooms is suggested in Fitzhugh's concluding remarks: there is evidence that the blooms were used as ballast for Frobisher's ship *Gabriel*, a conclusion confirmed in Fitzhugh's *1992-1993 Frobisher Bay Field Notes* (Arctic Studies Center Newsletter December 1993).

On a more positive note, the book furnishes excellent coverage of the excavations and sur-
veys undertaken by the Smithsonian expeditions on Kodlunarn and in outer Frobisher Bay. The layout is attractive, the writing excellent, and the book should appeal to the lay reader as well as the scholar. The reader is given a clear idea of the archaeological remains of the various Frobisher camps and their situation on this bleak island. The airphoto map of Kodlunarn Island with the sites worked by the Smithsonian group marked directly on it is a superb presentation. Also excellent are the appendices which offer lists of Frobisher's ship personnel, ship tonnage as well as a detailed catalogue of the artifacts and samples retrieved. A glossary and a comprehensive bibliography are also included. The authors and editors should be especially commended for the rapid publication of their work with the book in print only a year after the conclusion of the field work.

Birgitta Wallace
Halifax, Nova Scotia


*The Buccaneers of America* was the first great book about the golden age of piracy. Written by Alexander O. Exquemelin, who journeyed from France to the Caribbean as an indentured servant in 1666 and ended up as a buccaneer himself, the book was first published in the Netherlands in 1678, then translated into four more languages and republished ten times by the end of the century. It was an immediate international success in its own day and has remained an important, influential historical source down to the present.

Exquemelin created through his writing a veritable rogues’ gallery of the early Spanish Main. He chronicled the adventures of Pierre le Grand, whose men bored holes in the hull of their own vessel to force their attack on the vice-admiral of Spain’s treasure fleet; of Roche Brasiliano, a Dutchman who lived in Brazil before he came to roast Spaniards "upon wooden spits" (97); of Francis L’Ollonais, an indentured servant, then "common mariner," and finally pirate captain who swore upon the death of God and practised enormous cruelties against the Spanish until the "Indians of Darien" practised the same upon him (150); and finally of Henry Morgan, a Welshman who, like the others, was "little given to mercy" and who as the scourge of Spanish coastal towns in the 1660s and 1670s commanded thousands of sailors in raids of arson, plunder, and ransom (280). Exquemelin’s portrait of this multinational, Catholic-hating generation of pirates cut deeply into the collective imagination of Europe and America.

Robert Ritchie has done a creditable job as the editor of *The Buccaneers of America*, providing a brief, readable, adequate introduction to the text. Yet it must also be said that he has not produced a definitive scholarly edition. He has, rather, largely reprinted an edition of seventy years past, with a minimal index and, more unfortunately, extremely thin annotation. For example, several of the Native American groups who figure centrally in the text are not even identified in the notes. The volume also lacks a general map that would have allowed the reader to follow the movements of the buccaneers.

But Exquemelin’s narrative itself is the real attraction, for it offers something of genuine substance to specialists in history and other disciplines. The maritime historian will, of course, find rich, bounteous material on seafaring life in the seventeenth century. But so too will the medical historian discover in *The Buccaneers of America* information on medicinal herbs, including early curatives for venereal disease, while the labor historian will find useful observations and descriptions of work and class relations in transatlantic labor systems. The military historian will meet an abundance of evidence on both the social and technological aspects of warfare; the natural (or ecological) historian will find discourse on, for example, "the Fruits, Trees, and Animals that are found at Hispaniola" (43). Geographers will encounter a verbal mapping of areas little known to Europeans at the time. Specialists in literature will engage a text that not only spoke to and stimulated a nascent reading public among the middle classes of Europe, but pointed, in theme, form, and influence, toward the early development of
the novel. Anthropologists will find nothing less than the founding moment of their discipline in a European's effort to come to grips with the indigenous cultures of America. Exquemelin shows that maritime history was not in his day a narrow enterprise. It need not be today.

A closing caveat: Exquemelin's book is certainly a classic, but is it a "classic of naval literature" as its new publisher claims? Certainly naval action (of sorts) abounds in it, and, as Ritchie points out, the buccaneers did some of the naval work of the states of northwest Europe. But buccaneers were not, in the end, naval forces. They did not run their ships as the European navies did, nor did they have the same objectives. Perhaps most tellingly, buccaneers did not see themselves as navy men; indeed, independent as they were of states and empires, they saw the navies of the world as their enemies. That the Naval Institute Press should wish to include Exquemelin's buccaneers in a series so fundamentally ill-suited to them shows the continuing, contradictory vitality of the story of marauding on the Spanish Main.

Marcus Rediker
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania


Protected by the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, less than a mile offshore and with a reputation for impregnability dating back to John Hawkins' failed attack in 1568, Veracruz looked forward to the arrival of the Spanish plate fleet in spring 1683 with complacency. The city slumbered on the night of 17 May as nearly a thousand French, British, Dutch and mulatto pirates crept ashore. Unseen and unheard, 200 hand-picked buccaneers under the brilliant leadership of Dutch freebooter Laurens Comelis Boudewijn de Graaf breached the city walls. A second party of 600 pirates approached overland from the opposite direction. A few hours later, with very little resistance, Veracruz was in pirate hands. The subsequent looting, violence, destruction and hostage-taking became the stuff of pirate legend.

Through meticulous use of archival resources, David Marley has taken a rather well-known historical event and presented it in a fresh, dramatic way. Documentary evidence from the Archivo General de Indias in Seville and the Reales Cédulas Archivo General de la Nation in Mexico, among others, add a fascinating human dimension to the characters involved in the sack of Veracruz. Indeed, so richly detailed are Marley's descriptions of people's thoughts and feelings during the attack and its aftermath, that it seemed that the adventure was being romanticized for effect. Such fears were dispelled on reviewing the chapter on sources.

*The Attack on Veracruz* is a small treasure. Not only is its author a specialist in Spanish maritime history, he has also produced the official Marina catalogues for the Mexican National Archives. This familiarity with the documentary sources is apparent in the way they are so seamlessly woven into the story. However, should readers wish to locate a particular reference, Marley has conveniently listed the primary archival accounts with each chapter and where, for example, one could obtain a listing of Exquemelin reprints in English or French.

What raises *The Sack of Veracruz* beyond just a well-researched narrative is the sense of the personalities involved in the event. De Graaf, known as "Lorencillo" to friends and enemies alike, is described as tall, blond and handsome with a spiked mustache worn à l'espagnole and a fine taste in music. The bitter feud between the governor of Veracruz and the commander of San Juan de Ulúa, is brought to life through the documents, and sets the stage for subsequent events. The awful ordeal of John Murphy, an Irishman living in Veracruz, is retold from the actual account of events. Dragged from his house and imprisoned by de Graaf for trying to protect his wife and six children, Murphy was subsequently threatened with being hanged, drawn and quartered if he did not reveal where his wealth was hidden. He was then slashed in the head, clubbed, and carried off to a pirate surgeon to be sewn up. Such wealth of detail adds immeasurably to the sense of psychological terror that must have overwhelmed the pirates' victims in Veracruz during the attack. Contemporary illustrations and paintings add realism to Marley's story, enabling
readers to picture not only the setting but the participants.

At sixty-eight pages, Sack of Veracruz is not an exhaustive history of a pirate adventure. Nor will appeal to readers looking for a blow-by-blow strategic analysis of the raid. Its value lies in demonstrating the new human perspective that thorough archival research can bring to a familiar historical event without compromising the accuracy or objectivity of the study.

Faye Kert
Ottawa, Ontario


According to DesBrisay's 1870 History of the County of Lunenburg, New England legend has it that an old man, on his death bed, claimed to have been with Captain Kidd when "over two millions of money" were buried on an island east of Boston. One day in 1795, on Oak Island in Nova Scotia's Mahone Bay, Daniel McNlnnis, a young settler from New England, discovered an oak tree with a block and tackle suspended from it. The discovery was immediately associated with Kidd's treasure and a hunt was initiated which has since intrigued, fascinated, frustrated and killed treasure hunters for nearly two hundred years.

Oak Island Gold is William Crooker's second book on the subject. Like many others, it offers an historical survey of previous recovery efforts, comments on "new discoveries" and discusses who might have engineered the underground complex of tunnels and traps. Crooker is intrigued by the recent finds of treasure-hunter Fred Nolan, who owns property on the island. These include small pieces of broken china, a pair of hand-wrought scissors and a small railroad trolley buried in his swamp. Nolan has also identified old survey markers and the shape of a huge "Christian Cross" marked out with huge pointed boulders. A11, insists Crooker, are vital new clues to solving the mystery.

Crooker includes a little more detail in this history of the dig than in his earlier book, The Oak Island Quest, which is still in print. However, his attention to detail leaves something to be desired. Thus, McNlnnis is mis-spelled McGinnis and he claims that "LaHave... was a depot for pirates... a depot to which they resorted in great numbers." In fact, although the Governor of Placentia did encourage pirates to establish a base at LaHave in 1701, it was of little consequence. Their store ship was captured in 1702 and the shore depot burned by a small Boston privateer in 1705. Crooker also declares that "Roosevelt himself visited the island several times in 1909," when, in fact, F.D.R. only visited Oak Island once that year, in the course of a cruise on the family yacht, Half Moon II. Such inaccuracies, together with the fact that two thirds of the book's contents comprise a revamped version of the first part of Crooker's earlier book, diminish the value of Oak Island Gold. Fred Nolan's "new discoveries," speculations regarding Templar involvement in the mystery and Crooker's latest conjecture, that the treasure was part of the loot of Havana, stolen by Lord Albemarle and Admiral Pocock in the spring of 1762, are all quite fascinating. Unfortunately, it is hard to believe that an operation of such magnitude could have been concealed from the hundreds of inquisitive settlers and Indians who inhabited the area by then.

In contrast to Crooker's more comprehensive work, Millie Evans' booklet can only have been designed for the tourist market or as part of a prospectus for Triton Alliance, which owns that part of the island not owned by Fred Nolan. The first two chapters contain a much abbreviated account of the discovery of the "money pit" and subsequent efforts to retrieve the supposed treasure. The maps, plans and photographs have little new to offer, and Evans shows a distinct lack of objectivity in commenting that Mr. Nolan is creating a problem by standing in the way of his competitor, Triton Alliance. In her five page "Apologia," Evans wonders if Oak Island might have been a Basque fishing station, and the money pit the entrance to a salt mine.
operated by either the fishermen themselves or local Micmac Indians. Given the book's fairly comprehensive "Selected Bibliography," it is surprising that she was unable to produce something with more depth.

Obviously, the Oak Island mystery continues to fascinate innumerable armchair treasure seekers. Sadly, with each re-telling, details of the hunt are either omitted or expanded to suit the particular objectives of the author. As a result, neither of the books reviewed here can provide an accurate history of the pre-World War II hunt. Serious students should instead refer to Mather Byles DesBrisay's *History of the County of Lunenburg* (Bridgewater, 1870) and R. V. Harris' *The Oak Island Mystery* (Toronto, 1958) if they wish to place post-war developments in their true perspective.

Robin H. Wyllie
East LaHave, Nova Scotia


Charles Darwin's 1836 visit to the Cocos Islands came near the end of his landmark cruise in HMS *Beagle* and the young naturalist's earlier observations, particularly at the Galapagos Islands, have tended to overshadow the importance of his Cocos fieldwork. This book shows how the Cocos visit helped confirm many of Darwin's developing theories, presenting summaries of Darwin's notes journals and publications alongside comparable passages from Captain Robert Fitzroy's journal and other documentation of *Beagle's* Cocos visit. Its modest size makes room for a number of helpful maps and illustrations, although its overall quality is marred by a distracting number of typographical errors. Chapters outlining Darwin's findings and methods culminate in a convincing analysis of how the Cocos Islands influenced his observations about the dispersion, struggle and adaptation of plants and animals.

The people of Cocos also intrigued Darwin. Cocos had no indigenous population, but two communities had established themselves there in the early nineteenth century, of which Captain John Clunies Ross' household was the only one left by 1836. The other settler, Alexander Hare, had brought over a hundred Malay men, women and children to Cocos before being forced to leave when the Malaysians escaped his tyrannical rule and sought refuge with Ross. Ross' own household included servants of several other nationalities, and intermarriage had produced an ethnographic mixture that fascinated both Darwin and Fitzroy.

Darwin's encounter with Cocos' human inhabitants needs historical context, however. The author gives the impression that *Beagle's* was the first naval survey of the Cocos Islands. In fact Royal Navy ships had visited Cocos almost every year between 1829 and 1836. While doing repeated surveys, the Royal Navy gathered intelligence about Hare and Ross' cultivation of the Dutch and French governments; in 1837 the British government decided to discourage its rivals by giving the ambitious Ross a commission as British Resident, though it later decided against annexing the islands as Ross had hoped. Knowing this would have helped readers understand the hostility in Ross' account of Darwin and Fitzroy's visit.

The main focus of the book is scientific rather than political. Here the author pays close attention to historical context. Of particular interest is the debate about coral reef formation, in which *Beagle's* Cocos visit played a crucial role. Many of Darwin's contemporaries suggested that coral grew atop submerged volcanoes, eventually breaking the surface to form islands. Darwin's belief that coral atolls formed around volcanic islands which then subsided — a theory since proven correct — would encourage him to consider "gradualism," the evolutionary cycle of change in nature over vast stretches of time. His observations at Cocos provided evidence of the "fringing reef" his theories demanded, but which he had never seen before.

Patrick Armstrong has been to Cocos himself, and his own observations note man-made changes, particularly the decline of many species of flora and fauna that Darwin observed. Coral atolls have little topsoil and their ecological balance is precarious; even Cocos' relatively
small human population is taking its toll. The islands which Darwin called "a refuge for the destitute," (p. 75) home to plants and animals who made a perilous ocean journey to reach them, are a refuge no longer.

Jane Samson
Ashford, Kent


The loss of the American colonies in 1783 meant that Britain could no longer send to America convicts sentenced to transportation. One of the proposed sites for a new penal colony was the little-known coast of south-west Africa between the Dutch settlement at the Cape and the Portuguese sphere of influence in Angola. To assess the suitability of this site the British Admiralty sent Captain Thomas Bolden Thompson in 1786 to examine the coast of Namibia in HMS Nautilus. However, the failure to find any sources of fresh water demonstrated the total unsuitability of Namibia for such a settlement. (An excellent account of this voyage by Jill Kinahan, based on remark books kept by officers of the expedition, was published in Cimbebasia Journal of the State Museum, Windhoek, XII, December 1990, pp. 23-61.) Despite this set-back, the Royal Navy continued to visit and carry out surveys of the coast of Namibia for the next one hundred years.

Remark books were first instituted in 1759 when naval officers were instructed to forward hydrographic and navigational information to the Admiralty under headings such as "descriptions for sailing in and out of ports," "marks for anchoring," "wooding and watering," "provisions and refreshments," "fortifications" and "descriptions in regard to trade and shipping." When the British Hydrographic Office was established in 1795 these books were placed in its charge to amplify information collected by hydrographic surveyors. From 1829 the wealth of information in the remark books was used in compiling and keeping up to date Admiralty Sailing Directions. Jill Kinahan, Curator of Historical Archaeology at the State Museum of Namibia, has now used them to compile a fascinating historical record of visits by ships of the Royal Navy to Namibia.

The author's brief introduction is followed by a detailed chronology, intended as a convenient reference for those unfamiliar with Namibian history. An essay on hydrographic surveying methods in the nineteenth century by Captain Richard Campbell of the Hydrographic Office comes next. The main body of the book reproduces verbatim extracts from the remark books of twenty-four Royal Naval ships that visited the Namibian coast between 1795 and 1895. Also included are extracts from ship's logs and a relevant contemporary article on one voyage published in the Nautical Magazine. Each set of remarks is preceded by details of the ship concerned, followed by a commentary by the author on the local historical significance of the vessel's visit and the reasons it was sent there. These ranged from carrying out hydrographic surveys, preventing foreign whalers and sealers from operating in South African waters, opening communications from sea with missionary settlements, investigating and later regulating the loading of guano from Ichabo and other guano islands, preventing the illicit entry of arms, annexing Walvis Bay and the guano islands and, after the annexation of Namibia by the Germans, assisting in solving boundary disputes with the German authorities. The remarks are followed by a list of manuscript surveys relating to the voyage and their location and the titles of any Admiralty charts resulting from these surveys. A map accompanies each description showing the ship's track and any names recorded for the first time as a result of the voyage. Many of the surveys resulting from these visits are also reproduced. The book is well illustrated with contemporary photographs and illustrations of many of the ships involved or by copies of the ship's plans from the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich. The book concludes with a list of references and an index of African place names.

While the various remarks are of great interest, the value of this book is setting them in their historical context, which has clearly
involved a great deal of research. This book could well act as a model for others of its kind based on the wealth of historical material in many of the remark books in the archives of the Hydrographie Office. It is highly recommended.

Andrew C.F. David
Taunton, England


The Naval History symposia hosted by the United States Naval Academy on a biennial cycle have become one of the most important gatherings of maritime and naval historians in the world. The historians and scholars who grace the symposia never fail to enrich and inspire their audiences and it is highly important that the papers presented have an opportunity to reach a wider audience. This volume of selected essays from the Tenth Naval History Symposium in 1991 fulfills this critical function.

The Tenth Symposium dealt with such diverse topics as sea power and the state, naval and amphibious warfare in the age of sail, leadership, technological change, intelligence and analysis, World War II naval operations, and others. Twenty-three of the more than fifty papers presented are published here; it must have been a difficult decision for the editors. Nevertheless, the articles they chose cover a wide range of subjects and perspectives. For instance, in "Foundations of Chinese Naval Supremacy in the Twelfth Century," Paul Forage analyses Chinese naval supremacy under the Song Dynasty when China arguably possessed the strongest navy in the world. Forage credits Song success in sea battles against Jurchen invaders to "standoff bombardment," which significantly weakened the numerical superiority of the barbarian invaders and made it possible for human-powered paddle-boats to clear the Yangtze River of enemy barges.

Mark Grimsley provides an interesting discussion of the influence of "The Pirate and the State" through the career of Henry Morgan. Frank J. Merli's analysis of the Union blockade of the South contributes additional information on the Civil War period and Arthur Baker's "Disposing of the Kaiser's Navy, 1918-1920" shows how the sinking of the High Seas Fleet at Scapa Flow solved many problems for the Allies over who might get what vessels from the Imperial Navy.

The discussion of naval and amphibious warfare in the age of sail brings together three excellent papers by Gerald Jordan on the 1780 British invasion of Nicaragua, John McErlean on the 1794 invasion of Corsica, and Gordon Harrington on the American challenge to the East India Company during the War of 1812. As was often then the case with amphibious operations, the difficulties of coordinating military and naval operations were insurmountable, particularly if a relatively small land mass, such as an island, was involved.

The section on naval leadership has two interesting essays by James Bradford on "John Paul Jones and the Campaign of Liman" and Vernon Williams on "Littleton W. T. Waller: The Politics of Command." There is also a masterful vignette by Clark Reynolds on "Carl Vinson, Admiral John H. Towers, and the Creation of the Two Ocean Navy." Reynolds shows how Carl Vinson's determination and dogmatism was absolutely crucial to the creation of the two-ocean navy immediately prior to the beginning of World War II. America's ability to cope would have been significantly reduced without Vinson's personal crusade.

Technological advances are sometimes sustainable and sometimes prove illusory. Donald Canney discusses the role of the Fulton II in the beginning of the American Steam Navy. Robert Browning shows how difficulties overwhelmed technological advance in the early application of steam power to naval vessels. Paolo Coletta provides a highly interesting retrospective on the role of "Dirigibles in the U.S. Navy." William Althoff's "An Arctic Mission" reveals the difficulties encountered during the 1958 attempt to penetrate the Arctic with a ZPG-2 model airship as part of the International Geophysical Year (1957-58). The flight of the
719 can only be described as "hair raising." Even if regarded as a success, the difficulties in operating blimps in the Arctic proved prohibitive.

Papers by Gunnar Aselius dealing with Swedish intelligence assessments of the Soviet Navy (1921-1928), Joseph Moretz on Liddell Hart and naval warfare, and Alberto Santono on the Italian Navy and the British employment of ULTRA Intelligence on the Mediterranean all offer interesting discussions of the role of intelligence gathering and utilization. The challenge of naval and air force relationships are vividly underlined in papers by W.A.B. Douglas on Canada's naval-air force rivalries between the wars and by Lucien Robineau on the French Navy and aviation in the 1930s. D'Ann Campbell’s interesting essay on the role of the WAVES in World War II lends significant perspective to feminist studies with regard to the war.

Finally, three special studies explore lesser known aspects of naval operations during World War II. Procopis Papastratis discusses the role of the Greek Navy in exile during the war, with emphasis on the Mediterranean. Elbert Smith reveals the horror of a major loss at sea in the sinking of the USS Warrington which became the victim of a Florida hurricane on 13 September, 1944. The Warrington was ill-prepared to meet the challenges of such a storm and, while Admiral King was critical of the officers responsible for the ship at the time of her loss, modern reassessment of the situation has reason for taking a different view. The tragedy of the Warrington represents a footnote in the history of World War II but contains warnings that are valid for any naval force at any time. Jeffrey Barlow reviews the heroic fight on both sides between the US Navy and Japanese kamikazes during the latter days of the Pacific War.

In short, the Tenth Naval History Symposium has provided a number of first class papers and evidence of a solid body of research in numerous fields. The papers selected for this volume provide much interesting reading and food for thought, making the book well worth adding to any personal collection and deserving to be in every university library.


There has been a spate of books on the history of the US Navy recently. This volume, the first of a presumably two-volume set, provides another quality addition to a growing collection. Robert Love, Jr. focuses on the interplay between national politics, foreign policy and naval policy while providing quick sketches of all significant operational activities of the USN. Given the span of time and the wide scope of USN operations throughout this period, it is clear that many issues are dealt with rapidly indeed. The strength of the book is therefore not to be found in details — although Love includes enough to keep readers interested — but in the trends which he highlights during a sweep through almost 170 years.

Love breaks his work into thirty-nine chapters, dealing with issues chronologically while steadily arguing themes. His pithy and assertive style may not convince all readers, but makes for good reading and presents a strong argument. His short descriptions of the various wars which have involved the USN are well done, but the sections dealing with peacetime or pre-war policy are often more interesting. This results from the author's efforts to demonstrate how politicians and statesmen, bureaucrats and sailors have strived to find roles for the navy which achieve goals useful to each group. Love relates throughout this volume why, and therefore how, the competing motives of these groups contribute to the fact that the US Navy was usually found ill-equipped or unprepared for the type of demands placed upon it at the outset of a crisis or war. This focus on policy is kept fresh by Love's successful effort to weave both naval activities and personalities into his analysis, thereby giving a human and nautical dimension to what could be a dry book.

The wide range of US naval activity in this period is one of the principal sources of interest in a work such as this, and readers will rapidly appreciate that the USN usually avoided operations in European waters for most of the period, with the possible exception of the Medi-
terranean. The book spends much of its time in Latin American and Asian waters, venturing into north Atlantic waters only when forced to by the more extreme European wars. Love also spends five chapters on the American Civil War, as compared to three each for World War I and the period from 1939 to Pearl Harbor. The perspective of the book is, appropriately, very American. Love's analysis is derived mainly from secondary sources, of which the author demonstrates a solid grasp. There are a few archival references in the first part of the book, but not many. The author delves into original sources mainly in his assessment of Franklin Roosevelt's somewhat capricious direction of US naval policy in the years leading up to World War II. The last few chapters are probably the most interesting for this reason, although Love's capable marshalling of his material lends a fresh quality to the narrative throughout.

The book sets a very high standard in terms of illustrations and photographs, indexing, maps, and editing. The pictures are especially well chosen, and are sprinkled liberally throughout the text. Canadians might be surprised to read that in 1775 US General Montgomery proceeded southwest from Montréal to Québec to assist in the attack on that city, but this is one of just a handful of (comparatively!) minor errors discovered by this reviewer. Overall this book represents another solid addition to the growing US naval histories available.

D.M. McLean
Victoria, British Columbia


James Derriman is an historical researcher and writer who mines through the rich holdings of the Public Record Office, Kew, for material on the naval and legal history of a part of Cornwall rich in the history of privateering and smuggling. Marooned is a small but fascinating volume which is a fruit of that mining, and a tale which revealed, and reveals, far more of English society and its navy of Napoleonic times than a simple case of cruelty at sea.

The story is that of Robert Jeffery of Polperro, Cornwall, a 17-year-old of common origin and little distinction who left his blacksmithing training in 1807 to sign aboard a privateer, the Lord Nelson. The Napoleonic Wars were at their height, and the Lord Nelson was soon boarded by a press gang from HMS Recruit, eighteen guns; among the men pressed was Jeffery, who found himself bound for the West Indies. Recruit was commanded by what Derriman calls a "petty tyrant," Lieutenant The Honourable Warwick Lake, who seems to have embodied many of the vices of the English upper class with few of the virtues. Lake was connected to the Prince of Wales through his father, and displayed a cruelty and irresponsibility toward his "people" in Recruit that had made her a most unhappy ship. The great mutinies of 1797 had brought some attention to the plight of the common seaman in the Royal Navy, but in 1807 the capacity for a commanding officer to make his ship either a proud home or a miserable hell remained virtually limitless. Change and reform were slow, and mirrored the long struggle ashore to bring greater fairness to British society: it was that great struggle which came to give the otherwise marginal story of Robert Jeffery its impact, and its fascination, clearly, for Derriman.

In Recruit Jeffery was an indifferent seaman, and proved too weak for the harsh 'tween-decks world of the rope's end starter and the lash. He eventually was caught thieving mouthfuls of rum and some spruce beer, receiving lashes for the rum but only extra duties for the spruce beer. Then, as Recruit was passing the desolate, lizard-littered rock of Sombrero in the Anegada Passage east of the Virgin Islands, an apparently drunken Lake had Jeffery put ashore with only the clothes he stood in, and no shoes, and left him there. Had Jeffery not been luckily rescued by an American vessel some nine days later, his death would have been certain.

The entry "R," for deserted (or Run, as it was termed) was ordered put against Jeffery's name in the ship's books, and Lake sailed on, unconcerned with his criminal act. The fascination which the story then arouses centres on the effects this act had, like ripples spreading from a pebble's toss: the essential indifference
of the commanding Admiral, Sir Alexander Cochrane, to Lake's act, except when it proved it might be an embarrassment; the larger example it presented to social and political critics of the Tory government and indeed all upper levels of society of the contempt displayed for lesser beings by creatures such as Lake — and the seeming inability of society and the Navy to readily protect those lesser beings. And finally, how the story got into the hands of an Opposition determined by any means to embarrass the government, and how their blaze of publicity led not only to the cashering of Lake from the Navy but a small measure of compensation for Jeffery, if only to shut him up. In all of this one senses Derriman's conviction that the British were fortunate indeed to avoid revolution in these times on the scale of the French, and that even given the inertia of congenitally conservative institutions such as the Royal Navy and the openly malevolent bullying of the Lakes, there were just enough voices able to rise in protest, and just enough social countermeasures able to fight for the downtrodden such as Jeffery, to ensure that the English would not rise and overthrow what was, from a modern perspective, a wretchedly unfair social structure.

*Marooned* is recommended for those anxious to see more of the sailor's past world than seamanship, gunnery, or the minutiae of shipboard life, and no doubt any such reader will await further unearthings by Derriman, whose credo, like Jacky Fisher, seems to be that of the mole: he may be traced by his upheavals.

Victor Suthren
Ottawa, Ontario


"Old Ironsides," the USS Constitution, is easily the most famous vessel in American naval history. Because the ship enjoyed singular success in ship-to-ship actions with British warships at a time when American sea power was nascent and Britannia ruled the waves, the Constitution became more than just a powerful frigate; it became a symbol of American pride and power afloat. This symbolic importance persisted long after American naval might surpassed Britain's and became paramount in the twentieth century. Thomas C. Gillmer has written this book to ensure that this symbol of American sea power will be preserved for posterity.

Gillmer's sub-title is well chosen and indicates the book's major strength. The author is not an historian. Rather, he is a former professor of naval architecture and chairman of naval engineering at the US Naval Academy, and the designer of hundreds of sailing vessels. He uses this background to focus primarily on the vessel itself, as opposed to its exploits: "This book is not about the heroics of the famous old Navy captains who took her into history. It's about the ship herself, about her design, her style, her structure and strengths — and finally, how I believe she can best be restored and preserved for generations to come." (p.xi)

Gillmer begins with a thoughtful discussion of Joshua Humphreys' concept for six new frigates (one of which was the Constitution) authorized by Congress in 1794. Since the United States could never match Britain's naval might of over four hundred frigates and ships-of-the-line, Humphreys designed a warship strong enough to defeat British frigates in single ship actions and swift enough to out-sail the enemy's more powerful ships-of-the-line. Gillmer effectively uses numerous drawings and illustrations in his analysis. Indeed, the use of illustrations throughout the work is one of the book's major strengths. William Gilkerson's drawings and paintings are especially noteworthy.

Although he is at his best when discussing naval architecture, Gillmer does relate Constitution's exploits during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For maritime historians, this is probably the book's weakest part. Other studies are more detailed and better documented. Gillmer's bibliography omits many important works, and his documentation is thin.

The book's major successes appear in the last three chapters when Gillmer focuses on Constitution's decline and resurrection. He discusses how the ship became an American symbol in the 1830s with the publication of Oliver Wendell Holmes' poem, "Old Ironsides."
Although *Constitution* was not always well-maintained in the nineteenth century, the ship became a national icon and public outcries prompted major refits. Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of the Navy was even replaced after suggesting that the *Constitution* be used as a target for gunnery practice. Gillmer examines the major restoration of 1927-1930 and the need for a more thorough restoration in 1991. Testifying to Gillmer's professional abilities, the US Navy selected him to study the vessel's timbers and make recommendations to restore the warship. The author concludes with a passionate plea for Old Ironsides' preservation as well as his disappointment that some of his suggestions were scrapped because of their expense.

Perhaps Gillmer was more convincing than he thought. Since the publication of *Old Ironsides*, plans for the vessel's restoration have been altered to include the installation of key diagonals and other structural supports. Instead of moving out of dry dock in January 1994, the *Constitution* is not expected to be re-rigged and returned to its permanent berth at the Boston Navy Yard until March 1996.

Although maritime historians will probably continue to rely on other works concerning the *Constitution's* involvement in naval conflict, Gillmer has written a fascinating account of the design, construction, and especially the restoration of the United States' most famous warship. The numerous illustrations complement the author's extensive knowledge of naval architecture. Because of its technical nature, the omission of a glossary was unfortunate.

Carl E. Swanson
Greenville, North Carolina

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Over two thousand large sailing ships were built on the St. Lawrence during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Of these, the vast majority were launched from established shipyards at Québec or Montréal. The rest were built on the beaches of small towns and villages at "country" or "out of town" yards. Of at least sixty that were laid down in the village of Neuville (Pointe aux Trembles), twenty miles upstream from Québec, thirty-one were built by the shipbuilder Joseph Angers, either alone or in partnership, most of them for the local merchant, shipowner and ship broker Hyppolite Dubord.

In *La construction navale à Québec et à Neuville*, Marc Rouleau presents an annotated transcript of Angers' Journal of 1865 and of the "Job Books" for his fully-rigged ships *Bridget* (ex-*Gatineau*) of 1861 and *Calumet* of 1863. An introductory chapter on shipbuilding at Québec and Neuville, together with biographical sketches of Angers and Dubord, provide the context. There is also an illustrated chapter on wooden ship construction. The Journal reveals that being Dubord's shipbuilder was no easy task. An entrepreneur to the hilt, who spent a large part of his later years one jump ahead of his creditors before finally failing, Dubord greatly hindered Angers' work through slow payments of his shipyard expenses and late deliveries of shipbuilding supplies. Wages that were two months or more overdue made for discontented workers. The late deliveries disrupted the building schedule, and in the case of timber sometimes led to the use of unfit wood even though the Lloyd's Surveyor was likely to order it replaced. Yet Angers seems to have remained philosophical, handling a work force of as many as one hundred and fifty men with some kind of easy discipline despite the rivalry between local and Québec workers, a somewhat relaxed attitude towards the need to work daily, and occasional problems with drunkenness. Though the parish priest constantly made the drunkenness his target, Angers seems to have accepted that, like bad weather, it was inevitable that it disrupt shipbuilding at times. Of greater concern to him was the flow of building materials. Even the local supply of timber, the main reason for building out of town, could not always be relied upon. Yet because he knew his business well, he managed to launch as many as five ships in one season.

The ships were entirely sub-contracted out,
each agreement being detailed in their Job Books. These show not only the exact cost of the labour required and how it was divided up, but the pittance that was Angers' margin of profit. Only the love and challenge of building a ship can have led him to carry on. In spite of it all, he remained loyal to his employer, repeatedly travelling to Québec where he did the rounds with Dubord endeavouring to obtain a ship mortgage here, refinancing there, enough to keep creditors at bay and to give an advance, at least, to the men. One would like to think that Angers' tribulations were not a reflection of the conditions under which all country shipbuilders worked, yet even well-established Québec shipbuilders had to deal with similar situations at times, as they waited for overdue notes to be honoured or suffered through a sharp drop in the ship market. Rouleau's book undoubtedly helps us better to visualize their problems.

As was the custom, many English and Franco-English terms were mixed into the typical shipyard vocabulary, and we encounter them in the Journal. The editor explains them as they appear and his notes are extremely useful, though I do not always agree. Would "poteaux de fiferaille" not refer to balusters rather than belaying pins? And if local usage accounts for corruptions of French such as "calfeutrer" for calfater (to caulk), "gournaples" for gournables (treenails), I believe the correct French terms should also be given.

The introductory chapters contain information and statistics from many published and unpublished sources, including Rouleau's own research. They provide the essential background to the Journal, despite a sprinkling of errors and a number of other mistakes that a proof-reader should have caught. However, the authenticity of the Journal and Job Books and the information they contain on shipbuilding practice — the division of labour, details of labour and other costs — and the very real picture of Angers' tribulations in running the shipyard make this a most useful contribution to Quebec's sparse shipbuilding historiography, especially since no similar shipyard records are known to have survived from other nineteenth-century Québec yards. Rouleau is to be congratulated for having persevered in his determination to present this shipyard Journal to the public. In so doing, he has also laid before us an aspect of the social conditions that existed 130 years ago.

Eileen Reid Marcil
Charlesbourg, Québec


In his original introduction H. Allen Gosnell made no apologies for the narrative technique he chose for this work. He considered that "Very little history of distant events can be much more than a rehash of material which has already been told or written before." (ix) Gosnell therefore left behind what he called the "scholarly approach" in favour of an anecdotal history constructed around selections from the memoirs, newspaper articles and contemporary histories of the participants. These eyewitness accounts are arranged in chapters by engagement, and generally presented chronologically from the beginning of the war. There is a synopsis of the strategic and tactical situation surrounding each event at the start of the chapter with additional illustrative information when necessary.

The opening chapter is quite useful for the novice maritime or naval historian, with its concise description of the rapid developments in marine engineering and naval science which converged in the battle in Hampton Roads in March 1862 between USS Monitor and CSS Virginia (ex-USS Merrimack). Gosnell then explains how the peculiar requirements for the vessels in service on the western inland waterways led to the development of warships that were quite distinctive from their coastal counterparts. He also reminds us that the western gunboats saw action before the renowned Battle of Hampton Roads. Gosnell describes the principal types of vessels operating in the Mississippi: the Union wooden gunboats, ironclads and army rams, and the swift Confederate steamers used primarily, and somewhat successfully, as rams.

The book begins with the occupation of the Head of Passes at the mouth of the Mississippi River in the fall of 1861 and carries through the
ill-advised and near disastrous Red River campaign in early 1864. Throughout the work the personal accounts of Union commanders make for engaging, action-packed reading. The fall of Vicksburg in July 1863 ended the Confederate presence on the Mississippi River. This provides Gosnell the opportunity to include accounts of actions in lesser theatres such as the Suwanee and Red Rivers.

When Gosnell's book was first published there were few histories which dealt thoroughly with naval actions in the western theatre. Alfred Mahan's The Gulf and Inland Waters (1883) and an unpublished PhD dissertation by T.R Parker entitled The Federal Gunboat Flotilla on the Western Rivers during its Administration by the War Department (1939) were two earlier studies devoted solely to this subject. Contemporary accounts and general histories published after the war touched only on the important or dramatic personalities and events in the Mississippi valley. Yet in the years since Gosnell's work first appeared in 1949, several excellent volumes have been written on this subject; Edward Bearss' Rebel Victory at Vicksburg, John D. Milligan's, Gunboats Down the Mississippi, and Fletcher Pratt's, Civil War on Western Waters come immediately to mind. These were written in a scholarly style which Gosnell chose to avoid and, in many ways, they are more useful as tools for research and further study. While Milligan and Pratt do include Gosnell's book in their bibliographies, the latter citing it as an excellent source, and although Gosnell provides a bibliographical reference for each narrative, his omission of an index and endnotes makes it difficult for readers to refer easily back to material of interest. The maps and photographs suffer in quality and apparently have been reproduced as they appeared in the original volume. Republishing the book in its original form may therefore have been ill-advised, as even a small amount of editing would have benefited serious Civil War historians. On the other hand, if you are prepared for what Gosnell calls his "method of absorbing history painlessly," (p.ix) these first-hand accounts can still be fascinating and highly entertaining reading.

W. Wilson West, Jr.
Washington, DC


Originally presented as a dissertation in 1973, The African American in the Union Navy seeks to fill a void in two fields of Civil War historiography: the experience of African Americans and maritime history. Noting that the attention given to black Union seamen has been inadequate or inaccurate, David Valuska offers a brief but informative study on how the Union Navy came to incorporate black sailors in their labour force. The argument is contained within the first hundred pages; the remainder of the book consists of a bibliography and appendices, which may be of greater utility than the text. The bibliography is a valuable guide to manuscripts, archival resources, and other primary sources. The appendices are impressive lists of all of the 9,596 black sailors who served during the Civil War, including the date each entered the service, where they enlisted, their rank, birthplace, age, and for most, their occupation.

The Navy did not anticipate what problems might arise and plan accordingly; rather, the Navy responded to individual situations by making decisions that established a pattern for the remainder of the war. When faced with Contrabands (runaway slaves seeking asylum) who had been cured of smallpox and in need of new clothing, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles ordered that clothes be provided and that attempts be made to employ the Contrabands in order to recoup a portion of the cost. Similarly, when the Union Army began recruiting blacks by offering a more attractive pay and rank scale, the Navy was forced to respond by allowing black sailors to advance to ranks higher than landsmen. The policy forged in the heat of war benefited African Americans while meeting the growing manpower needs of the Navy.

Valuska contends that the attitude of the Navy towards blacks evolved during the war, an evolution reflected in policies adopted to grant black sailors equal legal protection and status as white sailors. When three black seamen of the captured USS Isaac Smith were not returned with the rest of the crew, Secretary of War
Edwin Stanton ordered three rebel prisoners be held hostage in retaliation. African American sailors were acknowledged as citizens with the right to be protected by the Union government. This shift in attitude, however, was not intended to promote or grant civil rights, but to maintain law and order while also making it clear to potential black recruits that the military would not abandon them. This did not necessarily transform the attitudes of the white sailors who served on board with their black counterparts; black seamen were systematically discriminated against and treated with derision. White animosity did not prevent black sailors from serving with distinction and heroism; Valuska argues that their contribution was indispensable to the success of the Union Navy.

The title of the book is perhaps misleading, as the focus is primarily on what black seamen meant to the Navy, and not on what their experience meant to blacks or their communities. Valuska raises the question of what the importance of a naval career was to African Americans but fails to answer it, or to indicate how many blacks may have continued to pursue naval careers after the war's conclusion. Valuska also characterizes black seamen as willing to ignore on board abuse out of greater loyalty to the Union and the fight for freedom. While undoubtedly true to some extent, there may have been other African American responses to discrimination at sea. Another potential avenue of future research to which Valuska's work points is the effect the intersection of black cultures may have had on African Americans as northern free blacks, Contrabands, Caribbean blacks, and foreign professional black seamen were thrown together in a close environment.

The African American in the Union Navy presents valuable insight into the evolution of the Navy's policy as well as establishing both the extent of black participation and the value the Navy placed upon black seamen. Valuska's extensive research also provides a rich resource for further inquiry into the experience of black seamen and how that experience may have impacted black male identity and culture.

Scott Hancock
Rochester, New Hampshire


In 1818 Captain Thomas Dickinson, R N, Superintendent of Ordnance Shipping was ordered to report on the use and justification for Board of Ordnance vessels worldwide. Although this event is regarded as the launching date of the "unknown fleet," the Board already had employed civilian-manned vessels for centuries. These vessels served both the Army and Navy, as the Board had exclusive jurisdiction over stores, equipment and munitions. When the Board of Ordnance disappeared in the reforms that followed the calamitous mismanagement of the Crimean War, control of the civilian fleet passed to the War Department. In 1888 the newly formed Army Service Corps assumed responsibility for War Department vessels.

Throughout the centuries, the fleet transported military stores in British coastal waters and on various foreign stations. It did this vital, if mundane, job with surprising dedication. War Department sailors commonly served for forty or even fifty years and sons often followed their fathers into the fleet. Their vessels were similarly steadfast. The coasters Marquess of Hartington and Sir Evelyn Wood left the fleet in 1957 with a combined service of 132 years.

Since 1882 the fleet also assumed responsibility for naval gunnery target vessels. Until then coastal batteries practised against moored or beached targets, but advances in naval technology imposed a greater demand for realism. In 1895 two purpose-built target towers joined the fleet. A final class of these vessels came into service in the 1940s. Many of these vessels came under enemy fire during World War II; several were damaged or lost evacuating troops from Dunkirk.

The postwar era brought new tasks and larger vessels to what was now known as the Royal Army Service Corps fleet. A flotilla of converted LCTs, coasters and escort vessels spent more than twenty years dumping ammunition into the Beaufort Dyke. Such an operation would be inconceivable in today's climate of
ecological awareness. A convoy of four LCTs, manned by volunteers, supported the Suez operation in 1956.

In the midst of this activity, the government made two decisions that brought an end to civilian-manned Army shipping. Target towing disappeared with the abolition of coastal artillery and, based on the Suez experience, the British Army opted for military-manned logistic shipping. The Royal Corps of Transport transferred the remnants of the fleet to the Navy in 1988.

Cooley shows us how the Army's unassuming sailors performed a variety of specialized, vital and often dangerous jobs. They worked against a backdrop of constant organizational change that would not be unfamiliar to any public servant. Although the civilian sailors displayed impressive loyalty to their sometimes indifferent employer, the fleet always found itself in competition with the private sector. The end came in 1991 when the Navy put the fleet's remaining duties out to contract.

The book covers much ground as it traces the changing fortunes of the civilian fleet over several centuries. There are few sources because even in recent times the fleet's activities were seldom recorded. Some detail may be missing but Cooley captures the spirit of service that exemplified the "Unknown Fleet." An anecdote (p. 133) illustrates the point. One War Department sailor said to another as they passed a cemetery along the Manchester Ship Canal, "You and I will be there one day, Jack."

"Yes, Ted"

"Never mind, old boy, it's a job ashore!"

Richard Summers
Ottawa, Ontario


This is not so much a history of HMS Vernon as a source book for future studies of all aspects of underwater weaponry and countermeasures. The author writes with the authority of one who was very much a part of the story he tells. He had the benefit of two previous volumes which laid the foundations of his account: G.B. Sayer's History of HMS Vernon, 1872-1930 and E.D. Webb's HMS Vernon, 1930-1955. He also benefited from the assistance of a strong team of experts and researchers, a generous response from his fellow torpedomen and financial support from British industry. The result is a book packed with information.

Poland begins with an account of the development of the torpedo itself and of a torpedo school attached to HMS Excellent. Later chapters trace the development of HMS Vernon as an independent command and its contributions to research and training in underwater warfare through the period of World War I, the inter-war years and the outbreak of World War II in 1939. Much of this, of course, is old ground, for the author readily acknowledges his reliance on Sayer and Webb. From then on Poland comes into his own with chapters on mining and mine countermeasures, rendering mines safe, diving and demolition and torpedoes and torpedomen at war. These are detailed and fascinating accounts, and although Poland's work is largely narrative and sometimes anecdotal in style, he has marshalled the facts from which will undoubtedly emerge a variety of more analytical studies.

Several chapters deal with the evolution of Vernon's mandate. The emergence of the electrical engineer and the Electrical Branch caused responsibility for electrics to be separated from the torpedo specialization in 1945. Heartache was involved for those whose technical preference was for the Electrical Branch, yet who were reluctant to relinquish their status as executive officers. Similar heartache was involved with the amalgamation of the Torpedo Branch and the Anti-Submarine Branch the following year when Vernon became officially the Torpedo and Anti-Submarine (TAS) School. Poland deals with understanding and sympathy with the problems that arose when the specialists of each branch had to re-qualify in the other.

That same understanding is apparent in the final chapters which cover the eventual demise of HMS Vernon as the Royal Navy's Torpedo and Anti-Submarine School. The years 1970 to 1986 had seen tremendous advances in technology as well as the extensive rationalization and centralization of training in the Royal Navy. The weapon specialists gave way to weapons engin-
The Northern Mariner

Vernon Semper Viret. Indeed, change was the very justification of Vernon's final demise.

Two specific matters in this wide-ranging book caught this reviewer's particular interest. One, dealt with in some detail, is the Buster Crabb episode. This was the case of the headless and handless corpse of a diver discovered in Chichester Harbour, some ten miles from Portsmouth in June 1957. It was subsequently established that these were the remains of Buster Crabb, a retired naval clearance diver who, working for the Secret Intelligence Service, had attempted a dive in April 1956, probably to measure the propellers of a Soviet cruiser then visiting in Portsmouth Harbour. He had been forced to the surface by faulty equipment and spotted from the decks of the cruiser, but never seen again until the discovery of the corpse some fourteen months later. Interest in the affair led to intense speculation in the press and embarrassment for the Government. Poland lays the matter to rest with the conclusion that it was a case of "a gallant, middle-aged gentleman who made one dive too many." (page 356)

One ought also to mention Poland's analysis of the character of the torpedoman in contrast to the gunner which appears as a persistent sub-theme throughout the work. The surface environment in which the gunnery specialist worked bred men trained to respond instantaneously, and consequently the gunner set great store in drill, precision, teamwork, conformity and the loud word-of-command. The torpedo-man, on the other hand, working in an environment where target data was transmitted at the speed of sound in water (five thousand feet per second) was by contrast more reflective, patient, enquiring and individualistic, with a propensity to keep the noise level down. Whether this character analysis of the two specialties "holds water," so to speak, is for someone else to decide. It does go some way in explaining the friendly rivalry which existed between Vernon and Excellent as well as the gunner's jokingly pejorative ascription of "swing it till Monday" as the motto of the Torpedo Branch and his description of what others would call a long weekend as a "torpedoman's weekend."

Readers should be warned of the difficulties in finding one's way about the text. The type is small, and the pages are crowded. The Table of Contents lists chapter titles but without page numbers. The bibliography, which is both annotated and extensive, omits the usual publication data of published works. Finally, while the list of Members of Torpedo Long Courses — 1872-1986 in Appendix A is a most interesting document, it is a pity that officers of Dominion navies were not identified as such after 1938.

C.B. Koester
Kingston, Ontario


*Russian Ships in the Gulf* is a product of the new spirit of openness in the former Soviet Union that is allowing not only Soviet-era documents but also those of the Tsarist era to see the light of day. Efim Rezvan, Executive Director of Independent Research Projects at the St. Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, has compiled a collection of orders, reports, and letters from the Central Archives of the Navy in the old capital chronicling Russian naval interest in the Persian Gulf at the turn of the last century.

The excellent introduction places Russian naval and commercial activity in the gulf in its broader context and prepares the reader to tackle the raw documents that make up the bulk of the work. Thus, Rezvan addresses the question of ultimate Tsarist interests in the region: were the Russians, in fact, determined to gain a secure "warm water port" in the Persian Gulf? Western politicians and historians have long debated the existence of such a drive. William C. Green recently dismissed the idea in "The Historic Russian Drive for a Warm Water Port: Anatomy of a Geopolitical Myth," *Naval War College Review* (Spring 1993). But Rezvan suggests that "many influential groups at court and in Russian financial and industrial quarters" (p.9) were
interested in the need to establish a presence in the region. As the adventurer S.N. Syromyatnikov, who in 1900 conducted a "secret expedition" to the gulf, later wrote, "the old trade route between the Mediterranean and India became a link between Odessa and southern Persia, Mesopotamia and Arabia. It will continue to be a link until a railway connects Persia and Mesopotamia with Moscow, giving the Russian people access to the warm southern oceans." (p. 159)

In Rezvan's view, Russian interest in the Persian Gulf was, in part, an extension of a historic southern drive. More importantly, it was a defensive move designed to prevent the British from gaining proprietary control of what was viewed in St. Petersburg as an increasingly important international crossroads between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Most of the naval vessels that steamed the gulf did so while en route from European ports to the Far East. And it was the Russo-Japanese War that brought to an abrupt and artificial end Russian political efforts in the Persian Gulf.

Rezvan also does a good job of demonstrating how easily the Russians were able to make political inroads into the gulf. Arab, and to a lesser extent Persian, leaders were quick to view the Russians as potential allies in a struggle to prevent either the Ottoman Turks or the British from establishing an imperial hegemony in the region. (Americans were similarly welcomed into the region for the same reasons at the same time.) In fact, Rezvan's work provides a good background for anyone wishing to understand the often warm Arab-Soviet relationships that developed during the Cold War.

The documents themselves make interesting reading. They are collectively travelogues of the pre-oil Middle East, memoirs of life at sea in ships ill-suited to service in the warm clime of the gulf, and insiders' views of "The Great Game" as played by the British and the Russians at the turn of the century.

Despite its many strengths, the book is marred at times by awkward translations, poor editing, and typos. Nevertheless, it is a useful and interesting study of international rivalry at the turn of the century, of well thought-out and successfully executed Russian policy in the gulf, and of how the colonial legacy of the British had opened the door to the Russians long before the start of the Cold War.

Michael A. Palmer
Greenville, North Carolina


Since 1987 reprints of all but two of Corbett's major works, a first French edition of Some Principles of Maritime Strategy and, for the first time, his Admiralty War Staff review of the Russo-Japanese war have been published. Three of Richmond's first four books were reprinted in 1993. The reasons for this resurgence of interest in the work of these two British naval historians and strategic analysts are discussed and their contributions analysed in Mahan Is Not Enough, which not only presents the papers but also, commendably, sets out in full the discussions upon them at a conference at the Naval War College in 1992. The naval historians and analysts present were neither uncritical nor in complete agreement. Yet their two illustrious forebears would have been delighted with a degree of high-class debate which they themselves had tried so hard to encourage in the Royal Navy against immense obstacles during the early years of the twentieth century. The French naval writer Raoul Castex at that time described Corbett as "this kill-joy who obliged me to a disagreeable but useful review of myself." Naval historians might well be induced into a similar review of their profession after reading this book. There is much food for thought here and at a price that offers noteworthy value for money.

The conference papers are divided into several topics. A typically thoughtful piece by Dan Baugh outlines the genesis and sweep of Richmond's strategic thought. Three cover what are admitted to be the largely unsuccessful attempts of Corbett and Richmond to improve the education of the Royal Navy, with papers by their biographers Donald Schurman on Corbett and
(sadly posthumously) Barry Hunt on Richmond, and, extending into newer ground, a valuable contribution by James Goldrick on the origins, purpose and early years of *The Naval Review* between 1911 and 1931 (plus an appendix which for the first time names the authors of its articles in that period). What became the centrepiece of the conference in terms of discussion engendered were two papers by Jon Sumida and David Rosenberg which considered the utility of the naval historian to a navy at the beginning and at the end of the twentieth century. A provocative after-dinner speech the previous evening by Rear-Admiral Guy Liardet maintained that recent change had been so great as to make naval history useless for naval purposes (as might have been said by the naval technologists at the start of the century whose obsessions Corbett and Richmond strove to counteract) and together these stimulated a lively and extensive debate on the value of naval history to naval practitioners. Most contributors stressed the importance of historical "process" rather than "substance" — the value of the historical discipline to instil an integrity which raises the standards of enquiry, broadens the perspective and so establishes the proper context for debate, and creates a train of thought in which the pertinent questions can be asked. It was recognised that Corbett and Richmond marked a halfway stage towards this poseidon. Neither gave sufficient weight to the impact of technology, Corbett wrote about maritime strategy in purely operational terms and neglected non-operational factors, Richmond took a broader view but failed to take account of changing political circumstance between the wars. The papers then turn to the contemporary relevance of Corbett and Richmond with a carefully-balanced piece by Geoff Till on "Corbett and the 1990s" and a fairly scathing indictment by Eric Grove on "Richmond and Arms Control." Two final papers look at their impact in other countries in the inter-war period: C.D. Coulthard-Clark (equally scathing) on "Richmond's Australian Connection" and Hervé Coutau-Bégarie on "Corbett and Richmond in France," before George Baer provides a masterly summing up.

Why has there been a Corbett/Richmond revival? This volume shows that they were among the very first to write what is now considered to be professionally respectable naval history, objective and soundly based on documents, so that their writings are now among the historical classics, and it also indicates that the time is ripe again for a reconsideration of their ideas. Brian Ranft has said that Corbett took the principles of war to be a guide to thought rather than directives for action, and many of their thoughts still have relevance for historians and strategists. They wrote during immense naval change, when the growth of vast navies recreated the prospect of large-scale war at sea and required those thinking men who could see above the remarkable new technology to reassess the objects of maritime strategy. Above all they looked beyond technological obsession with the big battle to stress the inherent flexible capacity of navies. The present time of change, when the end of the Cold War has diminished the prospect of a Mahanian Armageddon at sea, has produced a similar need to look beyond wondrous technology to the wider uses of naval power. Corbett and Richmond used naval history to emphasize the littoral use of navies and the projection of their power on land. To what extent their thought, predicated on great power conflict, can still guide us, is subject for debate here and beyond. In a challenging summing up of one of the discussions, Andrew Gordon suggests that the *Pax Britannica* era which Corbett skipped over in his historical analyses may be much more relevant. Richmond, who Hunt describes as wanting thinking officers, would have relished this controversy! James Goldrick and John Hattendorf should be congratulated for organising a stimulating conference and volume.

Michael Duffy
Exeter, England


In 1893 Irving Edward Sheely was the first of five children born to Madison and Louisa Sheely of Newtonville, New York. His first job as a young man was with a local newspaper solicit-
ing subscriptions by motorcycle in the New York backcountry. Thus began his love affair with motorcycling. Next he became a draftsman for the American Locomotive Company in Schenectady. Then, early in 1917, Sheely caught sight of a Navy aviation recruiting poster.

The new business of flying so intrigued him that in March he enlisted in US Naval Aviation as Landsman (candidate) for Machinist Mate Second Class and left for Pensacola Naval Air Station one week before Congress declared war on Germany. The base commander was ordered to recruit seven officers and 122 enlisted men as volunteers for an instant aviation force, and to send these untrained, under-equipped recruits directly to France to combat the German submarine threat. One of the volunteers was Sheely.

The force, designated as the First Aeronautical Detachment, was in France by early June, and was the first organized contingent of American forces to arrive at a World War I combat zone. Because the Americans lacked supplies or the means to train, French officials happily provided the facilities, officers and aircraft to train these men. Thus Sheely found himself learning aviation mechanics and aerial observation at the French Naval Air Training Station on the Mediterranean coast.

Observer/mechanics navigated over water, hit ground targets with aerial bombs, operated an aerial camera, manned a Lewis machine gun, maintained aircraft engines in peak condition, and trimmed all tension wires to wings and controls to fail-safe operation. The Americans received few supplies from the United States; they shifted for themselves. Sheely had to buy his own aviation helmet and goggles. They cooked over open fires. Sheely even took up barbering to provide his buddies with haircuts.

Sheely trained in England during the winter of 1917. He happily returned to France in March 1918 "fed up" with the miserable English weather and food shortages. His rating increased to Machinist Mate First Class/Air on 1 April, 1918, and soon after he flew a reconnaissance mission in a de Havilland (DH)-9 with RAF 202 Squadron based near Dunkerque. Off Ostende, Belgium, they encountered ten enemy planes and downed one. Sheely thrilled at his first combat experience. "We were able to hold our own, of two machines against ten Huns." A bullet missed his "hide" by three inches.

He flew anti-submarine patrols in seaplanes for the US Naval Air Service and in summer 1918 conducted high altitude (20,000 feet) daylight bombing raids against factories, railroads and military installations. These missions led him to develop an improved bombsight. Sheely acquired the nickname "The Hun Getter" and his squadron commander picked him to fly lead plane in formations of Caproni (Italian) bombers. Sheely confided to his brother, "I am fearless in the air. I understand my machine gun," and "I feel confident to hold my own against the Hun." The girls back in the States heard of Sheely's exploits. Every "Jane" he had ever known wrote to him. As well Sheely kept tabs on "a little French girl." He told his mother that "She is about twenty years old and 'pretty' is no name for her."

Flying combat left little time for romance. Sheely declared to his future sister-in-law, "I have faced death squarely in the face and not faltered." For many, though, luck ran out. Two of his comrades crashed behind German lines in November 1918. The observer/gunner, who was unhurt, was captured but the pilot, who sustained a broken leg, was shot to death by a German infantry captain. US Marines found his body six days after the Armistice.

Sheely's letters and diary chronicle a unique first person account of World War I Naval aviation. They detail the deprivations and inadequacies of that programme and the incredible price flyers paid in training and combat. Sailor of the Air tells of a young flyer's concern for family and interest in home. It recounts a wonderfully human story of endurance, perseverance and indomitable courage and, accordingly, deserves wide distribution.

David P. Beatty
Sackville, New Brunswick


This latest contribution to the Smithsonian History of Aviation Series is a biography of the
man who, more than any other, shaped naval aviation during its critical formative years in the 1920s and early '30s. Rear-Admiral William A. Moffett (1869-1933) served as the chief of the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics from its inception in 1921 until his untimely death in 1933, when he went down with the rigid airship Akron during a violent storm. Professor William Trimble, the author of three books on naval aviation, including *Wings for the Navy: A History of the Naval Aircraft Factory, 1917-1956*, is well qualified to present Moffett's story.

According to Trimble, there was little in Moffett's early career that suggested the pivotal role he would play in naval aviation. Born in Charleston, South Carolina, the Annapolis graduate served in more than twenty ships ranging from old windjammers to dreadnoughts. Moffett retraced the well-worn path that other officers followed to senior rank. During World War I Moffett was posted to the Great Lakes Naval Training Station near Chicago as commanding officer. This inauspicious posting would be critical to Moffett's advancement and his involvement in naval aviation, for it was there that he joined with local business elites like J. Ogden Armour, the meat-packing baron and William Wrigley, Jr., the chewing-gum magnate to form the Great Lakes Aeronautical Society, with himself as honorary president. The society established and financed a flight training unit and an aviation mechanics school. While he was at Great Lakes, "Moffett gained an understanding of the power of public relations and an appreciation of the importance of a rapport between the station and the communities around it." (p.53) Moffett subsequently used these skills when chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics to promote naval aviation. More important, perhaps, he would come to depend on his influential contacts for political favours.

At the end of the war Moffett took command of *Mississippi*, one of the Navy's new superdreadnoughts. The following year, he witnessed first-hand the superior capabilities of airplanes in spotting the fleet's gunfire during its annual gunnery exercises at Guantanamo, Cuba and gave him a glimpse of what the future held for airplanes operating from shipboard. Yet naval aviation was then in a state of flux. According to Trimble, "The organization of aviation had grown on a largely ad hoc basis through the war years, with divided lines of responsibility and little central coordination; aviation had been grafted onto the existing bureau system rather than integrated into it." (p.65) As the war ended, the Navy remained uncommitted to aviation, despite its significant wartime advancements. Then, in the spring of 1919, Brigadier-General William Mitchell, former head of the Army Air Service in France, proposed to the General Board a separate and independent air service encompassing naval aviation, much to the chagrin of the Navy. This marked the beginning of a lengthy inter-service rivalry for control of naval aviation, played out between Mitchell and Moffett.

After two years of wrangling, President Harding signed the Naval Appropriations Bill (H.R. 4803) into law in 1921, creating the Bureau of Aeronautics, with Moffett at its head. During his twelve-year tenure Moffett introduced several key initiatives: control over the selection, retention, and pay of naval aviation personnel, revision of the Navy's procurement policies thereby ensuring a viable national aircraft manufacturing industry, an effective public relations campaign which ensured a high profile for naval aviation. Equally important, he skilfully orchestrated a campaign against the "battleship clique" to ensure that the aircraft carrier assumed its rightful place in the US battle fleet. Despite his best efforts to secure more carriers, limited budgets and naval arms limitations conspired to limit the USN to three carriers (although *Yorktown* and *Enterprise* were authorized in 1931) during his tenure.

Not all of Moffett's convictions were as sound. He was an ardent support of the rigid airship and of the hybrid warship (the flying-deck battleship and cruiser). For Moffett "a six-inch gun cruiser with a flight deck and aircraft was more than at least equal, and in his opinion superior to the eight-inch gun cruiser without landing decks." (p.221) The flying-deck cruiser became the centrepiece of his efforts to secure additional aircraft platforms for the fleet and to counter the British advantage in aircraft carriers.

In developing his study, Trimble had to overcome a major hurdle of many biographers - limited personal records. Moffett was an intensely private individual who separated his private
life from his professional career. Consequently, little correspondence survived. Nevertheless, Trimble is able to provide us with a balanced account of the man and the professional naval officer, and it is difficult to argue with his conclusion, that "Moffett at the time of his death had already done more than anyone before or since to secure the place of naval aviation in the military establishment." (p.276) In a very real sense, the success of present-day American naval aviation is due, in large part, to his tireless efforts. For anyone interested in naval aviation this book is therefore a "must read."

Shawn Cafferky
Ottawa, Ontario


Allied convoys proceeding to northern Russian during World War II faced daunting obstacles. They not only had to battle adverse Arctic conditions of ice, snow, storms, fog, and perpetual daylight or darkness, but also the continuous attacks of German surface ships, U-boats, and aircraft. From 1941 to 1945, the Murmansk convoys cost the Allies 104 merchant ships and eighteen warships. Their bloody history is well known to scholars of World War II. What Paul Kemp has done, using secondary sources and some primary sources from British archives is to put the whole story, beginning with the "Dervish" convoy in August 1941 and ending with RA 67 in May 1945, into one well-written volume of popular history. It is all covered in Convoy!— the numerous attacks by U-boats and aircraft, the destruction of Convoy PQ 17, the Battle for Convoy JW 51B, the sinking of the Scharnhorst, and the career of the battleship Tirpitz.

However, while it is an excellent book of its type (that is, a well-written history for the general reader), Convoy! also displays several weaknesses. For instance, it is almost totally British in orientation. Nowhere in the text does Kemp state that most of the cargoes sent to North Russia were American and that the majority of the merchant ships were American flag vessels. In fact the reader gets the impression that these convoys were mostly made up of British ships. American merchant seamen, who manned most of the merchant ships in the North Russian convoys get, at best, a walk-on part in Convoy!. Furthermore, only one or two American books, not including Samuel Eliot Morison's History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, are listed in the bibliography. Neither American nor any original German sources have been used. For example, the War Diary of the Operations Division of the German Naval Staff is not cited. This is a curious omission, for an English translation of this document can be found in London. Kemp does make skilful use of materials in the Imperial War Museum, yet the documents in the Public Record Office, concerning naval operations in the Arctic, are not utilized in a systematic way, but rather in a hit-or-miss fashion. Finally, too much reliance is placed on a single staff history — Arctic Convoys (London, 1957) — while many other documents in the PRO concerning the Murmansk convoys and naval operations in the Arctic have not been consulted. In short, the problem with Paul Kemp's Convoy is that, while it reads well as an introduction to naval operations in the Arctic during World War II, in the final analysis it is no more than just another work of popular naval history, telling informed readers little that is new about the convoys to Murmansk.

David Syrett
New York, New York


Many books about the US Navy during World War II are little more than reports of tactical manoeuvres carried out by various units of the fleet as they effect strategic objectives against the enemy. But in this engaging book Arthur Layton Jr. brings together graphic personal accounts of combat veterans that range from the
The Northern Mariner experiences of young seamen to higher ranking officers of the surface and submarine fleets.

It was against US Navy Regulations to keep a private diary during the war, although a few were written surreptitiously. Thus a book such as this that assembles personal recollections of veterans during the war years is of great importance. The time is not too far distant when there will be few Navy veterans left to give us a picture of life at sea from an intimate level. To enhance these reminiscences, the author included over one hundred official photographs from the Navy Department as well as from the National Archives. Some are very explicit reminders that there were always Navy and Marine Corps photographers in the thick of the fighting.

The author begins with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, relating the story of a seaman who gives his views of Navy life in Hawaii in 1941 and his thoughts when attempting to shoot down a Japanese plane with a World War I bolt-action Springfield rifle! Later this same sailor joined the submarine fleet as a Torpedoman in USS Nautilus. He describes his terror when undergoing depth-charge attacks at the Battle of Midway and his elation when torpedoes from Nautilus help finish off a Japanese carrier. During the battles for the capture of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands we experience life aboard the destroyer USS Laffey and then the horror and panic of a survivor trying to stay alive after Laffey was sunk by an enemy torpedo. We follow the story of life aboard a Pacific Fleet submarine as it ranges the ocean. The aggressive USN submarine offensive was of supreme importance in helping to win the war, having sent over five million gross tons of Japanese shipping to the bottom by the war's end. We also experience gunnery operations aboard the new battleship USS Alabama at Leyte Gulf and the feelings of men under attack by fanatical kamikaze pilots at Okinawa.

To those involved in the Battle of the Atlantic against German U-boats the war was endless, and during what came to be known as the Bloody Winter of 1942-43 the Germans came close to winning. At this time the US Navy lacked the ships to fight a two-ocean war, but fortunately vessels of the US Coast Guard had been merged into the Navy, and it is from the remembrances of a gunnery officer serving in the Coast Guard cutter Ingham that we discover the viciousness of the war against the U-boats, especially when considering the horrible North Atlantic weather with fierce storms and freezing temperatures. The author also weaves in stories of a chaplain and seaman serving in the battleship USS Texas as it cruises from the invasion of North Africa to action off Normandy on that famous day of 6 June 1944 (though proof-readers slipped up in allowing the year to be identified as 1944!).

With his discriminating use of photographs to match the text, the author has given us a most captivating picture of life at sea with the US Navy.

Moreton J. Ensor
Brewster, Massachusetts


There's the stuff of a TV thriller in this biography of one of the most successful U-boat commanders of World War II. Author Timothy Mulligan is an American archivist whose specialty in captured German naval records uncovered details of the rebellious life, brilliant war record, and violent death of Kapitänleutnant Werner Henke.

Mulligan's interest was probably first caught by the dramatic incident he uses to start his book — the shooting of Henke by an American soldier in a secret prisoner-of-war (POW) facility near Washington DC, on 17 June, 1944. Though it was a case of "shot while trying to escape," indications are that the 35 year old German naval officer deliberately got himself killed. What brought him to that tragic solution makes an interesting saga.

During three years of combat, Henke rose from provisional lieutenant to commander of his own U-boat, and sank 142,636 tons of ships, placing him in fourteenth position among Germany's top U-boat aces of World War II. His exploits gained him the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves, presented personally by Adolf Hitler.
Henke was also involved in a controversial shipsinking of sufficient barbarity to have him named as a war criminal.

Deep research over a six-year period shows throughout this book, reflecting many personal interviews, correspondence, and official records in Germany, Britain, and the United States. The biographer clearly admires his subject, praising him for exemplary characteristics. Then, disconcertingly, Mulligan quotes naval contemporaries who have a less-than-pleasant opinion of "Handsome Henke." What does come out is young Henke's determination to excel after he joined the merchant marine as a cabin-boy, qualifying as a deck officer, and finally transferring to the Reichsmarine in 1934, at the age of 25. As a German naval officer, he saw much of the preparations for war, and was trained in gunnery and communications. As it happened, Henke fired some of the very first shots of World War II, commanding an 11-inch gun-turret aboard the pre-dreadnought battleship Schleswig-Holstein that bombarded Danzig on 1 September, 1939.

There is a strong theme of how rebellious a young man he was, forever in scrapes with his naval superiors, running into trouble with Nazi authorities ashore, even punching an SS officer. Perhaps this helped speed his transfer to the hazardous submarine service, for which he volunteered. There was already a pressing need for U-boat crew replacements, as the German navy lost seventeen of its fifty-one front-line boats in the first seven months of the war. Mulligan presents a detailed account of U-boat conditions, equipment, and personnel. They were a spirited band of men, with consistently high morale, despite the knowledge of near-certain death.

Henke set off as a watch officer aboard U-124 from Lorient, France, in late 1940. During a succession of wolf-pack patrols off West Africa, Henke's command, U-515, scored numerous kills of Allied ships. One of his victims was the British liner Ceramic, sunk with a loss of over 250 passengers, half of them civilian women and children. It seems that Allied attention was drawn to the sinking by German propaganda boasts about it. A little-known Special Warfare unit of the American Office of Naval Intelligence broadcast radio announcements dubbing Henke "war criminal number one," who would be brought to trial whenever captured. Mulligan makes clear his disapproval of this US propaganda, and questions why Americans would break the story about a war crime committed against British subjects. He evidently does not consider that the nations were in a close wartime alliance.

On Easter Sunday, 1944 a US Navy destroyer flotilla became Henke's nemesis. Depth-charged repeatedly for hours, U-515 was forced to the surface, fired on by ships and aircraft, and the forty-four survivors surrendered to USS Châtelain. Seeking to bluff Henke, American intelligence officers promised that if he co-operated by giving information, they would take him to the United States "and not be turned over to the British for trial." Henke signed an agreement to that effect, and was taken to the highly classified POW interrogation centre at Fort Hood, outside Washington, DC.

The author accessed documents which reveal the techniques used in trying to glean information from Henke. When he refused to honour his agreement, threats were made to have him turned over to the British—who were not, in fact, particularly interested in him. But his US Navy captors were convincing, and the "Lone Wolf made a suicidal run for the wire, getting himself machine-gunned by an alert guard. Mulligan's extensive footnotes and references, plus good photographs, flesh out this previously obscure tale from the U-boat wars.

Sidney Allinson
Victoria, British Columbia


As with the Allied navies, the German Kriegsmarine began World War II giving the greatest attention, support and publicity to their major fleet units and U-boats. And, not surprisingly, their stories have been well covered in a plethora of books. This, however, has not been the case with the S-Boats, minesweepers and the multitude of smaller coastal units and support
auxiliaries. In this excellent small book, the detailed history of Germany's coastal forces — especially the Schnellboote, on which this volume concentrates — is told almost for the first time. Though they were never able to achieve sufficient materiel support to achieve dominant significance, Germany's coastal forces became (with the exception of their U-boats) the focus of their surface warfare, involving more and more personnel, as the Allies began to assert sea and air superiority by mid-war.

The book will fascinate those who opposed these units, usually at night at high speeds and in "the fog of war," and it will intrigue anyone interested in the minutiae of the war. Most importantly, its tables and day-by-day unit histories will prove invaluable for researchers, ranking with Jiirgen Rohwer's Axis Submarine Successes 1939-1945 (Cambridge, 1983). It begins with a useful summary of the development during the inter-war years of two minor war vessel classes, the outstanding high speed S-Boats (called E-Boats by the Allies, for "Enemy"), and their fleet of 215 standard-design minesweepers. Whitley also covers in sketchier detail the support auxiliaries and depot ships, the smaller R-Boats (Raumboote or inshore minesweepers), some captured coastal boats, and, in greater detail, the development and operational use of the "Small Battle Units" (Kleinkampfer-verbando T K-Verband), which included the two-man miniature submarines and "torpedo-riders": "Biber," Neger," "Seehunde," "Molch" and others, similar to the RN's X-Craft and "Chariots." The Germans had high hopes for masses of these small dangerous pests, but their development was too little, too late — though not by much. Even at Normandy, a few daring sailors caused some losses to the assembled shipping.

On the other hand, the S-Boats were plentiful (223 were commissioned), better sea boats and faster than their opposing Allied MTBs and MGBs, frequently to the latter's chagrin. Driven by (usually) reliable high speed diesel engines rather than the MTBs' more dangerous and complicated gasoline-powered engines, they were primarily used in the Channel and North Sea, and in the northeastern Mediterranean for repetitive mine laying and coastal convoy harassment. Too often their depredations in the supposedly swept channels off the British coasts resulted in sunken merchantmen and warships, though they and the minesweepers paid an extraordinarily heavy price for their efforts: 54 per cent of S-Boats and 46 per cent of M-Class minesweepers were lost by the war's end. Of these, only about 21 per cent were due to surface or submarine action. As air superiority and air-to-surface coordination improved, bombing, strafing and even aerial torpedoes took an inordinate toll: fifty-four S-Boats and fifty-one minesweepers. For the S-Boats, considering their operating speeds of about 40 knots, usually at night and with no radar until late in the war, it is not too much of a surprise to learn that nineteen boats were lost due to accidents of collision and stranding. Another 15 per cent were lost to mines, often in their own fields.

The photos are numerous and enlightening, with a few comparative MTB/MGB photos, and for model-makers, some plans are included. In short, this is a beautifully researched book, a really excellent and valuable reference tool for anyone writing from the Allied side about our MTB/MGBs (I have used it already in that connection!). The price will mean, however, that this is not a book for the casual reader.

F.M. McKee
Markdale, Ontario


It is always a pleasure, after having written a favourable review of the first book in a series, to report that the second volume maintains the same high level of quality. Such is the case with the latest instalment of Lambert and Ross' history of Word War II allied coastal craft which is concerned with the products of the British Vosper firm and the American Elco firm.

Wisely, the authors opted for the same format that proved so successful in their earlier volume. Following a history of each company we get a brief but encyclopedic description of not only their major but also their experimental or "one off" fast attack craft. Useful tables
provide details of the construction and commissioning dates, service and fate, where known, of each hull number. The technical text is supplemented by judiciously chosen and informative photographs as well as a plethora of hull and detail plans and profiles, and three-dimensional views. My criticism of the quality of the reproduction of the plans in the first volume in the series is not justified this time around — they appear to be much clearer and, in any case, all the plans and profiles in the book may be purchased separately in a larger format. This is an invaluable service for model builders and owners of surviving fast attack craft.

I found the authors' history of Vosper, which was (and still is) a major player in the development and construction of coastal craft and its chief designer, Commander Peter Du Cane, to be not only interesting but informative. It was the 1937 Vosper Private Venture MTB which was the ancestor of the many Vosper "short" MTB types constructed between 1939 and 1945. Incredibly, this historic boat is still in existence as a sea scout training vessel. For those readers interested in such things, the Vosper Private Venture played a major role in the film, "The Eagle Has Landed."

The authors provide an equivalent treatment of the history and products of the American Elco company, which, along with Higgins, was a major constructor of PT boats for the US Navy during World War II. Elco's wartime products trace their ancestry back to another private venture MTB, the British Power Boat 70-ft. experimental MTB of 1938. This raises the question as to why the authors did not choose to place Elco and its wartime craft in the third volume of this series, which will cover the products of British Power Boat.

The authors' treatment of the wartime construction of the two firms is excellent but they also include a number of bonus items that increase this volume's reference value. Separate sections discuss the construction techniques unique to each firm, the camouflage colours and patterns of US Navy PT boats, and the wartime development of bridge and pilothouse construction. There is also an exhaustive analysis of the Packard 4M-2500 marine engine, the workhorse power plant for both American and Commonwealth fast attack craft and, even more useful, detailed technical notes on the service of this engine in the Royal Navy by a coastal craft engineer officer.

As if there were not enough, there are further special sections dealing with coastal craft armament including such diverse weapons as the twin 0.5 Vickers machine gun and its mounting, the 20-mm Oerlikon and its mountings, 18- and 21-inch torpedo tubes, American PT boat armament, the Dewandre machine gun turret used in British Power Boat and Elco's early products, the US Navy 37- and 40-mm guns and their mountings, rocket launchers and the Lanchester 9-mm sub-machine gun, the standard wartime boarding weapon of Commonwealth navies. All these specialized sections are well illustrated with a mixture of photographs, plans and drawings. Finally, for good measure, Lambert and Ross throw in an excellent history of the service of Free French Vosper designs and a descriptive catalogue of the surviving Vosper types.

In sum, this book is a worthy successor to the first volume of what is, without doubt, the definitive technical history of wartime Allied fast attack craft. It is not cheap but, in contrast to the many times I have complained in the pages of this journal about high prices for low content, it is well worth its price.

Donald E. Graves
Ottawa, Ontario


The on-going détente occasioned by the collapse of the Soviet Union has had the welcome result of making an ever increasing number of Russian historical accounts available to us. This work is a prime example of this trend, and given that our knowledge of Soviet commando operations during World War II is very limited, it is very deserving of a closer look.

The memoirs of Victor Leonov, one of the most heavily decorated Soviet commandos of this period, were first published in the Soviet
Union in 1957. Fortunately for us, James Gebhardt was not restricted to translating the original text, so that this work includes material that Leonov was unable to incorporate in the original edition. The volume is divided into nine chapters which are ably supported by a new foreword written expressly for this edition by Leonov in 1990, and an introduction to Leonov and the Soviet Naval Scouts penned by Gebhardt. The main text is a very personal account of one man’s military experiences. Leonov writes proudly of the men, and women, with whom he served, and their operations, from the Arctic coast to Korea. However, he provides only the briefest of details on the tactical and strategic factors that determined most of his missions. In reading the text one cannot help but be surprised at the paucity of complaints directed at superior officers by either Leonov or his men. The high opinion that Leonov held of his unit’s political commissar will also surprise some readers. Finally, despite the current political situation in Russia, Leonov has shied away from offering any criticism of the various Soviet organizations with which he dealt during the war.

Other disappointments include the quality and nature of the sole map provided, as well as the few photographs that are present. The former offers a very general outline of the unit’s stomping grounds in Norway and Finland. The latter consist mostly of portraits of the men who served in Leonov’s unit, and they are of a very poor quality. The text is bereft of any technical information and illustrations of the myriad small arms and equipment used by the Soviet Naval Scouts in this period. The large bibliography will be of only a limited utility for most readers in North America because the majority of the titles cited are Russian. The five appendices provide a brief outline of the other Soviet Naval Scout detachments who served during the war, three translations of captured German army documents, and a table of rank equivalents for the US Navy, US Army, and the Red Fleet.

Nonetheless, and despite these flaws, the author has provided us with a very realistic battle history of his unit. Leonov’s memoirs provide us with a very personal glimpse into the operations of this often overlooked segment of the Soviet military. The deficiencies are therefore more than compensated by the insights they provide into the makeup and operational history of this unit. Readers with a strong interest in commando operations will certainly benefit from this work.

Peter K.H. Mispelkamp
Pointe Claire, Québec


This book is the result of a remarkable collaboration. The Naval Radar Trust was established in 1986 by officers who had been involved in the development and wartime use of naval radars. Their aim was to gather information for a history whilst practitioners were still available. Derek Howse, himself a wartime naval officer and specialist navigator, was appointed author. The result of his seven years of research and correspondence with more than 150 individuals around the world is comprehensive, authoritative, and written in a straightforward style.

The narrative traces events in considerable detail. Early development of radar for the Royal Navy lagged behind similar work being done for the Royal Air Force. It is interesting to learn that the Canadian-born Director of Scientific Research at the Admiralty, Sir Charles Wright, played a key role in developing momentum. Indeed, he realized as early as 1935 that short frequencies would be needed for naval applications and his persistence led to the invention of the cavity magnetron. Asking Canada to loan engineering physicists in 1940 to serve as radar officers at sea was another of his initiatives.

The speed with which radar was developed under the pressure of war is extraordinary. In 1939 only a few ships had crude equipment to detect aircraft and ships. Within a year radar had become essential in warships and military aircraft of all types, and was being used for navigation. Special sets for fire control were being fitted by 1941, for aircraft direction by 1943.

This remarkable book must be a model history of a new technology and its application in
operations. Everything is included from the first experiments through to centimetric sets, electronic counter-measures, the development of the PPI, and the identification of friendly and hostile units. There is even an account of the use of the Decca navigation system and its predecessor, Gee, during Operation Neptune. To be fair the book does not attempt to cover production in detail. Equipment fitted in British-built ships transferred to the RCN is covered, as well as the radars purchased for HMC ships in the early post-war years. The significance of the Canadian radar officers to the Royal Navy is acknowledged. Indeed, Sir Charles Wright wrote in 1941 "To be quite honest I really do not know what we should have done without them." (p. 113)

The importance of centimetric radar in the Battle of the Atlantic has long been recognized. In fact it is interesting to learn that the need for a radar able to detect submarines on the surface was appreciated quite early. By November 1940 good results were obtained against a submarine with a new 10 cm system. Three months later it was boldly decided to gamble even before sea trials on what would become type 271, and large-scale production was ordered. By September 1941, type 271 had been fitted in twenty-seven escorts and the Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare at the Admiralty was worrying because the new radars were also being syphoned off into ships not involved in the Battle of the Atlantic. Type 271 was in 236 British warships in May 1942, only fourteen months after it had first gone to sea. It is also interesting to learn that type 268, a 3 cm warning radar developed by the National Research Council of Canada starting in 1942, reached production too late for the war but was eventually widely fitted in the Royal Navy (1600 sets were produced in Canada). Several hundred sets were fitted in merchant ships after the war and its design strongly influenced the early specifications for radars for the Merchant Navy.

Howse buttresses his narrative well with diagrams and appendices. Unfortunately the many excellent photographs have not been well reproduced and are dark and indistinct.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


This book chronicles Allied naval cryptanalysis efforts during the Pacific War with particular reference to the role played by "Ultra" signals intelligence. By mid-1941, Ultra had entered the military lexicon as the code name for all intelligence derived from the decryption of high-grade enemy codes. Deciphering Japanese naval codes was no easy task, as author John Winton makes plain; both the US Navy and the Royal Navy devoted considerable resources to ensure that, throughout the war, a significant amount of Japanese naval transmissions were intercepted, decoded, analyzed and acted upon at both the strategic and tactical levels of operation.

In 1939, the Imperial Japanese Navy introduced a high-grade code termed JN-25 by Allied cryptanalysts which, with occasional upgrading, was used throughout the war, carrying as much as 70 per cent of enciphered Japanese naval traffic. American codebreakers employed at the Combat Information Centre (CIC) on Oahu worked to break the code. Their efforts were spearheaded by Captain J.J. Rochefort, on whom Winton lavishes overdue praise. The first breakthrough occurred in November 1940. Yet, at the time of Pearl Harbor, the cryptanalysts had only been partially successful in deciphering Japanese signals, much less predicting their intentions and actions accurately. This came later.

The American effort evolved into a complex organization gathering and analyzing enormous amounts of radio and signals intelligence. Because of the often vast distances to be covered between Japan and its many naval outposts, the Japanese were forced to transmit in high frequency, which was detectable at long ranges. In the six months following the entry of the United States into the war, Ultra decrypts were almost the only source of intelligence regarding Japanese naval movements. The CIC intercepted and monitored not only the valuable
Fleet Signals but all forms of radio and message traffic. For much of the war, the US Navy used Ultra to read everything from the times and routes of enemy convoy and warship sailings to lists of promotions for junior officers.

Ultra proved such a bonanza of valuable information that at times it could not be converted into operational use lest the Japanese suspect their traffic was being read. Cover stories were sometimes invented to provide a plausible explanation for the bewildering frequency with which American naval or air forces appeared on the scene at a time when the Japanese felt themselves secure. Though their suspicions were aroused occasionally, the Japanese authorities were slow to alter or upgrade their JN-25 code. By May 1942, American listeners were intercepting perhaps 60 per cent of Japanese naval transmissions and decrypting and analyzing some 40 per cent. A lack of time and qualified personnel resulted in most of the thousands of daily Japanese messages remaining unread. In any event, many American countermeasures based on Ultra intelligence were formulated on a series of remarkably accurate educated guesses based on only sketchy appreciations of Japanese intentions. This was especially true during the crucial Battle of Midway since, by the end of May 1942, the Japanese had suddenly introduced a new version of JN-25. Experienced American cryptanalysts were able to deduce Japanese intentions from previous intercepts in what Winton has termed "the most stunning intelligence coup in all naval history." (p.58)

Despite the author's enumeration of many spectacular Ultra-related American (and to a lesser extent, British) tactical successes, such as the post-1942 US submarine offensive against Japanese merchant shipping or the downing of Japanese Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto's plane over Bougainville in April 1943, one is often left less than convinced from Winton's own analysis that Ultra was mainly responsible for many of the other victories he cites, including Coral Sea, Leyte Gulf and the Kamikaze attacks off Okinawa. The case for Ultra being decisive or the catalyst for victory is sometimes difficult to follow in many of the specific actions he describes. Ultra obviously was a key ingredient to victory. Yet American qualitative and quantitative material and technical advantages as well as the use of more conventional intelligence-gathering sources such as submarine and aerial reconnaissance, employing coastwatchers and the mundane task of routine low-grade traffic analysis also had much to do with winning the Pacific War.

What Winton has not done is properly introduce the reader into the world of naval cryptanalysis: the technical details and processes are sketchily explained and the Allies' use of Ultra is not properly situated in either the context of the World War II in general or in terms of the history of cryptanalysis relevant to the Pacific War. He makes no reference to early American pioneers in the field such as H.O. Yardly of "Black Chamber" fame, nor does he even mention the American "Purple" Analogue decoding device. Indeed, most of the work is devoted to plain battle narratives of the major engagements of the Pacific War (annoyingly without tactical maps) which add nothing to existing literature on the subject. Winton's acronym-ridden and jargon-laden text also begs a glossary which is not provided. This book offers a beginning in this interesting field, but a beginning only.

Serge Durflinger
Verdun, Québec


The late Gordon Wallace penned this memoir of his service with the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) of the Royal Navy during World War II; he passed away in 1993 before the book was published. It is a nicely-written account of wartime service.

Wallace initially attempted to join the FAA immediately upon the declaration of war in 1939. Rebuffed, he stayed working at de Havilland as an engineer. He joined the Local Defence Volunteers and eventually, in 1941, managed to join the FAA. His account then proceeds through basic training, Observer's school, and on to his first posting with 831 Sqn.,
F A A. He was an Observer on Fairey Albacores with 831 Sqn., staying with that squadron for more than a year until he was given exchange officer status and seconded to 14 Squadron, RAF, serving as an aircrewman on Blenheim Vs in the closing stages of the North African campaign. Wallace returned to FAA service as an instructor in 1943-44. He went back on operational duty in June 1944, with 812 Squadron, FAA, and was an aircrewman on Fairey Barracudas until the end of the war. He was discharged in 1946, and worked in engineering until retirement in 1987. His service career therefore spanned most of World War II, and he saw service in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, North Africa, and the Far East.

What can be learned from this memoir? First, accounts of everyday life of the combatants are always helpful, and usually disabuse us of any preconceived notions that war is constant action. As Carrier Observer makes clear, life in combat zones is nine-tenths boredom and routine, and one-tenth excitement. In contrast, Wallace's account of training and the civilian's introduction to military life (in this case, the Royal Navy) is at times amusing and never boring. Also helpful are his observations about FAA aircraft. This is important, as the FAA is one of the least-known, and probably the most oddly-equipped of any of the major combat air arms in World War II. Wallace flew on Albacores, Blenheim Vs, and Barracudas, giving him the dubious distinction of flying on some of the most mediocre aircraft of the British armed forces in World War II. Wallace also provides a good discussion of British Admiral James Somerville's tactics in the Indian Ocean vis-à-vis the Japanese Navy in March and April 1942. This is a bit unusual in a memoir, as academic discussions of topics are often avoided in first-person accounts. While some may disagree with his conclusions, Wallace's thesis is worthy of discussion: that the Japanese failure to engage and decisively defeat the British Fleet in the Indian Ocean may have taken away a critical margin of the Japanese which could have been used more effectively at the subsequent battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. Also worthy of note is Wallace's observation that damage caused by German air attacks to HMS Illustrious prevented her from joining HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse in the Far East in late 1941; Wallace avers that Illustrious's air component might have prevented land-based Japanese aircraft from sinking the two British warships.

In all, this is a well-written and entertaining account of life with the FAA in World War II. It is recommended for a wide range of readers.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


In his preface the author candidly admits that this book is a "line shoot" which he has produced purely for the fun of it. Considering that in doing so he must qualify as one of only a tiny minority who have ever had anything positive to say about the Fairey Barracuda aircraft, we must be indebted to him for his initiative.

This is one in a long list of personal accounts that have been flooding onto the market about the experience of servicemen during World War II. Dunstan Hadley enlisted in the Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Navy in 1942 after failing his medical exams at Oxford University. From early days at Lee-on-Solent he progressed to flying training at an RAF station in Cheshire and then was packed off to Canada to 31 Service Flying Training School in Kingston, Ontario where the RAF trained pilots for the Royal Navy. He arrived in Halifax at Christmas 1942 and the weather and new worldliness of it all made quite an impression.

The Canadian interlude was followed by more training in the UK, including carrier deck landings on HMS Ravager. He was then dispatched to the Far East, first to shore stations in India and Ceylon and then aboard HMS Victorious. It was from this carrier that he flew his one
operation as a Barracuda pilot with 822 Squadron against a target on Sumatra. The "Barra"'s days were numbered in the East though, and when the type was withdrawn in late 1944 he found himself being trained as a deck landing officer on escort carriers. In this capacity he took part in strikes against German-held targets in Norway towards the end of the war. He ended his own war with an appointment as Flight Deck Officer in HMS Ocean as she was fitting out for the Pacific; the Japanese must have heard about it and threw in the towel first.

As noted at the outset, Hadley is unusual in that he does not condemn the Barracuda outright as is normally the case. He describes how it could be flown safely at very low speed, its stability in a dive bombing attack, its ability to turn inside contemporary fighters with the use of flaps and how to fly it so as not to blank the control surfaces during the break-away after a torpedo drop. Most other personal accounts point out the type's alarming tendency to spin, shed its wings and generally misbehave.

Apart from these revelations the book truly is a "line shoot" in a very understated British way. Hadley tells his story with a lighthearted touch, although there is no mistaking the various dramatic interludes, usually involving dicey take-offs or deck landings in Barracudas.

There is not much to complain about, given Hadley's intent for the book. Maps of the operational areas would have been useful and one might wish for more of Hadley's own photographs rather than the well-known ones from the FAA Museum which predominate. Canadians might also wish for a sharper-eyed copy editor; while "Monkton" is the way it should have been spelled, the name of our city in New Brunswick is rendered slightly differently.

Christopher Terry
Ottawa, Ontario


Dubbed "Dauntless" by its makers and "Speedy D" by sardonic aviators, the slow but resilient SBD (Scout Bomber by Douglas) was America's sharpest lance in the momentous carrier jousts of 1942. As such, argues Barrett Tillman, it was a crucial element, not only in victory over Japan, but more broadly in the revolution that witnessed the decline of the battleship and the ascendancy of naval aviation. While that general transition has been chronicled many times, an important aspect of it is brightly illuminated in this slim but polished volume, a British version of the 1976 American edition. From inception to museum piece, Tillman charts the complete history of the SBD. The primary focus, however, is squarely on early "flattop" engagements, such as Midway, during which the sturdy Dauntless helped to shift the balance of power in the Pacific. Anxious to refresh fading collective memory, Tillman asserts that the SBD deserves a place in the pantheon of American warbirds at least equal to that enjoyed by the much-romanticized B-17.

To some extent, this work is a self-consciously sentimental journey on the part of one whose father served in SBDs. Happily, however, it never sinks into mere nostalgia. Instead, Tillman constructively uses his filial fascination and his own extensive flying experience to bring a solid body of research often vividly to life. Drawing on naval archives, published sources and personal interviews, he lovingly pieces the record together while preserving a healthy measure of objectivity. Adept at description, he recaptures the confusion, spontaneity and uncertainty of a moment when even the most advanced technology was woefully undependable and luck weighted heavily in the balance. Above all, he reminds us that early carrier campaigns were largely battles of attrition from which even the victors emerged badly mauled. Along the way he is careful to correct a number of exaggerated claims. Yet even when coolly assessed, the relative performance of the Dauntless is impressive. Thus, however slow, the SBD held its own against enemy aircraft including the nimble Zero. More significantly, as spearhead of the naval air arm, it resoundingly demonstrated its final worth. From May to November 1942 the conventional fleet accounted for one Japanese battleship along with one cruiser and eleven destroyers. By contrast, unaided or in company
with torpedo planes, the SBD sunk a battleship, three cruisers, four destroyers and no fewer than six aircraft carriers. Given this and the continuing debate about the impact of strategic bombing, one wonders why Tillman does not expand his thesis to assert that the Dauntless was a more clearly "decisive" weapon than the B-17.

An excellent selection of beautifully reproduced photographs greatly enhances the book. However, a brief appendix might have helped those unfamiliar with the rather arcane terminology favoured by the US Navy. Who, for example, would intuit that "V" stands for "heavier-than-air craft"? As well, aspiring modellers will have to look elsewhere for cut-away drawings, camouflage liveries and cockpit details. Furthermore, the physical and psychological experience of plunging in a Dauntless is perhaps better relayed in Samuel Hynes' autobiographical *Flights of Passage*. Even so, for those seeking an authoritative history of this classic aeroplane and its central role in the Pacific campaigns, Tillman has provided the eminently readable standard source.

James G. Greenlee  
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


This is the history of a very busy destroyer during World War II. The author joined the ship three months before she commissioned in August 1939 in Charleston, South Carolina and remained in her until he was wounded in action off Guadalcanal in October 1943. For those with only a superficial knowledge of the details of the naval war in the Pacific, this book gives real insight into the duties that ships assigned to the US Pacific Fleet were called upon to perform.

The USS Sterett went to sea for the first time as a commissioned ship just as World War II engulfed Europe and the North Atlantic. By the time she decommissioned in New York on 2 November, 1945 she had served on the American east coast, transitted the Panama Canal for the first time in May 1940, then back to the Atlantic a year later for service that took her from the Caribbean to Newfoundland to Iceland and to Scapa Flow in the north of Scotland. During that time she performed all the myriad of duties destroyers are designed to do. She even made a trip as one of the escorts to USS Wasp on a resupply mission to Malta—a very dangerous corner of the world in May 1942! By July 1942 it had returned to the Pacific and was escorting troop transports en route to Tonga and Samoa. Sterett was heavily involved in the invasion of Guadalcanal and the ensuing campaign. At the Third Battle of Savo Island on the night of 12-13 November, 1942, Sterett assisted in sinking a Japanese battleship, damaged a cruiser and sank an enemy destroyer before it could open fire. The American destroyer was heavily damaged in that action but successfully withdrew and survived to fight again. On completion of repairs in San Francisco, Sterett returned to the South Pacific in February 1943 and resumed its duties.

Early in April 1943, while the ship was under air attack, the author was wounded in the arm and had to leave the ship for hospitalization. The rest of his account was therefore assembled painstakingly from information provided by over fifty members of the crew by letter, conversations at reunions, and so on, as well as from the ship's log and other official accounts. The description of the ship's second surface action in Vella Gulf in August 1943 and her experience with kamikaze attacks in early 1945 are particularly interesting. Calhoun elicits and uses such information skilfully, so that it "fits" with the rest of his account. A minor complaint is the lack of maps. One or two simple maps of the operational area would have been useful in understanding the night surface actions.

This book is a good read for anyone interested in what naval service can be like or in war at sea, particularly the US Navy's surface campaigns in the Pacific during World War II. It will be particularly interesting for those who served in USS Sterett - all 832 of them - whose names are listed in an appendix. One gets the feeling that those men must have developed a very strong bond which has endured for fifty years. Service in small ships — especially in
wartime — does that to you!

G.D. Hayes
Sidney, British Columbia


This book chronicles fifty years of United States military activity in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. "Flag follows fishers" reads one headline, an allusion to the New England fishing craft which had long visited the south coast of Newfoundland. With permission of the British government, the United States during World War II erected at Argentia a huge trap for a new kind of fishery, one whose jaws — escort warships and airplanes — reached halfway across the Atlantic to take U-boats. After the war the Argentia base went into a long moratorium as far as active hostilities were concerned, until Washington put it on a list for full de-commissioning in 1994-5.

The author tells a very bare-bones story, based apparently upon something like a station diary, as well as on his own (1969-75) and others' memories. With nearly one-fifth of its pages devoted to pictures, the text provides only a basic chronicle of events and developments since 1940; there is little in the way of commentary or interpretation. The principal judgement expressed is by allocation of space: nearly half the book is devoted to the years of greatest importance, 1940-1946.

Joergensen records quantities like an almanac or a careful keeper of household accounts. Thus we are informed that 115 buildings were demolished in Argentia-Marquise to make room for the American base, that in 1948 there were 3200 Newfoundlanders employed there, and that just before the Korean War the total number of civilians was 628; a figure which rose to 1368 again by 1956. Folklore enlivens these statistics. The first Newfoundlander hired was Bill Warren of Harbour Grace, who proved his mettle by deftly unsticking a truck from mud. Within one nine-day period, three sets of twins arrived at Argentia hospital. Such domestic details are combined during the first part of the book with the exploits of war. Eight months before Pearl Harbor, in April 1941, USS Niblack out of Argentia took the US Navy to war against Germany by attacking, unsuccessfully, a U-boat off Iceland. By the following spring the Newfoundland Americans, all set for flying operations, made escape more difficult for the U-boats. Argentia's first U-boat kills were from the air, in March 1942.

After 1945 operational urgency slackened. Now the enemy became weather, boredom or faulty equipment. In 1958 and again six years later, resupply aircraft arriving from the southward link at Patuxant, Maryland crashed in Placentia Bay with a total of twenty-one killed. Such tragedies all receive a brief mention, as does each change of commanding officer as well as all the notable people who visited the base. The only incident discussed at length is a mid-1980s espionage sensation, when the RCMP and US naval intelligence cooperated to trap and convict an agent trying to help the Soviet Union spy on base facilities as they monitored Soviet naval communications (the Stephen Ratkai affair, pp.90-94).

An important theme during the long period of strategical decline was the interaction of the base with the local community: mercy flights, regattas, fighting floods and fires. Numerous snippets of information enrich understanding of socio-economic conditions. Thus, the University of Maryland taught extension courses at the base; Canadian Forces personnel introduced curling and hockey; an early 1980s hydroponics facility grew vegetables so well that a surplus was shipped to Iceland. Sounds like a great idea, but will it work in Mount Pearl?

Of more interest to readers of this journal is that, from 1946 on, Argentia was headquarters for a wide array of seaward services: ocean weather scouting, rescue, aids to navigation, the International Ice Patrol for which the US Coast Guard had responsibility since the Titanic went down in 1912. By the 1960s these functions had expanded to include flights as far as the polar ice cap, learning to predict ice distribution and characteristics in conjunction with satellite
photography. Even after ice reconnaissance/forecasting was phased out in 1973, important involvement in oceanographic research continued.

Joergensen does not try to evaluate the community, scientific, geopolitical or other aspects of the Argentia experience. Rather, he provides an orderly (ship-shape?) diary of key events, developments and names, in chapters chronologically arranged. Great powers — even declining ones — seldom interpret 99-year leases in anything less than three digits. It is therefore highly unlikely that the story of Americans at Argentia is finished. *Gallantry in action* appears at an important pause in the projection of American power abroad, a competent catalogue of facts which others can mine for metaphor or meaning.

Malcolm MacLeod
Portugal Cove, Newfoundland


In his brief book dealing with Franco-American Naval relations during World War II, Charles W. Koburger divides his study into three interrelated parts: from the armistice of 1940 until the eve of the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa; Operation Torch; from Torch until the end of the war. The first two periods have received attention from other scholars who have provided detailed diplomatic and military studies of the period 1939-1942. Koburger, however, provides a useful synthesis of earlier work.

Perhaps the most important and interesting aspect of *Franco-American Naval Relations* is the discussion of post-Torch developments. Koburger describes how the Americans created an extensive base and command structure in North Africa. Clearing ports, organizing ASW patrols and convoys and preparing for further operations in the Mediterranean was a process fraught with difficulties. French assistance was vital to American efforts. An essentially cooperative relationship quickly evolved between French and American authorities as both sides overcame professional and cultural differences with a minimum of friction. In the summer of 1944 the Allies invaded southern France. By the war's end over a million men and four million tons of supplies entered the Continent via southern French beaches and ports. As in North Africa the French navy greatly facilitated the Allied landing and logistical efforts. The British and Americans, especially the latter, helped the French to reconstitute their navy which had suffered devastating losses between 1940 and 1942. A number of French combatants were repaid in American ship yards, and the French navy received numerous light vessels. The reconstituted *Marine* then played a useful role in both the Atlantic and Mediterranean in 1944 and 1945.

Koburger regards the French navy as an organization run by honourable professionals who managed despite tremendous odds to retain both their honour and high professional standards. This point of view in fact constitutes the book's most significant problem. The definition of honour is an ethical and philosophical issue. Yet without offering a definition of the term, the author presumes that Vichy's naval officer corps was honourable. An equally strong case, could be made that the officers were at best narrow pragmatists who shifted their loyalties to emerge on the winning side. A case could also be made that between 1940 and 1942 the Vichy navy was in effect a pro-Axis force. The role of the Vichy navy blends into the larger debate over the policies and nature of the entire Vichy regime. Some maintain that Vichy preserved order in the Métropole and avoided at least until the end of 1942 the full rigors of German occupation. Vichy also preserved intact most of the French empire. Others, however, argue that a basic goal of the Vichy government was to integrate itself into Hitler's New Order as a junior partner. Moreover Vichy was as antidemocratic as any full-fledged fascist power. Between 1940 and 1942 the Vichy military fought against everybody but the Axis powers.

The debate concerning the role of Vichy and its military will continue. Koburger's book comes down on a particular side and readers should be aware of this fact. They can then separate, if they wish, his interpretative posture from the less controversial and very useful
portions of his study.

Steven Ross
Newport, Rhode Island


Although described as an autobiography, Chief Petty Officer Telegraphist Buckingham's narration is really a memoir, recalling his experiences during twenty-four years in the Royal Navy. In World War II, he served in the destroyer *HMS Havock* in the First Battle of Narvik (1940). Then, after a rather disorganized assignment in Iceland, he joined HM Submarine *P35*, later named *HMS Umbra*, and engaged in dangerous operations in the Mediterranean (1941-43) for which he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. There followed postings to submarine depot ships, particularly *HMS Adamant*, which served operations from Ceylon, Western Australia and Hong Kong.

The author's recollections and reminiscences provide an insight into life in the lower decks during a period of remarkable technical and social transition in the Royal Navy. The title and, more pointedly, the sub-title reflect the theme of the book. Buckingham reacted against overbearing authority and the misuse of power and privilege that he frequently encountered in relations between commissioned officers and the lower deck. He was probably typical of bright non-commissioned officers of his time, adjusting to the evolution of the naval service from labour-intensive units that depended upon an inflexible disciplinary regime to technically advanced units that required a diversity of specialization and a dispersal of individual initiative. Old concepts of giving and executing orders slowly yielded to criteria of appropriateness, common sense and human dignity. In the changing environment, Buckingham, a maverick, struggled against the surviving irrelevancies of the system. Having come through Narvik, he could also question the judgement of commanders whose bravado and derring-do arguably put ships and crews at needless risk. Though this gave him a reputation for being willful and somewhat difficult, Buckingham was recognized as competent, reliable and responsible in carrying out his duties. He did not always find those same attributes in the masters he served.

Writing in the first person, the author expresses himself clearly and candidly. The occasional mixed metaphor that escaped editing and the customary quota of misprints do not significantly detract from the text. The book can be read simply as an interesting chronicle of naval life or, for those concerned with social history, as an account of officer/lower deck attitudes in transition. Surprisingly, Buckingham tells the reader very little of his family life — merely the bare details of his marriage, the problem of getting leave to be home for the birth of his daughter, and the difficulty in finding a home in post-war Britain. He writes in generalities of his trade and may, therefore, disappoint the reader who looks for technical information on naval radio installations and communications operations.

Regrettably, Buckingham died as his book was published. That he had mellowed in the forty years since his honourable discharge from the navy is evident in his admission that most of the officers under whom he had served "weren't so bad after all." Nevertheless, his book affirms that he held fast to the Tightness of his opinions and stood ready to uphold them.

George Schuthe
Ottawa, Ontario


In the foreword to this anthology, a former Vice Chief of the British Defence Staff warns that those who share a concern for the governance of the country, the decline of the armed forces and other symptoms of deeper ailments, will find much to admire and endorse, but they might
also find plenty to provoke and annoy them. Vice Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly, an engineer officer, concluded a long and distinguished career in the Royal Navy as the British Naval Attaché in Washington. He first went to sea in 1932 as a midshipman in HMS Hood. During World War II he had a continuing experience of being bombed, mined, torpedoed and eventually was sunk. He survived to fill a variety of important and demanding appointments in peace time and was retired from the Royal Navy to serve as Director-General of the Defence Intelligence Staff. This was comprised of the three Service Intelligence groups plus economic, scientific and technical intelligence sections. After a second retirement he served on the Civil Service Selection Board and then as Vice Chairman of the Institute for the Study of Conflict.

The Admiral's extensive experience in incredibly varied and important appointments in the Navy and high government positions give weight to his views on a wide variety of subjects. These were preserved in papers, articles, memoranda, speeches and even a sermon, dating back to the mid-1950s. Subjects cover naval and national strategy, officer selection and training, leadership, naval engineering, warship design, the sea bed, the Soviet maritime threat, loss of religious faith, advice to the British Prime Minister, an indictment of the Maastricht Treaty, closer US/UK ties, future world outlook and so on. Correlli Barnett, the naval historian and Keeper of the Churchill Archive in Cambridge, recently asked Admiral Le Bailly if he might have his papers for the Archives. It occurred to the Admiral as he sorted through all the documents he had produced over the years that he should publish a selection with the hope of influencing a national return to the maritime heritage which had made Britain great.

Perhaps this work will revive Britain's maritime interests. Yet to me, the chief value of a collection such as this lies in a different direction. Here are recorded some of the day-by-day opinions and reflections of one who experienced war at sea in almost every aspect and followed this with high naval and civil appointments of exceptional variety. Many of his musings have been overtaken by events and are no longer relevant. But when future historians come to examine the amazing last two thirds of this century, the admiral's papers will be a source of illumination of the thoughts behind some of the decisions taken by those in authority at the time.

There are many nuggets in this work. A speech honouring Lord Nelson is extremely interesting and impressive, but the Remembrance Day Sermon at Rendcomb College I found moving beyond words.

L. B. Jenson
Queensland, Nova Scotia


This book focuses on the history of ML814-Islander, a four-engine Short Sunderland flying boat built in Belfast in 1944, tracing Islander's World War II operations in the Atlantic, through post-war commercial operation in the South Pacific and the Caribbean, to its current home at the Weeks Aviation Museum in Miami. Rich detail is provided by interviews with former aircrew, and many of the photos are as rare as they are excellent.

Smith begins with a description of Islander's Coastal Command anti-submarine operations over the Bay of Biscay and the North Atlantic, followed by a post-war stint with the Royal Norwegian Air Force. After being mothballed in 1946, Islander was purchased by the Royal New Zealand Air Force in 1952, and refitted for service in the Pacific. Islander's RNZAF service mainly involved medical evacuation and scientific flights.

In 1963, Islander was acquired by the Australian airline, Trans-Oceanic Airways, and modified for passenger service. Trans-Oceanic was later taken over by Ansett Flying Boat Services which operated Islander on scheduled flights between Sydney and Lord Howe Island until 1974. These were mainly tourist flights, and Smith manages to capture the romance of idyllic trips by flying boat to exotic South Sea islands. Smith himself is Australian, and regards
the period of Islander's Sydney-Lord Howe flights as the Sunderland's glory days. He provides much detail here, including anecdotes about the flying boat pioneer, Sir Gordon Taylor, who operated a luxury flying boat tourist service to remote islands in the post-war years.

Islander was sold in 1974 to Charles Blair's Antilles Air Boats for passenger operation in the Caribbean, but FAA certification could not be obtained, so the flying boat was stored, then sold to the wealthy British aviation enthusiast, Edward Hulton. The last half of Smith's book chronicles the restoration of Islander to flying condition and its maintenance up to 1992 in the U.K. Smith was heavily involved in this effort, eventually becoming an expert on Sunderland engineering and maintenance. Of particular interest are his accounts of work on Islander at the seaplane base at Marignane Airport in the south of France, and the damage suffered by Islander during the hurricane which struck the south of England in October, 1987. Smith also mentions various abortive schemes to use Islander for passenger flights, including a proposal by the Irish airline, Ryanair to operate excursions from Foynes, where the Trans-Atlantic Short Empire boats had stopped en route to New York during the late 1930s, and a proposal by Orient Express for luxury flights between Venice, Istanbul, Brindisi, and Athens.

Smith concludes his account with the sale of Islander to the Weeks Museum in 1992, where it is being restored to its wartime Coastal Command colours and configuration.

It is difficult to evaluate this book because it is unique. Few, if any, surviving World War II aircraft had careers as colourful as Islander's. Some may find Smith's style a bit wooden, and his obvious omission of detail regarding conflict or personality clashes between Hulton and various personnel involved in Islander's restoration may arouse curiosity. More background on the derivation of the Sunderland from the Empire Flying boats of the 1930s would have been appropriate. But these are minor flaws. Anyone attracted by the majesty and technical ingenuity of the great trans-oceanic flying boats will find this book rewarding.

Dennis A. Bartels
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


These two collections of essays are the second and fourth in what one hopes will be a continuing series aimed at promoting an understanding of the Indian Ocean region in Australia (the first in the series looked at the strategic dimensions of increasing Australian naval involvement in the region, while the third studied the geographical constrictions of the basin). Since the series began nearly five years ago, much has transpired to encourage a broader examination of events in this often overlooked corner of the globe. The recent crisis in the Persian Gulf underscored just one of the several interests of the Western naval democracies in the region, as well as the distances supply lines must extend in order to sustain operations on its littoral. The end of East-West conflict, the onset of global recession and the loss of Subie Bay has hastened the withdrawal of the US Navy from southeast Asian waters. The impact of the re-acceptance of South Africa — with its respectable navy — into the world community remains to be seen.

All of these factors point to the rising influence of regional powers in this ocean farthest from American, or for that matter Russian, reach. In the broadest definition there are some three dozen navies plying its waters. However, by common consensus, only one is worthy of "power" status. In the forty years of its existence, the Indian Navy has struggled to develop an independent capability, to the point where it is now poised to reap the harvest. It is therefore fitting that it should be the specific subject of one of these volumes. Indeed, the obsession with India and its intentions tran-
scends into the other volume, making that more of an underlying theme than the purported "impact of technological advances." The flirtation of the Indian Navy with one such advance—the acquisition, albeit for 'training purposes,' of a Soviet Charlie-class cruise missile-firing nuclear powered submarine— is an ominous portent for international politics in the Indian Ocean.

Within that context, these two groups of essays explore a surprisingly wide variety of issues. The nature of, reasons for, and implications of Indian naval expansion are thoroughly explored, as are themes of broader interest— the possibilities for naval arms limitations agreements, the roles of medium sized fleets, and the actual effectiveness under combat conditions of advanced technology equipment.

As published proceedings go, these are somewhat above the average. Individually, the papers are of a generally high standard, giving an even quality to each volume. The presentation is also good, with supporting tables and endnotes included. The omission of a map of the basin may not be a big point with the intended Australian audience, but would help orient more distant readers, especially if the intent is education. Perhaps a more worrisome observation is that the contributors (several are common to both volumes) are, with only two or three exceptions, from Australia and the United States. The possibility that the perspective is by default somewhat 'Western' is not entirely inapprop­riate, given that the majority of the regional navies were either modelled on that of their Royal Navy colonial masters, or established under British supervision. Nor is there an easy resolution to overcoming the inherent biases, since few of the other concerned nations are known for their promotion of intellectual freedom, and even then their collective suspicions would tend to subvert dispassionate analysis.

These concerns provide all the more reason for outsiders to take an interest in and become informed about the complexities of maritime affairs in the Indian Ocean basin. This series is an excellent contribution to the endeavour.

Richard H. Gimblett
Blackburn Hamlet, Ontario


The title of this work is somewhat misleading. While maritime security issues are raised in the book, it is far from a Corbettian-like product. Rather, it is a compilation of a number of papers given at a 1992 workshop on Australian-Indian Maritime Security. The authors include government officials, naval officers (both retired and active), as well as the usual sampling of political scientists. While this mixture of political, military and academic perspectives gives the book a wide range of topics, there is really no great depth of insight or research in any of the papers. Many, in fact, are general strategic surveys that extend beyond the maritime problems specific to the Indian Ocean. There is some interesting material on the volume of oceanic trade in that region, some interesting comments to support India's case for nuclear weapons, and surveys on the relationship between both Australia and India in relation to China, Japan, Pakistan, Indonesia and Taiwan. The future role of the United States Navy in the region is also mentioned. Yet the end result is a collection of works that will be of interest largely to policy-makers requiring an introduction to the maritime concerns of the area, or to general readers interested in acquiring a very general outline of some of the strategic concerns that India and Australia face in the post-Cold War period. In that respect it may be a useful educational tool for Canadian defence-planners, since it reveals what other middle powers are going through as they come to grips with new security problems.

One of the most disconcerting features of the collection is the frustrating usage of defence scientist jargon. The reader is bombarded with an alphabet-soup of references to MCSBM, MNCO, CSB, CSBM or CBM (to illustrate just a few), all which have something to do with the idea of building trust between nations. If the reader does not keep a running score-card it is possible to forget quite quickly what it is you are reading about. A list of abbreviations would have been helpful for this book.
It also becomes apparent that there is often a conscious effort throughout the articles to avoid confrontation over sensitive issues. Since the objective of the workshop was to further maritime relations between the two nations, that is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, the honesty of Vice Admiral Chopra (Ret'd), former Vice Chief of Naval Staff, Indian Navy, in his discussion of Australian racism towards India, and Dr. Sandy Gordon's forthright explanation of Australia's security needs and its view of Indian strategic concerns is both refreshing and insightful, in that they reveal the tensions underlying the mutual trust that these two nations possess. These tensions are exacerbated by India's possession of nuclear weapons, a topic that is not central to this workshop but one that appears with frequency as a key concern for Australian planners. Australian and Indian panellists all seem to agree that the growth of trade between the two countries is having a soothing affect on their perceptions of one another.

While this is not an expensive paperback, the bulk of the analysis could be obtained from specialist journals, and probably in greater detail. As a collection reflecting the opinions of important India and Australian policy-makers, it obviously has some value, as it does as a brief contemporary strategic survey of the area.

Greg Kennedy
Kingston, Ontario


This is the transcript of a colloquium held in Halifax in June 1993. There were forty-three participants, nineteen of whom presented papers. The participants were admirably chosen to fulfil the aim to: "provide [an] opportunity to bring together...Canadian scholars and analysts presently working on... maritime-related security issues....A select number of international experts were also invited...to add breadth to the discussions...." The organizers hoped to stimulate interest in the political dimensions of the oceans and cooperative maritime security, especially among graduate students, from a uniquely Canadian perspective.

This is a first class addition to the body of Canadian thinking about maritime security. The colloquium admirably reflects this amorphous new age in which we find ourselves. It was wide-ranging, including papers on competing demands for ocean use, boundary disputes, piracy and terrorism at sea, regional security perspectives, conflict resolution and crisis management, and roles of maritime forces in preventing conflict at sea, sanctions, embargoes and blockades, management and containment of regional crises, and peacekeeping monitoring and verification. Vice-Admiral Peter Cairns, Maritime Commander and Keynote Speaker reflected that "We are a country of great innovators and inventors [and] we will need that agility of mind to transcend traditional blinkered ways of considering maritime security."

The section on Emerging Concepts of Conflict Resolution and Crisis Management is particularly enthralling. Professor (Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey) Jan Breemer's "The End of Naval Strategy: Revolutionary Change and the Future of American Sea Power" provides an excellent precis of the true "sea-change" under way in the US Navy, from Mahan's blue-water emphasis on sea control, to today's "fundamental shift away from warfighting on the sea, toward joint operations conducted from the sea." Although the function of navies has always been to enable the projection of force onto other people's land, sea-control has been the US Navy mission for a hundred years, and we are seeing a fundamental shift in emphasis.

A thread running through the colloquium concerns how to tackle armed forces requirements in the absence of a threat as clear as that during the Cold War. In Canada we have not yet come as far as Australia, which now regards the capability of hostile action as threat-ambiguous and sufficient reason to maintain armed forces, whatever the current intentions are.

There is a fascinating piece on Canadian naval expeditionary forces since World War II, picking Korea, the Gulf War and Somalia, all US-led, as case studies. I think the authors have
made unnecessarily gloomy assessments of these cases, and left out the outstanding feature of all three. The gloom relates to the relatively small influence that resulted from these Canadian naval operations, even though the operations represented a major effort by the small Canadian Navy. In my view, "influence" is a flawed objective. Influence is largely a by-product of effort, and it is futile to make big efforts solely for that purpose. We took part in the operations at a level which helped the objectives of the operations to be achieved. The outstanding feature of all three of the cases studied was the capacity, consistently displayed by the Canadian Navy, to deal extremely effectively with unusual situations. Each of the three expeditionary force operations was unique. The requirements for each were unpredicted, and the required operations — such as train-busting in Korea, inshore operations under missile threat in the Gulf, and extended administrative and logistic support of shore forces off the coast of Somalia — were not specifically included in naval planning, but all the required missions were performed with cheerful competence.

I remain convinced that naval forces should have as much general-purposefulness as possible built into them — and this does not mean into each unit — in order to cope with the consistently unpredictable future.

This offering by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies is a pleasure to read, not least because its participants use plain English. It can be equally interesting both to serious students of naval affairs, and to interested laymen.

Dan Mainguy
Ottawa, Ontario


This report of global war games (GWG) played annually between 1979 and 1983 is of interest for what it reveals about the state of American naval strategic thinking. Using war gaming simulation, the series was intended "to explore warfighting issues and to provide a larger perspective than the tactical view that was prevalent in the Navy at that time." (p.vii) However, the book seems to justify the criticism of gaming and systems analysis as a basis for strategic doctrine by such early pioneers of operations research as Blackett and Zuckerman, namely that an increasingly sophisticated method of analysis was being applied to a scenario of too many variables and within a crude political framework. Moreover, the report's publication as an important contribution to the strategic debate of the 1990s is suspect, since it appears four years after the Warsaw pact collapsed without recourse to war, in contradiction to a major premise of the games. Where else was the intelligence, on which Red play was based, so overtaken by events, and how have the conclusions been invalidated?

The report suggests that the most important contribution of the GWG series was to promote the process within the military establishment of questioning previously accepted "truths". These were: 1) a war between the United States and the Soviet Union would "automatically" go nuclear; 2) defence of Europe without nuclear weapons was impossible; 3) a barrier across the Greenland/Iceland/UK gap was essential for the safety of trans-Atlantic shipping; 4) aircraft carrier battle groups could not survive in the Mediterranean; and 5) amphibious warfare had no role in superpower conflict, (p.60) In light of the first "shattered truth," vehemence of establishment opposition to the 1982 "No First Use" proposal is interesting. Second, the "discovery" that tactical nuclear weapons were not used in the GWG defence of the central European front is a reflection of the general reluctance to escalate war to the nuclear level. It also rediscovers the anomalous position of those weapons within the deterrence structure, and the difficulty of identifying suitable targets. The third rediscovers the experience of the Napoleonic wars. The fourth conclusion is easily challenged on the basis of the limitations of simulation and because some integral assumptions were since proven false. The last, that amphibious warfare had a role in superpower conflict, is twice flawed. First, the discovery of a role for the marines appeared to be an objective, and second,
the very limited Gulf conflict clearly showed that the risks attendant to an amphibious assault were too high.

This report reveals a lamentable condition of thought and understanding about the role of maritime forces at sea. The gaming methodology has possibly been pushed beyond its useful limits. The lack of an understanding of maritime war based on historical experience is noticeable. It remains to be seen in the reports of the follow-on series whether these shortcomings were resolved. The purpose of this first series was to initiate study and questioning, and therein lies its import. The US Naval War College has since hosted two conferences to examine the strategic thought of Mahan and also of Corbett and Richmond. If the incentive for these conferences can be attributed to the global war games, they have achieved a contribution to strategic debate far beyond the merit of the report.

It is only natural that as horizons are broadened beyond "the limited tactical view," so the scale and number of new questions needing answers will expand. This report vividly illustrates how difficult it is to translate maritime strategic theory into sailing orders for ships. Its deficiencies emphasize how important it is for all related academic communities to engage vigorously in the discussion. The substance of this report makes it clear it is far too important to be left to the uniformed — and perhaps ununiformed — community alone. As Canada has been "a long-standing participant" in the GWG series, members of CNRS, Canada's only dedicated maritime research association, ought to be concerned about the status of a maritime strategic debate which could have important ramifications for Canada. The health and condition of our maritime debate must also be questioned.

William Glover
Ottawa, Ontario


Another year, another issue of this prestigious annual. As usual, the Foreword is a comprehensive review of the state of the world's navies. The western powers continue to reduce their forces. The ships that the US Navy is decommissioning this year would constitute a navy larger than any other except Russia's; yet the US fleet remains incomparably strong and capable of projecting overwhelming force anywhere in the world. The medium-sized navies of Britain, France, Spain and Italy can all muster modern fleets as all old ships have been deleted. The same is true of smaller NATO forces like the Netherlands and Germany. (It would be nice to say the same thing about Canada, but our antiquated submarines and failing helicopters are a dismal contrast to our modern surface ships). Many navies, especially in the eastern Mediterranean, are benefiting from the US Navy run-down with leased Knox class frigates replacing older vessels.

South America shows little change and the Indian navy seems to be in a stable period. It is in East Asia that expansion is evident. China is becoming more active in the South China Sea where large oil resources may lie. Japan has a large fleet, though lacking big ships or amphibious capability, and the South Koreans are expanding theirs. In the southern region, Indonesia has purchased practically all of the remaining ships of the old East German navy, adding to an already very mixed bag. Thailand has ordered a Spanish-type light aircraft carrier and Malaysia is in the market for smaller patrol craft. Germany and Spain are the most successful exporters of new warships to third world navies.

This leaves the Russian Navy which is pulling itself together and looking to the future. The sole operational carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, has been carrying out fixed-wing aircraft trials but the Admiral Gorshkov will just be a helicopter carrier when her serious fire damage is repaired. Follow-on submarine, destroyer and frigate types are being brought along in small numbers and the last of the nuclear-powered Kirovs, the Petr Veliky will be completed. (All these ships have now been given names familiar in the Imperial Navy of the past) Submarines and smaller ships suitable for export have not been overlooked. The Soviets have learned from limited co-operation with western powers and observing multi-national operations such as the Gulf and can be expected to upgrade their
methods of command and control and the training of their personnel.

The standard of photographs and plans is as high as ever. For those familiar with older *Jane's* it might be pointed out that, for the last few years, it has been the policy to put all the information on a class either on one page or on two facing pages. This makes for easy reference but has a disadvantage in that the progression of design changes is not readily apparent, as the most recently built ships do not necessarily come first. There is a section on the rank insignia of various navies. Some seem to have rather more ranks than ships: Zaire, for instance, with a navy about one tenth the size of the fleet of the Hong Kong Police, has ranks right up to Admiral of the Fleet or, at least, insignia for them! The advertisements continue to be of interest and contain some of the best photographs, usually in colour. *Jane’s* is, as always, an authoritative and comprehensive reference book on the world's navies.

Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


July 1, 1995 will be the centenary of the commencement of Joshua Slocum's renowned single-handed voyage around the world in the 36-foot sloop *Spray*. To mark the occasion this book, first published in 1950, has been reprinted as a paperback.

Today's readers looking for a detailed account of that three-year voyage should look elsewhere. This book, written by Slocum's eldest son, is chiefly about Joshua's adventures before he gained world-wide fame. Only the final chapter describes his most famous voyage, and that briefly. Nevertheless this publication is not lacking in tales of danger both on land and at sea.

Acknowledging his father's birth and upbringing in Nova Scotia, Victor notes that Joshua's sea-going career began at age sixteen. At eighteen he was second mate; at twenty-five he had his first command. The "Captain," as his son calls him, served variously as a Pacific fisherman, ship-builder and timber trader. In command of the 332-ton barque *Washington* he carried general cargo from San Francisco to Australia, where he acquired a wife but lost his ship when she dragged her anchor in Cook Inlet and ran aground. Other commands followed in quick succession: the 362-ton barquentine *Constitution*, the packet *B. Aymar*, the schooner *Pato*, the 400-ton ship *Amethyst*, and the three-decked *Northern Light*. In all these endeavours he was accompanied by his wife and eventually two sons.

Many hair-raising incidents are described in detail and with much digression. Readers are also introduced to a mixed bag of characters, from mutinous crew to hostile jungle natives. The latter, so we are led to believe, were repelled by spreading carpet tacks on the deck! On the other hand, the "Captain" could be the picture of altruism to the missionaries he encountered. Joshua Slocum's career took another turn when he moved to the east coast where he bought and commanded *the Aquideck* (365 tons) and employed her trading to various South American ports. A grounding on a sand bar off Paranagua, Brazil abruptly ended this venture. Left to their own devices, the Slocum family constructed a 35-foot sampan-style craft and sailed 5,510 miles back to Washington. This remarkable fifty-three-day voyage with its many vicissitudes, told in Joshua Slocum's own words, appears to be the last in which he was accompanied by any member of his family.

In 1893 Slocum switched from sail to command the power-driven *Destroyer*. It is interesting to note that this semi-undersea craft was equipped with bow thrusters and armed with primitive torpedoes. What she lacked was sufficient bunker capacity to reach Brazil under her own power, so that she had to be towed to her destination. Upon arrival, under Slocum's command, the vessel was engaged briefly in a civil war.

These adventures all occurred before the voyage that brought Slocum such fame. His son provides a detailed account of the building of the *Spray*, complete with stability factors and
sail plan which the author claims contributed to the success of the circumglobal voyage. Yet that adventure is given only a scant description in the final chapter.

Joshua Slocum has been the subject of much debate over the years. Admirers who do not already possess this book will delight in this treatment of his early life. Detractors, on the other hand, will find much to criticize. Professional navigators, even of that era, might quarrel with Slocum’s accuracy. Newcomers to the subject will undoubtedly have their credulity tested. However, in the days of faxed weather up-dates, autopilots, GPS navigators, Chichester and Whitbread Round the World races, this publication has some historic value. It does provide a glimpse of family life at sea — an area of nautical study frequently overlooked.

Gregory P. Pritchard
Blue Rocks, Nova Scotia


In *Sailing Past*, Renee Waite has attempted to compile an anthology of anecdotes and the advice offered to amateur sailors from yachting books and journals published between the 1850s and the 1950s, casting off with a quotation from 1786! To accomplish this ingenious task, she has drawn upon the writings of fifty-six authors of seventy-six books and magazine articles, and selected 107 quotations.

This selection is clearly uneven, as the majority of the quotations are taken from the 1930s, only one from the 1850s, and only two each from the 1870s and 1950s. Thus, an opportunity to illustrate as well some of the historical and developmental aspects of a century of sailing has been missed. The excerpts chosen are not in the chronological order of the publications from which they are taken, but are more or less grouped according to subject. Some of these subjects include buying the boat, fitting out, anchoring, dealing with the crew, dress, etiquette for guests, cooking, the pros and cons of lady passengers, avoiding big ships, yacht clubs, sickness and injuries, and the answer to the problem of everlasting youth. The quotations would have been more interesting and satisfying to this reviewer had they been presented in sequential order. The compiler might also have attempted, in her choice of instructions, warnings, and advice offered to sailors, to allude to the changing recreational boating scene from its golden days in the nineteenth century to its explosive growth and democratization since 1945. One could perhaps better appreciate this slim volume if one were equipped with a British — or dated — sense of humour. However, the booklet is rescued somewhat by the many delightful and humorous drawings by Keith Waite, cartoonist for The Times, and by a useful bibliography and index to the authors.

Contrary to the jacket blurb, the compiler has neither "plunged deeply into this literature" nor "emerged with a treasury." Given the great quantity of material available, even a brief story of sailing in the past deserves better than this. For a friend who had invited one to be a guest on his first boat, this might be an appropriate gift; otherwise, "sail past" this one.

Peter Edwards
Toronto, Ontario