val battle. Britain’s decision to not play into Germany’s hand by implementing a “distant blockade” instead of a close blockade also upset Tirpitz’s battle plans for Germany’s battle fleet. Consequently, Germany’s only offensive naval weapon of consequence was the U-boat.

At the time, submarines were expected to comply with the rules of naval warfare as detailed in The Hague Convention and the rules of International Prize Law. Being forced to surface and order ships to stop for inspection exposed submarines to many dangers. Strangely enough, as the author argues, German U-boats working in the Mediterranean Sea were quite successful in carrying out this type of trade war. A certain clique within the German Navy, however, refused to believe that what worked in the Mediterranean could work in the North Atlantic. Overall, the author convincingly portrays the ebb and flow of the drive for unrestricted submarine warfare within Imperial Germany.

In general, this work exposes the reader to a number of seminal, if not revolutionary, interpretations of German U-boat warfare during the First World War. His main thesis is that a small group of German naval and army officers, as well as government officials, deliberately worked against the wishes of the Kaiser. According to him, they went out of their way to manipulate the Kaiser into waging unrestricted U-boat warfare, falsified data on U-boat successes, and even welcomed bringing the US into the war. It should be noted that the list of unexpected interpretations and arguments presented here is not limited to this main theme. They run the gambit from which navy first introduced the convoy system in this conflict to how close the Kaiser’s U-boats actually came to bankrupting England, even before unrestricted submarine warfare was declared.

Suffice it to say, many of the author’s interpretations and arguments will challenge the accepted perceptions of the reader. Overall, this is a well-researched and convincingly argued volume. Indeed, the author’s viewpoints are perhaps at least as eye opening for this topic as those that were espoused by Fritz Fischer in his work on Germany’s war aims and subsequent books on Germany during the First World War. This is highly recommended work that should find its ways on the bookshelves of twentieth-century European and naval historians alike.

Peter K. H. Mispelkamp
Pointe Clare, Quebec


Here is a fresh look at the River Thames and London’s maritime world in the age of Cook and Nelson, which we take to mean from the mid-1700s to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. This was an era of war, or preparation for war. The tidal river flows ceaselessly back and forth, bringing the wealth of the world to the wharves and doorsteps of London and taking at the same time and in exchange the riches of the land, in peoples, skills, foodstuffs, industrial goods, navigational instruments, and items of knowledge such as charts and books. The Thames, even yet, is a water on ceaseless change. Daniel Defoe talked about the river as a silver one, and by that he meant revenue and commerce, wealth and power. London, at the time, was
the largest European city, and it had all the infrastructure right to hand, close as it was to Westminster where the political power lay and the City of London, the greatest concentration of financial wealth and managerial techniques in the United Kingdom, if not the world. And the whole lay close to Antwerp and the ports of Europe across the English Channel, with links to the Baltic, the Mediterranean, the North Sea and indeed all the seas of the world.

London, therefore, was the nexus. It held the world in its fee. The early Tudors were slow to grasp the opportunities afforded by salt water but by the seventeenth century and under the reign of Queen Anne a global empire had been achieved—and grew in spite of attempts to curtail formal growth. The Royal Navy was the prime force of the British economy; Britain was a militant state, and its navy the enabler of expansion, the protector of trade, and the guarantor of foreign policy. And we are reminded, when reading herein of Elizabeth Cook and Elizabeth Blight (sadly Emma, Lady Hamilton doesn’t get a nod), that families were part and parcel of this global expansion and network.

The whole was fueled by war, and the wars were reactions to foreign interference on the high seas or on the margins of where the Union Jack already flew. The British state of the eighteenth century was unlike any other in the world, then or later. And it depended on the one river and on what happened in the world and on its shores. Pillaging, theft and crime were rife in this hub of riches and notorious pubs, too, now of heritage status. Churches and almshouses abounded. The river not only drained the extensive and rich Thames Valley, but had links by tributary canals to the heartland of Industrial England. On the upper reaches of the Thames, at Teddington, for instance, small shipbuild-
sweeping aside the old, and doing so in the form of the Docklands project. The shipping and warehousing may have disappeared, the hewing and quartering, and all the heavy lifting. But still the throbbing heart of global commerce, insurance and finance lay headquartered on the immediate shores of the Thames.

There is a romance to this that Peter Ackroyd missed, but now we have it in Margarete Lincoln’s treasured book. The many illustrations, extensive bibliography, and index combine with the delightful and edifying text to open to us a world we had lost but are now happily recovering.

Barry Gough
Victoria, British Columbia


One iconic image from the high Cold War years 1960-85 is of an intercontinental ballistic missile bursting out of the sea to ignite and race on its high-arc way to rain thermonuclear catastrophe on the enemy, be it the U.S. or Soviet Union. But years before the ballistic missile, first the U.S. and then the U.S.S.R. had developed initially short-range cruise missiles (i.e. guided from launch to target) carrying conventional, and then nuclear, warheads. The introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the arsenals of both powers did not terminate cruise missile programs but enhanced them.

This is the absorbing story that Polmar and Connell tell in some 165 pages of text and a half-dozen appendices. As with all of Polmar’s books, Strike from the Sea rests on formidable scholarship, mastery of the material and an engaging writing style. It is a tale that the specialist will relish and continue to consult, while the general reader will obtain an education in a key weapon system that in many ways shaped Cold War strategies and has emerged once again in the hands of the Russian Federation Navy (RFN).

Even as German “buzz bombs” rained down on hapless London in the summer of 1944, America’s Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, grasped the potential of rockets as future naval weapons. From 1946 on, American scientists worked assiduously to develop and elaborate both cruise missile technology and the surface and subsurface vehicles to deploy them both in a land attack and anti-ship configuration. Soviet naval strategists and scientists were no less aware of the possibilities of cruise missiles employed in tandem with submarine torpedoes and, just as promptly, began their own development programs in the early Cold War years. Thereafter, both sides advanced developments in near-lock step, with America’s initial “Regulus” program matched by a Soviet missile system designated “Shaddock” by NATO observers. Between 1956 and 1964, the Soviet program was hobbled by Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s general disinterest in pursuing advanced naval technologies, preferring land-based assault/deterrent programs. But after his overthrow, Navy chief Admiral Sergey Gorshkov was able to pursue a vigorous naval buildup in which sea-based missiles of both strategic- and cruise-missiles played a prominent role.

From the outset, the U.S. and Soviet navies equipped both surface ships and surfaced submarines with cruise