BOOK REVIEWS


The 1990s have been heralded by the publication in North America of three surveys of maritime museums. While some might assume this to be a reflection of the health and vitality of our maritime heritage, professionals within the museum world know these to be difficult times. Still, the very number of institutions represented is impressive and certainly reflects the relative popularity of museums and historic sites concerned with shipping in all its forms. Moreover, the arrival of these volumes can be seen both as the fulfillment of a need and as a cause for hope, namely that these works will facilitate and promote visitation, interest and greater public support.

Of these three books, *The Naval Institute Press Guide* by Robert Smith and *Sea History's Guide* by Joseph Stanford are similar in format and content. Each provides basic information about locations, facilities, themes, collections and admissions. Each is illustrated with small-format photographs, though Stanford's does so more generously and consistently. On the whole, the *Sea History Guide* seems better organized and more practical than the *Naval Institute Press* version, for it is printed on coated stock and is also considerably smaller, about half the size of the *Naval Institute* effort. To me, this is a virtue in any carry-along guide book, provided, of course, that the essential information is contained within its covers. In this respect, the *Sea History Guide* does not fail. In addition to the listings, there is a foreword by John Carter, one of America's leading maritime museum directors, as well as a research guide in the form of an afterword by David Hull, Principal Librarian of the San Francisco Maritime National Historic Park.

The *Sea History Guide* achieves its economy of space partly by its very dense print and lay-out (those unhappy with this will prefer the more spacious presentation of the *Naval Institute Guide*) and partly by a tiered approach: larger more important institutions receive a full listing and photograph, while smaller sites are given a short summary. By contrast, *The Naval Institute*
Guide uses the same format for each site listed. This will please those who feel that the value and virtues of smaller institutions are too often overlooked. On these grounds, Canadian readers should be displeased with the fact that the Sea History Guide relegates all Canadian museums to second tier status and only provides photographs for the two main Nova Scotia listings. This sort of bias is common enough and it is easy to imagine the reasons which might be offered in explanation. Nevertheless, surely Sea History could try a little harder when the adjective "Canadian" is featured so prominently on its cover! This treatment as an afterthought is also evident in the introductions of both guides which, aside from various references to the universal importance of the sea, provides contexts which are unmistakably American. No doubt the usual pragmatic considerations apply, but John Carter, as Vice-President of the International Congress of Maritime Museums, should know better. Ultimately, the best solution would be for Canadians simply to produce their own guide, something which would be a most appropriate project for the publishers of this journal.

Great Maritime Museums of the World is also intended as a survey and source of information for the avid visitor of maritime museums, but otherwise stands entirely apart from the other guides. It is a coffee table book, in both the best and worst sense. With its attractive design, large format, hard cover, colour images and international scope, it is aimed at the connoisseur and is intended to be savoured at home rather than kept at hand. Yet, like many books of this sort, it deals with its subject matter in a superficial and uncritical manner. Thus, nowhere do the editors explain what makes a maritime museum great. Nor is the history of this particular species of museum, or the challenges which they face today, discussed. Similarly, the contribution of museums to our knowledge of maritime history is not explored.

Most of the largest, oldest and best known maritime museums appear in this book, though beyond that the selection of institutions appears rather arbitrary (where, for example, is the Peabody Museum of Salem, Massachusetts?) This is perhaps explained by the fact that the book was organized and produced by a kind of joint venture arrangement with the various participants. The Canadian museums that appear are the Vancouver Maritime Museum, the Maritime Museum of the Atlantic in Halifax and the Fisheries Museum of the Atlantic in Lunenburg. Each institution is represented by an employee, usually the director. The result is a thinly disguised, extended promotional brochure. While each author approached the task with an individual style, the tone is almost invariably upbeat and descriptive, as one would expect in an advertisement. This approach has obvious utility and the information provided will undoubtedly be of interest to many maritime enthusiasts. Nevertheless, the book does little to challenge the reader or inform him or her of any limitations or deficiencies. It is a truism that one ought not to criticize a book for what it does not attempt to do, but in this case one can fairly argue that the intention of the book, like the criteria for selection, is never very clearly defined.

As a celebration of the wealth of maritime collections and the institutions that contain and preserve them, Great Maritime Museums of the World certainly has its merits and will no doubt please anyone who, in the words of Walter Cronkite quoted on the dust-jacket, seeks "another volume over which those of us enamored of the sea can dream." Whether or not evoking such dreams will ultimately
serve the best interests of our maritime heritage, however, remains to be seen.

Garth Wilson
Ottawa, Ontario


This practical handbook is intended to guide both layman and professional in planning for the preservation of historic maritime resources. These include large vessels, small craft, shipwrecks and hulks, aids to navigation, maritime facilities (sites, buildings, objects, water's edge) and living traditions.

The handbook was developed to meet a perceived need for practical aids in gathering data on maritime heritage that was missing from the planning processes of local, state and federal governments. In proposing a planning model, the book evolves a traditional community planning approach into a more specialized focus on the marine components of a community or area. This type of approach is familiar to planners of historic sites and would easily be adapted to a Canadian milieu. In provinces or communities without a tradition of planning of historic resources this publication also acts as a short-course in the approaches that can be taken.

This is a reference text; three main sections cover "Creating The Plan," "Getting The Facts" and "Taking Action." After an example set of inventory forms, a pilot study carried out in Gloucester, Massachusetts is included to illustrate the use of techniques discussed earlier in the text.

The forms are set up for a manual access to information. If the results of the inventory process have been extensive, these will result in an overload of data which cannot be easily analyzed. The publication does not venture into the area of automated data storage and retrieval, but a skilled historic resource planner could develop a database to serve this purpose.

Considering that this paper is also the proposal of a planning model, more definitive information concerning the form and degree of completeness of the data being inventoried would have been useful. The pilot study helps to put the usage of the system in a practical context but the examples in the pilot study are not necessarily complete and it could be frustrating for a user who is attempting to use it as a reference text not to have the information at the fingertips.

Since the inventorying and planning of marine resources is now gathering attention from heritage, cultural and business interests, this publication makes a positive and useful contribution to the structuring of projects and maintenance of resource inventories. Planning always works best as a "grass-roots" exercise and the tools offered here allow citizen participation as well as NGOs and government agencies.

John M. MacFarlane
Victoria, British Columbia


Microform may be an "unloved format," in D.J. Munro's words, yet it has compensations in respect of time and effort. Most
readers of this journal have probably reaped the benefits at some point in their research. The greatest convenience is to have microform and reader immediately to hand-in office or home. Alas, this guide will not facilitate the labours of those who have turned research into a "cottage industry" since it is not a listing of microforms available for purchase from British repositories, but rather of those which can be consulted in situ in London. A trip across the North Atlantic is still required, but to go forearmed with the information of "what is where" is a definite advantage.

The guide covers microform holdings of historical materials found in the libraries of the University of London and in the national, polytechnic and special research libraries of Greater London. The provenance of the original material is, of course, very much wider: indeed, it can be claimed to span the globe—hence the convenience of the central London location to the visiting researcher. The range and scope of the material is impressive. Munro's careful categorization into thirty-seven geographical/subject sections (from African Studies to Women's History) charts a way around, but the greater delight to the curious-minded are the three indexes which follow the detailed listings. Indexes to Title; Provenance; Name and Subject are particularly useful to maritime researchers whose searches frequently straddle regional and disciplinary boundaries.

Naval and maritime history claims one distinct category. Many entries will already be familiar to specialists: half of the thirty listings alone relate to National Maritime Museum microfilms. It may be that the greater number of "surprises" exist under other headings—Imperial, Military, Travel and Exploration, Science and Medicine, Official Publications, for example. Perusal of the full listings is strongly recommended, particularly when planning a research trip to London. After all, as the rate of production of original documents slows with further staff cuts at repositories such as the Public Record Office, contingency plans are increasingly necessary. Knowing where microform material is available may be a blessing to the frustrated researcher.

Valerie Burton
St. John's, Newfoundland


This book was conceived and initiated while the editor was a Research Fellow at the Marine Policy Center of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. It is an interdisciplinary volume of research into Soviet and Russian interests in the maritime arctic region presented in four parts: Part I looks at exploration, past and present; Part II examines Man and the natural setting; Part III deals with challenges of marine and river transport; Part IV offers legal and geopolitical perspectives. Numerous maps, diagrams and photographs together with a comprehensive index serve the reader well. A foreword by the Director of the Marine Policy Center insists that the book must be read within the context of the continuing political and economic upheavals whose magnitude seems to be building on an almost daily basis. How true. With the demise of the USSR, one could be tempted to dismiss the volume as overtaken by events. This would be a mistake.

The first three parts are unique in that the western point of view expressed in eight
The role of traditional expressive culture in the articulation of identity has been among the central concerns of folklore studies over the last number of years. As the result of a recent change of editorial policy, Canadian Folklore Canadien, the journal of the Folklore Studies Association of Canada, has been able to focus attention directly upon this question in the first of a series of thematically-defined special issues.

As its title suggests, this volume examines various aspects of the ways in which an affiliation to marine occupations has been, and continues to be, expressed through the genres of oral and customary tradition, from song to prose narrative and blason-populaire. In keeping with the interdisciplinary history of folklore studies, particularly in Canada, the contributors include not only folklorists but anthropologists and social historians. Essays range from semantic and symbolic textual analyses to more straightforward documentary social history. Thus, the diversity of subjects and approaches embodied in this compilation supports Laurier Turgeon's introduction which discusses ways in which identities may be variously constructed and modes of group representation undergo change through time, and stresses the need for both diachronic and synchronic analyses fashioned from a variety of methodological and theoretical perspectives.

Two essays—by Janet Gilmore on fishermen stereotypes in the United States and by Alain Cabantous on emic and etic views of seamen in early-modern France—show that seamen see themselves differently from those around them by focusing on cultural stereotyping which is evident in both narrative and conversational discourse and which forms the basis of the distinctive traditional speech genre that folklorists term the blason-populaire. The essays illustrate the continuing relevance of William Jansen's seminal notion of the "esoteric-exoteric" factor in folklore (Fabula II[1959]: 205-211). Both expand upon traditional
views of the integrative functions of folklore to consider its role in competitive discourse between groups.

Laurier Turgeon and Denis Dickner study factors that shaped the diet of sixteenth century French fishermen in Newfoundland. They acknowledge contemporary foodways literature which emphasizes the role of food in forming and proclaiming ethnic and other group identities: through a variety of historical evidence, they investigate the relative importance of cultural choice and material necessity in the evolution of a distinctive marine food complex.

That maritime identity leads to musical utterance is the contention of two essays on seafaring songs. James Moreira's study of the songs of nineteenth century British and American merchant seamen focuses upon their use of spatial imagery. He shows that the songs themselves as well as their references to place become fully meaningful only when viewed in the light of the cultural values and experiences of the occupational group itself. David Taylor's examination of contemporary fishing songs from the United States reinforces this point. Taylor concentrates on the ongoing impulse for the members of maritime communities to create and perform songs about life at sea in the face of dramatic changes in marine work and culture.

One may be forgiven for questioning the inclusion of the two essays that conclude this special issue, for neither has any specific folkloric content. Raoul Andersen's account of the health and injury problems of American fishermen on the Grand Banks is a thorough but straightforward piece of historical reportage based upon US consular despatches from Newfoundland during the second half of the nineteenth century. Aliette Geisdoerfer describes the decline of fishing communities in St. Pierre and Miquelon after the islands' utility as a fishing station for metropolitan France was diminished by technological advances in the fishery during the first half of this century. It is primarily a work of descriptive social history.

Of course, detailed social history is a necessary component of sound ethnography and the approach which characterizes the majority of the essays in this collection is one in which the cultural significance of folkloric materials is assessed in the light of available ethnographic data. In any event this volume should be of general interest to marine researchers, for it illustrates the variety and richness of sources available for the reconstruction of the attitudes and worldviews of maritime communities.

John Ashton
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


Lake Erie Fishermen is based on interviews conducted between 1983 and 1985 with thirty-five individuals, fishermen, their wives, and fish house owners, who were or had been active in Ohio's Lake Erie fishery. The book gives the fishermen's view of their occupation as much as possible in their own words and relates it to occupational folklore.

In this way, the book carefully develops a self-portrait of tough, capable men linked by common traditions, family ties, skills, shared dangers and hard work. Most were drawn to the work by the independence it offered and a love of the outdoors. They define themselves in terms of their work experience; they also respond to the
unfavourable opinion of some of their non-fishing neighbours who view them as lazy, dirty, alcoholics who threaten Ohio's important sport fishing industry.

Conflict between the sport and commercial fisheries is a major theme in the book. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Ohio boasted the largest freshwater fishery in the world. By 1950 that industry suffered from the combined effects of pollution and overfishing. Since then, Ohio’s commercial fishery has been increasingly restricted in favour of the lucrative sport fishing industry; since 1972 commercial fishermen have not been allowed to take walleye; in 1984 all gill-net fishing was banned. Now only seining and trap-net fishing are allowed and new licences are no longer issued. Predictably many fishermen hark back to a golden age when there were more fish, fewer regulations, and a cleaner lake; environmental degradation is a subtext which runs through much of the book but it never emerges as a major issue.

The authors set the fishermen's experiences in the context of folklore studies. Thus they note that, like members of many other occupational groups, commercial fishermen develop a collective identity through stories about their lives. These stories, of storms and danger, of brushes with the law, and of feats of strength and skill, lend human interest to *Lake Erie Fishermen*. They also provide useful information about fishing practices. But technical information is only incidental to the book’s goal. It is about attitudes to a way of life and how those attitudes are formed, not about the techniques of an occupation.

The folklore approach of allowing the fishermen to speak for themselves does not allow the authors to provide as much historical or economic context as an historian would like. Thus, there is only a passing analysis of the political factors which led the Ohio government to favour sports fishing over commercial fishing and no analysis of the economic factors which may have influenced the decision. Some matters deserve better explanation. To take a Canadian example, Ohio fishermen resent the fact that they are not allowed to catch walleye but Canadian fishermen are, and in fact export them to markets in Ohio. The inequity of the situation is clear, but justice to the Canadian fishermen requires some background. In 1972 when international quotas were established for the walleye fishery, Ontario allocated its portion to commercial fishermen and Ohio allocated its portion to sports fishermen. The Ohio fishermen’s problem is with their own government, not with Canadian regulations.

Unless dramatic changes occur in government policy, the fishermen interviewed for this book are probably the last generation of Ohio commercial fishermen. Commercial fisheries elsewhere are also under pressure from pollution and from sports fishermen; whether they will survive is not yet clear. The authors have performed a major service in compiling a record of a way of life which is under threat; their book and the records of their research will be an important source when the history of the Great Lakes fisheries is written.

A. B. McCullough
Ottawa, Ontario


In May 1982, while doing research on the Newfoundland Fishermen, Food and Allied Workers’ Union, I interviewed Gilles Theriault, Executive Secretary of the Mari-
time Fishermen's Union, in Shediac, New Brunswick. He was in good spirits: a couple of weeks before, the MFU had celebrated a major breakthrough when the provincial government passed legislation permitting collective bargaining for inshore fishermen.

It had not happened overnight. Ten years earlier, Thériault was a community worker with a regional development council in southeast New Brunswick. Among the community groups with which he worked were small associations of inshore fishermen, some of whom were becoming increasingly conscious of their lack of power in a rapidly changing industry. They began to work toward a larger organization that would have "a word to say" about the price of fish and the organization of the fishery. At first they intended to gain collective bargaining rights and then form a union. In 1977, still without the former, they formed the Maritime Fishermen's Union and continued a long struggle of demonstrations, confrontations, negotiation and lobbying.

The organizers had visited Newfoundland and British Columbia, the other two jurisdictions where inshore fishermen were unionized, and had offers of mergers and affiliations, but they were determined to go it alone. When I interviewed him in 1982, Thériault placed the MFU's membership at about two thousand of a possible 12-15,000 in the Maritimes, of whom only about five hundred had paid the $72 annual dues the previous year. Although some money came from the CLC and other labour organizations, it was very much a shoestring operation. Most staff were on salary only long enough to qualify for Unemployment Insurance, and volunteered the rest of the year. They might be interested in a merger some time in the future, he said, but only when they were securely established, and only on their own terms. The level of commitment and dedication was impressive, but it also seemed somewhat quixotic. I left the office wanting to know more about the MFU.

This book tells the story thoroughly and well. Sue Calhoun is a New Brunswick journalist and—not incidentally—partner of Gilles Thériault: she brings to the task both an insider's information and a professional's skill at coherent narrative. In her introduction she states that her intention was to present "an honest evaluation" of the MFU, and while her sympathies are clear, I believe she has accomplished the task. She traces the union from its earliest stirrings to the crises of 1990, filling in the history and the socio-political context as needed along the way. Particularly interesting are discussions of the role of Acadian nationalist sentiments and the political ideology and affiliation of some of the organizers.

The book is handsomely produced and well indexed, and contains a number of informative photographs. Calhoun has drawn upon a broad range of documentary sources listed in a selected bibliography, but academic readers will be disappointed to find no footnotes in the text, and that chapters are named but not numbered. A valuable addition is the foreword by Roméo LeBlanc, Federal Minister of Fisheries during the union's formative years. A Word to Say is extremely well-written, readable, and a solid contribution to Maritime and labour history.

Gordon Inglis
St. John's, Newfoundland


This collection of sixteen scholarly papers, commentaries, and discussions is a wel-
come addition to the study of the role of credit and "the truck system" of debt which often characterized North American economic development. The papers are arranged according to six major themes. Three sections deal with merchant credit and the fisheries in New England, Newfoundland, Labrador and the Grand Banks; other sections follow on the fur trade, credit in agricultural societies, and merchant credit and labour in mature economies. Together, the studies shed light on the historical relationship between merchant, storekeeper, fisherman and farmer.

Generally, the papers stress the traditional importance of fish, fur, and wheat as dominant exports in the early development of the colonial United States and British North America. Yet the nature of credit relationships between primary producers, planter fishing operators, merchant outfitters and mercantile capital so essential to that economy is complex, divergent, and little understood. This system of credit and debt had its roots in thinly settled or frontier regions where labour as well as hard currency were relatively rare. Fisherfolk and farmers needed to purchase house materials, tools, provisions, and other articles available only through local merchants who, in turn, were connected to merchant importers and larger trading houses, often in England. The credit and truck system was therefore a necessary component of early economic development in the New World. Within the fisheries, the exchange of goods for labour created a heavy dependence on the merchant, which traditionally was interpreted in strictly exploitative terms. In exploring this crucial historical relationship which widely characterized those who made their living from the sea, these studies reject such facile analysis in favour of a long term structural understanding of the North American economy.

Part of the considerable strength of this volume is Rosemary Ommer's introduction, which explains the importance of examining debt and credit in history, especially in North American staple-based production, and the concluding overview by Jacob Price. Together, they delineate clearly the significance of the broader topic, the nature and merits of the various approaches, and how these articles have contributed to our understanding. Though, as Price notes, only Brice-Bennett's article on the Moravians and the Inuit explores the cultural dimension of this system, the remainder offer considerable insight into other topics. In looking at colonial Massachusetts, Daniel Vickers relates the New England cod fishery to Newfoundland's. As well, Jim Hiller interprets the Newfoundland credit system, Robert Lewis and David Macdonald respectively examine the planters' fishery and the supply system, and Raoul Andersen offers a case study from the deep-sea, or banks fishery. For the Gulf of St. Lawrence region, Ommer's study of the truck system in Gaspé and Patricia Thornton's look at the transition from the migratory to resident fishery in southern Labrador further add to our conceptual and geographical understanding of the fisheries. Along with the other studies on related aspects of the merchant credit system, these papers are, according to Price, "almost without exception, characterized by impressive mastery of the available research data." (p. 360) Future studies will eventually support a broad synthesis. Until then, these well-crafted papers supply a wealth of information and interesting interpretations of an important though oft-neglected element in maritime history.

Rainer Baehre
Corner Brook, Newfoundland

This slim work seeks to chart the history of Christian missions to the seafaring community of London from the Middle Ages to the later twentieth century. An in-house publication of the Apostleship of the Sea, its aim is to elucidate the development of that Catholic organization of which the author was a co-founder in the 1920s. Missionary, artist, writer and architect, Peter Anson was commissioned to compile this study in his eighty-second year. He died before completing the task and his notes lay unused for almost twenty years until assembled in present form by Reverend Robert Miller. Slender in more than the obvious sense, the book's seventy odd pages simply do not provide sufficient scope for more than a brief outline of its subject. Moreover, Miller's decision to let Anson speak for himself may not have been entirely wise for the result is a rather choppy, episodic work; some chapters run to no more than a paragraph. Whether this was Anson's intention, or merely the outcome of work halted in progress, is impossible to say. In either event, the consequence is a somewhat uneven recitation of bald facts.

Anson is at his best in a spritely autobiographical introduction which paints a vivid picture of London's docklands at a time when the metropolis was still a focal point of global seaborne commerce. Unfortunately this rambling but evocative memoir gives way too soon to a rather sparse catalogue of facts which raises far more questions than it answers. Missing, for example, is any solid sense of the larger context within which these seemingly isolated events transpired. This, perhaps, is least understandable in Anson's discussion of the early twentieth-century shift from straightforward evangelism to a greater concern on the part of "sailortown' missionaries with the broader welfare of their would-be charges. Intimately familiar with life along the Thames during this crucial period, Anson was ideally placed to deepen our understanding of the circumstances and motives which induced this seachange. Yet, as is so often the case in this work, he prefers to record rather than truly explain.

On the positive side, it must be said that this little book has been lovingly produced with great care for quality and attractiveness. Of particular value are the many watercolours from Anson's hand which help to bring sparkle to an otherwise spartan work.

James G. Greenlee
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


The third volume of *Sjcek'len* lives up to the expectations set by its predecessors. Eight articles present good insight into the various fields of research in which the Esbjerg museum is engaged, either with its own staff or with researchers in close contact. Lavishly laid-out with photographs and with English summaries for each article, the book will appeal even to non-Danish-speaking readers.
Niels Frederiksen takes one house in the town of Sonderho on the island of Fanø, west of Jutland and traces six generations of a family of fishermen and skippers back to 1710, showing how much such a history can tell us about the progress over the centuries of its inhabitants, from small fishers to fairly well-to-do skippers. This is an offshoot of the author's book on Senderho, published by the museum in 1989. Another paper, also based on the museum's research on Fanø during the age of sail, deals with the problems that the barque Kronprinzesse Louise encountered on a voyage around Cape Horn in 1905-06. A quite different project, initiated by the museum after the motorized Lightship No. 1 was stationed permanently as a museum ship in Esbjerg harbour, is the history of lightships in the vicinity. The museum's director, Morton Hahn-Pedersen, expects his article and forthcoming book to form the basis for a larger work on Danish lightships and their crews.

An analysis of the 1636-1640 volumes of the Land Registry of Skast Herred, an area dominated today by Esbjerg, Denmark's largest fishing port, provides considerable information about fishing. It is not sea-fishing but rather exploitation of the area's streams and rivers which emerges as a dominant feature. Whether this means that there was little sea-fishing or that the fragmentary evidence in the registry for those years distorts the picture, remains to be ascertained. Poul Holm, in his critical review of the authoritative History of Denmark, which is currently in progress and is planned to be published in twelve volumes, notes the regrettable absence of a balanced account of the role of fishermen and seafaring, without which a true understanding of Danish history is impossible. Instead of placing all the blame solely on the authors, he argues that this also reflects the failure of maritime historians to situate their work in the broader contexts of their respective national histories.

Thyge Jensen describes the educational services offered by the museum to teachers and schools. He summarizes his lengthy experiences, stressing that the most effective programmes were linked to the laboratory and the museum's own fishing boat. It is not "high technology" but rather dialogue with staff members and the active participation of visitors that is required. Radio-marking of seals and rescuing stranded whales when they are still alive (or putting them down if they are dying) are two other major undertakings in which the museum is involved. A lengthy report on the museum's 1990 activities closes this fine volume. All in all, Sjask'len convinces this reviewer that the museum deserves local, national and international recognition and support.

Lars U. Scholl
Bremerhaven, Germany


This is a logical sequel to two earlier books on the design and construction of Olympias, a full-sized replica of an Athenian trireme (Morrison & Coates. An Athenian Trireme Reconstructed. Oxford: 1989; and by the same authors, The Athenian Trireme. Cambridge, 1986). However, this latest study contains sufficient background information for anyone reasonably familiar with ancient oar-driven ships to follow the des-
criptive narrative of the trials, as well as most of the technical aspects in the illustrations, tables and figures.

The object of the book is to record, review and discuss the results of the sea trials carried out with *Olympias* in 1988. Earlier trials in 1987 were principally to test the safety, stability and general handling and manoeuvring of the ship under both oars and sail. Generally *Olympias* performed well, but several problems and weaknesses were found in both vessel and crew. Defects in the structure and layout were rectified as far as possible during the winter of 1987-1988.

In 1988 it was hoped to carry out trials to quantify the performance of the ship and the rowers, in both inshore closequarters manoeuvres in calm water and in making passages in the open sea. These data were then to be used in computer simulations of tactics and manoeuvres involving a number of triremes in battle situations. The actual results were disappointing, largely due to difficulties with the on-board and shore-based instrumentation used for measurement. Adverse weather caused the open sea passage to be cancelled.

Nevertheless, a large amount of very useful and informative data was collected. The material is well organized and presented in ten chapters, with supplementary technical and administrative detail in the seven annexes. An excellent glossary should make the more technical parts of the text comprehensible to readers lacking a maritime background. A short but highly relevant bibliography is given. In a book of one hundred pages, much material has of necessity been presented in summaries, but the authors note where the collections of unpublished detailed material are held.

This book can be unreservedly recommended to anyone with either a scholarly or amateur interest in ancient oared fighting ships. Considering the amount of valuable material compressed into its pages the price is most reasonable. Print quality and legibility are excellent for both text and illustrations.

R.J.O. Millar
Vancouver, British Columbia


This book is a little gem, superbly crafted and well-written, on a subject perfectly delineated by its title and sub-title. More a social and labour history of the Arsenal than a naval or maritime history, this reviewer found it absorbing. After a succinct introduction, Davis discusses the origin and makeup of the Arsenal workforce, its management, and living arrangements. He then describes the dark side of the artisan workforce: their criminality, smuggling activity, and ways of letting off steam, all of which the authorities reluctantly tolerated. The contrast of this with the final chapter which identifies the various civic duties performed by the *arsenalotti* (firefighting, police, watchmen, militia, and ceremonial guards), forms the most interesting and instructive reading in the book.

There are two appendices. The first, entitled "Supplice in Venice," describes the method of petitioning the Doge through the Council of Ten for specific benefits or grievance settlements. The system involved the production of *offede* (performance evaluations) by the petitioner for examination by the various levels of judges. The whole is certainly not unlike modern grievance and ombudsman systems which exists today.
Indeed, there is a surprising similarity in many of the systems used in the Arsenal management to those which exist today in modern naval dockyard management. One of these is the sending to sea of many of the shipwrights, caulkers and oarsmen to make running repairs within the fleet while it was at sea. This system is not unknown in today's navies, particularly with civilian fire control and engineering trades in the modern dockyard. It also explains why some arsenalotti became superb seamen, spending more of their careers with the Fleet than ashore in the Arsenal.

The arsenalotti's Battagliole sui Ponti (little battles of the bridges) which they used to blow off steam are somewhat reminiscent of the way in which sports events today are often as much decided on the streets as on the field, and the description of them often makes hilarious reading.

Fifty pages of detailed notes accompany the text, as well as a comprehensive bibliography and good index. The research was based on original sources and has been organized most successfully, though the average reader unversed in Italian will find himself slightly disadvantaged by the liberal sprinkling of Italian words and phrases in the text, as well as longer untranslated Italian passages in the notes. Offsetting this minor quibble, however, is the fact that the text has been scrupulously proof-read; this reviewer was unable to detect a single printing error, almost miraculous today.

In summary, Davis has certainly achieved his aim in describing and explaining the Venetian Arsenal and its workers with a competency that makes it well worth the price. This book can proudly stand beside the works of Frederick C. Lane, that master historian of Venice.

Jim Lawless
Ottawa, Ontario


The product of a Library of Congress symposium held in 1986, this collection of ten essays on the history of port cities in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by sophisticated methodologies and a comparative approach. As the editors explain, analysis of the development of such ports as Havana, Pointe-a-Pitre, Port-au-Prince, Kingston, Vera Cruz, Cartagena, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires provides "a window enlightening the structure of economy, politics, culture, and society." (p. 1) The quality of the essays is high, and Jacob Price provides a closing summation that not only makes linkages among the works of the individual authors but also draws significant conclusions regarding the influence on port cities of shipping patterns, styles of imperial government, occupational structures, and population characteristics. Price appropriately concludes that the essays have revealed both similarities and differences among the ports investigated, and have thus pointed the way towards future comparative research.

While this is, in general, a rewarding volume, it is disappointing in one respect. Nobody should expect a collection of essays to be as coherent, or as comprehensive in examining its subject, as a single-authored work can be. *Atlantic Port Cities* scores well on coherence, thanks to the editors' careful introduction, Philip Curtin's preface, and Price's summation. However, it falls far short of being as comprehensive as its title would lead an unwariness to believe. "The Atlantic World" extended beyond
The Northern Mariner

Latin America and the Caribbean. It is true that the editors disarmingly explain that "limited financial resources restricted the scope of the case studies" at the original symposium (p. 2), and that Price's observations—as well as Linda Salvucci's essay comparing the trading partners Havana and Philadelphia—introduce comparisons with the Anglo-American colonies that formed the United States. The experience of the Atlantic world further north receives no such attention, beyond a brief reference to Donald Creighton's *The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence* (p. xiv) and an even briefer one to the work of "Harold Innes" (sic, p. 264). To be sure, there is nothing wrong with—and much to commend—an approach that focuses on Latin America and the Caribbean. But the editors might either have embodied this orientation in their title, or else expanded the collection accordingly.

That caveat aside, *Atlantic Port Cities* is an important and stimulating volume.

John G. Reid
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Throughout the world, changing urban, technical, trade, shipping and manufacturing patterns are rendering docklands obsolete. One such site is Prince's Dock. Closed in 1981 after 160 years of service, it is now "one of Liverpool's most public pieces of dereliction" and "one of the best city centre waterfront sites remaining." (p. 70) This small book from the research unit within the Merseyside Maritime Museum is part of the research efforts aimed at better understanding docklands.

It ably tells the story of the Prince's Dock from its origins to the present. The book conveys a good sense of local and business commitment to construction of the docks as well as problems such as shortage of horses and recurring conflicts of interest. As this was a dock built when steam vessels were still suspect and had its doom sealed by the container revolution of the 1960s, the careful reader will naturally go away with a sense of the impact of technological change on docks and needs.

Underlying research is strong, with some old myths put to rest, but the overall product falls unnecessarily short. The book cries out for stronger editorial and better design hands. Chronology is not always clear; there is a general dock plan with "Key to Dock Names" but some docks discussed are not listed; illustrations are often ill-chosen or unsuitably cropped for the intent suggested by captions.

For the interested reader there is much to learn from this little book but the reviewer fears it will do little to spark much needed pride and interest in the glory and heritage of Liverpool docklands. That would be a book to relish.

Norman R. Ball
Waterloo, Ontario


Honolulu has received little specific or systematic attention from social, economic or maritime historians. This book, by a noted labour historian, is therefore most welcome, even if its focus has been trained
narrowly on the port of Honolulu rather than on the city as a whole. The limited scope of the book, not suggested by its title, is all the more disappointing, as Beechert seems interested at several points in discussing broader themes than the physical growth of the harbour and its facilities and the endless squabbles surrounding its development.

A chapter on maritime labour draws heavily on Beechert's earlier writings; it has a concise yet penetrating overview of the struggles of waterside workers to organize and, once achieved in 1949, to be employed on the same conditions as west coast longshoremen. Yet no attempt is made to give a social dimension to dock labour, to the small coterie of merchants who long controlled Hawaiian political and economic life, or to the multi-ethnicity which was and is so characteristic of Honolulu. There is no discussion of immigration and little on seaborne tourism or the city's "sailortown."

On the physical and administrational aspects of the port and harbour Beechert offers many insights. His assessment of its performance and significance is based on a sound appreciation of the volume and nature of the shipping using Honolulu. He reveals that, after the initial period of triangular traffic with the American northwest coast and China, Honolulu had little potential to become a regional hub of shipping; in that sense, the book's subtitle clearly overstates its importance. Pearl Harbor and the many other non-naval military installations on Oahu could strategically justify the subtitle, but that argument is not made.

In an excellent section Beechert demonstrates how the most recent and telling proof of Honolulu's false claims to a regional role as commercial port was the failure of Matson Line to establish itself in the transpacific trade and to slot Honolulu into the transpacific network of containership services. But more could have been made of the passenger services from the American west coast to East Asia and Australasia which long included calls at Honolulu. In 1925 Matson, itself controlled by four of Hawaii's "big five" firms, took over the Inter-Island Navigation Company; with the purchase of Spreckels' Oceanic Steam Ship Company in 1926 and the demise of its last American rival in 1930, it perfected its "awesome level of concentration" in the islands' shipping industry. Only the explosion of military activity and tourism after 1945 would break open the oyster that was Hawaiian shipping and trade.

In its narrow mission as a port history Honolulu is informative and largely successful. To avoid misunderstandings, it would have helped had the introduction outlined that mission. And it is a great pity that Beechert has not ventured outside the confines of the port. A history of Honolulu as port city remains to be written.

Frank Broeze
Nedlands, Australia


There have been many publications about shipwrecks, written from a variety of perspectives. Some viewed these losses as tragic events, dramatizing the hazards faced by seamen. Others, often more scholarly treatments, examined them as time capsules. In recent years, a number of diver's
The Northern Mariner

guides have appeared. Still other works have taken more popular stances, presenting a mix of both myth and fact. Robert Sullivan's *Shipwrecks and Nautical Lore of Boston Harbor* falls into this last category.

A prologue emphasizes the large number of vessels (and lives) claimed by Boston Harbor and its approaches since 1614. Sullivan then gives a brief physical description of this sometimes hazardous environment. He attributes the many wrecks in the harbour proper to its constricted passages whose unpredictable weather and dangerous approaches favour marine disasters despite providing a good anchorage. However, improved navigational aids and the adoption of engine-powered craft have diminished the number of shipwrecks. These observations are followed by several abbreviated sections dealing with an odd assortment of topics, including pirates, lifesaving services, and salvage.

Most of the book is a disjointed collection of over a hundred brief shipwreck descriptions. We are taken on a tour of individual wrecks grouped by location. The main subdivisions are wrecks in the outer, middle, and inner harbour. Thus, the loss of the *Mohawk* appears in the section on outer harbour wrecks. The account is only two paragraphs long, of which the first is an extract from an unidentified newspaper.

In the end, the book is both interesting and disappointing. Clearly Sullivan surveyed a tremendous amount of original material to compile his selection. His short cryptic accounts of specific wrecks offer intriguing titbits and snapshots which tend to leave the reader wanting more. Despite a list of sources, most accounts are not properly cited within the text. Perhaps less important than the lack of specific references for the individual wreck accounts, is the lack of sources for many of the illustrations.

Although Sullivan wished to present a chronicle of area shipwrecks and other linked information, his book provides neither a more definitive list nor even a few detailed cases; I would have preferred fuller treatment of fewer wrecks. The book's most disappointing feature is the absence of proper footnotes; any reader who desires more information is forced to re-do portions of Sullivan's research. Nevertheless, there is some merit in this type of maritime publication, for it reminds that segment of the public which is not inclined to read more detailed studies that the reality of the sea and seafaring is a far cry from the oft-repeated myth of romance.

Robert S. Elliot
Saint John, New Brunswick


This is a handsome potpourri of memory, visual record and technical detail. Kaiser knows American schooners well, and his book reflects the many talents of a man who was a student of marine engineering, an experienced coastal mariner, a photographer, a draughtsman, and a journalist. The book is not a formal technical treatise; it will certainly not replace Howard Chapelle's work on our shelves. Rather, it is a personal reminiscence, mixing technical detail with memoir, yarn and illustrations.

Much of the book consists of short articles written for the *National Fisherman*. The subjects range widely: how to stow lumber in the southern pine trade; the procedures for lowering topmasts to pass under bridges; re-fitting an old schooner for the West Indies trade; how to restore...
the sheer in a schooner suffering from hoggling; the variety and uses of boom fittings; even something of the pattern of shareholding in latter-day coasting schooners. Kaiser is fascinated with different methods of schooner construction and has a keen eye for the differences between a "down easter" built in Maine and the rarity built in South Carolina. He also describes his work converting a Nova Scotian fishing schooner for personal use as a yacht.

Though the history of schooners before the twentieth century is not Kaiser's main concern, there are glimpses of older lumber and coal carriers and older fishing vessels such as the New England pinky schooner. There is even a short chapter on eighteenth century Bermuda-built sloops, light and fast vessels characterized by long main booms and huge jibs. But Kaiser quickly returns to his main focus, the many faces of the twentieth century schooner.

He does not forget those who worked in schooners, and we read about various "chanteymen," fishermen, and skippers. There are a few splendid photographs of workers handling various gear, along with the inevitable shots of the old skipper at the wheel. But Kaiser is more interested in the vessel than in the men, and we quickly return to the anecdotal record of schooners and their often unpredictable behaviour.

Kaiser is a congenial host with a good sense of humour. Surely few other sources discuss the relative merits of substitutes for oakum, when leaks must be stopped in a hurry: Kaiser discusses sawdust, lifejacket stuffing, and horse manure. He fondly recalls his own youthful "schooner fever" which allowed him to triumph over the many mistakes and mishaps of a boy struggling to learn the ropes. The schooner fever never left him, and this book is testimony to the schooner's power to possess a man and his life. I regret only that there is no index, since in such a collection one easily loses one's way. But this is a book for easy perusal, on the deck of your own yacht on a warm evening with canvas stowed for the night. It will be a welcome addition to the libraries of those who share Kaiser's fascination for schooners in the last stages of their long evolution.

Eric W. Sager
Victoria, British Columbia


Edward O'Brien was Thomaston's most successful capitalist. Though he made his fortune and his mark in shipbuilding, with particular attention to deep-water shipping, his success owed much to his diversification into manufacturing, the lumber trade, general merchandise, communications, banking, and insurance. Significantly, he named one of his vessels Baring Brothers after the great Anglo-American banking house. Born just a decade after the United States secured its independence from Great Britain and living until 1882, O'Brien witnessed profound economic, technological, and political transformations and growth in his chosen profession and his country, and became Thomaston's first millionaire.

What is perhaps surprising is that there appears to have been no attempt until now to investigate either O'Brien's personal or his business history. The bibliography suggests that the raw material for such a study is there. Certainly the paintings, prints, drawings, and artifacts that made up the exhibition which this slim booklet accompanied indicate that such a study would be
rich in material evidence. It would also be rich in directions for analysis and exploration. Critical developments in O'Brien's life, such as his transition from apprentice shipbuilder to partner to independent shipbuilder in less than ten years after the end of the War of 1812 still await explanation. Similarly, one cannot help but wonder at the seeming contradiction between a man whose sailing masters "generally sailed conservatively, so as to bring the longest life and the greatest profits overall" (p. 10) yet who refused to allow his ships to play it safe during the Civil War and instead kept his vessels at sea on risky, albeit lucrative, round-trips. Only one paragraph is offered to suggest what life was like for the men who worked O'Brien's ships, and nothing is said about the men who worked O'Brien's shipyards. Yet Robert Webb, the curator of the Maine Maritime Museum where the exhibition was on display between 1990 and 1991, cannot be faulted for these gaps. The aim of the booklet was to give the exhibition a context for its many exhibits. Webb is to be commended for providing more than a simple chronicle of O'Brien's life. Instead, he also makes a compelling argument for others to follow and to investigate O'Brien's life in the kind of detail that this booklet can only begin to suggest.

Olaf U. Janzen
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


In his introduction, Marven E. Moore points out that, despite the important role small water craft played in the evolution of our maritime economy and way of life, they have been largely ignored by maritime enthusiasts and historians. He states: "Pictorial renderings, artifacts, and publications abound for larger vessels, particularly sailing ships. No doubt their spectacular images and the abundance of written records about them have made these vessels the favoured subject." David Walker and Wayne Barrett have made a significant step towards improving this sorry situation.

Their book is a very evocative and impressionistic photo essay on the subject of small Atlantic water craft. It is a type of publication popularly referred to as a coffee table book. From the perspective of a museum professional, Small Wooden Boats of the Atlantic employs the strategy of good exhibit design. It places the artifact at the centre of focus and provides information that warming interest and growing curiosity will demand. In this case, the artifacts are a wide variety of small wooden boats of the Atlantic presented in their natural contexts through Barrett's skilful and sensitive camera lens, while information is offered through Walker's enthusiastic and knowledgeable commentary. Subjects range from the oyster-tonguing boats of Prince Edward Island to the Gander riverboat of Newfoundland. Each boat type is dealt with in a separate chapter.

Small Wooden Boats of the Atlantic is not a comprehensive analysis of Atlantic small water craft. Nevertheless it provides a surprisingly wide range of information on the subject. Walker's discussion includes everything from the function, design and construction of each boat type to more general historical and geographical relationships. He also treats readers to a great deal of other relevant information. Before discussing eel-fishing boats, he first informs his readers about the life cycle of the American eel. Walker weaves levity through his generous fabric of facts by occasionally
focusing attention on more human concerns. Thus he comments on a little one-seater plywood boat sitting on a slipway in Ingomar, Nova Scotia: "If anyone wants to go along for a row, he will have to sit on the bottom. It may be a wet ride, however; the plastic bailer (an old bleach bottle) suggests that the boat may leak." (p. 17)

This delightful, easy-to-read coffee table book with beautiful photographs will contribute significantly towards a greater appreciation of the largely small water craft of the Atlantic and to an increased awareness of their importance in the day to day life of Atlantic Canada.

Walter W. Peddle
Spaniard's Bay, Newfoundland


Here is yet another book by a small boat circumnavigator about life at sea aboard a thirty-foot schooner, full of shrewd observations on the world in the 1980s from the perspective of a small sailing vessel, written in a style and mood all of its own.

Following Gehrig's dreams to their fulfilment, from building his own steel vessel to completing his wanderings around the world, from Vancouver to Lunenburg, Nova Scotia over five years, I am reminded of the cruising yarns published by intrepid small boat sailors of the 1920s and 1930s, like George Dibbern's Quest (London, 1941), when such feats were much less common. Gehrig, lucky as he was, did not have to worry about politics as Dibbern did in the 1930s. Yet the two have something in common. Maybe it is the romantic side of the German soul—in its best sense.

The book is a joy to read, particularly when so many cruising yarns today bombard us with exact departure and arrival times, marina facilities, details on mechanized navigational systems, etc. Gehrig is a master in the art of eliminating the superfluous, and he is one of the few who lets the reader share in his state of mind and that of his indefatigable crew during the ups and downs of their voyaging.

Having sailed the same seas Gehrig encountered, albeit on cargo vessels, I was with him all the way. And I was pleased to learn that his Atkin designed schooner served him well, because an Atkin designed sloop taught me many a lesson while cruising the South Shore of Nova Scotia. I did take exception to some of his unseamanlike expressions, such as "tailwinds," and I did miss reproductions of the plans of his sturdy vessel, but these are minor complaints. I recommend the book to armchair sailors, to the dreamers who want to push off and to the experienced ocean cruising clan. It will hit the mark with all of them.

Niels W. Jannasch
Tantallon, Nova Scotia


These are the latest editions of the author's ongoing series of recognition manuals of the now former Eastern Bloc merchant shipping. The revolutions in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe have made the fleets he describes of historic interest.

Each volume begins with a brief sketch of changes in each fleet since the previous edition of these works. *Soviet Merchant Ships* also includes a transliteration of the Cyrillic alphabet. Greenway gives the technical particulars of each class, including builder, date delivered, deadweight, gross and net tonnages, dimensions (in both metric and imperial measure), engines (including horsepower) and speed. For container vessels the number carried is listed but for salvage tugs the author does not provide the bollard pull. Vessels under one thousand tons are generally not included but the deep sea fishing fleets are listed. Listings are given by type. Each class is represented by a clear photograph usually taken from the quarter or broadside. Most of the photographs are aerial views. These have the advantage of showing more of the ship's layout than a sea level view but for that reason they do not show the vessel as it would look to the mariner. The author's selection of photographs should be considered more a complement to than a competitor of the Talbot-Booth system of line drawings used in *Jane's Merchant Ships*.

Canadians will find *Soviet Merchant Ships* the more interesting of the two volumes. Comparisons between the Eastern Arctic Sealift and Soviet Arctic shipping are inevitable. The Soviets have spent much time and energy developing the Siberian sea route as a glance at such ships as the nuclear powered Arctic barge-carrier *Sevmorput* or the *Vitus Bering* class of Arctic RO-RO's attest. The numerous classes of sea-river ships will remind many on the Great Lakes of the old St. Lawrence River canallers. The *Ladoga 101* type even have their telescoping navigating bridge right forward and their engines aft.

*Soviet Merchant Ships* includes not only the former communist countries of Eastern Europe but Cuba and Vietnam as well. Yugoslavian ships are not listed in this volume. As might be expected the Comecon nations were for the most part allocated older, less efficient units. It remains to be seen with the collapse of communism how many vessels these new free enterprise governments will sell off. The reunified Germany has already sold off many of the ships on the old East German register.

Greenway is to be congratulated for providing a comprehensive listing of Soviet and Comecon shipping just before the Soviet imperial system collapsed.

M. Stephen Salmon
Orleans, Ontario


Two long-awaited books on Canadian maritime history have reached booksellers, Sager and Panting's *Maritime Capital* and this one. They represent diametrically opposite ends of the bibliographical spectrum, for one is academic, the other populist. Both species have strengths and weaknesses, and one of the enduring goals of this reviewer has been to try to reach a common ground where both may mingle. Neither book achieves this state of affairs.

The problems of *Maritime Capital* must be left to others; in reviewing the problems of *Passage to the Sea*, however, I face a dilemma. I had long sought to write about Collard's subject, but that was not to be. Yet I cannot help but feel that Collard's book fell short of what it should have been. This is supposed to be a history, not, as the
Book Reviews

The title suggests, a song of praise for recent management in breaking with tradition and actively seeking out ocean business. In truth, during its best years CSL provided Canada with an outstanding presence in maritime business rather than ignoring it, as many blue-ocean historians and enthusiasts would have us believe in their tirades over the demise of the Canadian merchant marine. It so happened this was a land-locked enterprise. As Collard points out in passing, Canadian expertise was sufficient to scare the pants off the Americans, our logical competitors, (p. 408)

The book is all-too-obviously a commissioned book of the old kind; in fact, the historian need not read past about page 350 unless interested in the careers of the company's present movers and shakers. Edgar Allan Collard is a familiar name in Canadian journalism, and his by-line still appears weekly in his old newspaper in 800-word columns. Regrettably, through a peculiar publishing device used throughout its pages, this is precisely how the text in the book appears. It is distracting and, worse, gives the impression that the author cannot write except in column-sized bites.

A book of the populist genre must meet certain requirements to satisfy non-followers. The most obvious one is that it must answer questions of minutiae which most academics disdain. Collard does not achieve this. Thus, in his treatment of the sudden change of names of "his" company, there were two, not just the one he notes on page sixty-eight, but we find no explanation for this. Why? Who were the CSL's "Angels" (pp. 272-3) who in the 1960s postponed the demise of its shareholding arm? These and many other nitty-gritty questions are not answered, leaving the academic historian in the lurch.

Still, for the enthusiast this is probably a satisfying book, for it is a coffee-table book with a bite. It has superb photographs, a fleet list (albeit incomplete: as important as knowing when a ship joined a fleet is when it left), superb type-face with virtually no typographical errors, and a workmanlike index—it does have a text that occasionally adds human colour.

This is not the book this reviewer would have written, for which thanks be given. The definitive work on CSL and its shipping endeavours still has to be produced. In the meantime this is a necessary start in showing Canadians that their maritime traditions are not just ocean-based.

Kenneth S. Mackenzie
Ottawa, Ontario


As a unique North American small vessel type, the Great Lakes fishing tug has received little attention. It evolved from powered vessels used to tow unpowered craft to and from fishing grounds. They were soon put to use fishing as well and could break through ice and transport fresh fish quickly to shore-side plants. In time their decks were housed in from bow to stern and rail to rail to provide shelter for crew, catch and gear (usually gill net). The distinctive housing, called turtlebacks almost disguise the tug layout, wheelhouse just forward of amidships and engine and funnel on the centre lines. Side and stern doors permit fishing and loading/unloading. Small gasoline and diesel engines quickly supplanted steam for power and the
type became common on all the Great Lakes with interesting local variations.

*Katherine V.* was built in 1928 by Henry Vincent (formerly of Garden Island, Ontario) for Charles Vogelheim and Dan Klann of Rogers City, Michigan. Heavily built of wood, her hull was steeled for ice protection. She is the last surviving large wooden fish tug in Canada or the US; she has been beached at Rogers City since the early 1980s. This report is the result of a superficial survey of the vessel in 1989. Although the authors were able to visit the boat for only four days, their photographs and recorded observations provide a valuable record of the vessel. Frank and Nancy Prothero publish the *Great Lakes Fisherman*, a trade publication, and have a good working knowledge of fishing boats, but they readily admit their lack of experience in taking off lines and producing drawings and carrying out a survey. They therefore plea for an expert survey, inventory and preservation of the boat which is threatened by land development nearby.

The main body of the report provides an organized compilation of findings, amply illustrated. The boat is fifty-seven feet by fourteen feet and equipped with her original three cylinder Kahlenburg engine, generator set and compressed air powered Crossley net lifter, all of which remain intact. A tiny wheelhouse projects above the rounded turtleback, all fitted with port lights which give a Buck Rogers appearance very much ahead of its time. The authors make much of the high quality of construction. Good maintenance must also be a factor in the longevity of a vessel which fished until 1970. She has since been buried in gravel up to her bilge keels, there is decay in the area of her stern post, and her stem was sprung in beaching. The rest of the hull and upper works appear relatively sound. The final pages of the report give an historical context and perspective of the vessel. Interviews with the second and third generations of Vogelheim owners and a longtime skipper result in several anecdotes and incidents in the boat’s career and old photographs of her in various locales. Her tendency to roll, the fitting of bilge keels shortly after building and the report that she was built three feet shorter than designed are valuable bits of information.

The declining lakes fishery, caused by the onset of the lamprey and the powerful sport fishing lobby, ended *Katherine V.*’s working career, but this report makes a strong case for a second career as an example of the wooden boat builder’s art. An ambitious work by two enthusiasts, the report should not be judged too critically for any technical shortcomings. It is an interesting and thorough introduction to a boat of its type and begs to be followed up not only by a detailed survey and documentation, but a wider documentation of the Great Lakes fishing tug as a type.

M.B. Mackay
Halifax, Nova Scotia


Eighty years after the event, the sinking of the *Titanic* continues to generate publica-
tions in large numbers. Since 1985, Robert Ballard and his colleagues have created a whole new audience for the *Titanic* story; indeed, my four-year-old nephew knows more about the subject than I did at that age! It's therefore important to comment on whether new books about the *Titanic* clearly distinguish between fact and fiction.

Getting at the truth was the purpose of the official British inquiry into the sinking. Between May and July 1912, the Wreck Commissioner, Lord Mersey, and his five assessors held thirty-seven days of sittings, asked 25,600 questions in cross-examining a total of ninety-seven witnesses, and issued a seventy-four page report containing twenty-four recommendations on matters like watertight subdivisions, lifeboats and rafts, and boat drills.

And yet, questions remain. Was the inquiry as thorough as the US Senate inquiry headed by Senator William Alden Smith? Was it as persistent as it should have been in questioning the builders of the *Titanic*, Harland & Wolff, her owners, the White Star Line, and key players like J. Bruce Ismay, Captain Stanley Lord, and Guglielmo Marconi? Out of respect for his memory, did the inquiry avoid criticizing the late Captain Edward J. Smith? Did it simply whitewash the Board of Trade, whose shipping regulations had been found so tragically wanting? In his recent book *Titanic: The Death & Life of a Legend* (NY: Knopf, 1987), author Michael Davie claims that the Mersey inquiry reached "the very peculiar though unstated conclusion that, despite failures here and there, nobody at all was responsible for the worst maritime disaster in history." (p. 196)

Probably because of the expense, St. Martin's Press has made the unfortunate decision to reprint virtually none of the extensive testimony of the ninety-seven witnesses who appeared before the inquiry, reducing them to mere ciphers, numbered surnames in the margin of the summary report. Equally unsatisfactory is the decision to introduce the reprinted report entirely with vivid first-person accounts by three survivors, readily available from other sources. The introduction in fact deprives the reader of the context needed to read and assess the inquiry's report intelligently, because it contains no background information on a number of topics, such as the effect of Anglo-American business competition on the ownership and operation of the *Titanic*, the state of British marine architecture in 1912, British shipping regulations and inspection procedures at the time of the sinking, the ambiguous conduct of the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company during and after the disaster, and the British judicial procedures which affected the conduct of the Mersey inquiry. Even reprinting the chapter from Davie's book entitled "Lord Mersey and the Whitewash Brush," which is based on original documents at the Public Records Office, would have been helpful.

What Lord Mersey's official report lacks, *Titanic: Triumph and Tragedy* abundantly supplies: a sense of humanity. Indeed, the faces of those who sailed in the ship are present on almost every page. Drawn from the collections of seventy public institutions and private individuals in Britain, Ireland, Canada (notable the Public Archives of Nova Scotia) and the United States, the book's hundreds of illustrations range from photographs by professionals and by amateurs like Father Francis M. Browne (a Jesuit priest who travelled from Southampton to Queenstown), to sometimes-blurry halftones from contemporary newspapers and magazines, to underwater photographs of the *Titanic* taken by Ballard's expedition in 1985. There are also illustrations of a whole range of material
which one would not necessarily expect to see reproduced in the form of illustrations: documents, plans, letters, menus, even sheet music and commemorative plates. John Maxtone-Graham's description of the book as a "photographic pantechnicon" (p. 7) is certainly an apt one!

Titanic: Triumph and Tragedy relies heavily on the implicit authority of the Titanic Historical Society (of which John Eaton is a founding member and official Historian, and Charles Haas is a past President) for the accuracy of the information which it contains. Lacking both footnotes and bibliography, how is the reader to know whether or not all those statements like "A faint smile played on the Captain's lips as the QM gave an overhead lanyard a steady downward pull" (p. 75) have any factual basis? And why are contemporary visual documents mixed together with six paintings by Ken Marshall (pp. 96, 110-111, 124, 156, 157, 161) with no warning that these are modern reconstructions by an artist who was not present at the event? The single-minded pursuit of a subject like the sinking of the Titanic leads to an unselective approach to sources. Titanic: Triumph and Tragedy may be a visual tour de force, but its research methodology remains open to question.

Peter Robertson
Ottawa, Ontario


As a title, British Superliners Of The Sixties seems to have been selected not so much to describe its subject matter as to establish criteria with which to disqualify all but the three liners examined in this book. The Southern Cross is described in revolutionary terms yet was built in the 1950s; the '60s Windsor Castle at 38,000 grt falls slightly short of what must constitute a "superliner." The subtitle of this book is much more positive in stating precisely what the topic is: a paean to these three ships.

Since John Maxtone-Graham's The Only Way To Cross came out in 1972 there has been a deluge of books on ocean liners, from fleet histories to the romance of transatlantic travel to photographic essays. One would think that every conceivable topic would have been covered many times over. So, it is refreshing to come across a book such as British Superliners Of The Sixties which looks at liners in a much different light. Dawson begins with a brief history of the evolution of ship design from its earliest days to the 1950s. Each major development is methodically and thoroughly examined. Once the groundwork has been laid, the author proceeds with the main subject of his book: A Design Appreciation of the Oriana, Canberra and QE2.

Oriana owes its inclusion to several noteworthy innovations such as the large-scale use of aluminum and advanced weight economy. "The ship which shapes the future," Canberra brought breakthroughs in design which were obvious to all and sundry "in such things as her machinery located aft, her graceful exterior profile, crisp modern interior design, and numerous other technical and engineering innovations." (intro) QE2 borrowed from both her predecessors while making a unique statement of her own in the areas of passenger facilities and interior layout and design.

Of particular interest are those sections devoted to the courtyards on Canberra to ensure natural sunlight to inside cabins and...
the concealed shower fittings in the optional two/four-berth cabins. The design of QE2's revolutionary funnel, Michael Inchbald's inspired use of space in the Queen's Room and the incorporation of the promenades in QE2's climate-controlled interiors are other fascinating sub-topics.

Though the book is lavishly illustrated, the arrangement of its photographs and diagrams leaves something to be desired. They are frequently pages apart from the related, forcing one to flip backwards or forwards in order to bring the two together. This weakens Dawson's effectiveness in conveying the points on design that he wishes to make. I suspect that this arrangement was due to the fact that many sections of the book covered material for which there were no photographs or diagrams while other sub-topics were awash in an abundance of accompanying visuals. Still it is an annoyance to the reader.

This is a most authoritative book on these three ships and one which is a must for anyone interested in ocean liners. It is truly a labour of love by its author, who communicates his enthusiasm and joy for the subject throughout the work.

John S. Davies
Vancouver, British Columbia


M.J. Rodriguez-Salgado opens these ten insightful essays by Spanish and English scholars with a valuable exploration of the dynastic aspects of Philip IPs foreign policy. His persistent advocacy of the Infanta Isabel for the English throne was a rational solution to an enduring problem. Simon Adams proves that the Spanish embargo of 1585 had nothing to do with the Enterprise of England, but was a boon to the more bellicose English royal advisors. The immediate origins of the war were accidental conjunctions in an explosive diplomatic atmosphere. Pauline Croft summarizes her earlier work on Elizabethan Anglo-Spanish trade. She confirms established opinion concerning the importance of the trade before 1585, emphasizing English dominance in its shipping.

I A A. Thompson treats the armada as a shift from Mediterranean to Atlantic war, calling for resources which were not Spain's strength and methods which defied Spanish traditions. This shift westward also meant less Mediterranean involvement, new taxes for Castile, and new contracts for Portugal, Aragon, Cantabria, Vizcaya, and Navarre.

Rodriguez-Salgado's second essay explores the Armada's shortage of pilots familiar with the English Channel. The problem, the considerable efforts made to overcome it, and the consequences after the battle are convincingly explained. Josd Luis Casado Soto retrieves the reputation of Spanish Atlantic shipping from Spanish historical neglect and Anglo-Saxon bias. Philip II legislated mercantilist shipping regulations, and subsidized large merchantmen built to royal standards. Excellent Cantabrian-built ships had small superstructures and fared comparatively well in this armada's ordeal.

Adams' second essay analyzes the results of Spanish and English expectation of a battle in the Downs. He also argues that Parma expected the fleet to create a bridgehead for his army while Medina
Sidonia expected the army to help acquire a safe anchorage. Parma's preparations are detailed in a crucial essay by Hugo O'Donnell y Duque de Estrada. The assembling of a 26,27,000 man army of invasion, from Italy, Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands is examined. The essay makes it clear that Parma was neither sceptical nor obstructionist, but the strategy was defeated by fireships and foul weather. A study by Manuel Garcia Rivas of the armada's medical services supports current understanding regarding spoilt victuals, comparatively light battle casualties, and the horrors of the voyage home. Nonetheless, his careful final estimate of 9,000 lost, out of 25,696, corrects prevailing exaggerations.

The book ends with an illuminating essay by Carlos Gómez-Centurión Jiménez on Spanish religious propaganda in support of the Gran Armada. This crusade commanded extraordinary effort from those who paid, organized, and participated. The disaster was read as divine retribution, and sceptical voices urged that God's work against the heretics be left to God.

Though marred by inferior proof-reading, this welcome volume of clashing insights illustrates trends in scholarship and the special value of underused Spanish sources and perspectives.

Ian K. Steele
London, Ontario


This slim offering is a spin-off from Phillips' more ambitious study *Six Galleons for the King of Spain: Imperial Defense in the Early Seventeenth Century*. Here she focuses on the life history of one particular galleon. She has marshalled together all the documentary information on *Los Tres Reyes*, including the building contract, inventory and other official documents to present the story. Readers desiring a broader perspective may not find this book very engaging and might wish to consult her other work.

The book is divided into three sections: building the vessel; the official inventory of the vessel when construction was completed; and its operational history from the completion of construction to its wrecking in the New World a few years later. The process of building a galleon, from securing materials to actual construction techniques, is covered only briefly and in general terms. Students of naval architecture will find little new information here. Phillips is on firmer ground when, utilizing the inventory, she describes the architectural features, fittings, rigging, sails and armaments of the galleon. This section, however, reveals an incomplete command of naval architectural terms. The use of the outmoded term "rib" instead of more accurate word "frame" will irritate those who study historic ship construction. Also, some words appear to be inaccurately translated. For example, mention is made of the "circumference at the masthead on the upper deck;" (p. 25) masthead should likely be translated as mast partners.

The ship's inventory is nicely presented. Illustrations of the original document appear on one page with a transcription on the opposite page. This, in turn, is followed by an English translation giving the reader an opportunity to check the accuracy of the translation. A similar rendering of the building contract of the *Los Tres Reyes* would have been welcome.

The working history of the vessel is briefly covered, giving a glimpse into the Armada system. During its short life, *Los*
Tres Reyes voyaged to the West Indies bringing supplies to the colonies, engaging in military operations against the Dutch and returning with vital treasure for Spain. On its last voyage the vessel wrecked at Cartagena and was surrendered to the salvagers. Although short, the history of Los Tres Reyes illustrates the indispensable role these vessels played in the maintenance of the Spanish Empire.

The book is illustrated with drawings from Marqués de la Victoria's eighteenth-century Diccionario maritimo, a treasure from Madrid's Museo Naval. Besides several fold-out plates, smaller illustrations are sprinkled liberally around the margins of the text. The illustrations are only marginally germane to the topic at hand and the small size of the book renders the fold-out plates almost too small to be useful.

Such criticisms aside, the book is well written and enjoyable to read, incorporating a surprising amount of information for a small volume. Befitting a limited edition, it is attractively bound and printed on good quality paper. The limited printing of five hundred copies, however, will make it difficult to acquire. Although narrow in scope the book succeeds in its goal, that is, to present a succinct life history of a single seventeenth-century Spanish galleon.

R. James Ringer
Ottawa, Ontario


Travelling overland from London with several other seamen, Thomas Anthony arrived in Bristol Saturday, November 9, 1633. There he joined the Merchant Bona-venture, a strong Londoner of 220 tons with sixteen or twenty ordnance. As with nearly all larger ships of the day it had several owners, but its chief owner, Sir Peter Richaut, was a wealthy merchant and financier originally of Brabant. Merchant Bona-venture had been chartered by Portuguese merchants for a Brazil voyage. Upon leaving Bristol after much delay and threat of legal action by the Portuguese to force her out of port, she made for Cork where she took on pilchards, salted hake, and joined a powerful Portuguese trading man-of-war under Portuguese command. A few months later in the Biscayan port of Pasajes, Anthony, along with most of the English crew left the ship and returned to England before it cleared European waters and sailed on to Brazil, under Portuguese command and with a Portuguese crew.

Anthony made two other voyages as purser or commercial factor which Kenneth Andrews documents. In the account of these voyages there is a spectacular list of freight goods taken on for shipment to the Americas, an account of a tobacco trading venture, and fascinating detail on the acquisition of indentured servants in Kinsale, Ireland intended for sale in Virginia. As it turned out, they were traded for tobacco in Barbados.

Anthony's account of commercial voyages to America along with Sir Kenelm Digb/s privateering exploits at Scandroon in the Eastern Mediterranean and William Rainborowe's attack against the Barbary corsairs at Sallee in Morocco are several episodes in the maritime history of Caroline England that Andrews explores in detail. These stories are set beside thematic chapters on the growth of the shipping industry between 1582 and 1640, using shipping returns of 1582 and 1629, ship-
owners, seamen and mutiny, ship money, and the Parliamentary naval enterprise.

While it may be possible at a purely descriptive level, Andrews argues, to keep politics, commerce, and naval matters separate in historical accounts, they were, in fact, very much interrelated. How they interrelated Andrews does not pretend to know and his stated objective is to stimulate reflection in juxtaposing material from the spheres of seafaring, commerce and naval politics. Clearly he believes that earlier historians have underestimated the growth of English maritime strength during this period. Also the material, especially Sir Kenelm Digby’s aimless Scanderoon adventure, suggests that England had passed to a phase of development in which Elizabethan political administration was inadequate and privateering archaic. Andrews does not attempt to conclude, or for that matter summarize, the findings presented in the book. That is left to the reader.

David McGinnis
Calgary, Alberta


Cannons, like ships, are products of human labour. They are technical-social constructs. They reflect a given level of knowledge and embody a context that is social and economic as well as technical. Students of technology today are much more conscious than their predecessors that society shapes its technological innovators and its innovations, whether they are new warships or new guns. The great innovations that modernized gunfounding in the middle of the eighteenth century were based on two developments, solid-core casting and accurate horizontal boring. These were introduced and developed in 1715 by the Swiss gunfounder Johann Maritz, and later spread to France and Spain by his sons. These innovations were long kept out of Dutch and English foundries at the Hague and Woolwich where the classical methods of casting about a core and later vertically reaming out the rough casting continued into the third quarter of the century.

Jan Verbruggen (b. 1712) and his son Pieter (b. 1735) were Dutch gunfounders who signed a contract with the British Board of Ordnance in 1770 and transferred themselves, their families, and the new technology to Britain. Between 1770 and 1774 they rebuilt the Woolwich Royal Brass Foundry and during the next twelve years transformed the manufacture of bronze cannon in Britain. The only bronze guns still employed in the Royal Navy were on vessels such as the King’s yachts and revenue cutters, but as the Board of Ordnance supplied guns to both the Royal Artillery and the Royal Navy and the technology was applied to iron as well as bronze guns, this work ought to interest naval historians. Indeed, the iconographical material alone deserves to attract a very wide audience for several reasons.

The fifty splendid colour reproductions of the Royal Brass Foundry Drawings executed by the Verbruggens form the core of this book. They portray the casting and machining of bronze cannon and are unique. They possess a quality of intimacy and immediacy, of vigour and originality, that sets them apart as works of art from the more didactic engravings associated with the Grande Encyclopédie and the Descriptions des Arts et Métiers. At the
same time, these watercolours are state-
ments of fact rather than conscious glorifi-
cations of mechanical process or of human
genius. Their special quality is probably
due to the fact that the artist was no strang­
er to the industrial process that he illus­
trated; he was a leading innovator in the
century when heavy ordnance production
experienced the greatest technical advances
since gunfounding first appeared in Europe
many centuries before.

Although a work of genuine collabor­
ation, its careful focus on the artifact gives
it a strong sense of unity. In addition to the
beautifully reproduced Verbruggen water-
colours, it contains two chapters on the
Verbruggens written by the late Melvin H.
Jackson and originally published in 1973 in
a work long since out of print. The editor,
who collaborated with Jackson on the ear­
lier work, contributes a completely re­
written chapter on the drawings themselves
and has added English translations from
the French of two important unpublished
eighteenth-century manuscript texts on
gunfounding: David Emanuel Musly’s Traiti
d’Artillerie from the 1760s and Isaac Land­
mann’s notes from the 1790s on founding
bronze guns. Musly’s text aids enormously
in seeing and understanding the Verbrug­
gen drawings. Also included are twenty-six
Musly plates and more than fifty sketches
made by Landmann to accompany his
notes. A further sixty or so contemporary
engravings and modern technical drawings
make this book one of the most profusely
illustrated works ever published to illustrate
the art of gunfounding. A final brief chap­
ter on modern casting technology by J. Th.
von Doesburg, and appendices listing all of
the surviving Verbruggen guns, specifica­
tions, artillery nomenclatures, glossary and
notes combine to make this the most com­
plete study of the subject available in Eng­
lish and perhaps any language. Its publica­
tion was made possible by a generous
grant-in-aid from the Prins Bernhard Fonds
in the Netherlands. This book’s approach
to technology from social and contextual
perspectives as well as a strictly technical
one moderates any appeal to simple
determinism. The Art of Gunfounding
embodies art, scholarship and generous
support for both that is all too rare. The
author and publisher have produced a very
valuable contribution to the history of
technology.

James Pritchard
Kingston, Ontario

Brian Lavery. Building the Wooden Walls:
The Design and Construction of the 74-Gun
Ship Valiant. London: Conway Maritime
Press, 1991. 208 pp., maps, photographs,
drawings, bibliography, index. £25, cloth;

Introducing Brian Lavery as an expert on
eighteenth century British warships is far
from necessary—his numerous works would
require their own section on a library shelf.
His latest project, Building the Wooden
Walls: The Design and Construction of the
74-Gun Ship Valiant is rather new so a few
words regarding it are in order.

As its title suggests, the book deals
with a Third Rate Ship of the Line, one
that was so successful that her design was
copied many times with only minor alter­
ations for a period of more than twenty
years. In 1747 the French seventy-four gun
Invincible was captured by and commis­
sioned into the Royal Navy where she
performed so well that the Admiralty
decided to build two ships based on her
hull design: the Triumph, to be built at
Woolwich, and the Valiant, to be built at
Chatham. It is here that the description of
how Valiant was constructed begins.
Lavery starts with an informed explanation of how ships' draughts were prepared, works his way through all aspects of construction that even includes harvesting timber and founding guns, and finishes with a fully manned ship, before outlining her career. While this has been done before in various formats, a reader would have to consult many sources to find the broad overview presented here, and still not find all the details included in this book.

If this were not enough (and here I have saved the best for last), the book also describes all the facilities of Chatham Dockyard at the time *Valiant* was built, again in great detail. Since little has been written on the subject of dockyards, this is most welcome. It is assumed that *Valiant* was built in dock number one, a dry dock proper, and of particular interest is the description of this dock and of how ships were floated to launch, as opposed to the more usual slipway technique. *Victory* too was built in dock number one at Chatham; indeed her keel was laid less than a year after *Valiant*’s launch, thus indicating the importance of such facilities. Lavery also describes the buildings which then existed there. Chatham Dockyard was recently restored as an historic attraction; because Lavery is Assistant Curator at Chatham Historic Dockyard, he was ideally positioned to write on this subject.

The years of *Valiant*’s career were active and historically significant ones for the world in general and Britain in particular. For the era beginning with the Seven Years’ War and ending with Trafalgar, *Valiant* is probably as close as one could come to finding an archetypal seventy-four gun ship. With this book Lavery has done a remarkable job of portraying an important part of the naval world during *Valiant*’s lifespan. As with Laveyis other works, this book is rich with photos, reprints of contemporary paintings and lithographs and of course his own sketches.

John McKay
Langley, British Columbia


Carl Swanson sets out to establish the legitimacy and importance of privateering ("the basic maritime strategy" in America), to rescue it from comparative obscurity at the hands of naval, economic and business historians, and to demonstrate its part in the political economy of eighteenth-century mercantilism as an act of patriotic endeavour, producing windfall profits for some and relieving the national budget of the burden of a larger navy. These goals are developed in seven closely woven chapters dealing with the popularity and rules of privateering, shipping, the competition for seamen, theatres of operation for Colonial and Spanish/French privateers and the impact on commerce (not least the escalating cost of wages, freight and insurance). There are thirty-eight tables, an appendix on the sophisticated computer data file, and forty pages of notes. The results exemplify the need for similar regional war-by-war studies both for colonial and British privateering set within Swanson's comprehensive framework.

The major source was the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, which observed high standards of accuracy since all matters concerning shipping were of vital concern to the American colonies and their trading ventures. Also used are other contemporary newspapers, surviving Vice-Admiralty court records and
other documents and business papers which leaven the text. Some 3,973 cases form the data base. Under rigorous analysis these are distilled into a wealth of information about owners, ships, armaments, crews and recruiting, reports of actions, casualties, seasons of operations, losses and recaptures, prize ships and cargoes and their values, naval and enemy activities. The temptations to revert to piracy were apparently avoided, though some elements of buccaneering did persist. Thus, in some cases the unwaged crew had the power to determine the distribution of their share of prize (worth two-thirds of the overall value; the British rate was fifty per cent maximum) to the disadvantage of any landsmen on board. This caused recruitment problems in an already difficult labour market. The division of power between captain and quartermaster compelled Admiral Vernon to remark "till the Constitution is altered, I fear they will generally prove a Nursery of Pirates." Swanson refers to neither of these points nor to the logistics of despatching, reprovisioning, repairing and careening privateers on their seven-month cruises to the Caribbean, 2,000 miles from home. But these are minor matters.

Some 343 American and 123 British West Indian privateers took at least 829 prizes-88% were enemy ships and corsairs, 4.1% were neutrals, and the rest were recaptures. The navy accounted for 339 prize actions, for a gross total of 1168 successful prize actions. Swanson estimates that the gross value of the prizes amounted to about £7.5 million sterling; his estimates of prize values may seem overly high to British readers but they mostly emanated from the Caribbean, the honey pot; British privateers had to be satisfied with the leftovers, coastal traffic and such pickings as they could find in the Mediterranean.

This excellent study correlates commerce-raiding with other maritime and mercantile activities and provides a timely corrective to any overemphasis on British privateering. The effect on the trade war in the English Atlantic as a whole now demands a continuation and conclusion in the Seven Years' War, using Swanson's framework. I nearly lost the book twice; two acquaintances having little knowledge of the subject picked it up and became deeply immersed in it. It is a "must" for interdisciplinary studies of maritime affairs and the economy; obviously it also has an appeal to a wider public.

Peter Raban
Market Harborough, Leicester


Anyone with an interest in the events of the American Revolution will be pleasantly surprised by this book. Few will have been aware of the Spanish occupation of the Bahamas from 1782-1783, and the campaign will probably remain an intriguing sideshow in most histories, but the author is to be commended for a solid piece of work. The careful reader will gain much insight into how war was waged by British, American and Spanish authorities, and especially how inter-service rivalries and personal ambitions could befoul the best intentions of skilled officers.

Let it be said at the start that this is not the stuff of heroic exploit: there are no naval battles or dramatic landings, and both the conquest and the recapture caused few casualties. This lack of dramatic action
reflects the fact that the Bahamas were low on the priority lists of all participants. The British had far too much to worry about elsewhere, and the Spanish aimed first at Gibraltar, and secondly at Jamaica. The Bahamas episode emerged as a peripheral operation to the latter. Spanish resources were so committed to the Gibraltar enterprise that they needed French naval assistance to cover the Jamaica operation. This assistance could not be provided until 1781, when France assigned a naval force to the Caribbean, but even then warships were so scarce that the only escort available for the Spanish transports was an American frigate in Havana by chance. The plan was for the troops to make a quick capture of the Bahamas and then return to join the imminent assault on Jamaica. The capture was virtually painless, as the British had no real garrison and the citizens were insufficiently motivated by patriotic zeal to risk life and property in a futile gesture of resistance.

The Spanish occupation elicited little opposition; the locals were willing to make the best of it. This changed when Spanish authorities began to react to the continuing depredations of the Nassau privateers, a numerous and predatory swarm. Fines and confiscations eroded the new loyalties among the wealthy, who began to rethink their role under the Spanish regime. When an expedition of South Carolina Loyalists mounted an attack to retake the Bahamas, the Spanish found they had lost any support they might have expected from their now reluctant subjects. The retaking of the islands created a diplomatic nightmare because the war was by then over. The hapless Spanish commander, Captain Claraco, knew this but the attackers pretended otherwise for fear their hopes for financial gain would disappear if peace had broken out. Eventually the reoccupation occurred with minimal loss of life; the Spanish and British then coexisted while the dispute was argued at higher levels. In the end, the Spanish tired of the game and withdrew all forces, except the ever-unfortunate Claraco. That wretched officer emerges as the most sympathetic character in the whole episode. A reasonable and professional man, he had the misfortune to back the wrong horse in inter-service political squabbles, and when his patron went down, the enemies (particularly the all-important financial officials) made his life hell and his job impossible. In fact he spent the next ten years fighting charges arising from his brief governorship, sometimes from prison.

The book is thus a window on many facets of eighteenth-century war. Those accustomed to thinking the British were incompetent dolts in this war will be cheered to discover the Spanish were possibly worse. It is to the author's immense credit that the book is based on very extensive research in archives on both sides of the Atlantic. He also tells a story very well, and writes with clarity on very complex issues. For the reader, the "final campaign" is an enjoyable episode; for poor Claraco, and the many privateer owners who never recovered their confiscated property, one might say "it was bitter in the Bahamas."

Paul Webb
London, Ontario


This is a year-by-year chronology of the US Navy and Marine Corps. Jack Sweetman
manages to find a significant event for each year from 1775 to the Gulf War, including the years 1785 to 1794 when no US naval force existed. He covers operations and battles, the acquisition and loss of major warships, peacetime achievements, technological advances, the dates of appointment of those placed in authority over the service, even references to external events that influenced the activities of the Navy and the Marines. All this is conveniently referenced in the four-way indexes (by month and day, by US naval vessel, by merchant and other naval vessel, and general). Illustrations are well-chosen and, in many cases, quite unusual. Unfortunately, the maps do not maintain the quality of the book.

This may be the ultimate trivia book for naval enthusiasts, ideal for quiet evenings by the library fire relishing major and minor events in the story of the most powerful navy the world has known. Consider, for example, the career of USS Peacock. In 1841, her ship's company managed to destroy three native villages in Samoa, two native villages in the Gilberts and finally to wreck their ship on a bar off the mouth of the Columbia River. The True Blue Saloon in Valparaiso was a different species of bar. Here a liberty party from USS Baltimore encountered a less-than-respectful group of locals in October 1891. By December matters had escalated to the point where war between the United States and Chile was possible. However, cooler heads prevailed because, as Sweetman tells us, "Americans are chagrined to note that materially the Chilean fleet is superior to their own." (p. 100)

The serious reader will undoubtedly notice the incredible number of times that the USN and the Marines have intervened in the affairs of other countries (approximately 133 times). He or she will also be impressed by the speed and manner of the USN's response to the challenge of 7 December, 1941. It's quite a chronology.

David Fry
Toronto, Ontario


With the widespread use of quantitative methodology and the increasingly sophisticated examination of sources, historians have been treated to various "new" histories. First came the "new economic" history followed by the "new social," the "new political," and even the "new military" history. Now, Christopher McKee has given us the "new naval" history, and what a welcome addition it is! Eschewing the standard practice of naval historians who concentrate primarily on tactics and operations, McKee focuses instead on the social history of the men who formed the early republic's naval officer corps.

The author devoted twenty years to this book, and it shows. The research is impressive. McKee began by constructing a data file containing all officers who served in the Navy from 5 June 1794, the date of the first captains' commissions, to 13 February 1815, the day before Washington learned the War of 1812 had ended. More than 2,900 individuals are included in the file, based on numerous materials in Washington's National Archives such as service records, muster and pay rolls, log books, the extensive correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and naval officers, as
well as numerous other government records, supplemented by newspaper obituaries, local histories, and genealogies. Forty-five tables and eight charts support the text. Dozens of portraits of the officers illustrate the book.

The study is arranged topically and explores the most significant aspects of naval life. McKee presents the Navy's administrative structure and the most important ranks that comprised the officer corps—captain, master commandant, lieutenant, and midshipman. He also does an admirable job of providing the historical context. Despite the important service paid to democracy and egalitarianism in the new republic, deference dominated the Navy's world view. Society was hierarchical. Some were born to command and lead, others to obey and follow. Naval officers, of course, were gentlemen with the right to command.

McKee sketches the world inhabited by midshipmen, the lowest rung on the promotion ladder. Their geographic origins, family background, age (they were not young boys as is commonly believed), education, and political affiliations are explored. Their life at sea within "wooden walls" is examined. McKee emphasizes that midshipmen learned how to become officers through active service: "each ship was a floating classroom." (p. 194) Socializing and interacting with more senior officers provided a practical, professional sea education. The Navy's regulations, based heavily on Great Britain's, were successfully internalized.

Considerable attention is given to the severity of shipboard discipline, a favourite topic of naval historians. For breaches of regulations, officers confined men in irons, beat them with rope ends, or flogged them with the cat-o'-nine-tails. Capital offenses were extremely rare, however, and only three men were executed in the pre-1815 navy. McKee's assessment of naval discipline seems overly favourable. Despite a prohibition on more than twelve lashes with the cat, McKee demonstrates that nearly 40% of the known floggings exceeded the legal limit. In addition, McKee casually dismisses the most widespread punishment, rope end floggings, which could render a sailor's back "a mass of blood," (p. 237) because such beatings were so common no one bothered to keep records. After comparing naval floggings to the use of the lash on antebellum plantations, McKee surprisingly asserts that enlisted men supported flogging in the same degree as their officers. His own evidence (pp. 234-237, 258-261, 264) suggests that, like the slaves, sailors possessed a different outlook.

The quest for promotion and financial rewards receives much attention. McKee shows the keen competition for advancement through the ranks. Administrators and officers were at odds over the relative importance of merit and seniority, though significant victories over the enemy earned rapid promotions. McKee emphasizes the role of financial remuneration in the decision to become an officer. Few positions in the early republic paid monthly wages year after year like the Navy. Once at sea, officers sought windfall earnings by capturing enemy vessels. McKee's discussion of prize money is thorough and perceptive.

McKee concludes by examining the most common reasons for officers leaving the service. Most resigned, believing that sea service was primarily for younger men. Nearly one-sixth were cashiered. About one-fifth were discharged in reduction of force. Death claimed another fifth, though only fifty men were killed in action. The sea claimed more lives than the enemy.

McKee has made a major contribution to naval and maritime history as well as
early American social history. This book will also be of great value to anyone interested in the War of 1812.

Carl E. Swanson
Greenville, North Carolina


Donald Yerxa, a history professor at Eastern Nazarene College in Massachusetts, notes that the prevailing view of United States' strategic interest in the Caribbean region in the first half of the twentieth century is Mahanian. Alfred Thayer Mahan envisioned the Caribbean as an "American Lake," the soft underbelly of mainland defence, and with the opening of the Panama Canal, the huge pivot area necessary for a one-ocean navy to fulfil two-ocean commitments. While not rejecting Mahan's thesis, Yerxa relies on a more illuminative model, "maritime empire," advanced by College of Charleston historian, Clark G. Reynolds, for understanding US naval activity in the Caribbean. Historically, according to this model, maritime empires have exhibited two recurrent and complementary concerns: the need to protect the imperial sphere of influence from external threats, and the need to police it to remove internal threats to the empire's stability.

Yerxa notes that by strategic instinct and British example, the US established a maritime empire in the Caribbean after the Spanish American War. Construction of the Panama Canal transformed the Caribbean region into the most crucial area in the United States' strategic purview. Washington charged the US Navy with defending the region from outside threats and policing the region to silence fomenters of instability. Both missions shared a common objective, national and regional security. External defence demands required the navy to plan for war, develop bases, mount fleet exercises, consider fleet deployment and conduct actual wartime operations. Internal policing consisted largely of implementing State Department policies that included gunboat diplomacy, support of armed interventions and various goodwill measures. In 1917 and 1941 the Navy's activities involved deployment of major fleet units in the Caribbean to counter anticipated German naval thrusts or to mount the antisubmarine operations of 1942-1943. These naval activities, Yerxa contends, resulted in the establishment and maintenance of an American maritime Caribbean empire. In founding this empire, the US Navy performed in classic manner consistent with the activities of other great naval-marine empires throughout history.

*Admirals and Empire* is based largely upon archival papers, and the breadth and quality of Yerxa's research is admirable. There are some important omissions. Yerxa described Fleet Problem XX of January 1939 when American naval vessels passed en masse through the Panama Canal on their way to wage a two-week naval "battle" off the shores of the Windward Islands. The exercise illustrated the inadequacy of American naval and air bases in the Caribbean and provided President Franklin D. Roosevelt with the support he needed for further acquisitions. Under the Anglo-American Destroyers-Bases agreement in September 1940, the US transferred fifty World War I vintage destroyers to Britain in exchange for base rights in the Caribbean and British Guiana. Yerxa fails to mention that the bases acquired at the same time in Newfoundland
and Bermuda were leased to the Americans with no strings attached.

Yerxa also overlooks Roosevelt's negotiations to acquire British bases in June 1939. American naval officers hastily inspected sites and drafted, backdated and signed leases to secure land for bases in Bermuda and St. Lucia and aviation installations in Trinidad in August 1939 before the war began. That summer, Roosevelt also arranged with Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King for American wartime utilization of Halifax naval yard facilities whenever the need arose. The US would have liked to have requested air and naval base sites in Newfoundland in 1939 too, but were afraid of Canadian objection.

Notwithstanding these oversights, Admirals and Empire fills an important gap in the strategic history of the United States. It should interest students of US Naval and diplomatic history.

David Pierce Beatty
Sackville, New Brunswick


Interest in the aerial aspects of World War I has blossomed in the last twenty years. The personal, technological, organizational and operational dimensions of aviation in this formative period are receiving increasingly systematic attention. As a result, opportunities arise for the publication of material on the more obscure parts of the story of the air war. The Price of Honor is an excellent example of this.

This book provides a fascinating glimpse into the world of early United States Navy aviation and its role in World War I. The book is based on some two hundred letters written by Kenneth MacLeish, a member of the privately sponsored First Yale Unit of USN aviators, to his fiancée, Priscilla Murdoch. The letters are supplemented by others written to his family and friends and cover the period from March 1917, when he joined the Unit, to his death in action on 14 October, 1918. The letters are divided into the major periods of MacLeish's service and annotated to identify individuals to whom reference is made in the text. The editor also includes contextual material to provide background and thirty-eight well-reproduced photographs.

The letters give us a unique insight into the early days of US naval aviation. They reflect the confusion in organizing a force for participation in a major conflict, the very small community of people concerned and the influence of relatively junior officers, the alienation felt by those serving in Europe from the naval establishment in the United States and the extent of the casualties among the early volunteers. Just as interesting are the insights into the outlook and social values of upper middle class America as reflected by this well educated young man who had an obvious problem with training enlisted personnel as pilots and the behaviour of many of his compatriots in Paris and London away from the surveillance of their parents.

The book is attractively produced though it lacks maps showing the location of MacLeish's training and service. This need is acute, given the rapidity with which he was transferred during the eleven months he served in England and France.
Despite this minor shortcoming, the book is a useful addition to the literature on the origins of US naval aviation and of air operations in World War I.

Christopher J. Terry
Ottawa, Ontario


This is the story of Lieutenant Commander Hugo Koehler. The book consists largely of edited quotations from Koehler's own writings. His letters and dispatches were collected and prepared by Margaretta Potter, a one time fiancée and life-long friend, then edited by P.J. Capelotti. Both were encouraged by Koehler's step-son, Senator Claiborne Pell.

Koehler emerges as a bold, courageous, sophisticated, generous, career officer in the US Navy. He had remarkable insight and incredible powers of observation combined with a vigorous curiosity. Muscular and attractive to women, he also had a capacity for ruthlessness with those he considered inferior. These qualities together with his linguistic and writing abilities led to unusual appointments where he could witness some of the major events of the first third of this century.

Koehler may have been the illegitimate son of Archduke Rudolph, crown prince of Austria and heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He attended Harvard for a year, then entered the Naval Academy, graduating in 1909. His graciousness as a host was more impressive than his grades. His early exploits included touring the battlefields of Port Arthur, Yangtze Patrol, tiger hunting in Mongolia with European royalty, being arrested as a German spy in Japan, commanding a group of U-boat chasers operating out of Ireland, socializing with upper-class friends in London at the end of World War I, and even winning an official protest against an order to remove his mustache. As an official interpreter with the Allied Naval Armistice Commission he travelled extensively in postwar Germany recording his observations. His reports and letters from Russia during the civil war provide a picture of the White Russian resistance and their eventual defeat. As Naval Attaché to the American Legation in Warsaw Koehler continued his travels and reporting. Returning to a more typical naval career in 1923 he soon became restless. He married the ex-wife of Ambassador Pell in 1927 and resigned from the navy soon after in 1929. Thereafter he did very little, dying in 1941 at age 55.

Capelotti's goal is unclear. Was it to reveal a figure of historical importance, a biography of a great man? Was it to aggrandize a deserving individual? There are excellent descriptions of the military, economic and social conditions at the time of Koehler's travels, yet I could not find any revelation of historical importance in his writings. As a naval biography we observe a capable, intelligent young man of privilege who enjoyed associations beyond those normal for his rank. His career was marked by no struggle, no victory, no defeat; there are no lessons to be learned on leadership, naval tactics or even naval intelligence. His exploits were well known to fellow officers. As his legend grew he was probably viewed as an eccentric specialist. After his naval career he failed to utilize his talents in any beneficial manner. He became an avid dilettante feared by his son and disliked by his wife's friends.
As engaging as Koehler's writings are, and as pleased as I am that Senator Pell is proud of his step-father, two hundred pages plus are more than the Commander deserves. A good Agatha Christie would have been as fertile a read.

Carl W. Ross
Kingston, Ontario


In this book the author tries to describe the politics, economics, and personalities, as well as the machines, involved in German, French, British, and American attempts to establish overseas mail and passenger air services during the 1920s, '30s, and '40s. This is a difficult task. Readers who expect a great deal of technical detail will be disappointed, as will readers who expect detailed political and economic analysis. But, as a general introduction to the rise and demise of the long-range flying boat, the book is quite satisfactory. We learn of the political and bureaucratic in-fighting which allowed Juan Trippe and Pan American Airways to absorb or ruin its rivals; we learn of the idiosyncratic genius of designers such as Glenn L. Martin and Igor Sikorsky; we learn of the crucial role played by government subsidization of overseas airmail routes in the pioneering efforts of Pan Am, Imperial Airways, and Deutsche Luft Hansa.

Although Gandt has chapters on British, French, and German aircraft and overseas routes, his main focus is on U.S. designers, machines, and airlines. The technological superiority of the Boeing 314 over foreign rivals is amply demonstrated. Nevertheless, it would have been interesting to learn more of French efforts which are, for the most part, unknown to Anglophone readers. More information on the six-engine Latecoere 631 would have been particularly welcome. The Tupelov-designed four-engine MTB-2 Soviet flying boat of 1937 is not mentioned at all.

The accounts of the narrow escapes of China Clippers threatened by the Japanese onslaught following Pearl Harbor are exciting. Unfortunately, Gandt omits accounts of equally exciting incidents involving French and British flying boats, such as the organization of an anti-Vichy coup in French Equatorial Africa aboard an Imperial Airways S-30 on the Congo River in August, 1940. Sir Gordon Taylor's dramatic accounts of survey flights in a PBY flying boat of trans-Pacific air routes are also omitted (see Taylor, *The Sky Beyond,* 1963). But such criticism may be unfair. Gandt probably only had space to cover incidents of interest to North American readers. His bibliography will give direction to those who wish to pursue various political, technical and economic aspects of French, British, and German flying boats.

Apart from these general considerations, Gandt's descriptions of Trippe and Lindbergh raise certain questions. Trippe is described as "Republican-oriented;" but, according to Gore Vidal, whose father was an FAA official during the 1930s, Trippe had substantial influence with the Roosevelt Administration, at least initially (see Vidal, *Armageddon,* 1987). Gandt also writes that, with the rise of the Nazis, "the general suspicion of all things German deepened in Britain, France, and the United States." (p. 124) He does not mention that Lindbergh, a top-level adviser to
Trippe and Pan Am, became well-known during the 1930s for his anti-Semitic, Isolationist, and pro-Nazi sentiments.

Despite these problems, *China Clipper* is worth reading. There are numerous well-chosen photographs, line-drawings, and tables comparing various flying boats in terms of passenger capacity, take-off weight, cruise speed, and range.

Dennis Bartels
Corner Brook, Newfoundland


This very useful book provides most of what you need to know about naval arms limitations during the 1920s and 30s in a little over two hundred clear pages of text. In addition to fresh sources from US archives, the author skilfully integrates an enormous collection of books and articles on all the participating powers. There are full references, with helpful critical comments, and a splendid bibliography.

Kaufman took as his point of departure two outstanding recent works, *Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitations, 1914-1922* (Chicago, 1976), Roger Dingman's study of the Washington conference of 1921-2, and *The Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), Stephen Pelz's work on the collapse of naval limitations in the latter part of the 1930s. Both books substantially redefined the subject by demonstrating the decisive impact of domestic politics on the positions of the principal naval powers. The core of Kaufman's work is a sustained analysis of American policy, emphasizing its domestic determinants through the whole inter-war period.

Kaufman finds that all of the inter-war administrations and congresses were imbued with the unrealistic conviction that arms in themselves cause conflict. The original Washington treaties of 1921-2 did have a measure of success but only because the United States' vast "Second to None" naval expansion programme of 1916 had alarmed Japanese and British leaders, who in any case were genuinely interested in political detente. But this was not understood at the time. Succeeding administrations, supported by an electorate interested only in peace and prosperity, relentlessly pursued naval limitations for their own sake, surrendering the United States' main bargaining chip by allowing the navy to dwindle far below treaty limits. Moreover, American leaders separated limitations from vital political and strategic issues in an effort to appease Japan, even as that power became increasingly totalitarian and impervious to external influences.

The finale came at the Second London conference of 1935-6 where, after Japan withdrew from limitations and embarked on all-out expansion, the United States and Great Britain renewed limitations on themselves in a futile effort to win back Japan by moral suasion. Japan had in fact been violating the treaties for years, and was well prepared to build rapidly in the late 1930s.

The book concludes on an almost entirely negative note: "British and American delegates spent more than fifteen years using the naval arms limitation talks to reduce each other's fleet below levels that Great Britain and the United States had a common interest in maintaining. Japan took advantage of the lavish and illusory expectations the process of naval
limitation epitomized and encouraged." (pp. 193-4) Kaufman explicitly rejects the traditional defence of naval limitations as a vital step in the development of trust and cooperation between the US and Britain.

However, the common Anglo-American interests to which he alludes were by no means as evident as he suggests. He apparently has not consulted work by Brian McKercher and Barry Hunt about grave differences between the two powers that persisted from World War I concerning the rights of a belligerent (Britain) to blockade trade by a neutral (the US). Only good fortune—Germany's politically foolish decision to embark on unrestricted submarine warfare—had headed off an Anglo-American crisis over the blockade question. None of the substantive issues had ever been resolved. Much of the Anglo-American bargaining over naval reductions in fact turned on the critical question as to whether Britain would be able to employ its traditional and successful strategy in a future war without facing armed resistance from a neutral US that now possessed a fleet equal to Britain's. McKercher and Hunt's discoveries, moreover, support the work of scholars such as David Reynolds and James Leutze on the difficulties and slow pace of emerging Anglo-American cooperation in 1937-41. Both the politically isolationist US and a still-proud Great Britain were extremely reluctant to accept the implications of the shift of power from the Old World to the New, and to put aside genuine ideological, and economic as well as strategic differences.

These, however, are points of interpretation open to further work. Kaufman's contribution is valuable and welcome.

Roger Sarty
Ottawa, Ontario


At the end of World War I the world's navies faced a complex dilemma concerning the future of warship design. The conflict had shown that navies could not rely solely on the traditional big-gun battleship, and supporting cruisers and destroyers, for control of the sea. While the battleship was not obsolete, it had to share centre stage with new technological developments such as the submarine and the aircraft carrier.

The roles of these relatively new forms of warships were not clear, particularly in the case of the aircraft carrier which had not proven its true operational value. That aircraft had an invaluable reconnaissance role was obvious, but there was much uncertainty about their capabilities as a weapon against maritime targets. Could an aircraft carrier rely on aircraft as its main weapon system? Did they require sufficient big gunnery armament to ward off enemy warships they could not outrun? Would some form of hybrid carrier-battleship or carrier-cruiser have a role to play in fleet or single-ship operations? All of these questions were hotly debated in the interwar years. We know now that the correct approach was to develop the true carrier, relying on its own complement of aircraft as its principal offensive and defensive weapons. In this unusual book the authors have focused their study on another school of thought—the attempt to develop hybrids that would mix big guns with aircraft on a single platform.
The authors should be praised for tackling this topic. Often technological dead-ends or oddities are ignored by historians who all too frequently show technical development as being linear and progressive. This book is at its strongest in its well considered and fascinating account of the extensive effort that went into developing the idea of the hybrid warship in the period between 1918 and 1939. It does not just consider the construction of actual hybrid warships, of which there were few, but also examines in detail the never-carried-out plans, both fanciful and serious, to build them.

The authors have gone to great lengths to document fully all of the hybrid warships schemes, including, whenever possible, drawings and photographs of the vessels. This visual record is a remarkable study of the might-have-been. One can trace the hybrid developments back to the most famous of them, HMS Furious. As first completed in 1918, Furious had an aircraft platform aft, a massive 18-inch gun forward and, in between, a full superstructure. Admittedly a failure because its small aircraft deck and dangerous air currents from the superstructure and funnel gases made landing too dangerous, Furious did not end the dream of combining these two very different types of weapons.

Particularly fascinating is the account of the United States Navy's extensive planning for flying-deck cruisers which lasted throughout the 1930s. Many senior admirals including Ernest King, William Moffat and Robert Ghormley supported one or more of the schemes proposed for these ships, only to allow the plans to die when, according to the authors (p. 101), money became available for larger pure carriers. It is surprising here that the authors make no mention of the US Navy's experiences with USS Ranger, which, although considerably bigger than the proposed cruiser-carrier combination, was found too small for successful carrier operations.

Equally intriguing about this section of the book is that it does not fall into the trap of focusing on the major navies but also gives extensive coverage of just about every hybrid project considered. This includes the construction of the Swedish cruiser-seaplane carrier Gotland and unexecuted American designs for Soviet hybrid battleships.

The authors would have done well if they had taken this first section of the book and expanded it. Although there are hints throughout that they are familiar with the current writings on the development of the aircraft carrier, battleship and cruiser during the interwar years, they provide no systematic criticism of this writing for failing to consider the hybrid warship. Nor is there any comparison with hybrid submarine developments, many more of which were actually constructed.

The second half of the book which covers the period from 1939 to the present is unfortunately far less satisfactory. Throughout the work, the authors struggle with the definition of hybrid warships, often involving lengthy discussion about whether or not a ship fits into this category. While it serves a purpose to discuss the hybrid nature of the pre-war USS Lexington and Saratoga, their arguments for extending the discussion into the World War II and post-war period are unconvincing. The authors set five as the rather arbitrary minimum number of aircraft that must be carried if a ship is to be considered a hybrid. Thus, while there is no discussion of development of seaplanes for cruiser and battleship use, ships such as the UN's Tone-class are hybrids because they carried a few more aircraft than other ships. While it can be
The Northern Mariner

argued that the Japanese seaplanes were more versatile than those of other navies, the Tone-class' capabilities were only marginally better than other UN cruisers. In the chapters on the post-war period the reader must accept the authors' argument that guns are neatly replaced by missiles on such ships as the Kiev or the Invincible and that helicopters are equivalent to seaplanes. There seems to be no appreciation of the changing nature of the technological problems. How, for instance, can the British Invincible-class be considered a hybrid if its only weapon systems other than aircraft are anti-aircraft missiles? Are these not more closely related to aircraft in their speed and long-range than to guns? Are most major warships now a hybrid because they carry helicopters? If so, why is there no discussion of frigates and destroyers that now rely on helicopters as one of their principle weapon systems?

With so many questions unanswered, the book degenerates into an incomplete and unsatisfactory study. The authors should have accepted their own arguments that the hybrid warship of the 1920s and '30s was a technological dead-end and not tried to link them with the very different ships of contemporary navies. Had they done so, they would have had a much more intriguing and valuable historical work.

David Zimmerman
Victoria, British Columbia


Jonathan Utley, a professor at the University of Tennessee, set out to provide a more comprehensive history of an individual warship by setting the subject more against the context of the times in which she served. In a well-written, extensively researched account that embodies elements of social, technological and operational history, Utley successfully presents a marvellous account of the battleship USS Tennessee, whose career stretched from 1921 to 1947.

Utley covers the "Big T" in both peace and war but the inter-war section is the more interesting and of most value to historians. We learn how design decisions, some good, some bad, affected the ship's performance; how changes in weaponry affected battleship tactics; about the lengths officers would go to earn coveted efficiency ratings; and how what was once the most advanced ship in the US Navy steadily became obsolescent in comparison to potential rivals. Most illuminating, however, are the sections dealing with day-to-day life onboard a peacetime battleship. From recruiting to discipline to messing to training to the treatment of venereal disease, Utley paints an intriguing portrait of American naval life during the inter-war period.

Utley loses little momentum with "Old Blisterbutt's" abrupt transition from peace to war. A survivor of Pearl Harbor, the battleship was too slow to operate with the fast carriers but found a new role in bombardment and fire support. This was a difficult transition and new methods had to be learned to increase efficiency. That the ship was successful in doing so is evident from her arduous thirty-seven day ordeal off Okinawa where she provided effective fire support while withstanding determined Kamikaze attack. To increase emphasis on the importance of this new role, Utley pays relatively little attention to Tennessee's participation in the victory at Surigao Strait. This reader would have been inter-
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ested in the reaction of the old "gun-club" who undoubtedly shed tears of joy as the US battleline crossed the Japanese T!

Utley's book sets a new standard for individual ship's histories, and there is certainly room for such a volume in Canadian naval historiography. It is highly recommended for academics and buffs alike.

Michael Whitby
Almonte, Ontario


The "Anatomy of the Ship" series is aimed at the technically-minded marine historian, model builder and marine artist. It has set high standards in research, photography, graphics and publishing. This particular volume maintains all these qualities to a high degree. Conceived for the 1912 building programme, the Warspite and her four sister battleships were altered in their design stage to enable them to surpass the new 14" gun ships being built for the American and Japanese navies. The increased hitting power of the new 15" gun allowed the removal of one turret from the design, thus providing more room for additional boilers and greater resulting speed. Thus the concept of the fast battleship was born.

Completed in 1915, Warspite joined the Fifth Battle Squadron and was present the next year at Jutland. Her first major refit came in 1926 and altered her appearance considerably. In 1934-37 Warspite was completely rebuilt, emerging with new air defence systems, spotter-aircraft on catapults and a silhouette new to British battle-ships. During World War II she served with distinction at the Second Battle of Narvik, in the Mediterranean theatre, where she was Admiral Cunningham's flagship at the Battle of Matapan, and at Crete where she was heavily damaged by air attack. Later she took part in many shore bombardments in Italy, France and North Africa, finishing her war supporting the Normandy landings in June 1944. In 1947, while in tow to Faslane for breaking up, she parted her line and went ashore on the Cornish coast. Over the next nine years she was broken up there in situ.

Watton gives a brief design and service history of Warspite as well as a useful career summary in his introduction. He describes her construction, general arrangements, machinery, protection, weapons systems and aircraft in a very complete manner. Details of the alterations carried out at her significant refits and the 1934-37 reconstruction are adequately covered as are the changes made during World War II. There follows twenty-one pages of photographs of the ship in all stages of her life. These visually enhance the written descriptions.

The drawings in the final section of the book are exceptionally well done, though some inconsistencies and a lack of notes might confuse the uninitiated. All the General Arrangement Drawings in Section A are to 1/450th scale. This is a different scale to deal with for modelling purposes. Much of the detail of the A1 External Profile (p. 40) is lost in the centre binding of the book. Perhaps the Anatomy series, in their modern ships at least, should opt for a 1/32" scale, with a fold-out plan format. These two improvements would solve both problems. The inclusion of complete lines drawings at a common scale would be of greater use to the student of naval architecture. Lines of the hull before and after the addition of torpedo bulges
would make an interesting comparison. I also believe that a supplementary external profile, covering changes made in the 1926 refit, would add continuity to the train of alterations made to the ship over its long life. There is some difficulty in relating the superstructure deck plans E6/1 to E6/5 to the profile E6/6. (p.82) Not all the deck plans for each level are shown. The spotting top is not shown at all. In Section G the beautifully drawn armament details G1/1 to G1/13 have incomplete notes, (pp. 94-96) There is no description of the function of the detailed components, leaving the reader with little idea of how the mounting actually functions. A scale plan and elevation of the pom-pom mounting would clarify its design, size and operation in addition to the perspective view shown (G6 p. 100). The steam pinnace and admiral's barge (K3 and K4) would be enhanced if there was a scale general arrangement plan and profile as done in K5, K6 and K7, K3 and K4. (p. 112) Other boats K1 to K13 have no scales indicated on their drawings, (pp. 113-115) In Section L, dealing with the ship's aircraft, it would be interesting to see, for comparison purposes, the dimensions of the respective aircraft, a summary of the weapons carried, engine horsepower and flying performance data, all in a tabular form (L1 to L5, pp. 116-120). The disruptive camouflage profile shows no accurate means of determining the true colours. A reference to Humbrol or other modelling paints would establish the exact shades. The description of the camouflage colour on the back dust jacket profile is inaccurate and subject to fading, so is therefore of little use.

The quality of the line and wash renderings of the ship in the frontispiece and in the introduction to the drawings is to be complimented, (p. 38) The painting on the front dust jacket is commendable and shows Warspite heavily engaged during the Battle of Jutland with German units.

With these comments and criticisms in mind, it is the reviewer's opinion that Watton's The Battleship Warspite is great value for the money and will provide the casual reader as well as the serious student with a deep insight into the design and construction of the twentieth century capital ship.

D.B. Munro
Ottawa, Ontario


This is a useful book. Ollard moves on sure footing through the relationships of naval and political personalities. His considerable knowledge of the seventeenth century is illuminating when applied to events of the twentieth century. Arthur Marder's Lord Fisher comes back to us as the miraculous genius that he was. Cunningham, the keeper of the Mediterranean, is brought out from the grey pages of A Sailor's Odyssey here as a considerable figure, a real ferocious admiral, and Ollard shows how it was that "ABC," as he was known, deserves even more recognition. Churchill, who is brought in to link Fisher and Cunningham, together with their respective generations, occupies a good deal of space.

The book has problems. In the Cunningham section the identification of action sequences in time is not clearly delineated. Secondly, Cunningham's cutting edge is too often dulled by explanation or clarification. Ollard's great virtue is that he has affection for the Navy and the historical characters he writes about. It is clear that Churchill often outrages him, but he keeps to the
traditional British interpretation that depicts that Great Man as frustrating in detail, yet indispensable to the big canvas.

There is fundamentally serious purpose behind this accomplished writing. At the core of this book is OUard's feeling that despite the efforts of naval historians and other naval writers, the Navy has been done down. In two world wars the Royal Navy's part has been consistently upstaged by chroniclers of the activities of politicians, soldiers, and airmen. This, in my view, is a correct assessment, and it is a pity that OUard did not stake the claim more blatantly. But the book does challenge aspects of Churchill. It does so through the contrast between Churchill's insensitive handling of the French warship problem and that of "ABC," and it does so by showing how "ABC" overcame other problems of his key command despite Churchill's overbearing interfering. Churchill had a landsman's view of the movement of sea power, and, indeed, of combined operations. OUard understands this, and he shows how Cunningham, holding the Mediterranean command, the lynch-pin of the Empire, and sometimes of the Alliance, enhanced his post by his presence. Moving between Churchill's assessments and his supply realities he kept his connecting link open, and enabled the first land launchings to take place in his arena. Eisenhower understood and acknowledged Cunningham's part in the Alliance strategy. Cunningham was not what North Americans would term a "nice" man; he was a recognizable type out of an ancient traditionalist dock, the Royal Navy. He was not a man to be easily intimidated by two cap badges, pearl-handled revolvers, Ernest J. King, nor even by long Cuban cigars! Ollard is right to point out how the Imperial lynch-pin in the Mediterranean was such a vital figure, and this book increases one's respect for such a determined driver. I hope it is widely read and sets many readers thinking about the proposition that the Royal Navy was the dominant service in two wars for Empire. It was the politicians who lost their nerve and perspective.

Donald M. Schurman
Kingston, Ontario


The role and contribution of British admirals to the Allied victory in World War II is a familiar story, and on the surface there seems little that can be added to it. Using the technique of prosopography—collective biography—Martin Stephen has, however, painted an alternative portrait of the Royal Navy's senior officers.

Stephen notes that the admirals came from military families, although not necessarily naval. More important perhaps, most of them benefitted from the Fisher and Selborne reforms of 1902. Common entry training and the opportunity for cadets to specialize in courses other than gunnery were just two of the changes. There were "top commanders who were gunners in the Second World War: the majority were not." (p.49) The new breed of RN flag officer was represented by those who specialized in other branches such as signals and the submarine service. Unlike the earlier generation, they usually had a firm grasp of new technology and were more willing to exploit it. Their experience during and following World War I laid the groundwork
for their subsequent success. Command of destroyers, often against superior forces, was, Stephen argues, the greatest common denominator among the top commanders, (p. 16) Command of distant stations during the inter-war period gave them the opportunity to exercise initiative away from the ever-watchful eye of the Admiralty.

Stephen's conclusions frequently differ from the traditional historiography. Thus, he exonerates Phillips for the loss of *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*, arguing that Phillips was aware of the threat posed by air power to capital ships. He blames the destruction of Force Z on poor communications between the R.A.F and the RN that resulted in the failure to provide air cover. He also argues that Force Z was inadequately equipped to deal with the Japanese and should never have been sent in the first place. Similarly, in re-evaluating Admiral Cunningham's contribution, he argues that Cunningham was the product of an earlier period and had no real grasp of air power, that he dismissed technology and was a poor planner. Stephen argues convincingly that the victory at Taranto had more to do with pre-war planning than with Cunningham's direction of that operation.

The book is not without problems. Stephen accepts that "it was Noble and Horton who between them fought—the Battle of the Atlantic—the largest and the most important battle," (p. 208) yet he barely touches on their contribution to the Allied victory. Equally troublesome is his assessment of the hunter/killer groups formed around fleet carriers early in the war. Initially he declares that, "as an idea based on the hoped-for performance of aircraft and asdic, it was perfectly reasonable and worthy of rather less scorn than it has received." (p. 27) Yet later he states that "hunting groups were a disastrous idea current at the start of the war...," (p. 195) echoing the widely accepted view.

Despite these criticisms Stephen sheds some new light on the individuals who led the Royal Navy to victory in World War II and should provoke discussion. The book is a welcome addition to the literature for the scholar and general enthusiast alike.

Shawn Cafferky
Ottawa, Ontario


In this, his first work devoted entirely to modern naval warfare, John Terraine provides us with a fascinating operational history of the struggle between the German U-boat arm and its Allied adversaries for the mastery of the North Sea and Atlantic sea lanes. Twice this century, the U-boats succeeded in completely disrupting seaborne commerce world wide in campaigns of mercantile destruction at enormous cost in human lives and capital.

In the first instance Terraine demonstrates how the ever methodical Germans simply exploited a new weapon and, in a moment of calculated expediency, dared to utilize it to its fullest potential, a move that almost won them the war. In the second instance the author shows how the negligence of British and American naval leaders, and the blindness of their governments gave Hitler's U-boats every opportunity to pick up where their Imperial predecessors had left off. The Allies, Terraine argues, had completely failed to grasp the
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grisly lessons of the 1914-18 war at sea. As a result it took nearly four hard-fought years and the loss of thousands more men and ships before the Nazi U-boat arm was finally and decisively defeated.

Terraine begins with the introduction of the U-boat as a viable weapon just prior to the Great War and continues to the end of German U-boat operations in 1945. In his treatment of the two world wars, Terraine relies heavily on the writings of naval historians and political observers of the periods, but he is careful to present his own analysis and conclusions. For the World War II account of U-boat operations he leans heavily, and properly so too, on the detailed account provided by Grand Admiral Karl Donitz, commander of the U-boat arm throughout the war. The Allied contributors are equally well known and historically sound as the narrative and a glance at the bibliography will demonstrate. This reviewer was especially pleased to find the Royal Canadian Navy's, and the Royal Canadian Air Force's, efforts in the North Atlantic portrayed fairly and realistically. To his credit, Terraine quotes freely from the works of several Canadian authors.

The development, production and distribution of weapons developed or introduced during the wars, and their importance to the war effort, is fully described; the utilization of existing weaponry of all kinds is covered in some detail. Particular attention is paid to the use of aircraft in the anti-submarine role, to the importance of communications of all kinds and especially to radar and sonar.

The work of the Intelligence communities on both sides is particularly well documented. The diverse assortment of personalities and their methods are fully described and analyzed as Terraine skilfully works the effects of this peculiar brand of warfare into the overall fabric of the account.

The values of national military policies and the qualities of political and military leadership provides the framework on which Terraine hangs much of his analytical discussion. The author describes the commanders, their command establishments and staff and arrangements in critical detail. Along the way he provides numerous accounts of the political and military decision making processes at all levels. He also gives the reader some interesting insights into the personalities of the men involved in the conduct of these long and intensive battles.

The action moves from an HQ ashore to the bridge of a corvette to the control room of a submarine and the cockpit of an aircraft and back to a cabinet meeting smoothly and coherently. A master at his art, the author has succeeded in providing an historical account that is at once informative, readable and a valuable reference.

This is a lot of reading. A third of the narrative is devoted to World War II. A quarter of the total volume contains a voluminous collection of endnotes and a comprehensive selection of references.

Dave Perkins
Dartmouth, Nova Scotia


In 1941, even with a world war raging, the United States was still obsessively hostile to rearming. For the British and Russians fighting for their lives, the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor, followed by the declaration of war on the USA by Germany, was a godsend. At last the full might of this nation would be brought into the conflict.

The massive Japanese air attack sank five battleships, three cruisers and three destroyers as well as damaging other ships in harbour and aircraft on the ground. The next big blow to the United States was equally unexpected and even more disastrous. It occurred right on America's Atlantic doorstep. Three days after Pearl Harbor, Germany launched a U-boat assault against the shipping lanes on the eastern seaboard of the United States. Admiral Donitz, the Commander-in-Chief U-boats, detached five long-distance submarines for this purpose. He named the operation "Drumbeat," the blow would come to the Americans like a thunderbolt, all the boats striking their first targets on the same day; the defenders, such as they were, would be scattered and confused. Donitz was right.

In January 1942, the torpedoings began. Over the next six months nearly 400 merchant ships and tankers with their invaluable cargoes were destroyed, often in full sight of shore, within the USN Eastern, Gulf and Caribbean Sea frontiers. Not until July 1942 was a capable anti-submarine organization established and running.

Operation Drumbeat is a meticulous examination of this happy time for U-boats. "Drumbeat's" leading boat, U-123, is selected for particular scrutiny. Beginning with a biography of her captain and a tour of the pens in L'Orient, Gannon skilfully alternates technical analysis with the progress of the operation. Detailed but understandable discussions of submarine machinery, cypher systems, communications, radar, and sonar are interspersed with notes on personnel, dress, customs, discipline, attitudes and even pay. Each torpedoing by U-123 is described in full for both the attacker and his victims. There are excellent descriptions of British intelligence procedures and of German U-boat Command.

The U-boats suffered problems along with their successes. U-123 had no charts of the American east coast with all its shoal waters. Her captain had only an old tourist guide and he nearly ran aground on Long Island. Torpedo failures were common with faulty contact and magnetic pistols and unreliable depth controls. One captain, Peter Cremer, mistakenly sank a most valuable German blockade runner. Hitler himself helped the Allies by diverting twenty U-boats to protect Norway from anticipated British invasion.

Prior to Pearl Harbor, Admiralty representatives had given the USN complete details of their anti-submarine measures, including HF/DF, intercept and the breaking of German Enigma cyphers. Later they kept the USN informed of the daily progress to American waters of the Drumbeat submarines. Yet Admiral King, C-in-C Atlantic, and his staff were totally unprepared for the onslaught. The defence forces allocated were twenty old, slow, small and underarmed cutters and patrol craft. Merchantmen and tankers were routed independently, and seaside communities were not blacked out or even dimmed so that coastal traffic at night was silhouetted in a blaze of lights. Not until May 1942 did ships begin to sail in convoy. These drew the submarines to warships and broke the back of Operation Drumbeat.

This book brings together a vast amount of source material and presents it vividly. Indeed, it is the best book on submarine warfare I have ever read. For any student of naval warfare, Operation Drumbeat is necessary reading.

Latham B. Jenson
Queensland, Nova Scotia


Stern explains his purpose as an attempt to present a detailed technical description of the Type VII U-boat as a weapons system. The idea is excellent, for until now we have had no counterpart to Anthony J. Watts' *The U-Boat Hunters* (1976) which has been a primary source of ready information on combat systems used against German submarines. Stern has achieved much. His selection of photographs, which he has been collecting over the years, and his clear prose cover the major features of Germany's famous "Atlantic Boat." Part One discusses its design genesis; Part Two, characteristic features of hull, propulsion, crew, provisioning and sanitation; Part Three covers its weapons and targeting systems; Part Four its sensor systems (radio, radar, hydrophones and infra-red); and Part Five its defence countermeasures such as anti-radar coatings and decoys, and anti-sonar coatings and decoys. Only occasional infelicities of style make one wonder what he is about. For instance, Part Two begins: "This section will present the physical description of a typical Type VII...with the understanding that there was no such thing." (p. 29) His introduction should have clarified that he was presenting a generic class of boat that underwent a series of significant modifications in its career. Thus one speaks of a VII, a VIIc/41, and a Vlld.

Stern is best when confining himself to description; his section on torpedoes and the notorious torpedo failures is particularly good. He is much less satisfactory in providing historical background; thus, his skimpy and idiosyncratic Introduction (which does not really introduce his topic) explains that in February 1917 Germany's submarines "were finally freed from all political restrictions and allowed to sink merchant ships without warning." (p. 8) This, of course, is far from the truth, for they were forbidden to touch a Swede, or in any way to antagonize the still neutral United States. Similarly, his Annex on Grand Admiral Donitz, a feature touted in the jacket blurb, is entirely gratuitous; it adds nothing to our knowledge, and gives no inkling of the complexities examined in other studies.

The book needed careful editing: footnotes at the end of sections within Parts are hard to find; his frequent use of German is riddled with errors, and nautical terms are sometimes incorrect. Ships and submarines go astern, not backward, and one cooks in the galley not in the kitchen. Also, having decided to compile such a book, why not go to the sources? He mentions visiting archives in Canada, the USA and "Koblenz, Germany." Yet the technical manuals on the equipment he discusses are in the Federal and Military Archives in Freiburg, Germany; and Germany's famous U-Boat Archives in Cuxhaven (Stiftung Traditionsarchiv Unterseeboote) holds a daunting wealth of photographic and other documentation that would have enhanced his book. Still, Stern's book is the only one of its kind on the market and will be a most useful adjunct to the nautical library.
Type XXI U-Boat by Kohl and Rossler is a translation of the excellent work originally published in German in 1988. Its sharp focus lends itself well to the "Anatomy of the Ship" series which is published in the United States by the Naval Institute Press and in Great Britain by Conway Maritime Press. This has entailed certain changes to the established format and approach of the series. The publisher notes, for example, that the drawings have been reproduced from Kohl's highly accurate interpretations of the original blueprints. The changes in no way detract from the work. Mallmann Showell's good introduction on the electro-submarine sets the stage for forty-four pages of superb photographs and sixty-six pages of detailed drawings. This well-translated and clearly presented English-language version provides a wealth of information for both specialist and general reader alike.

Michael L. Hadley  
Victoria, British Columbia


This book deals with the eventual loss of the so-called "pride" of the French Navy Surcouf in which I served for two or three weeks as Canadian liaison officer. She was the biggest submarine ever built; according to Jane's Fighting Ships of 1941, she was 361 feet in length and displaced 2,880 tons surfaced and 4,304 tons submerged. She was armed with twin 8-inch guns, and even carried an airplane in a hanger. Yet, unique as she was, she was hardly the "pride" of the French Navy.

The book deals interestingly with many myths, rumours and fanciful tales which grew up around the vessel. However, in many places it makes brave assertions of fact without enough supporting evidence. Because of a dearth of evidence concerning Surcouf's fate, the giant submarine constitutes a poor subject for historical writing as has been confirmed by much other writing on the subject. And though the author opens and closes the book with praise for the "brave and gallant crew," throughout the book he is extremely critical of the officers and men, and too often without sufficient evidence to support his criticism.

At the outset, we find Surcouf in Devonport and the book deals well with the very difficult situation arising from the defection of a huge submarine from its navy as a result of the defeat of its nation. The inadequacies of both the French and the British led to no less than three shooting deaths on board in the British port. The author is very critical of the design of the submarine and of the efficiency—even of the loyalty—of the crew. Without supporting evidence, we are told that though Surcouf was "useless," Churchill told Admiral Max Horton that she must be kept in service because de Gaulle. At one place the rumour about Surcouf torpedoing allied ships in convoy is supported by reference to another book on the subject, a book which does not inspire confidence as source material.

Occasionally the British author allows his prejudices to show, a mistake in historical writing. Thus he claims that "foreign navies seldom work to the standards of the British," (p. 68) an immodest and probably inaccurate statement which would better become a non-British person. Elsewhere he makes the curiously prejudiced statement that "the only consolation [on Surcouf] was plenty of red wine...kept in a large tank and
about the only item in the submarine that was always in working order." (p. 91)

Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a mere tank not being "in working order."

The author betrays his prejudice again when he writes about "allies like France who collapsed at the first sigh of fighting;" (p. 163) Such an uncharitable observation has, of course, a measure of truth but it does ignore the equally complete collapse of the British before superior forces in continental Europe at the same time.

We are told that a visitor had difficulty in understanding the "patois" spoken by the crew. (p. 134) This is complete nonsense; some of the sailors may have had mild local accents but I found not the slightest difficulty at any time whatsoever in understanding their speech. Similar accent problems existed in British ships and sometimes gave trouble, even with Canadian or American ships in company. Without support, we are told that Surcouf was "filthy;" during my time on board, I found her to be as clean as might be expected of any other vessel. Indeed, much appears to be said based on reports which are said to have disappeared and thus could not have been consulted.

The seizure of St. Pierre and Miquelon by Surcouf and three corvettes under Admiral Muselier is mentioned; it is accompanied by a belief that St. Pierre was sending back to Vichy details about convoy movements; on this score, I have a letter from Derek J. McLcIlan giving no less than fifteen reasons for accepting such a belief. The seizure of the islands pleased Churchill greatly but vastly displeased Roosevelt who was deeply prejudiced against de Gaulle, a man with a well-recognized capacity for earning such adverse prejudice.

The book has much speculation about the submarine's course and speed after leaving Bermuda on her last sailing; the author concludes that Surcouf was probably in collision with the American merchant ship Thompson Lykes. Rusbridger maintains that this collision spelled the death of Surcouf with the deaths of all 132 people on board.

While the book constitutes very interesting reading and the author writes well, too much is urged without supporting evidence. Because of the paucity of evidence on the subject, the subject is nothing short of a trap for historians.

L.C. Audette
Ottawa, Ontario


This book was written from the notes in a journal kept by a serving naval officer, although this was forbidden by regulations. The entries from the journal are organized around the patrols of the two submarines on which Mendenhall served, USS Sculpin and USS Pintado. There are two parallel story lines in the book as a result of this documentary foundation. One of these is the rise of Corwin Mendenhall from Ensign to Lieutenant Commander and Executive Officer. The other is the rebound of the American Navy from the dark days following Pearl Harbor to the sense of coming victory as the Japanese merchant and naval fleets drew back to their home islands.

The reader is introduced to a peculiar set of warriors. The author attempts to present to us the subculture of these underwater sailors crammed together in close quarters and therefore living in one another's pockets. He notes the ties of camaraderie that develop among these men. The incipient claustrophobia of such a life
becomes real for the reader as the crew waits submerged to learn of the success or failure of a torpedo attack. Quickly, the hunter can become the hunted. The casualty rate among submariners was high. No attempt is made to dramatize these events. They appear in their chronological place as successes or failures and then the patrol goes on.

What is striking about this book is the realization that the sort of mundane activities that one would expect to find in any standard naval establishment ashore occurred on a submarine in a war zone. For example, bridge tournaments as well as other contests took place under water. The letters from home and the other staples of postal communication, such as parcels and publications, have their place. But, in addition, there was a certain amount of horseplay and, of course, some friction arising from clashes between incompatible personalities. Mendenhall relates his differences, as an Executive Officer, with his commanding officer. One of his frustrating situations occurred because he believed that he had been prevented from obtaining command of his own vessel. Studying and training for promotions and upgrading went on as the stalking of enemy vessels took place.

A very traditional aspect of the patrols was the intermittent renewal of contact with life on land when the sailors put into port in order to carry out repairs and to enjoy the relaxation and leisure activities provided there. Even here, there is no romanticizing on the part of the author. All in all, life aboard a submarine is made to seem ordinary. But, the references to friends and relatives to the crew who were lost in action provide a reminder that war is carried out in a lethal environment.

Gerald Panting
St. John's, Newfoundland


The author is an historian of the war at sea, 1939-45, now writing a two-volume history of US Army Marine Transportation, 1775-1946. He first went to sea in the US merchant marine in 1944, at the age of fifteen, and holds a master's licence. He claims, with this paper, to prove that American merchant seamen who served at sea during World War II worked under a national legal framework which, under international law, placed them in the role of combatants. He argues that although they were part of the combat forces of the United States, they have never received national recognition.

Under the international law of maritime warfare a merchant vessel that takes a direct part in hostilities on the side of a belligerent or acts in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to a belligerent's armed forces acquires warlike character or "the character of an enemy warship" and is liable to be treated the same as an enemy warship. It was the policy of the State Department in both World Wars "that ships armed and under naval orders to use that armament without restriction...cannot be considered anything other than belligerently offensive in nature." (p. 101)

In World War I, US merchant ships were requisitioned for war service and placed under the control of the Shipping Board. Starting in March 1917, Naval Armed Guards (gunners and signalmen) were put aboard with instructions that the
ships' armaments were to be used solely for defence against *the unlawful acts* of German submarines. The merchant marine lost 126 ships (three were army transports or "military auxiliaries") to enemy action during that war.

Unlike World War I, the US merchant marine in World War II was nationalized under the War Shipping Administration. By mid-1942 most merchant ships were armed, with Naval Armed Guards embarked, and under naval orders to use their armament without restriction against enemy forces. Though they were civilians, masters and crew were subject to naval discipline. When a merchant ship was at "battle stations," 75% of the *civilian* crew had duties as "assisting gunners" or ammunition handlers. It is the status of these men, who made their merchant vessels *warships*—in law, if not in fact, that Gibson particularly examines.

I commend his treatise on the status of the American merchant seaman, before and during World War II, especially to those who are concerned with similar issues in Canada and Britain.

Allen Taylor
Cantley, Quebec


This is a very folksy description of a wartime US Navy career as seen through the eyes of a young man from the American Midwest. The title suggests the author's sea-going knowledge, training and understanding of ship-borne life as experienced by an Armed Guard Commander. The primary responsibility of the Commander was to discipline and train the US Navy personnel who were assigned to man the guns on American merchant ships. Thus, a 7,177 gross ton Liberty class ship carried a crew of about forty plus an Armed Guard crew of twenty-six USN personnel.

Apparently the author was promoted from the enlisted man yeoman (writer) rating to Ensign USNR and subsequently received training in handling the kinds of weapons then fitted in American merchant ships. He does not mention any training in upper deck or watchkeeping duties. Nor does his writing foster the feeling that he knew much about seamanship. However, he was given a rude introduction to war when his second ship the SS *William Gaston* was torpedoed one dark night off the coast of Brazil. The survivors were spotted the next day by a patrolling aircraft and were picked up by a US Navy seaplane tender.

McCormick states that he used the resources of the Naval Historical Center and the National Archives in Washington DC, though this is not noted in the text of the book. Generally, the book reads like a series of extracts from letters written home. The material was not organized so much as it was selectively assembled in a near chronological sequence—a rambling and oftentimes boring "salty-dip." There are no details of historic interest and infrequent reference is made only in the broadest terms to convoy escort and anti-submarine activities. Specific references are made however, to ladies who provided protracted entertainment on a casual basis, together with addresses and details of bars where they could be met. Should one wish to visit an eclectic collection of watering holes or similar venues, then this book could have been useful some years ago. The advent of AIDS may well have closed down some of the author's favourite sports centres.
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After two readings, the reviewer's copy of the book fell apart and was not deemed worth the effort to repair. There are some advantages to poorly bound books.

Douglas G. Meredith
Westbank, British Columbia


In 1974 (has it been seventeen years?), The Ultra Secret (Harper & Row) by Fred Winterbotham made public the highly secret breaking during the war of the German machine-generated codes. A spate of books followed about the Enigma machine, the codes, the initial work to break them by the Poles, the French and British Secret Services, and so on. Readers can be forgiven for feeling that nothing is left to be written on the subject. But then that could also be said of the Battle of the Atlantic, yet excellent books continue to appear that shed light, develop new lines of research and interpretation that are of much interest.

This volume falls into that category. It offers a detailed examination at the adoption by the German military in the 1930s of the initial business Enigma, the development of the supposedly unbreakable codes by using increasing numbers of code wheels and the variable connection plug board, and Allied efforts to devise the same equipment by working backwards through the coded messages plucked from the airways. This led at first to sporadic and rather delayed "break-ins" into Luftwaffe and harbour and coastal defence vessels cipher; eventually came the break-in on the U-boats and weather ship codes.

The Poles had absolutely dumbfounded the French and British in 1939 by turning over several complete Enigma units with some partial decryption of the then current codes. But when the war really began, the rapidly increased volume of highly complex coded messages swamped both Poles and French and, for some time, the British. Over a thousand codebreakers were soon at Bletchley Park, where ex-IBM technicians developed the early computer searching machines to test the huge range of possible interconnections between guessed-at German text and the codes transmitted.

Kahn gives due credit to the brainy ex-Oxford and Cambridge dons who often simply guessed the connections between the jumble of letters and figures received and their meaning in plaintext, but he also gives proper attention to the value of machines seized at sea, and more particularly of the key nets, day codes and cross-connections, printed in water-soluble inks. It is amazing how much effort went into preparing a deliberate seizure of ships and U-boats and their vital ciphering machines. Kahn carefully documents the care continually taken by those at BP to protect the secret from leaking back to the Germans and in hindsight, the almost unbelievable confidence of German High Command in the absolute security, the impossibility of a useful break-in, of their system. U-boat Command occasionally suspected that the Allies were "reading their mail," but careful investigations always led to the conclusion that Enigma was completely safe, and never compromised for more than a week or so. German listeners even missed several Allied security gaffs—like sending the same message in two different ciphers about their "Ultra" intercepts, one of which was known to be broken, and sinking too many refuelling U-boats to be a coincidence. Even more than radar, this was a secret of
vital importance; the outcome of the Atlantic Battle hinged on it.

Kahn uses some USN terms that were not applicable in the RN, and while an expert on codebreaking and Enigma, gets a bit out of his depth in the details of RN organization and nomenclature when describing the boarding of U-boats and weather ships and seizing the vital current machine setting instructions. These were valuable for a few weeks; more importantly, they lead to the thinking behind the ciphering systems and allowed BP to reduce their "bombe machine" testing of hypotheses to a manageable and much swifter routine. Looking at results, Kahn notes that when the Enigma codes were not being broken, after the U-boat command added an additional rotor to the machine and changed cipher systems in early 1942 until November of that year, our North Atlantic convoys had a singularly hard time, and could not usefully be diverted from concentrations. Before then, with only partial reading of the U-boat messages, the Allies' way was easier. After the next break-in, and once we had the extra escorts and aircraft to exploit our knowledge, times soon became controllable, by May 1943.

The detailed description of the construction of the codes and the machines may not be to everyone's interest, but it includes a documented review of the altruistic passing of all details to the USN and the latter's help in breaking new ciphers. On the whole this is a very well written and detailed summary of how the system arose, how it was defeated, and the problems to the Allies and to BDU in using the information gained. In effect it pulls the whole story together in one manageable volume.

F.M. McKee
Markdale, Ontario


These papers bear a resemblance to RCN in Retrospect (Vancouver, 1982) and RCN in Transition (Vancouver, 1988), the published proceedings of the Canadian Naval History Conferences of 1980 and 1985. It is a pity the University of British Columbia Press did not seize the opportunity and put out an edition of this antipodean approach to problems that lend themselves so usefully to comparative analysis, for the Australian collection ought to be acquired by anyone with a serious interest in the naval problems of lesser powers since the mid-nineteenth century.

Substance here is more cohesive than style. A lucid editors' introduction defines three themes: relationships between the RAN and other navies, especially the Royal Navy; "the search...for a force structure which meet strategic requirements in a credible fashion within what has always been a limited budget;" and postwar history. This will be familiar to Canadians, four of whom—James Boutilier, Roger Sarty, Joel Sokolsky and David Zimmerman—contributed to the book. Despite its real importance, Sokolskys contribution is virtually the same as his paper of the same title in RCN in Transition; Boutilier, Sarty and Zimmerman, however, have written ground-breaking comparative studies (the only comparative studies in the collection) that merit a careful reading.

One is struck by the varied backgrounds of other contributors. The interest
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by both serving and retired members of the Australian naval profession in their history is a healthy sign. That some of their contributions serve more as primary than secondary sources for the historian is not to cast aspersions. Their assessments of equipment and policy are very useful contributions to the literature, to say nothing of the example they set for naval professionals elsewhere. Barbara Winter's entertaining and hard hitting critique of archives, like the book she has already published (HMAS Sydney: Fact, Fantasy and Fraud) is a no less healthy sign that naval history is not simply an activity of the naval establishment in the Antipodes. Even if they have, in their own words, brought forth a "patchwork," the editors have drawn welcome attention to Australian naval history.

Let us hope this is only a beginning. Understanding the part played by maritime forces in the history of societies so dependent on the sea as those on the Pacific rim is of great mutual concern, and the role of navies in maritime affairs can usefully be illuminated by going beyond the parochial limits of national historiography. Comparative studies can illuminate the relationships of military institutions like the navy to the societies from which they spring. Even if none of the papers here published focuses directly on the question, virtually each one has oblique references that not only amount to a fourth theme for the book but also provide the launching point for comparison and contrast. In particular, the tendency of sailors to talk the same language as their counterparts in other navies, as Goldrick finds for example in the First Sea Lord's papers, as also becomes evident in the recollections in the outlook of some American naval professionals like Admirals William S. Sims and Richard G. Colbert, has created conflicts of interest that affect the links between naval and national policy. Naval history, as the introduction observes, may never be the widest area of a nation's history, but naval historians of the world, in the words of an American naval hero, have just begun to fight.

Alec Douglas
Ottawa, Ontario


This book reads like an average day at sea; long periods of boredom punctuated by intense activity. Lest this sound unnecessarily harsh, it should be said that Murfett has written what promises to be the definitive account of the Anglo-Chinese Amethyst crisis of 1949. Part of the problem is the very nature of the crisis itself, consisting as it does of two periods of rollicking Boy's Own Annual action (the journey up the Yangtze by the British frigate HMS Amethyst, her bombardment by People's Liberation Army (PLA) shore batteries, and her daring escape) separated by a prolonged period of pointless palaver between the British and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities as well as an extended debate in the House of Commons, all of which Murfett serves up in detail.

He begins his account with a conventional recapitulation of the gunboat era on the China coast but fails to analyze the inner dynamic of that era adequately; namely, the inability of the parties to communicate with each other and their shared delusions of superiority. The Manchu dynasty in the nineteenth century and
H.M.'s Government in the twentieth were unable to come to terms with the fact that they no longer represented great powers. In the first instance the miscalculation was fatal, in the second, nearly so. In each case gunboats were the vehicle by which failed dialogue was elevated to another level.

In late 1948 the senior members of the commonwealth diplomatic community in Nanking agreed that a guardship should be stationed in the Yangtze off the Kuomintang (KMT/Nationalist) capital to provide psychological and material support for commonwealth nationals caught up in the civil war between the CCP and the KMT. By April 1949 the CCP's army, the PLA, had reached the northern side of the Yangtze and *Amethyst* was trapped between the warring factions. The British saw the entrapment as an affront (particularly as they maintained disingenuously that they were neutral) while the Chinese communists saw the crisis as one more instalment in a century-long catalogue of national shame and British intransigence.

Harold Macmillan called the episode a "little cameo of incompetence," (p. 145) destined to be studied by staff colleges around the world. If it isn't studied, it should be; it is a vivid illustration (based on painstaking primary research) of the complexity of international naval and diplomatic relations in which the language of negotiation, the maintenance of face, the characteristics of naval and diplomatic cultures, and pure happenstance play such a part.

Murfett is to be congratulated for his skilled recounting of the tale. It is unfortunate that he could not gain access to CCP documentation and it is surprising that he was not able to come to a conclusion about the frigate's firing circuits. Some have maintained that a noise created by the testing of *Amethyst*'s circuits led the PLA gunners to open fire. Others argue that it was a "virtually noiseless procedure" (p. 229). One would have thought that a retired commander (G) or a gunnery rating could have provided the answer to this question; an answer which, in turn, would have helped lay to rest one of the issues at the heart of the crisis, who fired (or was thought to have fired) first?

James A. Boutilier
Victoria, British Columbia


This is a far-ranging, highly detailed and thoroughly researched history of the NATO Alliance viewed entirely from the maritime perspective. Its focus is the US naval contribution to what was "a maritime coalition from its very beginnings." (p. 2) The resulting study addresses the changing strategic, political and organizational inputs into American NATO naval commitments.

Despite this focus, Sokolsky is forced to admit the obvious: seapower has traditionally been subordinated (and rightly so) to the requirements of the European Central Front in all NATO military calculations. It was generally felt that though a European war could not be won by seapower, it could, in fact, be lost through even a partial inability to control European waters or to maintain effectively the vital lifeline across the Atlantic. "Control of the seas" was the key to resupplying the Central Front—particularly with the surging naval power of the Soviet Union beginning in the 1960s. Successful wartime seaborne
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reinforcement would diminish the likelihood that NATO would be first to use nuclear weapons—as implied in the inherently vague strategy of "Flexible Response." Thus, NATO maritime strategy was an integral component of nuclear deterrence. Chapter 5 presents a lavishly detailed study of NATO sealift and resupply capabilities in the 1945-1980 period. The serious decline in the quantity of NATO merchant fleets threatened the basis of the USN's role in European nuclear deterrence.

Chapter 4 surveys potential Soviet naval strategies as they evolved over time. In the final analysis, the debate over whether Soviet strategy was basically defensive (protection of SSBNs and the homeland) or offensive (submarine and mining offensives in European and North American waters) did not really matter: the point was that NATO's crucial maritime strategy in support of a war on the Central Front was threatened either way.

Other problems abounded. "In comparison to the integrated forces on the ground in Europe, the organization of Allied seapower was a mosaic of overlapping responsibilities and political compromise." (p. 44) The national policies of the different member states were often at variance with the overarching goals of the Alliance. Only in wartime would full command authority be passed to the appropriate unified command structure. Not surprisingly, the USN sought greater commitments from its allies as well as more control over force deployments.

Though at times repetitive, acronym-laden and highly speculative (perhaps more the fault of the subject than of the author), this book boasts a wealth of statistical analysis tables and a profusion of NATO naval command organizational charts. All are excellent for reference purposes, though at times they distract the reader. In these changing times, with much of the Soviet Navy tied up awaiting its fate, Sokolsk/s work cannot serve as a clarion call for increased NATO maritime activity. It is nevertheless interesting institutional history.

Serge Durflinger
Verdun, Quebec


Amidst the ending of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the high probability of change in the international system, Robert Jordan outlines the evolution of NATO's maritime organization with the hope that it might "prove helpful to those diplomats and military leaders who will influence the shape" of future structures or systems, (p. 155) In turn, he examines the maritime origins of NATO and command relationships, command and sub-command structures in the Atlantic and Northern regions, the role of the Mediterranean naval forces in the continental European command, and the American nuclear contribution. The subjects are as important as they are dry.

In his brief conclusion, Jordan argues that the years of experience in developing a very complex command organization, and the years of close cooperation which was a part of it, not only in shore headquarters but in the operational integration of various units of many navies in the recent Gulf conflict, "the habits of working together," can all "contribute positively to whatever future emerges." (p. 155) To that extent, the record of that experience is very valu-
able indeed. Perhaps the surprising conclusion is the extent to which SACEUR, originally thought of as a land commander, evolved as a major maritime commander because of the importance of the Mediterranean forces which fell under his theatre command. The glue which held everything together was the US Navy. Jordan argues that even if the NATO structure as we know it disappears, the role of the United States will remain not just as a global superpower but as a regional power because of the location of its maritime forces in each area. The presence of the maritime forces, like the nineteenth century British Army policing the empire, are out of sight to the taxpayer/voter, and therefore much more acceptable to various national politics. Obviously the experience of the NATO command structure, carefully chronicled, will be useful in any such future security arrangements. With this focus it is perhaps not surprising that much of the political debate about the issues, most notably the forward maritime strategy, is missing.

William Glover
Ottawa, Ontario


This is the ninety-fifth edition of Jane's, long considered to be the premier authority on the world's navies. The current editor, Captain Richard Sharpe, took over in 1989. Like his predecessors, he has put his distinctive stamp on the publication without changing its essential nature.

In the foreword, the editor reviews the events of the last year and comments on technical and regional trends. Sharpe has expanded this section, which is well illustrated, printed on differently-coloured paper, and could well stand on its own as a summary of the current naval situation. Jane's looks at the world from a UK-US-NATO perspective. As a result, and even though this year's foreword begins with a quotation from one of Siegfried Sassoon's World War I stories ("Everyone suddenly burst out singing!") and ends with a photo of a Russian and a British admiral apparently engaged in an ecstatic waltz, the editor warns that western navies should not be precipitously reduced. In an uncertain and unstable world he advocates adequate balanced forces, a position that no military person would contest but which may be hard to sell to many politicians.

A reading of Sharpe's analysis offers the following conclusions about the naval picture on a regional basis. Russia has taken over the former Soviet fleet, which remains a formidable force even if foreign deployments have virtually ceased and the rate of construction of submarines and other warships has, at last, slowed. The new aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetzov was transferred to the Northern Fleet to remove it from dispute with the Ukraine over control of the Black Sea Fleet. The US Navy is reducing the number of its ballistic-missile and attack submarines. The costly Seawolf submarine programme will be held to one, or at the most, three units. The most interesting new ships are the Arleigh Burke class, which are replacements for older destroyers. However, about one third of USN frigates will be placed in reserve. Eleven carrier battle groups will be retained. In Britain, the Vanguard-class strategic submarines are completing, but nuclear-powered attack subs are being retired early. All European navies appear to be reaping a peace dividend and have
slowed construction. In south Asia, the Gulf is now stable from a naval point of view, although Iran is trying to acquire some submarines. The Indian navy has slowed the expansion so evident in the last few years and has reluctantly returned its leased C/iar/ie-class submarine to Russia. In spite of the small size of our navy, Canada rates quite a long paragraph. The commitment to new equipment instead of retaining redundant bases is noted, and Sharpe feels that the resignation last year of Vice-Admiral Thomas was not in vain. He remarks that Canadian service personnel must have a special resilience to cope with the hostile and belittling headlines so often found in our press.

In the main body of the book there are, as usual, large numbers of new photographs. The lists of sensors and weapons are number-keyed to an elevation by Ian Sturton of the ships of each class, including variants, if any. Explanatory notes clarify the status and role of the main types. Moreover, a few paragraphs are headed "Opinion," in which Sharpe expresses his personal views. This is a welcome revival of a practice of founder Fred T. Jane himself, whose pungent comments enlivened the early editions.

Despite its title, the book is not limited to "Fighting Ships." All naval and government vessels are included: small auxiliaries and service craft as well as Coast Guard, Fishery Patrol, and even some police boats. Every country that owns something that floats is mentioned: Anguilla, Equatorial Guinea, Vanuatu, and so on. The comprehensiveness is awesome but the size of the book is enormous, and it is priced accordingly. The customers are navies, government departments, universities and libraries, and perhaps some well-heeled and very interested individuals. For the rest of us, back copies are available on the second hand market, and significant earlier editions from 1898 to 1952 have been reproduced. These, along with some of the more easily obtained post-World War II issues, say one in every ten years or so, would provide a comprehensive record of the world's navies in the twentieth century.

If the national sections show naval power as it is today, the advertisements of shipbuilders and arms and equipment makers from all over the world foreshadow the future. This year Italian firms seem the most prominent. There are none yet from the erstwhile Soviet Union, but watch for them in the future.

Douglas Maginley
Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


John Ruskin, the eminent English art and social critic of the last century, wrote that "Take it all in all, a Ship of the Line is the most honourable thing that man, as a gregarious animal has ever produced." The reader of this book will, if nothing else, become convinced of the very wide range of considerations, constraints and political circumstances that impinge on the design of warships.

The author is a distinguished British naval architect, member of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors and the author of other books on naval construction and of many technical papers—primarily relating to frigates. The material is based for the most
part on the Royal Navy, although the subtitle, "Options for Medium Sized Navies," has some validity for our own situation. Indeed, of particular relevance is Brown's observation that warships should be "designed for tasks perceived at the time and with sufficient flexibility to (be) adaptable for new roles." (p. 162)

Much of the material relates to the design and operation of "frigates" with displacements in the range of 4500-5000 tons. Nevertheless, Brown also discusses "corvettes" of about 1800 tons. There are contemporary examples of the latter in some NATO and South American navies, though our recently contracted Coastal Defence (and Mine Countermeasures) Vessels are somewhat smaller. At any event, there is food for thought here with regard to any future naval construction for Canada.

Brown notes the current parlous state of shipbuilding in Britain and, we might note, in Canada also. In these circumstances where there is very limited design capability—and hardly any for research and development—he proposes a design centre for warships (and other government vessels) which would probably have to be a government entity. It may be too late for us in Canada to re-create the capability we had in the RCN from the mid-1940s to the mid-1960s, but it might be advantageous to use such a facility-Canadian or not—if we are to produce warships in a cost-effective manner and without undue contractual litigation.

This is a good and informative book based on significant experience—somewhat heavy (and expensive) for the general reader but a mine of useful material for those who are concerned to produce a contemporary "Ship of the Line." We might therefore usefully conclude with the qualities that Ruskin calls for in those who are so involved: "...human patience, common sense, forethought, experimental philosophy, self-control, habits of order and obedience, thoroughly wrought handwork, defiance of brute elements, careless courage, careful patriotism and a calm expectation of the judgement of God..." A demanding challenge!

S. Mathwin Davis
Kingston, Ontario


Naval Architecture for Non-Naval Architects is an interesting guide through the fascinating field of naval architecture. Principally qualitative rather than quantitative, and written primarily with commercial and small surface vessels (there are some references to military ship and submarines), the author effectively acquaints the reader with important design and analysis considerations in a logical progression similar to that used by a naval architect when designing a ship.

The design process begins with a clear definition of the target vessel characteristics. The author outlines a series of simple general arrangement principles to initiate active definition of the design vessel. Decisions made even at this very early stage are often irreversible—schedules gel rapidly, and long lead equipment orders must be placed, all of which add inertia to the project. The author provides us with good insight into the broader issues affecting general arrangements and the necessary compromises.
A hullform is then defined to envelope and support the machinery, payload and hotel type real estate identified in the general arrangements. Accordingly, the author explains the intricacies of the lines plans, resulting hydrostatics and coefficients commonly used by naval architects to ensure rapid convergence of the design. For example, sufficient sectional area is required for machinery to avoid step changes in power requirements later due to an increase in beam. The author also warns correctly about the need for continual vigilance with respect to fundamentals such as stability, structure and cost.

Serious consideration of ship stability signals a switch to analysis of the fledgling design. The statical stability characteristics of the hullform are explained, then ship dynamics including motions, their causes, ship response, and the solutions are explored. The author leaves the treatment of loads, such as that due to wind, commonly addressed quasi-statically by comparing wind heeling moments graphically to the righting moments (GZ) of the ship, and the affects of loll and trimming on dynamic stability for more advanced levels of study.

Propulsion system design, a compromise between speed, fuel consumption (endurance), power and cost are largely affected by the hullform design. Friction and wavemaking resistance complete with model basin theory and Froude's resistance logic are explained in very clear concise terms. An array of potential propulsive systems including a particularly interesting and well-written section on the physics of wind power highlight this chapter.

Hull structural strength analyses are explained in the basic terms of overall bending and shear stresses derived from analogous beam theory. Use of various building materials ranging from steel through copper nickel to concrete is discussed. Structural arrangements to resist loadings are well described complete with excellent illustrations. Strength considerations in way of upper deck openings might be emphasized. Important conclusions are drawn for optimal longitudinal structure albeit mention of other competing design variables at this juncture might assist in putting structural considerations in perspective.

Naval Architecture for Non-Naval Architects, while covering the basics, also touches very briefly on a few of the more advanced design and analysis considerations including manoeuvring, vibrations analysis, and mooring. Prospective naval architects would gain valuable insight by reading this brief, understandable yet informative book.

Kenneth B. Holt
Halifax, Nova Scotia


We are told by the author that when Columbus reached the West Indies, he saw exactly what he expected: a few of the 7,448 islands lying to the east of India, whose existence had been reported more than two centuries earlier by Marco Polo. When Hernan Cortes reached the peninsula now known as Baja California in 1535, he thought he had found another of them. It was over two centuries before the myth of the Island of California was finally dissipated, this despite the fact that Ulloa had reached the head of the Gulf of California only four years after Cortes had reached its southern end, followed by other voyagers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The book is much more comprehensive than the title would indicate. It deals with the myths of the Sea of Verrazzano and of a navigable Northwest Passage as well as the myth of the Island of California. However, the main subject of the book is how, and in particular why, the myth of the insularity of California (and by extension other historical myths) developed, persisted, and was almost extinguished in the sixteenth century, only to be revived by Drake's privateering voyage to the Pacific in 1572. The damage Drake inflicted on Spanish ships and cities cried out for an explanation. A useable reason for Drake's success emerged through the blending of the Island of California myth with the equally powerful myth of the Northwest Passage. It was deduced that Drake must have come or gone by some channel linking the Gulf of California with the Northwest Passage. All explorers whose reports were inconsistent with the myth were accordingly disbelieved, while credence was given to others who linked their stories of the Island of California to old tales of monsters, of fierce demons guarding enormous stores of riches, and of islands of women.

This summary might give the false impression that Polk has simply written a romantic tale. On the contrary, narratives of the exploration of the Californian peninsula and the Gulf of California are all in the book, and the fifty-two plates of maps start with a thirteenth century mappamundi and extend to a geological projection of California as an island fifty million years from now. There are extensive cross references between maps and text. It was interesting to this reviewer to find in the book a map prepared by Michael Lok that shows a passage from the Pacific Ocean, leading to both Frobisher Bay and Cape Hatteras. It is in the latitude that Lok ascribed to Juan de Fuca's mythical voyage from the Pacific to the Atlantic. However, the date of the map is ten years earlier than the date Lok claimed for the Fuca voyage. Fuca, if he existed, told Lok exactly what he expected to hear.

Apart from the narratives, the author's exposition of the way in which myths arise and persist is relevant to the work of researchers studying other historical subjects. There is no reason to believe that the process of myth creation is dead, or that old ones have all been eradicated.

Dora Polk has written a valuable book, and has written it well.

John Kendrick
Vancouver, British Columbia


The Columbus Quincentennial commemoration in 1992 is being complemented—and in some ways improved upon—by the International Maritime Bicentennial in British Columbia, Washington, and Oregon which reaches its climax this same year. Just as the Spanish voyages of 1492 and after planted a European presence in the first temperate zone of the New World, so also Spanish voyages (together with British, Russian, American and French) played a leading role in unveiling the last temperate coast in the New World three centuries later. This "last act" in Spain's long-lasting maritime empire is at least as fascinating as the first act, and illustrates a remarkable development in enlightened attitudes toward native peoples, in navigational techniques, and in naval architecture. Also
fascinating is the fact that the Spanish voyages and early presence on the North­west Coast have been unregarded and virtually unknown until very recent times.

Donald Cutter stands at the head of a small group of dedicated scholars who are bringing to light one of the most intense periods of maritime exploration the world has ever seen. His latest book on Mala­spina and Galiano introduces the Spanish counterparts of Captains Cook and Vancouver, a comparison which promises rich elaboration in the years ahead.

An Italian-born navigator like Columbus, Alejando Malaspina com­manded Spain's most ambitious naval scientific exploring expedition, a 62-month-long cruise in the specially-built corvettes Descubierta and Atrevida (sisterships) beginning in 1789. The voluminous docu­mentation and artifacts from this voyage were entombed for nearly two hundred years, and only recently resurrected for exhibition and research.

Cutter's current study captures three revealing episodes from the larger expedi­tion during 1791, when Malaspina made an unscheduled reconnaissance of the Alaskan Coast searching for the Northwest Passage, when his ships visited the Spanish outpost at Nootka Sound on Vancouver Island, and when he sent his officers Dionisio Alcala Galiano and Cayetano Valdds back north from Mexico in small schooners to explore British Columbia's Inside Passage (1792). Each episode furnishes very extensive descriptions of the Yakutat Tlingit and Nootkan cultures at the time of early con­tact with Europeans, some of which will be surprising and thought-provoking even to ethnographers. In fact, Dr. Cutter clearly gives prime attention to this material which exceeds contemporary British and Amer­i­can accounts in both volume and detail.

The Galiano-Valdes Expedition is probably the most widely known of the Spanish voyages to the Northwest Coast, on account of the historic encounter with Captain Vancouver and subsequent British-Spanish cooperation in charting endeav­ours. This voyage provides one of the most entertaining and adventure-filled accounts in Canadian maritime history, accompanied by copious illustrations from the pen of one-time cabin boy Josd Cardero. Not many people are aware of its connection with the larger Malaspina Expedition.

Throughout this landmark work, Dr. Cutter's lively lecturing style and eye for significant detail bring to life one of the greatest voyages of enlightenment in the late eighteenth century, one whose hero returned home only to be stripped of honours, imprisoned, and ultimately ban­ished from Spain. The book is an appropriate companion to the exhibition of the same name travelling throughout 1991 in Canada and the United States. The one disappointment to those familiar with the original material is that the illustrations have been reproduced so poorly.

Gregory Foster
Galiano Island, British Columbia


In the aftermath of the Nootka Crisis, Spain ordered the urgent completion of Quimper's exploration of the Strait of Juan de Fuca (1790) and Narvaez's exploration of Haro and Georgia Straits (1791). One
objective of Bodega's voyage to Nootka in 1792 to meet Vancouver would be to establish the Strait as the boundary between Spanish and English interests. These waters also appeared to offer the last likely access to the long-sought Northwest Passage.

Malaspina learned of Madrid's order while in Acapulco on his great "politico-scientific" voyage. He promptly convinced Viceroy Revillagigedo to assign the task to two of his officers, Commanders Dionisio Alcala Galiano and Cayetano Valdes, instead of to Francisco Mourelle, the viceroy's own appointee. The two schooners built for the mission, Sutil and Mexicana, were "the most ill calculated and unfit vessels that could possibly be imagined for such an expedition," according to Vancouver. It was a judgement with which their captains would not have entirely disagreed. Nevertheless, their navigation and cartography of the intricate geography of the region was of the highest order and their report is one of the major chronicles of the exploration of the Pacific northwest. Galiano and Valdds share with Vancouver the honour of finally burying the myth of a useful sea passage connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

The publication in 1802 of the account of their voyage was an accident of circumstance. Malaspina's expedition had been designed to emulate and if possible surpass the scientific expeditions of Cook and Lapfrouse; publication of his achievements would bring Spain comparable prestige. However, Malaspina became implicated in a political plot after his return to Spain, and all his papers and those of his scientists were impounded. Kendrick believes that the decision to publish the account of a "side trip" (p. 23) rather than the journal of one of the more significant Spanish voyages "may well have been a matter of expediency." (p. 42) The manuscript was already in Madrid and it was only necessary to remove all references to Malaspina. It was published anonymously with a lengthy introduction written by the naval historian Navarette, which lifted the veil of secrecy concealing the extensive Spanish explorations of the Pacific since 1532.

The author-editor of the 1802 account has never been definitively identified and Kendrick does not attempt to do so. His purpose is to reveal the text of the original manuscript and to determine its author. After meticulous study of the various segments and drafts in Spanish and Mexican archives, Kendrick believes Galiano wrote the greater part but also made use of notes provided by others. He reveals where, for political reasons, the author-editor of the 1802 publication inserted anachronistic material and altered or deleted so many passages that it can no longer be considered an authentic account.

Kendrick gives us a very readable translation of what in effect is a reconstruction of the original manuscript, a definitive work which now supersedes Jane's A Spanish Voyage to Vancouver and the North-West Coast of America (1930) and the chapters Wagner used in his Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca (1933), both of which were translated from the 1802 publication. Kendrick has also preserved the flavour of the original by retaining the Spanish place names (which he identifies in a glossary) and not shying away from "the somewhat wearying superlatives." (p. 33) Of particular interest are the passages relating to the expedition's interaction with Vancouver in the Inland Passage and the descriptions of native life. The uncluttered maps, which include both the Spanish and contemporary place names as well as the ships' route, make the expedition's progress easy to follow.
Kendrick’s book is an indispensable and timely contribution to the bicentennial celebrations of the Spanish contribution to British Columbia’s maritime heritage.

Freeman M. Tovell
Victoria, British Columbia


Oak Island, a tiny island in Mahone Bay on Nova Scotia’s South Shore, has been the focus of one of the longest and most frustrating treasure hunts in history. Since 1795, when resident Daniel McInnis found an old wooden block hanging from an oak tree, its secret has eluded generations of seekers and foiled all attempts at retrieval.

Johnson relates how his obsession with Oak Island began in 1958, when he read R.V. Harris’s *The Oak Island Mystery.* He details his experiences as an active participant in the hunt between 1959 and 1965, when his agreement with the lessee of the mineral rights was terminated by the latter’s tragic death. Much of the book is based upon Johnson’s subsequent research and consists of summaries of previously unpublished material, together with Johnson’s comments. He does appear to have paid less attention to the historical in favour of the physical, upon which his revelation is based, and a number of inaccuracies have resulted. Thus, he claims that, by 1895, so many excavations had been undertaken, the precise location of the actual Money Pit was unknown. In fact, the pit was still intact in 1916, although rendered unsafe by the removal of platforms and bracing in 1909 to facilitate the operation of an orange peel grab bucket. It did not cave in until c. 1920.

Johnson’s plan of operation, based on the 1937 survey by Charles P. Roper, is the most interesting of the seven maps and plans; his solution to the mystery is as reasonable as that of any person involved in the hunt—a hunt complicated by secrecy, misdirection and speculative theories involving Captain Kidd, the Lost Treasure of Tumbes and, more recently, extraterrestrial visitors.

Even with its errors and odder sidebar layout, this little book offers an inexpensive introduction to a subject that has fascinated and intrigued thousands since first publicized in 1864. This may account for any perceived bias on the part of this reviewer, who has now wasted many delightful hours reading everything on Oak Island he could get his hands on.

Robin H. Wyllie
East LaHave, Nova Scotia


This study of the painter Felix Schwormstadt is distinguished by a lively and attractive layout. This is not surprising, for the painter worked primarily as an illustrator. The contents of the book are clearly organized, with a section of illustrated text and a section with plates in black and white and colour of reproductions of originals and published work. An appendix contains notes, a source-list and a bibliography.

Of the seven chapters, the first two and the last deal with the painter’s biography; the other four discuss the artist’s various
fields of activity and his production, his illustrations, drawings for the press and paintings. The author, an historian, has diligently collected much historical data which he assembles chronologically in the established manner into the artist's biography. After his death in 1938 Schwormstadt was largely forgotten, unfairly contends Scholl. He supports his argument with reference to the behaviour of art historians who show little regard for artists like Schwormstadt. All the more laudable is the historian who sets himself the task of writing an art historic monograph.

How has Scholl managed? With art historical methods, the statements made by paintings can be decoded. Here knowledge of the artist's biography may be helpful. Schwormstadt's life was set within a normal middle class framework. Scholl uses many written and oral sources to illustrate this. Especially noteworthy are the successful efforts with which Schwormstadt tried to gain access to the ships of the Kaiserliche Marine as painter during the World War I. Some of this work is reproduced here.

The author was on the safe territory of his profession as historian when researching Schwormstadt's biography. He moved on to thin ice however in his assessment and art historical classification of the painter's pictures. All of the painter's work belongs, indisputably, in the category of genre-painting. Genre-painting has a long tradition in art history and there are very few open points in its terminology. But in Scholl's text one looks in vain for such terms as soldiers-, street- or coffeehouse-genre. Not even the conversation piece, which has such an important place in Schwormstadt's work, is characterized. Scholl attempts to show art historical relations by defining the purpose of the work as poster, illustration, advertising, leaflet, etc. Schwormstadt's motifs, themes and stylistic characteristics and their art historical models were examined in a manner which can only be called "linguistically clever." For this reason, the questions concerning the value of the paintings as source material for maritime history and the artistic quality of the work remain unanswered.

The carelessness with which Scholl deals with the subject matters of a picture is demonstrated by his interpretation of a painting showing a submarine loading torpedoes, (p. 54) The torpedo is being loaded propeller first, the head pointing out. This representation is incorrect, asserts the author; torpedoes are loaded nose first. He does not clarify the contradiction that this picture (if it was indeed incorrect) could pass the censors of the Reichs Marine Amt before it was published in 1917. The contradiction between this crude mistake and the otherwise so highly praised exactitude of the painter is not questioned critically. He does not suggest that there may possibly have been a submarine-type in the Kaiserliche Marine, where the demonstrated method of loading a torpedo was typical. This was in fact the case in the Österreichischen-Ungarischen (k.u.k.) Kriegsmarine, as two photographs from 1916 prove. (Pawlik, Baumgarther, S.M. Unterseeboote [Graz 1986], p. 15).

In speaking of the historical precision of art, it of academic interest to note that the author has quoted incorrectly to support his argument (one quote on p. 52, note 3, is not on p. 9 in the cited literature but on p. 57; and it has been taken out of historical context). It is unfortunate that the opportunity to do this important analysis has been wasted. Thanks to Schwormstadt himself, this is at least a pretty picturebook.

Boye Meyer-Friese
Hamburg, Germany