

this solid work.

Keeping in mind that Barbuto set out to have a razor-sharp focus on New York State's role in the War of 1812, this is a book that readers interested in the War of 1812, the raising of militia, the early development of the American army, and state involvement in the making of war should find well worth reading.

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Quintin Barry. *Crisis at the Chesapeake: The Royal Navy and the Struggle for America 1775-1783*. Warwick, UK: Helion Books, www.helion.co.uk, 2021. 264 pp., illustrations, maps, ship list, bibliography, index. UK £25.00, US \$45.38, paper; ISBN 978-1-91333-653-0.

“There was in the end no way in which the Americans could have ultimately been denied their independence; but the war that was fought to achieve it was substantially a naval war, and it was at sea that it would be decided.” That statement in the introduction sets the theme for this work. What follows broadens most people's visions of the American Revolution by placing it in the context of a world war. It achieves this by illustrating the role of navies in the war and how combat in other theatres affected the Revolution and was affected by it.

The tale begins with a recognition that Britain's Royal Navy, which had been shaped by two centuries of successful European war – largely against the Spanish, Dutch and French – in home waters, was ill-suited for its role in the American Revolution. Its fleet of mostly ships of the line were ill suited to transporting men and supplies across the Atlantic and intercepting small enemy smugglers, but the Royal Navy's

tasks were broader than that. With the entry of France and Spain into the war, Britain was challenged in four theatres: home waters; North America; the West Indies; and Gibraltar. Competing demands on resources would play roles in the course of battle and its outcome.

This work brings the glorious victories of Minutemen, John Paul Jones (who is not even mentioned in this tome), and George Washington down a notch or two. Speaking of 1778, the author opines, “In many ways the West Indies now ranked as the most important overseas theatre. It was widely believed that they were crucial to the British economy and commerce, while the French islands represented a target of considerable importance. Their loss would be a damaging blow to France, and the King was willing, in order to avenge ‘the faithless and insolent conduct of France’ to come to terms with the colonists if it enabled the conquest of the French islands” (49). Jumping ahead to the end, the terms on which peace was agreed were broad indeed. The United States received independence, true, along with the chance to come crawling back to Mother England, but other territorial interests were also resolved. Spain relinquished its claim to Gibraltar, retained Minorca and West Florida (which it had captured from the British), and gained East Florida, while returning the Bahamas to Britain. The Dutch regained Ceylon and kept the Cape of Good Hope, but lost Negapatam (southern India) to the British and conceded them trading rights with the Spice Islands. France weakened Britain through the loss of her American colonies, as well as recovering St. Lucia, Saint-Pierre and Miquelon (and extended their fishing rights there), and possessions in India, along with retaining Tobago that it had taken during the war.

After an overview of the American

War, the following chapters focus on individuals and battles that played key roles in the war in America and the West Indies. Although the subtitle highlights the Royal Navy, there are also chapters devoted to Comte d'Estaing and Comte de Grasse of the French Navy. Nor did all of the battles occur on American soil or in its waters, as chapters entitled "Martinique" and "St. Eustatius" illustrate. Throughout, Barry skillfully interweaves the stories of the naval forces with those of the land battles. For example, early in the war, Britain punished American blockade breaches by staging a naval raid on the town of Falmouth. He also shows how the arrival of British and French fleets from the West Indies decided the question of whether American offensives should be directed toward New York or the southern colonies and how French superiority in the Chesapeake prevented reinforcement of Cornwallis' army, thereby forcing its surrender.

Although I greatly enjoyed this book, I am always suspicious when I can identify an error. The portrait that is identified as that of John Byron Cooper (53) is repeated as that of Sir Thomas Graves on page 95. Hopefully this is an isolated mistake and not an obvious example of a pattern.

Though a fairly short book, it is one to be read slowly for understanding. This volume greatly enhanced my understanding of the American Revolution. Quintin Barry has placed the movements of armies and roles of navies into a sequence that explains their relationships to each other, rather than as merely disjointed rockets bursting in air that culminate in the surrender at Yorktown and the end of the war. For Americans, it presents an opportunity to see the other side. For Loyalists or British sympathizers, it presents examples of where their champions, both generals

and admirals in the New World and politicians in the Old, made their errors and why. The bibliography is a guide to further reading, both in popular and specialist genres. The index is also helpful.

I recommend *Crisis At The Chesapeake* to anyone interested in the American Revolution, the Royal Navy of the late eighteenth century, or the interplay between the Revolution and other concurrent theatres of combat.

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Andrew Boyd. *British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth Century*. Barnsley, S. Yorks: Seaforth Publishing, www.seaforthpublishing.com, 2020. xxiv+776pp., illustrations, maps, notes, bibliography. UK £35.00, US \$ 52.95, cloth; ISBN 978-1-52673-8. (E-book available.)

The adjectives "comprehensive" and "definitive" come to mind after reading *British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth Century*. After tracing the Victorian origins of modern British naval intelligence, it describes its role in four successive periods of the twentieth century, each of which presented unique challenges: the Great War, the interwar period, the Second World War, and the Cold War up to the end of the Soviet Union. This book is *comprehensive* because it describes a wide range of intelligence gathering and analyses and puts them in context, and *definitive* because it shows where and how naval intelligence was used. The author's narrative style is clear, logical, and authoritative. This study is reminiscent of the abridged 1993 version of F.H. Hinsley's *British Intelligence in the Second World* in that it is not an inclusive history of background events, but does provide a remarkably complete framework for the