War, the following chapters focus on individuals and battles that played key roles in the war in America and the West Indies. Although the subtitle highlights the Royal Navy, there are also chapters devoted to Comte d’Estaing and Comte de Grasse of the French Navy. Nor did all of the battles occur on American soil or in its waters, as chapters entitled “Martinique” and “St. Eustatius” illustrate. Throughout, Barry skillfully interweaves the stories of the naval forces with those of the land battles. For example, early in the war, Britain punished American blockade breaches by staging a naval raid on the town of Falmouth. He also shows how the arrival of British and French fleets from the West Indies decided the question of whether American offensives should be directed toward New York or the southern colonies and how French superiority in the Chesapeake prevented reinforcement of Cornwallis’ army, thereby forcing its surrender.

Although I greatly enjoyed this book, I am always suspicious when I can identify an error. The portrait that is identified as that of John Byron Cooper (53) is repeated as that of Sir Thomas Graves on page 95. Hopefully this is an isolated mistake and not an obvious example of a pattern.

Though a fairly short book, it is one to be read slowly for understanding. This volume greatly enhanced my understanding of the American Revolution. Quintin Barry has placed the movements of armies and roles of navies into a sequence that explains their relationships to each other, rather than as merely disjoined rockets bursting in air that culminate in the surrender at Yorktown and the end of the war. For Americans, it presents an opportunity to see the other side. For Loyalists or British sympathizers, it presents examples of where their champions, both generals and admirals in the New World and politicians in the Old, made their errors and why. The bibliography is a guide to further reading, both in popular and specialist genres. The index is also helpful.

I recommend Crisis At The Chesapeake to anyone interested in the American Revolution, the Royal Navy of the late eighteenth century, or the interplay between the Revolution and other concurrent theatres of combat.

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The adjectives “comprehensive” and “definitive” come to mind after reading British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth Century. After tracing the Victorian origins of modern British naval intelligence, it describes its role in four successive periods of the twentieth century, each of which presented unique challenges: the Great War, the interwar period, the Second World War, and the Cold War up to the end of the Soviet Union. This book is comprehensive because it describes a wide range of intelligence gathering and analyses and puts them in context, and definitive because it shows where and how naval intelligence was used. The author’s narrative style is clear, logical, and authoritative. This study is reminiscent of the abridged 1993 version of F.H. Hinsley’s British Intelligence in the Second World in that it is not an inclusive history of background events, but does provide a remarkably complete framework for the
role played by naval intelligence.

Andrew Boyd’s *The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters: Linchpin of Victory 1935-1942* (2017), similarly a remarkably full book based on a wide range of sources, established the author’s authority in dissecting complex aspects of modern naval history. Boyd was with the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) for 25 years after serving as an officer in RN submarines. Following his FCO time, he worked with a British multinational defence technology firm before completing his doctorate in history in 2015. It’s tempting to conclude that his experience in working in bureaucracies and in the navy is behind his masterful ability to identify important developments in a broad field, to convincingly describe interactions inside government and between allied intelligence organizations, and to single out individuals who played key roles.

The beginnings of a coherent structure to gather and analyse intelligence were part of a push in the Admiralty in the last quarter of the nineteenth century to be better able to plan for possible wars. The dynamic Captain Tyron (later to order the disastrous *Victoria / Campden* collision) created the “Foreign Intelligence Committee” in 1882 when Naval Secretary. This temporary body evolved into a Naval Intelligence Department under Captain William Henry Hall (father of “Blinker” Hall of Great War-era fame), the first of three generations of Halls with outsized roles in British naval intelligence.

The key to operational success in war lay in understanding the enemy’s intentions, ability, and means of fighting. This required an ability to gather information and to analyse and fuse it in a centre where operations would be planned and directed. Andrew Boyd has a lot to say about the flawed processing of signals intelligence in the early years of the First World War. Eventually, in October 1917, Captain William James proposed reforms so that intelligence about German forces would be presented in a room where senior planners directed operations. This idea was implemented and constituted a significant step towards the Second World War Operations Intelligence Centre.

During the First World War, British naval intelligence rose to the challenges of exploiting information on a hitherto unprecedented scale. New organizations were created to manage economic warfare against the Central Powers and to exploit information available from intercepting enemy radio traffic. Boyd fully covers the contentious issues surrounding the processing of signals intelligence and its promulgation from the Admiralty during the Battle of Jutland. His deft description of how information was gathered and used to enforce the blockade of the Central Powers is typical of how he dissects a complex story.

In the 1930s, international tensions in the Mediterranean created fresh requirements for a filtered presentation of current operational intelligence in the Admiralty. In 1936, during the Spanish Civil War, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff William James (by now an admiral) pushed for the creation of a centre to compile a composite intelligence picture from multiple sources. This was the genesis of the Operational Intelligence Section (OIC) which Boyd describes “as important an intelligence innovation in Britain’s coming naval War as Bletchley Park” (325). The narrative includes balanced discussions of intelligence failures, such as an underestimation of German successes in breaking British naval radio traffic before and during the Second World War, and in 1941, not focusing on photographic evidence that the Germans were constructing bomb-proof shelters for U-boats.
Boyd emphasizes the roles of various key individuals and provides engaging character sketches. Ian Fleming emerges as a substantial figure, an important initiator of various developments during the highly effective Admiral Godfrey’s tenure as Director of Naval Intelligence. Godfrey had an abrasive side and was “curtly” dismissed after bureaucratic intrigues in late 1942. Boyd provides a balanced account of this episode but writes, “What was not reasonable was the sheer brutality of Pound’s (the First Sea Lord) treatment” (517).

Almost a fifth of the book is devoted to the period between 1945 and 1989 where few individuals are singled out. Those in senior intelligence positions tended not to be in office as long as the giants “Blinker” Hall in the Great War and John Godfrey in the Second World War; published sources are also not as specific about key personalities in intelligence as they are for the years before 1945. There is also a shift in perspective as Boyd provides extensive coverage of strategic weapons systems development and the acquisition of Polaris missile technology from the US as context for intelligence issues. The capture of the Falklands in 1982 took the British government and intelligence community by surprise. The successful, long-range projection of naval power to recapture the islands was facilitated by intelligence assistance from France, the US, and Chile. “Looking Back on the Cold War,” Boyd writes that good intelligence remained a force multiplier. He cites the importance of special intelligence collection by British submarines off the Soviet Union in gaining benefit for the UK from the US.

The text is supported by well-chosen photographs. Although there is no bibliography, the endnotes provide full titles of documents and books cited. There is a useful list of acronyms and abbreviations. The narrative is a model of clarity thanks to the author’s lucid writing style. With its authoritative tone, wealth of detail, wide scope, and engaging coverage of personalities and bureaucratic interactions, British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth Century is a monumental achievement. This outstanding book will surely become a benchmark study of the role of naval intelligence.

Jan Drent
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In the early nineteenth century, the Napoleonic Wars continued seemingly unabated. The battles in Europe resonated throughout the entire continent. Mighty sea clashes had their names written in the ink of eternity – the Battle of the Nile at Aboukir in 1798 and the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. Less well known is the role of the Imperial Russian Navy in this time.

Besides its struggles on the European mainland, the Russian Empire was in competition with the Ottoman Empire for control over the shores of the Caspian Sea. After the first Russo-Turkish War (1768-1774), the Russians gained power in Ukraine and reached well into the Ottoman Balkans. Their goal was control of the Dardanelles, the entry to the Mediterranean. Prior to the