

interviews, published documents, and Davis' own recollections provides for both a general and personal discussion of events. This book is a good starting point for a reader who wants to explore these conflicts without becoming overly bogged down in the politics surrounding events. The author's use of published accounts of the wars and individual battles discussed, enables the casual reader to explore various subjects in greater depth at leisure. Furthermore, Camp's extensive use of personal papers, interviews, and oral histories provides those who want it with a way to locate original documents and recollections of the people who were actually involved in the events, allowing them to do their own research and draw independent conclusions.

If this book has a shortcoming, it may be in the discussion of Davis' life and career outside of the warzone. Of the 36 chapters and epilogue, only six discuss in any depth his family and time outside the Marine Corps and away from the battlefield. Students of military history might not mind this, but readers wishing to examine the impact of a military career spent at war, on family life, may find this less satisfactory. Davis' wife and children are just mentioned in passing, or in the context of moving to a new assignment or heading off to another war.

Richard Camp provides us with a well-researched account of the career of General Raymond Davis, from beginning to end, across three wars. His book is well researched, and accessible to both serious students of military history, as well as those exploring these events for the first time. He also provides readers with the tools to explore the people, places, and events discussed in greater depth. While somewhat lacking in the personal exploration of the effects of a career in military service on

the family, *Three War Marine Hero* superbly illustrates the changing roles and responsibilities of a Marine Corps officer over the course of his career.

Michael Razer
Ward, Arkansas

Hugues Canuel. *The Fall and Rise of French Sea Power: France's Quest for an Independent Naval Policy, 1940–1963*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, www.usni.org, 2021. xiv+344 pp., illustrations, map, tables. US \$54.95, UK £49.95, cloth; ISBN 978-1-6824-7616-1.

This rather unique volume is another welcome contribution to the already-published books in the excellent series from the United States Naval Institute Press entitled Studies in Naval History and Sea Power. Historian Hugues Canuel has not written a traditional naval history of the years from 1940–1963; instead, he examines French naval thinking and strategy – and its leading personalities – against the backdrop of the enormous historic challenges to French naval power in the mid-twentieth century. The book opens with the crushing defeat of France in the Second World War and the collapse of its naval power worldwide. The book concludes with the remarkable build-back of the French navy and the nation's return to the ranks of the world's naval powers.

With the German military victory in France in 1940, the French navy (*Marine nationale*) was divided between the officially neutral Vichy regime and Charles de Gaulle's Free French forces exiled in London. The author examines in great detail the conflicts and events of this French naval civil war, as well as the challenges France faced in its relationships with the United States

and Great Britain. The Allies, especially the United States, were forced to walk a difficult line between the rival French loyalties before the D-Day invasion in June 1944 and the subsequent collapse of the Vichy government just two months later. The author contends that the Free French forces under de Gaulle spent more time and energy on politics than it did on military matters, frustrating the Allies, who wished de Gaulle would focus more on a military win against the Germans. Canuel notes that De Gaulle's haughty manners and self-aggrandizement did little to build relationships, while trust was further eroded by Allied concerns about security links among the Free French forces.

The Fall and Rise of French Sea Power gives extensive coverage to the conflicts in the French colonial empire between the Vichy forces and the Free French supporters. With the Allies landing troops in French North Africa in November 1942 as part of Operation Torch, North Africa became the locus of the conflict – and the site of the last armed naval clashes between the US and Vichy forces. Marshal Henri-Philippe Pétain and the Vichy regime he headed were rapidly moving toward a pro-German position, but Vichy France did not survive the war.

Though France was on the victorious side with the German surrender in 1945, its naval power lay in ruins, and its hold on its colonies severely diminished. French military strategists warily eyed a powerful, Cold War Soviet Union, which had defeated the Germans and occupied Eastern Europe. In order to restore its naval power, France had to rely on extensive aid from the United States (via the Marshall Plan) and a weakened Great Britain. In addition, French politics were in continual turmoil, demonstrated by its frequent change of governments – 21 adminis-

trations over the 12 years of the French Fourth Republic (1946–1958). Despite the political instability and disputes about its claim to be a world power, the Republic of France became a founding member of the NATO alliance in 1949.

France's naval prowess was still struggling in 1956 during the Suez Crisis, which Canuel views as a milestone for French admirals and politicians. For all the world to see, French naval forces lacked the ability to conduct a large-scale operation. In the face of strong US opposition to fighting in Egypt and British withdrawal of its troops and ships, France had no choice but to step down from its engagement in Egypt. The ignominy was not lost on Charles de Gaulle. A major turning point for France and its navy came in 1958 when de Gaulle returned to political leadership, serving for seven months as prime minister followed by a decade as France's president (1959–1969). His strong ideas for a path forward for post-war France included plans to rebuild the country's naval power independent of its "Anglo-Saxon" wartime allies, even though France would continue to depend on their material and political support.

De Gaulle accelerated France's relief from its most pressing colonial issue, Algeria, with a French withdrawal of its forces in 1962. With de Gaulle's determination to restore French naval power, Canuel credits him and other senior commanders with modifying the traditional geopolitical French desire to be a great land power *and* naval power concurrently. The change was significant, and brought France more in line with the long-held strategy of Great Britain, which, as an island nation, aspired to be a strong naval and maritime power.

One reason for De Gaulle's success was his decision to take France nucle-

ar as the post-war economy slowly recovered. This decision, in the author's opinion, made the navy France's most potent military service, in part by taking her nuclear weapons to sea. Developing an independent nuclear deterrent made France a nuclear power, putting the country in the same company with the United States and Great Britain, as well as the Soviet Union. The rebirth of French naval power coincided with its evolution into a blue-water navy, equipped with nuclear weapons. As a result of this evolution, De Gaulle emerges as a key figure in the book and receives the major recognition for restoring the navy – and the public's pride in France.

While not for the general reader, the book provides a compelling and detailed account of the changing fortunes of French naval power over the years 1940-1963 – a very troubled period in France's history – from a political, diplomatic, and strategic vantage. The story is complex and its detail is well-supported with thorough research.

Hugues Canuel holds a doctorate in war studies from the Royal Military College of Canada and has served as a Canadian defence attaché. The book's bibliography is current, with a section of extensive notes for each chapter. *The Fall and Rise of French Sea Power* provides a much-needed contribution to the non-French reading historical community and a welcome addition to twentieth-century naval and maritime historiography.

W. Mark Hamilton
Alexandria, Virginia

Lars Cleander. *How Carriers Fought: Carrier Operations in World War II*. Oxford, UK: Casemate Publishers, www.casematepublishers.com, 2020. 296 pp., illustrations, tables, appendix,

notes, bibliography, index. US \$22.95, UK £14.00, paper; ISBN 978-1-61200-853-0.

This work is a 2020 paperback reprinting of author Lars Cleander's 2018 examination into the mechanics of aircraft carrier engagements during the Second World War. Cleander, a former Navy systems engineer, analyzes the design and implementation of all aspects of carriers used during the war, covering available "tools" and tactics, their effectiveness and use in battles, as well as a breakdown of the Pacific Theater carrier battles of the war. While offering information on American, Japanese, British, and even German Luftwaffe forces, this work naturally focuses on the first two as the primary adversaries of the Pacific carrier war. Cleander approaches the subject from the viewpoint of a technician or logistician, rather than a historian, offering an interesting take on one of the defining naval aspects of the Second World War.

The book is divided into three parts: an examination of the technical and logistical components of carrier operations; an examination of the major wartime engagements; and a comparative analysis that includes coverage of what if scenarios regarding changes in various aspects of carrier design and deployment through the benefits of modern hindsight. Cleander describes this overall flow as covering a carrier's "tools," their combat usage, and how well they were employed (xiii). Part I is subdivided into nine sections which address the types of equipment, training, and tactics employed by the various navies from navigation and aircraft models through the attack patterns and defensive responses. The technological limits of the time are addressed throughout, such as the early American use of signal frequency radios resulting