Due to the publicity surrounding U-505, Roskill wrote The Secret Capture to tell the world that there had been many other captures of enemy submarines before U-505’s capture. The first chapter of Roskill’s book relates the capture of ships throughout the ages and the second chapter shows that the Royal Navy and its allies captured many enemy submarines throughout the Second World War – although none survived to be put on display.

Roskill’s book is a fine account of a battle which helped the Royal Navy at a critical time. It is recommended.

Robert L. Shoop
Colorado Springs, Colorado


A Carrier at Risk is the fourteenth installment and first part of Sciaroni’s contribution to the Latin America @ War Series that covers Argentine anti-submarine (ASW) operations in the Falklands/Malvinas War. This was the lesser-known hot war fought between Argentina and the United Kingdom at the height of the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union. In response to what the Argentine military junta thought would be a fait accompli (an irreversible action or done deal) by invading the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the United Kingdom countered with the largest naval task force seen since the Second World War. This brief, fierce war that pitted two countries with western technology and tactics against each other has been studied in depth by allies and adversaries alike. While much has been written about the amphibious operations, air attacks, and of course, the infamous attacks on both the Royal Navy destroyer, HMS Sheffield, and Argentine battle cruiser, ARA General Belgrano, little has been revealed about how the Argentine Navy conducted antisubmarine warfare, until now.

This book covers the harrowing tale of how Argentine antisubmarine aircraft and helicopters protected their carrier, the ARA 25 de Mayo from Royal Navy submarines in a deadly game of cat and mouse. Historians argue that after the Royal Navy sunk the General Belgrano, Argentina immediately withdrew all her naval forces out of fear to preserve a “fleet-in-being” concept to maintain regional credible deterrence. Sciaroni, however, offers a different narrative. He suggests that the 25 de Mayo, Argentina’s sole aircraft carrier, did not immediately withdraw; rather, she and her escorts continued their hunt for the Royal Navy submarine force.

Using British and Argentine archives, Sciaroni paints a full picture of Argentina’s anti-submarine operations in the days leading up to the sinking of General Belgrano and after. Using old S-2E Trackers and H-3 Sea King helicopters with antiquated acoustic processors and tactics, the ASW squadrons protected 25 de Mayo against the five British nuclear submarines and a single diesel submarine patrolling the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. Sciaroni juxtaposes the Argentine ASW assets against American ASW assets in order to show how the Argentines succeeded in the Herculean task of protecting their sole carrier. A typical US Carrier Battle Group ASW response would have been comprised of squadrons of ASW helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, five to eight escort frigates and destroyers, one to two nuclear submarines, and the...
assistance of overhead satellites. The Argentine Navy had just three destroyers, two anti-submarine helicopters, and two functional S-2E trackers. To make matters worse, the Argentine carrier and surface task force could only run at 20 knots due to defunct steam propulsion plants, whereas the British nuclear submarines could sustain 30 knots underwater. The fact that 25 de Mayo did not meet the same fate as General Belgrano in the midst of waters infested with British submarines is a testament to their methods and tactics that worked in spite of the odds.

For those unfamiliar with ASW operations or tactics, Sciaroni explains the basics in laymen’s terms and then explicitly describes the equipment, aircraft, and capabilities used. After stating the capabilities and limitations of the platforms, he carefully reconstructs a day-by-day account of the carrier’s ASW operations from 3 May 1982 until finally returning to territorial waters six days later. He concludes that 25 de Mayo returned home safely because the British submarines, in fact, were unable to sink the carrier, as opposed to their choosing not to sink it.

When describing what occurred, Sciaroni correlates material from British and Argentinian archives with first-hand accounts of the action. He even retrieved records related to HMS Splendid, a Royal Navy submarine, that mistakenly stalked the Argentine cargo ship ELMA Formosa thinking it was 25 de Mayo. Although not a part of the Argentine ASW effort, examples like this capture the sense of the “fog of war” that covered the two nations battling at sea. The secretive nature of antisubmarine warfare sometimes begets more questions than it answers. For example, in an effort to learn more about their western adversaries, the Soviets would fly their Tu-95 Bear bomber over the Royal Navy task force to gather intelligence – but beyond this interaction, a “ghost contact” gained by the Argentines would continue to fuel further questions and speculations of “who” and “what” it was when compared against Royal Navy and Argentine Navy archives.

*A Carrier at Risk* is an objective look at Argentine ASW operations. Grounded in fact with minimal conjecture, Sciaroni captures the complexities of ASW without becoming too technical. While only 72 pages long, the book is filled with information not found elsewhere. The Falklands/Malvinas War continues to be a veritable goldmine of lessons to apply to future warfare, especially for ASW operations. This book is a rich resource that covers the triumphs and failures of both the Argentine and Royal Navies.

Dylan Phillips-Levine
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This is a reprint of Smith’s 2006 study on the decision-making processes of commanding officers during the five carrier battles of the Second World War in the Pacific Theatre. Six central chapters focus on the engagements from a primarily American perspective, although Smith includes some of the Japanese rationale as well. Drawing from an impressive array of sources, he aims to illustrate the factors that led to the offensive mindset of American commanders and their ability to make quick and effective decisions in combat situations. Maps and diagrams used throughout the work chart the movements of both sur-