This event is well described as are the subsequent peace negotiations, and the bitter disputes between Wemyss and British Prime Minister Lloyd George (Wemyss openly despised most Allied politicians) and US Admiral William Benson regarding the disposal of the German fleet then interned at Scapa Flow. Germany actually did the British a great service by scuttling their capital ships at Scapa Flow on 21 June 1919, as it defused what could have been a difficult situation between the Allies. The citing of Wemyss as the “creator of Armistice Day” negates the role played by many others in the November 1918 negotiations and the first Armistice commemoration was not until 11 November 1919, by which time Wemyss had retired.

“Rosy” Wemyss relinquished his position as First Sea Lord in late 1919 following more bitter in-fighting within the upper echelons in the Royal Navy, and British politicians, which saw Admiral Sir David Beatty, who had commanded the battlecruiser squadrons at Jutland, appointed as First Sea Lord. Wemyss then retired quietly to France, with his wife and daughter, where he died in 1933. Wemyss appears to have been popular within the Royal Navy, but descriptions of a “dark side” detailed in other sources are conveniently omitted or glossed over in this biography.

_Rosy Wemyss, Admiral of the Fleet_ is still a good read and his contribution to the Royal Navy, the successful prosecution of the 1914-18 war and its conclusion, via the Armistice, is note-worthy. Johnson-Allen’s biography of Wemyss is a heavily, positively biased piece but the true story of this quite interesting admiral has yet to be written.

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This work is a sequel to Jordan’s 2011 _Warships After Washington_ and continues his analysis of the building and modernization programs carried out by the world’s five major navies during the second half of the Treaty Era. Building upon his previous work and utilizing the same style for continuity, Jordan examines the six main types of vessels affected by the London Treaty’s design limitations. Each nation’s rationale and design process is well covered, showcasing the advancement of technology, the reactionary elements to foreign design, and the comparative results. Standardized charts, simplified blueprints, and photographs are located throughout for increased understanding, bolstered by an acronym and abbreviation glossary and unit conversion tables. A
postscript on the failed 1936 treaty, an appendix transcribing the 1930 treaty, endnotes, bibliography, and an index compliment Jordan’s analysis to round out the text.

The book begins with an introductory examination of the 1930 London Treaty, the participant nations, and the implications of its acceptance (or in the case of France and Italy, partial acceptance) on the existing and planned vessels of each country. To avoid retreading his earlier examination, the ramifications of the Washington Treaty are briefly spoken of when necessary, with parenthetical references to relevant chapters in Warships After Washington placed where readers may desire a more detailed analysis. This is followed by the core six chapters of his work, essentially self-contained studies on Capital Ships, Aircraft Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers, Submarines, and Small Combatant and Auxiliary Vessels of the London Treaty Era.

Each section follows a pattern of brief introduction to the constraints and patterns imposed by the treaty before delving into each nation’s resultant actions. This usually consists of initial ship designs by the countries, with reactionary actions discussed in chronologically placed subsections. The delicate balancing act of creating effective designs within the bounds of allowed tonnage and stipulations is thoroughly covered, to include proposed designs that were ultimately rejected such as America’s plans for a sub-category (b) Flying Deck Cruiser (135-138). Funding is often exposed as the general limiter of each nation’s ambitions, with additional constraints unique to each nation coming into play. The two-ocean nature of America’s navy saw vessel beam and displacement additionally constrained by the width of the Panama Canal, while tensions between France and Italy centered around the former’s “perceived need to police … overseas territories” leading to both a refusal to accept full parity and a miniature naval arms race (264).

Technological advancement is often touched upon within the work, as its evolution greatly affected vessel design and rebuilding. The section on battleship modernization is particularly impressive in this regard, showing how reduced numbers of more modern propulsion systems could result in faster, more efficient ships all while freeing tonnage for increased armour and armament. The dangers of trying to fit too much armour, armament, and equipment on too small a hull are also made clear, as some of the built designs were clearly “over-gunned and overweight” (185). This was particularly true for the interwar destroyers of America and Japan, where disproportionately heavy armament on small hulls led not only to gross over-tonnage, but structural weakness as well.

Each chapter contains its own conclusions subsection, where Jordan analyzes the overall logic and goal of the chapter’s ship designs, with discussion of their eventual practicality and evolution under the treaty-free
restraints of the Second World War. His postscript acts as a conclusion to the era, examining the world events that put a strain on the treaty system, and its eventual collapse with America’s March 1937 invocation of the escalator clause against Japan and the June 1938 raising of battleship displacements by Britain and France (290). Jordan’s well-reasoned arguments and insights paint a clear picture throughout the work of ship design, counter-design, and the strains of diplomatic planning verses technological reality.

There are one or two typos in the work, which are negligible in nature. Jordan has provided an excellent examination of the interwar naval vessels of Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. His concise, easy-to-read style and subdivision of the work into vessel types has created a convenient comparative study for those interested in ship design, interwar international agreements, and treaty vessels’ service before or during the Second World War. His efforts to standardize profile drawings and data have created a greater level of accessibility for foreign designs than previously available, making *Warships after London* a welcome addition to the historiography of international naval ship design.

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Over the last twenty or so years the progressive improvement in the quality and clarity of published colour photograph reproduction has led to a plethora of books show-casing the prized holdings of various museums around the world. This has embraced not only an astonishing variety of subjects, but has also included (most gratifyingly for a nautically-minded audience) generous samplings of the ship model collections of many maritime museums (including the Glasgow Museum, the National Maritime Museum, and the Musée de la Marine, to name but a few). There are also a number of books featuring the ship model collections of private collectors (the Thompson Collection of the Art Gallery of Ontario, the Rodgers Collection of Dockyard Models at the US Naval Academy Museum (2 volumes), and the Kriegstein Collection, the subject of the current review).

This book is notable in that, while most of its ilk are penned by professional curatorial staff, this one is written by the collectors themselves, Arnold and Henry Kriegstein, identical twins (and doctors, both) with a synchronized