to be minor errata. For example, Stavros Niarchos’ ship, SS Bayou, was sunk by U-129 on 28 February 1942, not “in” the Caribbean as stated, but rather over 400 nautical miles east-southeast of Trinidad. Chairman Deng Xiaoping’s name had a letter omitted, with condolences for the typesetter. Inevitably coverage of the lives and careers of Niarchos and Onassis have a bit of overlap – they did both marry Tina Livanos and they did both profit from the 1956 Suez Canal closure.

The text is highly informed, buttressed by solid, innovative, and original research from primary source material. The analysis is based on extensive, first-hand executive shipping and travel experience. Neither “sea stories” nor “data displays,” Giants of the Seas is a well-cogitated and surprisingly humanistic, descriptive, and readable account. This is the product of the very global, globalized, interdependent and financially and electronically complex world that the shipping industry helped create.

One of McCown’s points is that shipping seeks efficiencies; it always has, and the men and women who allow and encourage those efficiencies will sail furthest over ruffled seas. “Despite playing a more central role in economies than ever before, ironically [the shipping industry] has receded from public view, and is now a largely invisible network to the public.” Shipping has often been opaque, and through history this was often intentional, so perhaps it only has itself to blame if not everyone recognizes its contribution.

John McCown founded Blue Alpha Capital in 2015 and is an expert on the container shipping industry. He is primarily focused on developing entrepreneurial opportunities in maritime space, including a Jones Act turbine installation vessel and a digital product for container shippers. He worked with the father of the container ship, Malcom McLean, for whom he served as executor. He also co-founded and took public an integrated US flag shipping/trucking company and led shipping and transportation investments at a $20 billion hedge fund. John is an inventor with two patents and an MBA from Harvard University; he graduated from Marion Military Institute and LSU.

Eric Wiberg
Boston, Massachusetts


Eminent historian N.A.M. Roger recently noted that Atlantic history too often contains “a hole in the middle” (The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World, 71). Most Atlantic history leaves out the ocean itself, Roger contends, a
The paradoxical state of affairs given that the emergence of an Atlantic world would never have happened without ships, seafarers, and key nautical tools. Alida Metcalf, a professor of history at Rice University, shares Roger’s underlying sentiment and has crafted a short, informative book that helps fill this hole. She does so by exploring the moment in time when map and chartmakers conceptualized the idea of an Atlantic world.

Historians have never arrived at a consensus as to when, precisely, Europeans formulated the concept of an Atlantic world. Some scholars place the emergence of the idea in the mid-fifteenth century, others date its origins to 1492, and still others claim that Europeans failed to see the Atlantic world as an integrated space until the mid-to-late-sixteenth century. Metcalf boldly enters this historiographic debate, positing that the notion of an Atlantic world emerged in the first decade of the sixteenth century. She argues that influential charts and maps made during that decade moved the Atlantic Ocean from the periphery to the centre, thereby creating a new way of seeing the world. Chartmakers and their brethren portrayed the Atlantic not just as a geographic entity, but also as a navigable space that invited exploration, trade, and colonization.

Metcalf’s foray into debates surrounding the intellectual origins of the Atlantic world is complemented by engagement with a second historiographic tradition, that of historical cartography. Metcalf embraces both internalist and contextualist approaches to the historical study of maps and charts, focusing not only the details of individual pieces but also on the political and cultural messages contained within them. Borrowing ideas from the field of persuasive cartography, she argues that the charts and maps made after 1500 portrayed the possibilities of an interconnected Atlantic Ocean. The message these visual artifacts conveyed was that of an Atlantic world in which accessible, exotic lands offered plentiful opportunities to those willing to take advantage of them.

*Mapping an Atlantic World* is organized into three chapter pairs situated between a succinct introduction and a thought-provoking conclusion. The first chapter pair looks at depictions of the Atlantic Ocean in *mappaemundi* from before and immediately after 1500. Those created in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, such as the Catalan Atlas (1375) and the Fra Mauro map (ca. 1450), place the Atlantic on the world’s periphery. Depictions of the Atlantic changed dramatically around 1500, when Castilian navigator Juan de la Cosa returned from his third transatlantic voyage and produced a world map. La Cosa’s *Carta Universal* (ca. 1500) was followed by the Cantini planisphere (1502) and Nicolay de Caverio’s *Planisphere nautique* (ca. 1506). Contemporaneous with these manuscript charts were printed *mappaemundi*, notably the Contarini-Roselli map (1506) and *Universalis Cosmographia* (1507) of Martin
Metcalf’s second chapter pair explores the chartmakers and printers who brought the Atlantic to the forefront of European cosmography. By analyzing extant charts, as well as key mid-sixteenth century texts penned by Pedro Nunes, Alonzo de Chaves, and Martin Cortés, Metcalf reveals how chartmakers drew on the heritage of portolan charts to emphasize the navigability of the Atlantic. Yet manuscript charts, for all their beauty, had relatively small circles of viewers. This situation changed with the emergence of the printed map, which became ubiquitous in Europe over the course of the sixteenth century. Metcalf devotes much ink to one map in particular, the Universalis Cosmographia, which was accompanied by a book and small globe. She argues that Martin Waldseemüller and his collaborators – a group that included artists, printers, and other humanist scholars – wanted Europeans to contemplate more intently the new “Fourth Part of the World.” In creating methods for so doing, these individuals helped transform how Europeans both visualized and perceived the world.

The book’s final chapter pair examines three of the visual images adopted by map and chartmakers to symbolize the New World: parrots, trees, and scenes of cannibalism. Parrots were “exotic animals … glamorous and astonishing to Europeans” (96), while trees highlighted the commercial potential of the Americas. According to Metcalf, parrots and trees rapidly became accepted visual codes for the New World, inviting viewers to contemplate a novel and distinctive place. Scenes of cannibalism were less prevalent, but important nonetheless. The first such scene appeared on a manuscript chart produced between 1502 and 1506, but not on a printed mappamundi until 1516. Images of cannibalism supported written accounts of anthropophagous practices in the New World, helping to justify European efforts to claim and civilize the Americas.

Metcalf concludes her book by considering the importance of ephemera in the practice of history. Relatively few mappaemundi have survived, in large part because they were discarded as new information became available, and their ephemeral nature tends to obscure the historical significance of these artifacts. Such an oversight would be a mistake, says Metcalf, who argues that the influence of medieval and early modern charts and maps of the Atlantic was both profound and long lasting. Through vivid artistry and recurring tropes, imagery presented in this genre of ephemera became part of Europe’s broader socio-cultural milieu. Map and chartmakers left their imprint on history by creating a new way of seeing the world, one that portrayed “transatlantic connections, interactions, and exchanges” as “not only possible but desirable”
(142). Well-illustrated throughout, *Mapping an Atlantic World* is a welcome addition to the scholarly literature on the emergence of an Atlantic world.

Timothy S. Wolters
Ames, Iowa


In this brilliant work, Naomi Oreskes carefully assesses how American naval funding in the Second World War and Cold War influenced oceanography as a science. During this period, the blossoming field of oceanography became essential to North American defence. The United States Navy (USN) funded and supported research of the world’s oceans, fueling major scientific re-interpretations of vast amounts of data, often gathered by naval warships or by research vessels supported by naval funds. Yet, as the author points out, at times, naval priorities conflicted with purely scientific goals, impeding creativity and sharing. Such impediments led to at least one maritime disaster. Oreskes carefully examines the diverse positive and negative effects of defence funding, sometimes within an international context, but mostly focused squarely upon the American picture.

As she notes in her conclusion, some people might be tempted to dismiss assorted oceanographic conflicts as “personal or sociological, but they had epistemic consequences.” (469). Despite that conclusion, she does not ignore the personal, national, sociological, economic, philosophical, and other factors in her disciplined analysis. For example, she opens her book by demonstrating how personal animosity masqueraded as security concerns in bitter attacks against Norwegian oceanographer Harold Sverdrup during the Second World War, effectively preventing him from contributing to American breakthroughs in defence-related oceanographic research during that conflict and resulting in his post-war decision to return to Norway. That episode and others are based upon thorough documentation, a careful weighing of alternative explanations, and a demonstration of the interplay of complicated factors.

Her research includes consideration of the long battle to establish the theory of continental drifts, the extended debates over how data supported that and other theories, and how naval funding, security concerns, nationalism, fear of ridicule, organizational rivalries, and personalities affected the analysis of new data emerging from early Cold War oceanographic research. These are complex matters. Oreskes includes the philosophy of science, the science itself, and some modelling methodologies; it was sometimes difficult for a non-