

a person knowledgeable about the Chesapeake Bay Campaign and the British assault on Cumberland Island. The authors could have drawn attention to Barrie's significant role in receiving and then encouraging Blacks, enslaved in America, to obtain their freedom by fleeing to the British ships-of-war. Bingeman et al. overlook the point that Barrie thought he received command of the *Dragon* (intended as the flagship for the Leeward Islands station) because of a possible misdealing with a dozen American prizes he caught off the Strait of Gibraltar at the start of the War of 1812. The Gibraltar prize court freed the vessels (denying Barrie a good deal of prize money), a decision overturned upon appeal, after the ships had left.

The third chapter for Barrie is a mere two pages covering his time posted to the Royal Naval Establishment on the Great Lakes, 1817 through 1834, and his final years in England. Given the extensive details provided for his early life, it seems a bit of a missed opportunity, given that the information exists for this time in equal, if not more accessible documents.

The numerous illustrations are essential to the authors' explanation of the recovered artifacts. Various maps plot the location of shipwreck fragments and the underwater terrain, all very helpful in comprehending some of the challenges faced by the divers, and the intermingled dispersal of the wreckage. The three appendices contain the brief court martial for *Assurance*, Barrie's report of the loss of *Pomone*, and the court martial for this loss.

This book ought to appeal across a wide spectrum of interests, from underwater archeology, to ship wrecks, through the early stages of a single officer's naval career. It offers information and insights for both the professional and novice in these areas.

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Jorge Boveda. *All for One, One for All: Argentine Navy Operations during the Falklands/Malvinas War*. London, UK: Helion & Co, [www.helion.co.uk](http://www.helion.co.uk), 2021. 88 pp., illustrations, maps, tables, bibliography, index. UK £14.95, US \$24.68, paper; ISBN 978-1-91405-919-3.

The Falklands War of 1982 was the first post-Second World War conflict fought between near-peer defence forces in the missile age. Casualties on both sides were high and the British Task Force commander, Rear Admiral John 'Sandy' Woodward, later stated it was "a lot closer run than many would care to believe."

Jorge Boveda has done a very good job in describing and analysing the Argentine naval operations during this short but bloody conflict. This book is part of the Latin America War series that examines various conflicts in Central

and South America during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Boveda based this work on his Master's thesis – through his naval-officer father he was able to access many former senior Argentine naval officers to gain their thoughts and recollections of the conflict. The Falkland Islands had been British territory since 1833 but Spain had claimed them prior to this, as the *Islas Malvinas*, and in turn Argentina inherited this claim.

The Argentine Navy was completely unprepared for the conflict in 1982 which was imposed on the country by the ruling military junta. In many cases, senior naval officers were only informed of the impending seizure of the Falklands a few weeks before the event occurred. Most of the navy's ships were elderly vessels (some dating back to the Second World War) and in a poor materiel condition due to defence budget cuts. The Argentine fleet air arm aircraft were aged as well and spare parts were scarce. New ships, aircraft, and weapons were being procured but were still in build or, as in the case of the Super Étendard aircraft and Exocet missiles from France, in the initial delivery phase. A conflict with Chile over territorial issues was always expected but an invasion of the Falklands was literally beyond belief for the average Argentine naval officer – particularly as many had been trained by the Royal Navy and their newest ships were 1970s vintage British-sourced Type 42 destroyers.

To make matters worse, the three Argentine services were far from joint: they operated within their own stove-piped commands and frequently competed for the limited funding available to defence. Planning for the invasion was undertaken at the highest political level from late 1981 and much was based upon flawed diplomatic intelligence suggesting Great Britain would not act to recover the Falklands. That said, Britain had sent subtle messages that the Falklands was of minor concern and was intending to remove the Antarctic patrol vessel, HMS *Endurance*, reduce the size of the Royal Marine garrison at Port Stanley, and remove the scientific staff on South Georgia. The impending sale of the aircraft carrier HMS *Invincible* to Australia and the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier HMS *Hermes* all sent a signal to the Argentines that April 1982 was the time to strike. A short victorious war to recover the Malvinas from Britain would take the minds of the average Argentine off the poor economy and the excesses of the ruling Junta.

The British government's reaction to the invasion and the rapid dispatch of a task force to the South Atlantic, took the Argentine Junta by surprise. Suddenly, they were faced with fighting a world-class defence force with modern weaponry. The Argentine Navy suffered initial losses with the light cruiser *General Belgrano* sunk by the submarine HMS *Conqueror* and the submarine *Sante Fe* badly damaged and abandoned at South Georgia. At least four Argentine merchant ships were lost in the conflict as well; however, the British forces did not get off lightly. Although the Argentine aircraft carrier *Veinticinco de Mayo* spent most of the war in port (as part of the fleet-in-being

concept) the Argentine Fleet Air Arm A4 Skyhawk's and Super Étendards conducted audacious low-level attacks, sinking the Type 42 destroyer HMS *Sheffield*, the frigate HMS *Ardent*, and the cargo vessel *Atlantic Conveyor*.

These attacks were pressed home with skill and determination by well-trained pilots and had the Argentine Navy possessed more serviceable aircraft and weapons, the British ship losses would have been more severe. The Argentine Air Force A4's also sank and damaged a number of British warships. Overall, the Argentine aircrew (and their ground crews working around the clock to get aircraft serviceable for the next day's sorties) inflicted losses on the British Task Force that were close to being unsustainable. Had the Argentines possessed more Exocet missiles and been able to potentially launch their fighter bombers from their aircraft carrier closer to the Falklands (thus giving them more time over the islands and being able to reach the British carriers operating well to the east), then the outcome of the war may have been different – hence the close run comment by Woodward.

Additionally, the Argentine Navy displayed an ability to think outside the box. Since they operated British Type 42 destroyers they knew the flaws in that type of weapons systems and exploited these during the sinking of *Sheffield*. They also took an Exocet launcher from one of their ships and secretly transported it to the Falklands where, after much trial and error, they created a land-based Exocet launcher which was used to attack the destroyer HMS *Glamorgan*, badly damaging it. British post-war performance analysis of their naval forces was scathing and many officers were chastised for the loss of their ships, with some deemed negligent for seriously under-estimating their enemy. (See *Abandon Ship – The real story of the sinking's in the Falklands War* by Paul Brown reviewed in *The Northern Mariner* 31, no. 3 (Fall 2021).

The language used throughout (translated from Spanish to English) is a little clunky at times and some aspects of the conflict are glossed over, such as the initial amphibious landings at the Falklands using Argentine landing ships and the South Georgia operations. Excellent photographs and diagrams/drawing detail Argentine Navy capability, but there is some padding up front detailing the creation and ethos of the Argentine Navy in the nineteenth century and its pre-Falklands War history. That said, readers with a limited knowledge of the Argentine side of the Falklands War should use this as a primer to gain a better awareness of the conflict. My final takeaway is never under-estimate your enemy. The Argentine Navy (and Air Force), despite limited and outdated equipment, exacted a heavy toll on the British Task Force and increased the British effort and personnel casualties incurred to liberate the Falklands.

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